A few past lives ago, I used to work on the AIX kernel at IBM. I once spent a few weeks poring through trace data trying to investigate a very mysterious cache-aligned memory corruption induced by a memory stress test. Our trace data was quite comprehensive, and is always turned on due to its very low overhead. It was concerning enough (and took me long enough) that it eventually sucked in the rest of my team to aid in the investigation. None of these other guys were noobs- a couple of them had (at the time) built over 20 years of experience in this system, and in diagnosing similar memory corruption bugs beyond any doubt (many were due to errant DMAs from device drivers). I had too, though for much less than 20 years.

After several full days of team-wide debugging, we had no better explanation based on the available evidence than cosmic rays, or a hardware bug. IBM's POWER processor designers worked across the street from us, so we tried to get them to help- first by asking nicely, then by escalating through management channels.

Their reply was more or less: we've run our gamut of hardware tests for years, and your assertion that it's hardware related is vanishingly unlikely... we don't look into hardware bugs unless you can prove to us beyond a doubt it's hardware related. Cache-aligned memory corruption without any other circumstantial evidence isn't enough.

On a crashed test system sitting in the kernel debugger for several weeks now, there would be no more circumstantial evidence beyond the traces. A corruption like this was never seen again, by all accounts.

If we were right and it was evidence of a hardware failure, this is one way such a problem can go undetected. I hope it was something else, or even a cosmic ray, but we'll never know for sure, I guess.

I understand that someone at Microsoft Research once found a bug in the XB360's memory subsystem by model checking a TLA+ spec of it. The story goes that IBM initially refused to believe the bug report. A few weeks later they admitted that such a bug did indeed exist, had been missed by all their testing and would have resulted in system crashes after about 4 hours use.

Did you by chance see the paper a year back or so outlining that memory errors are more likely to occur near page boundaries? The author's premise was that a lot of 'cosmic rays' are just manufacturing flaws.

I debugged lots of memory corruption errors in my time working on AIX kernel stuff. Most of the ones I got to work on did indeed happen at a page boundary [1]. I think there is a pretty simple reason for this: "pages" are both the logical unit size of memory the kernel's allocator hands out, and the unit size that the hardware is capable of addressing in most cases. Therefore, when something at the kernel level is done incorrectly, it often references someone else's page.

It's also possible for a _byte_ offset to be wrong, and these types of errors need not occur at a page boundary. Useful things to do with a raw memory dump with this kind of corruption (at least in AIX kernel):

- Identify the page containing the corruption, and find all activity concerning the physical frame in the traces.

- Try to reverse engineer the bad data. Often times, there are pointers you can follow. You would have to manually translate the virtual address to physical frames, but that's pretty simple to do, both for user space and kernel space (in our case, it was always in kernel space, which was 64-bit and just used a simple prefix).

From there, you just have to be crafty and thorough in following the breadcrumbs and either identifying the bug in code, or at least who should investigate next.

In my original post, note that the corruption was on a _CPU cache_ boundary (128 bytes in POWER). IIRC, the containing page was allocated and pinned [2] for a longer time than the trace buffer tracked (it's been a few years, though).

[1] To make things fun, AIX and POWER supports multiple page sizes- 4K, 64K, 16MB, 16GB. Hardware also has the ability of promoting / demoting between 4K and 64K for in-use memory... lots of fun :-)

[2] AIX is a pageable kernel. If kernel code can't handle a page fault, it needs to "pin" the memory.

... note that any of this can be really outdated, it's been almost a decade since I was an expert in this stuff :-)

(Edit: formatting... how do you make a pretty bulleted list on HN??)

Pretty cool to read these stories about AIX. It's always been a nice system paired with HW often a couple years ahead of the performance curve, but it certainly became more and more of a sustaining effort after 2001.

Can you provide a citation? I'd like to read it.

Ah, found it: "Cosmic Rays Don't Strike Twice" http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~bianca/papers/ASPLOS2012.pdf

Fantastic paper. Thanks for sharing! Just posted it here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14697744

Shouldn't ECC offer a second form of benchmark on this? If you see transient, cosmic-ray looking errors in ECC, presumably that's much stronger evidence of a hardware bug. Of course, I've also heard it claimed that ECC design and manufacture are held to a higher standard that might hide the issue.

