They want people to think like that because they've built businesses that require it. Telegram stores the messages you send/receive unencrypted on their servers. That's not good, unless you've been trained to think that "privacy" is just about choosing the company, government, or legal jurisdiction that gets total access to your data.
Security professionals know that's not how we should think about security (never trust people!), because Durov is leaving a lot out: there aren't safe jurisdictions, servers get hacked, and centralized databases will get compromised. Logic, though, is probably no match for conspiracy theories.
1: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/11...
If Telegram isn't that secure, then why are extremists like IS using it over Signal or WhatsApp? I know Telegram has better features for big groups and much better multi-platform support, so is that the reason? I'm legitimately asking without any snark.
I am talking about politicians, head of terrorist groups, etc.
While saying that top politicians are complete idiots is probably wrong - then again maybe not, I am not sure anymore - the fact that H. Clinton, run the most expensive campaign in history, with backing from all major tech corps AND her staff didn't bother to use encryption at any scale, let alone running a mail server (God knows what kind of software the server was running if it was OpenBSD or Windows Server 08), to me says a lot about how flawed the understanding of these people and their consultant's is about today's world.
Watching "House of Cards" everybody seems incredibly smart, driven, etc. but the politicians I see in real life on average and on the not-very-smart side and the few I've met in person are clueless beyond salvation.
Ps. Sorry for possible mistakes, I'm reading from mobile.
Sadly, one of the conclusions you can draw from Telegram is that a security business is almost better off with no security.
Pavel Durov says that Telegram is "heavily" encrypted over and over again, journalists who don't know better take that at face value and encode it into every headline ("Telegram, the encrypted messaging app, ..."), and meanwhile since there is no encryption there is no risk of anyone finding or publishing vulnerabilities in it.
Since cryptography already seems unreal to most people (and is always just a matter of getting the smart IT guy to 'crack' it on television), everyone's already predisposed to thinking that security = Switzerland. Unless there's a major change, the charlatans will win every time.
Also, is there evidence that extremists aren't using Signal and WhatsApp?
WhatsApp and Signal offer non-anonymous groups only. They are probably used by people who already know each other.
Anyone who has used Telegram for more than 5 minutes knows there are secret chats. The effort being made to rig the information against Telegram also tells a lot about its relevance.
The telegram desktop main developer said[4]: "Well, I'm afraid there isn't. They are just not in high priority, many other important things first."
It seems stickers, funny bots and GIFs have more priority over security. I think this tells a lot.
[1]: https://github.com/telegramdesktop/tdesktop/issues/871
[2]: https://github.com/zhukov/webogram/issues/126
[3]: https://github.com/vysheng/tg/issues/1189
[4]: https://www.reddit.com/r/Telegram/comments/2z24ly/how_to_sta...
Secret chats are not enabled by default, and most users don't enable them; so yes, messages are generally stored without encryption on the Telegram servers. That's a more neutral way of presenting the information.
I think his point is the reverse, while people trust Signal because of Moxie & Trevp.
puts Tinfoil hat it's possible that Trevp is not "that" involved with Signal because he doesn't want to be involved with the government and backdoors.
The point of all of this should be that it's not about people, places, or jurisdictions. If you make it about that, the charlatans who want you to think that Switzerland = secure will win every time.
They don't. From the Telegram FAQ:
"Cloud chats are stored encrypted in the Telegram Cloud, and the keys needed to decipher this data are kept in other data centers in different jurisdictions. This way, local intruders or engineers can't access this data, and several court orders from different jurisdictions are required to force us to give up anything. Thanks to this structure, we can ensure that no single government or block of like-minded countries can intrude on people's privacy and freedom of expression."[1]
[1] https://twitter.com/durov/status/872891017418113024
[2] https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/government-backed-privac...
As of October 2016, the project has received an unknown amount of donations from individual sponsors via the Freedom of the Press Foundation.[100] Open Whisper Systems has received grants from the Knight Foundation,[101] the Shuttleworth Foundation,[102] and the Open Technology Fund,[103] a U.S. government funded program that has also supported other privacy projects like the anonymity software Tor and the encrypted instant messaging app Cryptocat.
With his reply, Durov is implicitly claiming that Signal must be compromised because it received some funding that can be traced back to the US government. This is the same kind of FUD that has often been used to smear Tor in the past (and indeed, the piece he cites describes Tor as "a federal weapons contractor" and "a foreign policy weapon, a soft power cyber weapon").
...wait.
Tor's main purpose is to allow agents of US intelligence agencies to communicate back with the home base.
"Giving free access to the Internet being a powerful tool for undermining authoritarian regimes" makes it harder for an adversary to focus solely on intelligence agency agent traffic.
I'm not saying Tor is backdoored or monitored, though it's heavily monitored.
When enjoying the benefits of Tor, it's wise to also remember Tor's main purpose.
I assume that "founded" is a typo, but to be clear, there is no evidence that the US government either encouraged the creation of OWS or contributed any actual work/code to OWS.
The conspiracy-theory part here is that taking funding from the US government (any part of the US government, whether the NSA or Radio Free Asia) means that your protocols or your implementations have backdoors, even if those protocols and the source code implementing them are public and well-reviewed.
Even the author of CryptoCat now thinks you should not use CryptoCat, but I would not rush to assume ill of the OTF funding it back then.
I bet you meant to type "funded".
Most of the funding for the foundation that funds Wikipedia comes from small donations from users.
