Please re-write this for clarity.
The regulators should only test for false negatives, where the car should have stopped, but did not detect the obstacle (false negative), because there, it is a clear threat to safety, and the car company's incentive, while definitely still present, is less pure, as the amount of false negatives is a direct trade off with the quantity of false positives (because it is a treshold: a minimum confidence level from which you decide that there is indeed something in front of the car and you need to break), which make driving more awkward for 99% of drivers
1. Regulators want aggressive breaking but carmakers want smoother driving
2. Manually tuning all the edge cases for cases where the software is uncertain what's happening will lead to fragile monolith black boxes
These kind of tradeoffs were things every self-driving car software developer KNEW they were going to have to deal with - the most extreme being the one where the software has to decide who to kill and who to save:
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-drive/culture/technolo...
You misunderstood. The Uber software had sole control of the brakes (plus the human of course). The Volvo factory system was disabled so that it didn’t have negative interaction with the Uber system.
Your mistake is understandable. The article was poorly written, perhaps due to a rush to publish, as is the norm these days. Even if the NTSB report was unclear, that doesn’t excuse clumsy reporting.
If you’ve ever done significant mileage in a car with an emergency braking system you probably have experienced seemingly random braking events. The systems favor false positives over false negatives.
> At 1.3 seconds before impact, the self-driving system determined [...]
Unless this is exceptionally poorly worded, it certainly sounds like self-driving system was the one doing the determination.
This isn't horseshoes, as the old saying goes. I unapologetically have a high bar here.
The charitable interpretation of this is that the industry believes that self-driving AI is a safety feature of greater quality than, say, lane assist or auto-breaking.
The less charitable one is that they find it too much work to integrate their AI to other safety systems. Which, to be fair, is really going to be a lot of extra work, on top of developping self-driving.
That's not how I read it, or how any of the journalists who are reporting the story are reading it. Uber disabled the self driving software's ability to do an emergency stop when it detected it was going to crash. The Volvo system is separate and also was disabled when the car was in self driving mode.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-24/uber-self...
>Sensors on an Uber SUV being tested in Tempe detected the woman, who was crossing a street at night outside a crosswalk, eventually concluding “an emergency braking maneuver was needed to mitigate a collision,” the National Transportation Safety Board said in a preliminary report released Thursday.
>But the system couldn’t activate the brakes, the NTSB said.
That's the only reading that makes sense to me, otherwise why did the car fail to attempt to stop when it detected the pedestrian and knew it was going to hit them?
"At 1.3 seconds before impact, the self-driving system determined that an emergency braking maneuver was needed to mitigate a collision (see figure 2). According to Uber, emergency braking maneuvers are not enabled while the vehicle is under computer control, to reduce the potential for erratic vehicle behavior."
I believe you are the one who has misunderstood.
"emergency braking maneuvers" refers to an additional automated (software) system for automatically applying the brakes in an emergency (that's detected by that additional system).
>2 In Uber’s self-driving system, an emergency brake maneuver refers to a deceleration greater than 6.5 meters per second squared (m/s^2).
So, Uber's self-driving system has command to brake normally, but it cannot "slam" the brakes. The other system from Volvo's is deactivated when Uber's is working and cannot brake at all. Thus, since Volvo's is deactivated and Uber's won't brake if it judges that a deceleration of >6.5 m/s^2 is needed, it turns out that in automated mode, the car actually lacks the ability to trigger emergency braking at all, hoping instead that the driver will somehow notice. But in a sadistic twist, no warning is given to the driver at any moment that they need to slam the brakes.
However, if the safety driver was trained to brake immediately upon warnings it could have worked quite well. But that would negate the removal of e-brake actuation.....
The NTSB report is pretty unclear, I had to re-read it several times and I think you're correct that the "emergency braking maneuvers" they refer to are the Volvo ones. It's strange though that they word it as
> At 1.3 seconds before impact, the self-driving system determined that an emergency braking maneuver was needed to mitigate a collision
Is the Uber self-driving system able to interact with the Volvo system? Or are they calling the Volvo safety features a second "self-driving system"? And what were the steps, Uber realizes it needs an emergency braking maneuver and sends a signal to the Volvo system which then responds with "I'm disabled" ?
I understand why the Volvo features may be disabled, but it's alarming that the self-driving system made no attempt to brake at all when it was fully "aware" it would hit someone.
The report does mention the Volvo braking features by name a few paragraphs earlier though... So I'm still not entirely sure.
If what you said is true, then the vehicle operator would not be relied on to intervene because the Uber self-driving software would apply the brakes. Since the vehicle operator is relied on to intervene, this indicates the Uber self-driving software has its emergency braking disabled.