That's precisely what was used to benchmark it.

having often attributed these things to cosmic rays as well, anyone have any actual estimates on how often/likely cosmic rays are to cause errors in desktop-like setups?

had to have been a cosmic ray at least once right?

Cosmic ray errors (called soft errors in the industry) are measured in FIT rate, (failures in time) which is measured in failures per billion device hours. Basically, it's very unlikely to hit a desktop computer, somewhat likely to happen higher in the atmosphere/space, and very likely to happen in a system with hundreds or thousands of processors.

There are some numbers in http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-11/Dinaburg/BH_US_11_Dinabur...

> short loops of less than 64 instructions that use AH, BH, CH or DH registers as well as their corresponding wider register (e.g. RAX, EAX or AX for AH)

This is yet another of the many places where the complexity of the x86 ISA shows up and makes its hardware implementations more complicated: the x86 ISA has instructions which can modify the second-lowest byte of a register, while keeping the rest of the rest of the register unmodified (but AFAIK no instructions which do the same for the third-lowest byte, showing its lack of orthogonality).

For in-order implementations, like the ones which originated the x86 ISA, it's not much of a problem. But for out-of-order implementations, which do register renaming, partial register updates are harder to implement, since the output value depends on both the output of the instruction and the previous value of the register. The simplest implementation would be to make a instruction depending on the new value wait until it's committed to the physical register file or equivalent, and that's probably how it was done for these instructions for these partial registers before Skylake.

For Skylake, they probably optimized partial register writes to these four partial "high" registers (AH, BH, CH, DH), but the optimization was buggy in some hard-to-hit corner case. That corner case probably can only be reached when some part of the out-of-order pipeline is completely full, which is why it needs a short loop (so the decoder is not the bottleneck, AFAIK there's a small u-op cache after the decoder) and two threads in the same core (one thread is probably not enough to use up all the resources of a single core). The microcode fix is probably "just" flipping a few bits to disable that optimization.

And this shows how a ISA is more than just the decoding stage; design decisions can affect every part of the core. In this case, if your ISA does not have partial register updates (usually by always zero-extending or sign-extending when writing to only part of a register, instead of preserving the non-overwritten parts of the previous value), you won't have the extra complexity which led to this bug. AMD partially avoided this when doing the 64-bit extension (a partial write to the lower 32 bits of a register clears the upper 32 bits), but they kept the legacy behavior for writes to the lower 16 bits, or to either of the 8-bit halves of the lower 16 bits.

The loop needs to be short because the loopback buffer is only active in loops of 64 or fewer entries (usually fewer real instructions, something like 40 or so). Moreover, Skylake introduced one loopback buffer per thread, instead of the previous loopback buffer shared between both threads.

My guess is that is where the bug is; the behavior for partial register access stalls---insert one extraneous uop to combine, e.g., ah with rax---is unchanged since Sandy Bridge.

Just as information, the Loop Stream Detector was introduced in Intel Core microarchitectures. With Sandy Bridge, it was 28 μops. It grows to 56 μops (with HT off) with Haswell and Broadwell. It grows again (considerably) with Skylake to 64 μops per thread (HT on or off).

The LSD resides in the BPU (branch prediction unit) and it is basically telling the BPU to stop predicting branches and just stream from the LSD. This saves energy. However, predicting is different than resolving. Branch resolution still happens and when resolution (speculation) fails, the LSD bails out.

In any case, 64 μops is a lot. That's a good sized inner loop.

It's also a problem with SMT[1]. The design cost is pretty small, it's a fairly straightforward extension of what an out of order CPU is already doing. But due to the concurrency issues debugging/verifying it is incredibly difficult.

[1]Simultanious MultiThreading, which is marketed by Intel under the name Hyperthreading when using two threads.

This is an amazing analysis, and seems entirely likely to be right to me. Thanks for writing it up.

You really don't know what you're talking about.

---

     For Skylake, they probably optimized partial register 
     writes to these four partial "high" registers (AH, BH, 
     CH, DH), but the optimization was buggy in some hard-to-
     hit corner case.

They did not do this.

The high registers (AH/BH/DH/CH) are nearly written out of existence with the REX Prefix in 64bit mode. Within the manual(s) it is called out effectively not to use them as they're now emulated and not support directly in hardware.

