http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PunkBuster
These agreements could be summed up in 3 words: "we own you".
This is spying with the sole purpose of spreading ads and making money.
The "spyware" only spies on modifications to the game client in any way and tries to detect non-human involvement, which of course includes inspecting the file system and RAM. In theory it could harvest irrelevant information from your hard drive or memory, but no reverse engineer has ever made such a claim to my knowledge.
Valve Anti-Cheat does very similar things, but is run by what many consider to be a trustworthy company, so not that many people take issue with it. If one trusts the company that distributes the spyware, it's not really a problem, in my opinion. If Valve were to ever violate that trust, it would severely harm their business.
I also strongly disagree with DRM, because it only harms other players while providing no benefits. In contrast, online cheaters can completely ruin the playing experience for online games, and have heavily contributed to the death of some games.
I also have no issue if people decide to cheat when in single-player mode. If you pay for the game you should be able to do whatever you want if you're not affecting others. It's only a problem when they're playing with other people over the Internet. PunkBuster and VAC only run when you're playing in online mode.
Edit: It's pretty bad form to downvote new accounts becuase you disagree. Imagine if I didn't know about hellbanning.
Ask yourself what open source licenses, corporate EULAs and the NSAs defense have in common. The best hope here is that Lenovo explicitly promised someone something they didn't keep.
You can bet that if the NSA manages to use this to hoover up some tasty HTTPS, this scandal will be lauded as a big boost to "national security" behind the scenes, and nobody will be punished. For all we know NSA had a hand in engineering this.
Of course, if some government data is stolen as a result, then the whole thing will be thrown under the bus and deemed a threat to "national security".
I hope anyone who uses terms like "national security" does it in full awareness of what Orwell meant by newspeak and doublethink.
This is a transparent dragnet that can easily be blamed away, which has been shown to be much more preferable in the NSA's M.O.
And to be clear, I mean, absolutely nothing. This isn't a slightly unlikely thing that still leaves room to wonder about "plausible deniability"... this is a thing that happens all the damned time and the NSA need at most sit back and passively reap the benefits, along with hackers and criminals.
Somebody somewhere wanted to get in on the advertising gig because it looks like free money. Their first attempt didn't work on HTTPS sites. Some techie was ordered to fix it. Said techie read a few things on a few sites and typed in the magic commands to "make it work" and probably literally didn't even know that they'd just annihilated security for all their users... they literally just knew that this made their software "work", and for them, pretty much the first time they clicked on to an HTTPS page and saw their own ads, the story ended. Ship it.
To a first approximation, nobody using SSL in some manner understands SSL.
Some of the code inserted is pretty strange, including functions to checks for lenevo, bestbuy.com and isPayingCountry() with a list of country identifiers:
So apparently they work with some big companies, and I can't work out what the country check is for, perhaps for subsidiaries of a large customer?
[1] https://github.com/heyalexej/pretty-fucked-up/blob/master/ba...
[2] https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/awesome-screenshot...
[3] https://gist.github.com/mvirkkunen/89f61a06819530e48b53
[4] https://developer.chrome.com/webstore/program_policies#ads
Insanity!
of course they are - Lenovo customers have signed the agreement that this is ok when they started the machine the first time </sarcasm>
https://forums.lenovo.com/t5/Lenovo-P-Y-and-Z-series/Lenovo-...
Rest assured Lenovo was perfectly aware of the security and privacy implications of this feature from the beginning.
They merely try to sound oblivious because their laywers hope that will soften the legal and media repercussions.
Superfish looks like the kind of crapware that pays OEMs to include it in their bundle. Lenovo took the cash and didn't bother to review the code. Superfish, for its part, probably doesn't have the best and brightest engineers working for them. They probably tasked a junior programmer with working around SSL, who then committed the first solution that worked without ever thinking about security implications, and they shipped it.
If they did know about the problem, they could have fixed it. If the app simply generated a new key as part of first-time use, then it would just be run-of-the-mill crapware rather than a gaping security hole. Even if Lenovo has malicious intent, it would still have been in their best interests to do at least that, yet they didn't. Hence I assume it was incompetence.
It doesn't take a "security review" to spot a gaping security and privacy violation like this.
Any engineer with even the slightest clue of how a browser and "the internet" works would have called this out during the first "How does this product work?"-presentation.
Let's not pretend Lenovo is staffed with monkeys.
Remember stuff like this:
http://www.cryptofails.com/post/70059600123/saltstack-rsa-e-...
(Which, possibly unfairly, is one reason I'm leaning more towards ansible than saltstack to this day -- I mean, if stuff like that got through... what else, in more complex areas of the system?)
Never falsely attribute to incompetence what is actually ascribable to malice. You can't come in here with a straight face and say that no one at Lenovo considered the security risk of including this software. If it was considered and they pushed ahead with it anyway, that's malice.