Only the telegram server is closed source (for now), telegram client and protocol are open source.
> No, because I never took money from the government. I left Russia and lost a $3bn business there because I defended users' privacy from it.
while he is often spotted in Saint-Petersburg, Russia. Moreover, Telegram's developers themselves sit next door to Vkontakte's (that was allegedly taken from him), so he's hardly dissident.
I believe no Western media tried to look behind his bravado and this saddens me. I'll be happy to help with local sources if someone is interested, though.
I'm not well read on this (eg, what company he lost, how he claims he lost it, etc) -- you seem to be responding in the context of a story, but not a story I know about.
I believe that's the gist of his "official" image. However, there are cracks in that story to which I alluded in the comment.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VK_(social_networking)#2013.E2...
https://cs.au.dk/~jakjak/master-thesis.pdf
https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1177.pdf
tl;dr: they tried to use SHA-1 as a MAC. This is something of a crypto 101 mistake. Had they even used HMAC they'd be in much better shape. Worse, even after this was pointed out to them and people started writing papers about potential attacks, they have stood by their shaky design, refusing to update it or even admit mistakes were made in the initial design.
But even worse than that, end-to-end encryption is off-by-default, and users must opt into it. Why?
https://telegram.org/faq#q-why-not-just-make-all-chats-secre...
"This allows Telegram to be widely adopted in broad circles, not just by activists and dissidents, so that the simple fact of using Telegram does not mark users as targets for heightened surveillance in certain countries. We are convinced that the separation of conversations into Cloud and Secret chats represents the most secure solution currently possible for a massively popular messaging application."
Putting aside the fact that if Telegram's cryptography were properly implemented, an outside observer shouldn't be able to tell whether or not end-to-end encryption is being used or not (i.e. Telegram does not provide proper separation of data-at-rest versus data-in-motion), this seems to be the "I don't need encryption because I have nothing to hide" argument, but perpetrated by what's allegedly supposed to be a secure messenger.
The real reason why Telegram doesn't enable end-to-end encryption is pretty clear: they don't have the features to provide a good end-to-end encryption experience: They don't support end-to-end encrypted group chats. They don't have encrypted backups like Signal and WhatsApp.
Because it is unusable. It has no synchronization between devices, only 1 device to 1 device. And if you accidentally closed the chat, you have to verify it again. You can't store trusted key fingerprint.
It is not suitable for mobile devices. Secure chats are like OTR, but with bad crypto. Signal and WhatsApp are the same protocol as OMEMO, originally designed for Signal.
> so that the simple fact of using Telegram does not mark users as targets for heightened surveillance in certain countries
And yet Telegram is associated with terrorism more that, e.g., WhatsApp.
It's a not yet proven secure protocol, is the worst you can say against it I believe. I'm not a security guy mind you, I'm just parroting what I keep seeing. Rightfully so, lack of deep audit is a very valid reason to worry. Yet, worry and untrusted is vastly different than actively exploitable / broken.
Whenever one can consider a person's arguments in isolation from your opinion of said person, it's wise to do so. This is one of those opportunities.
I enjoy the comments of tpacek and ryanlol
Another day on HN...
"Security researchers call for Guardian to retract false WhatsApp backdoor story" [1]
The Guardian claims they have offered to let Zeynep Tufekci write a rebuttal; according to Tufekci, they have repeatedly delayed and are not taking the offer they made seriously.
If you have spread this misinformation in other places, you might want to follow up with the people you misled.
[1] https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/20/security-researchers-call-...
> WhatsApp does not give governments a “backdoor” into its systems and would fight any government request to create a backdoor
The problem is that I have to take their word for that, while they have the ability to activate the backdoor at will.
I linked to HN for a reason, so that people could see what other people think concerning the article. Here is the HN version of that opinion https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13394900
The misleading is that people are told that proprietary and centralised messaging services such as whatsapp can guarantee security - the truth is that they probably can't.
Do you still believe HN users instead of security researchers?
Do you still give security advice based on randos on HN instead of security researchers?
I think Signal doesn't even have the metadata available, but I'm not sure about that.
[1] (Horrible Forbes Link)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/01/22/whats...
So yeah, Signal doesn't retain metadata. All they can provide is whether you're using Signal or not and when you've started using it.
[0] https://whispersystems.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand...
Telegram protocol is open and has an open source reference client. While not as good as having both the server and the client open source, at least it allows independent verification that the protocol is being implemented faithfully.
That said, I think it's pretty clear that WhatsApp does have a way to allow the FBI to snoop on users:
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/13/whatsapp-...
I know it's controversial and many don't believe WhatsApp would actually use it like that, but I don't buy it. Either they already use that "feature" as a legal intercept or they're about to do it at least in the UK, where Snoopers' Charter passed and the law is vague enough to force them to do something like that. It may happen in Australia, too, if the new anti-crypto bill passes.
I still trust Signal for now, but I'm not sure whether or not their server-based solution will be so backdoor-proof against future bills, and I think they should be prioritizing decentralizing Signal somehow.
EDIT: Sigh, Germany, too:
http://fortune.com/2017/06/14/germany-fingerprint-children-s...
This seems to be a shot at WhatsApp and Signal, implying that they have loopholes that allow the FBI to snoop in. I'm not sure how true that is. This might be an attempt to deflect from the fact that Telegram uses a home-baked encryption protocol which might be insecure, while WhatsApp uses the OWS protocol.