The 16bit registers (AX/BX/DX/CX) are in worse situation, but it ends up costs additional cycles to even decode these instructions as the main encoder can't handle these instructions and you have to swap to the legacy encoder, and you'll end up losing alignment. This costs ~4-6 cycles, also the perf registers to track were only added in Haswell (and require Ring0 to use [2]).

High Register and 16bit registers are huge wart that it seems Intel is trying desperately hard to get us to stop using.

    That corner case probably can only be reached when some
    part of the out-of-order pipeline is completely full,
    which is why it needs a short loop (so the decoder is not
    the bottleneck, AFAIK there's a small u-op cache after the decoder)

There is a 64uOP cache between the decoder and L1i cache that is called loop stream detector. Normally this exists to do batched writes to the L1i cache.

But in _some_ scenarios when a loop can fit completely within this cache it'll be given extremely priority. This is a way to max out the 5uOP per cycle Intel gives you [1]. It'll flush its register file to L1 cache piece meal as it continues to predict further and further and further ahead speculatively executing EVERYPART OF IT in parallel. [3]

In short this scenario is extremely rare. uOPs have stupidly weird alignment rules. Which you can boil down to:

    Intel x64 Processor are effectively 16byte VLIW RISC processors
    that can pretend to be 1-15byte AMD64 CISC processors at a minor performance
    cost. 

---

The real issue here is when Loop Stream mode ends it is properly reloading the register file, and OoO state.

This is likely just a small micro-code fix. The 8low/8high/16bit/32bit/64bit weirdness is likely somebody wasn't doing alignment checks when flushing the register file.

---

[1] On Skylake/KabyLake. IvyBridge, SandyBridge, Haswell, and Boardwell limited this to 4.

[2] Volume 3 performance counting registers I think we're up to 12 now on Boardwell.

[3] Volume 3 Chapter 3.4.1.7 (Page 107)

> The high registers (AH/BH/DH/CH) are nearly written out of existence with the RAX flag in 64bit mode. Within the manual(s) it is called out effectively not to use them as they're now emulated and not support directly in hardware.

I think you meant REX prefix but even that doesn't make any sense.

High registers are a first class element of the Intel 64 and IA-32 architectures. They aren't going anywhere. Microarchitectural implementations are an entirely different thing.

That aside, where in the manuals does Intel say not to use the high registers? They're pretty clear about such warnings and usually state them in Assembly/Compiler Coding Rules.

From the parent:

> For Skylake, they probably optimized partial register writes to these four partial "high" registers (AH, BH, CH, DH), but the optimization was buggy in some hard-to-hit corner case.

That is about right. I don't agree with the preceding slap at x86 but this is a good summary.

BTW writing to the low registers is in principle also a partial register hazard but then Intel sees fit to optimize that as a more common case.

In particular, mov AH,BH is not emulated from the MS-ROM which is just hella slow. It uses two μops for Sandy Bridge and above. This is covered in 3.5.2.4 Partial Register Stalls.

Lastly, there is no section 3.4.1.7 in the Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual which is 3 volumes. You must be talking about the Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Optimization Reference Manual which is a single volume. And it isn't clear how that section furthers your argument.

> High Register and 16bit registers are huge wart that it seems Intel is trying desperately hard to get us to stop using.

Someone really ought to tell clang and gcc this; they both happily use 16-bit registers for 16-bit arithmetic.

Anyway, Intel obviously already has special optimizations for many partial register accesses, dating back to Sandy Bridge. While it's quite possible that they left out the high registers initially (no clue, don't care), if they did they could have decided to include them in Skylake. Who knows though...

What are you even talking about with the LSD? The LSD is entirely before any register renaming and the entire out-of-order bits of the CPU. It's likely the LSD is involved only because that (plus hyperthreading) might be the only way to get enough in-flight µops to trigger whatever is going wrong, whether or not it's due to optimizations for partial register accesses.

Indeed, I've worked with CPUs that didn't have the register split of x86 and they are far less friendly to implementing certain algorithms, which would otherwise require many additional registers and lots of shift/add instructions to achieve the same effect. ("MOV AH, AL" being one simple example -- try doing that on a MIPS, for instance.)

How often have you really needed to do "a = (a & 0xffff00ff) | ((a & 0xff) << 8)"? I don't think I've ever needed to do it, and I wouldn't be surprised if compilers don't even generate "mov ah,al" for that, due to the fact that AH/BH/CH/DH only exist for 4 registers.