This is not my experience with VW's 2016-model-year system.
Soemtimes it stops a second or two before I would've. I haven't had any false positives, though.
Nobody disagrees with you and that is explicitly the reason why a human is on board, so I am not sure what you are arguing against.
I think it's very clear that a human driving a normal vehicle is different from a human sitting at the wheel of a self-driving (semi-self-driving?) vehicle. You simply cannot expect a human to remain as engaged and attentive in such a passive situation.
It's baffling to me that they chose to deactivate emergency braking without substituting a driver alert. If the false-positives are so frequent as to render the alert useless (i.e. it's going off all the time and you ignore it) I don't think these vehicles are suitable for on-road testing.
You can lean fairly heavily on the 'still dangerous, but better' argument in the face of 40,000 US vehicle fatalities each year, but there are limits.
It seems that Uber wasn't actually verifying that, though.
That sounds like a terrible idea.
Independently-working override-capable systems are the base of engineering redundancy safety. See airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS), which will automatically and forcefully steer an aircraft to avoid a collision if necessary: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airborne_collision_avoidance_s...
If any of the systems are vulnerable to any such false positives, and equipped to enable emergency braking to avoid them, even on the highway, it's not hard to imagine why they might be disabled, especially during testing phases.
I think it's fair to say that at this early stage in product development, there's probably no 'always right' answer for how to handle a given obstacle without considering locality, driving speed, road conditions, likelihood of false positives and negatives, etc.
Hey there's an idea for Uber, maybe instead of disabling the forward collision system entirely they could just decrease the sensitivity to lessen false positives (like in our Jeeps)?
Instructions from TCAS are near absolute in their priority. If ATC says to do something different, you ignore ATC and do what TCAS says. If the pilot in command says to do something different, you ignore the pilot in command and do what TCAS says. If somehow God Himself is on your plane and tells you to do something different, you ignore Him and do what TCAS says. Compliance with TCAS is non-negotiable, and the Überlingen disaster[1] is the bloody example of why it's that way.
Self-driving/autonomous-car systems need to have a similar absolute authority built in. If Uber disabled theirs because of false positives, it's a sign Uber shouldn't be running those cars on public roads.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_%C3%9Cberlingen_mid-air_c...
Redundant safety systems are a great idea, evidently Uber needed more of them, and integrating with the Volvo system might have been a reasonable option. It's silly to suggest that the integration would necessarily have been trivial, though. That's what I'm objecting to.
The above traits aren’t exclusive to Uber’s “engineers”, but are lethal when applied to the engineering of life safety systems.
A lot more than one, that's for sure.
See how that holds up in civil court in front of a jury, or any legislative body Uber might need to convince to allow their operation in a jurisdiction in the future.
“Just think of how many more people we would’ve killed if we didn’t care at all!”
I had thought an audience of developers would "get it," since we deal with fallout from ill-conceived integrations every day, although admittedly in a far less spectacular form than control system engineers.
Unfortunately, the uber hate train has already left the station and there's no slowing it down until the investigation finds (or doesn't) actual evidence of negligence rather than clickbait guesswork by armchair engineers. Too bad.
You do a disservice to the audience by assuming it would be understanding of grossly negligent behavior.
Failures happen, that is to be expected. If you're building self-driving vehicles, you're supposed to be engineering for those failures. Disabling two life safety systems (Volvo's AEB and Uber's own AEB) and relying on a single inattentive human driver? I don't understand how that's understandable or justifiable in any scenario besides a carefully controlled test track.
(Were any Professional Engineers even involved in this? Or was it just a bunch of "software engineers"?)
There is no "guarantee" that uber "engineers"/engineers put more thought into this than "their system is inconvienent, tear it out" or "we don't need their system because ours will be better, tear it out." Nobody can guarantee Uber engineers were not stupendously negligent until the investigation is complete. Anybody who thinks they can guarantee that has an irrational basis for thinking they can provide such a guarantee.
Somehow, it works out.
The point is that so far most (all?) of these computer systems don't have a failure mode where it kills pedestrians, because their scope is very limited.
Same with power steering: it won't steer into a different directorion. You don't have to "fight" with it.
If you can't give your "self-driving software" full access to the brakes because it becomes an "erratic driver" when you do that, you do not have self-driving software. You just have some software that is controlling a car that you know is an inadequate driver. If the self-driving software is not fully capable of replacing the driver in the car you have placed it in, as shipped except for the modifications necessary to be driven by software, you do not have a safe driving system.