Anyway, since you asked: In AArch64 that would be written "bfi w0,w0,#8,#8". "bfi" is an alias of "bfm", an instruction far more flexible and useful than any of the baroque x86 register names. BFM can move an arbitrary number of bits from any position in any register to any other register, and it has optional zero-extension and sign-extension modes.

If you're talking to any memory-mapped registers, you'll be doing it all the time. Granted, you're much more likely to be using something like ARM to do that. x86 is a bit large/expensive/power hungry for embedded programming.

CPU manufacturers do do huge amounts of testing, and Intel does formal verification of some functional units. The reliability is far better than most software, in part because making a new release costs billions.

In my limited experience, their root cause analyses are really impressive as well with lots of internal attention and resources. I'm not allowed to talk about any Intel issues, but we reported a very strange issue to Nvidia, sent a couple of dozen cards back and six months later got a truly fascinating report back we with hundreds of pages of compute test result tables and electron microscope images and chemistry lab reports. Anything that hints of a manufacturing problem is taken incredibly seriously.

I worked for a large company that used thousands of Intel CPUs every year and when we suspected a CPU bug we were mostly brushed off. We had a very persistent person on the team who kept tracking the issue to find correlations and some very good kernel developers that went on to nearly pin-point the issue and only then did Intel pay attention and it then took them still several months to acknowledge the issue give a brief report on the issue and acknowledge that our proposed workaround will indeed work.

I've never seen Intel do a very good job at failure analysis or following on with failures unless prodded very hard.

Intel likely has very thorough data on the issue, but you'll never see it unless you are one of their tier 1 customers* and have an NDA with them. In my experience working for a large hardware manufacturer they are very skittish about releasing detailed failure analysis data to outside companies.

* For Intel that would be companies like Dell, Apple, HP, and maybe a couple of others.

To be fair, I don't even want to think about the amount of spurious bug reports they are probably receiving.

Here's a video of a tour of Nvidia's lab: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pRz_CG3DZb4

That's a nice lab. You could try to submit this to the front page.

This is because once upon a time people were put in jail for not doing that (when the customer was the DoD).

That's absolutely true. When it comes to CPU/memory, skilled software engineers always think, "it must be my bug, it always is".

So in that super rare case of actually running into a CPU defect, it's a mindfuck, it'll drive you crazy. You'll be looking for the flaw in your algorithm which makes it fail once a week under production load. But you just can't find it, it makes no sense ...

(When it comes to drivers for network/storage/graphics etc devices, it's a whole different story. Those things are piles of bugs that need work-arounds in drivers.)

A little anecdote describing one such bug. I didn't find this, another one of my teammates did.

The symptom was that a board with a specific microcontroller on it would be working fine, then after a power cycle it might not keep working. A flash dump would show that the reset vector, the first byte of flash on that system, would be all zeroed out. Of course the system would not run anymore, but why did it happen? After months of intermittent debugging and trying to reproduce the cause was determined. At least under certain conditions the brownout detection level was lower than the voltage level that caused the CPU to make errors. If the board lost power slowly then the CPU would start executing corrupted / arbitrary instructions which generally included lots of zeros. It would occasionally write zeros to the zero address, bricking the board.

Since then we have external power monitoring and reset circuits on all the new boards, but existing ones needed a fix. Luckily the board had power failure interrupt connected, so when that triggers we reconfigure the CPU to execute on the slowest possible clock rate, which greatly reduced the occurrence.

Yes, we have seen similar in AVRs (328p) where the lowest voltage brownout threshold/trip is not enough to prevent the EEPROM and/or Flash from getting corrupted somehow...

Similarly: Kernel bugs! Once upon a time I spend a good week trying to reproduce a rare crash one of our users saw ever so often (just enough to get our attention, but not enough to get a repro case). Stack traces made no sense and just in general the whole crash made no sense the more I looked at it. Turns out it was a bug in XNUs pthread subsystem, a part where I would have never looked if it weren‘t for desperation, because, well, it‘s the kernel, it works, right?

Emacs would regularly panic the kernel on one OS X version when I opened preview to look at a pdf and had TeX recompile.

The DVD player on OSX with a MacBook (polycarbonate ones) would occasionally cause a kernel panic if you had 4GB of RAM installed.

Or at least should have been long since spotted thanks to use and abuse.

You have some lovely stories online about these things. Like the guy tracking down a stuck bit in RAM.

Or on the network level, a VPN that failed only when traversing one possible route between company offices.

I have a very old one. I was working on a embedded system using an Intel 80186. The ‘186 had a memory mapped IO system that was very unusual for Intel x86 CPUs. The code that I started with was originally written by a bunch of Motorola 68000 guys so they used this mode. I had to modify the interrupt structure so I rewrote the interrupt service routines. Since it was memory mapped and ANDs were documented to be atomic, I assumed that I could just AND bits into the interrupt mask register. Big mistake. It turned out that ANDs to the IO registers were not atomic. And could be interrupted in the middle of the write after read. I took me about a month to realize that this was a hardware “bug” and not in my interrupt code. Drove me nuts.

These problems have existed for years - I once tracked down a dead cell in core memory on a system I worked on in the Air Force. Because of the chance alignment, it caused incoming messages to never "end". Which was fun for the operators.

http://www.1882nd.com/images/DSTE.jpg

It may be far better than average software quality but far more also relies on it. The question is whether the quality is adequate in light of what is at stake.

Really? How is it different from a kernel bug that causes random behaviour? Both apparently can be fixed with a software update. They're both bad, but why should Intel be held to a higher standard if mitigation is similarly complex?

Because futher down the stack, more reliable a tech has to be. Otherwise good luck debugging. Also agree with heisenbit.

Hmmm... on that note, if the universe is a simulation, then a bug in that could have some interesting ramifications.

"Don't use the bookshelf over there, physics is broken on that shiny spot." :D

// FIXME Trying to read both the position and the momentum of a particle reliably crashes the simulation.

// Workaround: Make the accessor method return fuzzy values for either of those values.

The problem with finding a physics bug is that it's liable to be amplifiable. Break conservation laws just a little bit and suddenly you have potential for exponential runaway leading to an unplanned reality excursion, and say goodbye to your light-cone.

Well, by definition the behaviour would be undefined so could go any which way. ;)

Modern day VM software has various levels of exception checking, and code to catch/mitigate/etc when bugs crop up.

So, a universe-capable simulator might have any kind of behaviour if/when a bug occurs. It doesn't need to be an unbounded, runaway scenario. :)

And, if a very bad reality excursion happens, you scrap that branch and restore the last checkpoint. Nobody inside the simulation will ever remember it. You only bother fixing it if halt/scrap/restore becomes a burden.

It probably happens more often than we imagine ;-)

> Hmmm... on that note, if the universe is a simulation, then a bug in that could have some interesting ramifications.

> "Don't use the bookshelf over there, physics is broken on that shiny spot." :D

You know "The Animatrix - Beyond"?

Nope, just looked it up though:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Animatrix#.22Beyond.22

Seems like the same kind of concept. :)

I don't know why you were downvoted. I find this hilarious and thought-provoking.

IIRC wasn't there some blog posts about how intel has cut their verification/QA drastically since 2010? is this the result?

Although it mentions 2015, I think that might be the one I linked in my original post above: http://danluu.com/cpu-bugs/

releasing cpu micro code to work around bugs is very cheap.

But that doesn't mean you necessarily get to keep the affected feature - the only 'work-around' might be to disable it. Consider TSX on Haswell and Broadwell, where Intel had to disable the whole feature because of a bug. And of course there was the 486 FP bug which couldn't be fixed by any kind of microcode update.

If Intel had to completely disable hyperthreading in Skylake and Kabylake that would make the premium anyone paid for i5 vs i7 worthless.

you mean i3 and i7.

despite what cpuinfo tells you, no HT in i5.

and my previous comment was ironic :)

But if you don't have HT in your i7, you basically have an i5 that you paid more than you needed for.

Or has that changed? At one point, i7 was full-featured, i5 was an i7 with HT disabled, and i3 was i7 with HT intact but smaller caches. Is that different with Skylake/Kabylake?

and my previous comment was ironic :)

Ack - sorry. I must be irony-impaired. That's why I don't post very often. :-)

i3 also has half the cores.

Mobile dual-core lie5's have hyperthreading too.

i am more willing to accept software having bugs / failing. i have 0 tolerance for hardware to have bugs

I wonder if there's a CPU out there that doesn't have bugs.

It depends on how exactly you define a bug, but something like a 6502 or Z80, which has essentially all the errata well-documented since it has existed for so long, might qualify.

Z80 implementations for one had a whole slew of undocumented instructions, allegedly because they were buggy in some way.

The VIPER was built to be fully proven, but there was come debate on methodology.

stop playing lawyer ball. i'm talking about the bugs that require turning off core functionality (such as hyperthreading) and/or that lead to system halts / corrupted data.

yes it happens, but software bugs happen every day where as if your system blue screened every day you know dang well you'd be on the phone with the hardware vendor for a refund / new system.

>yes it happens, but software bugs happen every day where as if your system blue screened every day you know dang well you'd be on the phone with the hardware vendor for a refund / new system.

Well, since hundreds of millions of people use Skylake/Kaby Lake CPUs for 2 years now, and only now we learn about this, obviously this is not of the "system blue screens every day" variety but a very rare bug.

> obviously this is not of the "system blue screens every day" variety but a very rare bug

Not to be anal but we can't know this.

How much more would you pay, or how much of a speed penalty would you take, for bug-free CPUs?

nobody has, but it ain't easy.

This seems like precisely the sort of thing that a competent manufacturer should rule out formally. Formal verification of individual FUs isn't exactly ambitious...

I think we're getting to levels of complexity where the process Intel uses, with lots of different QA and testing teams doing their best to look for bugs, just isn't going to cut it. We need formally verified models transformed step-by-verified-step all the way down to the silicon. It's already feasible, with free tools, to formally verify your high-level model (using e.g. LiquidHaskell) and then transform this to RTL (using e.g. Clash). With Intel's QA/testing budget, it's well within reach to A) verify the transformation steps and B) figure out how to close the performance gap between machine-generated (but maybe slower) and hand-rolled (faster, but evidently wrong) silicon.

I've done formal verification on several units of a microprocessor, and I can assure you, formal verification on individual FUs is very, very ambitious (think impossible) for a modern microprocessor.

For example, you can not possibly formally verify the fetcher unit on its own, because the state space that you need to cover for several cycles for all the module inputs and outputs is beyond the capability of any formal verification tool.

Typically, you run formal verification on sub-blocks of sub-blocks of FUs.

For this particular bug, it looks like multiple functional units are involved, so it might have been missed by formal verification.

> because the state space that you need to cover for several cycles for all the module inputs and outputs is beyond the capability of any formal verification tool.

Then use a proof methodology that doesn't require exhaustive enumeration. This objection is actually fairly alarming to me; perhaps there is a larger disconnect between industrial formal techniques for hardware and software than I thought. Strings also occupy a "large state space", but this obviously doesn't prevent us from doing formal verification on functions over strings.

  Then use a proof methodology that doesn't require exhaustive enumeration.

You may as well have said "then you use a magical tool that doesn't exist".

  Strings also occupy a "large state space", but this 
  obviously doesn't prevent us from doing formal 
  verification on functions over strings.

What is your reason to think this is 'obviously' the case?

> You may as well have said "then you use a magical tool that doesn't exist".

Ok, so what this tells me is that you're not aware of what modern verification techniques look like.

There's not really any one resource I can point you to, but take a look at these links. I've used these or similar technologies personally, but there are others I haven't used.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuitionistic_type_theory

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homotopy_type_theory

https://leanprover.github.io/about/

http://goto.ucsd.edu/~rjhala/liquid/liquid_types.pdf

> What is your reason to think this is 'obviously' the case?

Because I've done this, and anyone who claims to be familiar with formal methods should be at least passingly familiar with all the things I mentioned.

Even if you aren't, if you've ever heard of SAT (a fairly universal CS concept) you should at least be familiar with the idea that non-exhaustive proofs are a thing.

  Ok, so what this tells me is that you're not aware of what 
  modern verification techniques look like.

Well, techniques are not tools. I am asserting that it is quite probable that no practically useful tool exists to non-exhaustively verify the state space laydn wants to cover.

Notwithstanding your example that it's possible to non-exhaustively verify some functions on strings. There is a quite some distance between that to verifying just any function.

  Because I've done this,

Sure, but how does that make it obvious to laydn that his state space is coverable? And what makes it so obvious to you that his state space is coverable? After all, the 'largeness' can have different sources, including those that make non-exhaustive methods infeasible.

I think this may be an example of the disconnect between research and the industry. Researchers say things are solved when they have shown something is possible and published about it. They feel it's then up to the industry to extrapolate, while research moves on to exciting new and greener pastures. Meanwhile the industry thinks the results are too meager, thinks the extrapolation involves a lot of technical difficulties and generally is not willing to spend enough money on what they cannot see as anything but a longshot.

If you do any model checking at all, with tools like SPIN or TLA+, you are already in the state-of-the-art minority in industry.

I've had great success (in software) with randomized/probability based testing. You don't walk the full state space but generate subsets randomly to walk.

If done naively, it doesn't work because you are unlikely to hit the problematic bug. So you have to be clever: do not generate inputs uniformly! Generate those inputs which are really really nasty all the time. If you find a problem, then gradually simplify the case until you have reduced the complexity to something which can be understood.

With some experience for where former bugs tend to live, I've been able to remove lots of bugs from my software in edge cases via this method. (See "QuickCheck").

So it's okay for software to have bugs that get fixed (I think everybody here acknowledges that software will always have bugs), but Intel isn't allowed to have issues in their processors, even if they can fix them with a software (microcode) update?

In general, people expect hardware to be far more bug-free than all the software which depends on it. I'm disgusted enough at the current trend of continuously releasing half-baked software and "updating" it to fix some of the bugs (while introducing new bugs in the process); and yet it seems to be spreading to hardware too. From the perspective of formal verification, buggy hardware is like an incorrect axiom.

but Intel isn't allowed to have issues in their processors, even if they can fix them with a software (microcode) update?

They could've caught and fixed this one with some more testing, before actually releasing. Formal verification isn't necessarily going to help, if it's a statistical type of defect --- thus the concept of wafer yield, and why dies manufactured from the exact same masks can behave completely differently with respect to the clock speeds attainable and voltages required.

Formal verification cannot be used to fully verify an entire Intel CPU, simply because the computational resources required to do so are astronomical. Heck, the cache coherence unit alone is basically impossible to verify.

Therefore, CPU designers verify the important units (e.g., the ALU) independently of each other, and then try to verify their interaction. But a system level design verification check is simply not possible.

Obviously, faults that result from fabrication can still take place, so they are tested for using BIST and JTAG. Test coverage can be pretty high, but obviously not 100%.

As you can see, there are still a ton of places where hardware errors can seep through.

Expectations of hardware are indeed higher than for software, but isn't it a valid trade-off for Intel to make as long as most of the issues can be fixed with a microcode update? On Windows, it's updated via Windows Update, and on most Linux distributions, a package exists for CPU microcode. Most users have an easy—if not automatic—way to obtain the updates.

I believe the main issue with formally verifying everything is that reasoning about parallel code is extremely hard and might well make the entire endeavour unattainable. It would be great to have formally verified CPUs, though.

> They could've caught and fixed this one with some more testing, before actually releasing.

Isn't this true of any bug?

Windows update applies CPU patches?!

I know they did AMT but that was a special case and different.

Seems like they do when it fixes serious bugs, a quick search yields e.g. https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/3064209/june-2015-i... ("This update fixes several issues with Intel CPUs that could cause computer crashes or functions incorrectly.")

If this "fix" ends up disabling HT, how can I get a refund not just for the CPU but for the $3k laptop I spec'd around it? Without needing to sue?

That's just the workaround until a fix is available for your CPU, if I understood correctly.

No, that's not what I meant. In the past, Intel's microcode updates have simply disabled the broken functionality as an official solution.

http://techreport.com/news/26911/errata-prompts-intel-to-dis...

You specifically said the fix might be to permanently disable HT.

The TSX situation was indeed unfortunate, I have one of the affected CPUs. But it was a new feature that was broken, not something that used to work, so the bug's impact was less serious, and disabling the feature didn't have too much of an impact.

Contact your laptop OEM.

Have you ever had to do this?

The Dell XPS 9350 (Skylake) has numerous issues with GPU noise, USB-C compatibility, wifi reliability - Dell don't care unless your consumer laws are strong enough to make them care.

No but dell had a 30 day full refund policy. Did those bugs not start until day 31?

TBH, everything was covered by warranty other than the coil whine and wifi - by sticking to one particular driver version you can avoid many of the wifi issues. Not everyone has had the USB-C problems and it's gotten a little better with the most recent updates.

Well, if a software bug leads to data corruption it is not really "allowed" as well. It is quite amazing that there are not more bugs like this. Intel spends an insane amount of money on very large teams of very smart people to work on these insanely complicated systems.

I don't think this is sustainable, and I think that massive arrays of relatively simple processors. First, we will need a culture shift that learns programmers to program concurrent programs from the start, and this will take a lot of time (because technology moves a lot faster than culture).

It would be nice if they allowed users to update rather than vendors. I have a mobile Xeon. I don't know if it's affected or not.

There are hardware bugs that are impossible to fix in microcode. What then?

you make workarounds in software, obviously.

...or recall all the hardware and replace it:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentium_FDIV_bug

There will always be. What then? We stop producing cpus and wait for some magical new technology that prevents all bugs?

Its why you can't treat hardware bugs and dismiss them flippantly like software ones.

It's funny, since many of today's software bugs are due to the legacy of C, faults of which can often times be attributed to mimicking the behaviour CPU hardware too closely.

EDIT: My wording was poor, but what I meant was that it's not like hardware vendors do not make bugs happen due to deficiencies in their design, which are not only tolerated, but often reflected in software, which runs counter to OP saying that apparently hardware vendors are not allowed to have bugs, but the software ones are:

> So it's okay for software to have bugs that get fixed (I think everybody here acknowledges that software will always have bugs), but Intel isn't allowed to have issues in their processors

Go back to rust-land now :D

It was meant as a response to OP basically saying that hardware vendors make way fewer bugs that the software ones, which is true, but many bugs of software can arguably be attributed to hardware design, so it's not like they're without fault. Rust has nothing to do with it, not sure why even bring it up.

I get it - sorry, meant to playfully Sunday afternoon troll you.

Ever since I moved from C to Java (I like low level stuff but the company I joined is such) I have been having one of three major problems - logic bugs, too many frameworks, causing bugs due to lack of in depth understanding of each one of them, and GC bottlenecks. Of all of them, I hate the GC ones the most.

Formal verification of a decode unit simply will never happen. The complexity is far too high.

Formally verifying something like a multiplier block is difficult but doable if you care. Formally verifying an FPU is probably at about the limit.

If you want formal verification, you would have to simplify a modern microprocessor a lot.

That's the whole point of doing a provably correct transformation from a simpler model domain. Even complicated OOOE engines are fairly tractable if you don't try to implement them at an RTL level...

Perhaps we are imagining different formal verification methodologies. Can you tell me what kind of formal verification you're referring to?

> I wonder how many users have experienced intermittent crashes

I wonder if it's exploitable ;) Maybe that's why they never release the details of these CPU bugs.

> Was it a software-like bug in microcode e.g. neglecting some edge-case, or a hardware-level race condition related to marginal timing

Not sure about microcode, these x86 cores execute many simple operations natively, by means of dedicated circuits. Microcode is only involved in emulation of complex x86 instructions.

And hardware problem doesn't have to be marginal timing. It could simply be a logic bug, i.e. the circuit operates as designed but it was designed to do something else than it should be doing in some unforeseen circumstances.

I feel like a lot of the processors Intel has released recently that have had problems like this. Intel's Bay Trail processors like the Celeron J1900 have a huge problem around power state management (https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109051) that's unlikely to ever get resolved and makes those processors almost unusable under a lot of conditions (random hard hangs on systems without watch dog timers really kind of sucks). I wonder if Intel has been more lax recently with how the systems get tested?

I've no knowledge about IC design, but it sounds to me that even the biggest name in CPU industry doesn't (or do they ever) do formal verification? Is the process like when I'm writing some mediocre code and say to myself: "hmm, it probably works", and throw the bunch into the version control (whereas they throw it to the wafer fab)?

> * I would recommend demoscene productions, cracktros, and even certain malware*

Modern PC demoscene productions don't really do very funky things CPU-wise anymore. Most run mostly in shaders, actually. Amiga and C64 is a different story, but Intel isn't making that many Amiga CPUs :-)