It's negligent, and in this case probably criminally so -- and that might constitute "an evil" -- but I don't think this is the result of someone's overt intentional evil act. I don't think anyone actually did consider the security risk of this particular piece of software. Maybe I'm naive, but if nothing else, the risk of lawsuits/backlash seems too great in this case.
I don't like ads and bloatware, but I think calling them "evil" is diluting what "evil" means.
I might be wrong, of course. But I don't think any of the big OEMs does any real review of the crap that is installed on computers -- and I think forgetting to generate an unique cert/key on post-install/first run is an error -- not intentional. Deciding to install this kind of crap strikes me as a very poor decision -- but I'm still not sure I'd consider it evil. Evil would be using the Intel management co-prosessor to do something similar -- presumably then a clean install wouldn't help.
That's what I meant by invoking the opposite of Hanlon's razor. Sure, never attribute to malice what can be explained by ignorance. But my point is, you can't explain this one with ignorance. There is just no way that Lenovo has hired a security team that would do a review of this and say it looks fine, and no way a company the size and stature of Lenovo would not have a competent security team. The only logical answer is that this was raised as a risk and management chose to accept the risk.
I'm not saying they're evil (I used that word to describe Charles Manson), nor that their end goal was for users to be compromised. Merely that they had to know this was a bad idea, and they chose to do it anyway.
"Any engineer" means something in HN, but we're not talking about "people who read HN" levels of engineer here, don't be mistaken.
Some people that have had no or limited experience with software are assigned to software projects, and that's the issue with companies like Lenovo.
I find it very hard to believe that no red flags were raised by any of the engineers, managers and especially lawyers who must have screened this "feature" for problems.
It seems more plausible that the problem was known from the beginning (it is by design after all) and Lenovo decided to risk it.
Virtually everyone in the engineering team raised a flag when the imbec...uhm, the Product Manager came up with the idea. We pointed out that a) this burdens us with the responsibility of storing sensitive data which can, at least, have significant legal implications and that b) even if it's encrypted data, it may be a little hard to market a privacy device that works by uploading user data to our server as a first step without being transparent about the whole process. Oh, and c) that the data recovery mechanism he proposed (which involved storing the users' private keys on our servers as well, just in case they lost their precious little gimmick) was, in this case, entirely retarded.
The whole thing didn't even make it to Legal, because everyone in the decision tree just thought that since there's no plaintext data being stored, there's no potential for a lawsuit (and when we told the PM about Lavabit, he came back two hours later saying he Googled it and that we're covered since we're not an e-mail provider). The bright heads in Marketing weren't exactly sure about the whole transparency thing. They thought we should keep it simple and just tell people that their data is safely encrypted and be done with it, because end-users don't need to know about tech mumbo-jumbo like encryption keys and all that.
I don't work there anymore (thank God) and they haven't launched in the meantime, but when I left, they were basically working on implementing this clusterfuck.
I'm sorry I can't be more specific than this (for obvious reasons, I hope). The point is, however, that decisions as complex as these (there's a stack of paperwork thicker than the Osbourne-1 involved in preloading anything on a laptop) are made through an elaborate process, not made "by mistake".
Someone knew there was a problem. The problem may have ended up misunderstood or washed out along the decision chain (although I find that fairly unlikely), but someone, at some point, decided this was ok.
How does that go along with a gigantic fuckup like this? Ipso facto there was no vetting, otherwise this wouldn't happen. What did they expect, that this wouldn't come out, that this wouldn't damage their brand even further? If it was done out of malice it is still poorly vetted and incompetent malice.
They probably didn't figure out that anyone would have a problem with this. For them, it's just a cool gimmick to get some money. That it is a gaping security hole which makes about 0.42 % of user population mad, probably never occurred to them.
Unfortunately, for the 0.42 % (that is us, reading this site, and people of similar interests) it will be hard going to explain to the next 4.2 % why this is so bad. The remaining approximately 96 % of population will stay largely uninterested.
Yea, read again. I claim that even if there was malice there necessarily was an element of incompetence present in that case as well.
> it will be hard going to explain to the next 4.2 % why this is so bad
Why? People aren't interested in exact details, that's why they rely on 0.42%. You can illustrate the magnitudes of moronity required to design some of their products and lack of respect for security by explaining that they approach those that are needed to drive a car which has chainsaw strapped on its steering wheel. This isn't mere buffer-overflows due to bad coding, these are comatose levels of stupidity.
I don't think I've seen a junior anything who was informed and insightful enough to write a network proxy, including SSL support, and the necessary certificate work.
And calling it enhanced is not always an unreasonable interpretation. For instance, take the case of a cheap mobile phone with a very limited bandwidth. You can increase the end user satisfaction considerably if you move some of the functionality to a server layer so that when you browse, the things actually happen somewhere in a cloud and your phone is just displaying the result, without being the actual browser as seen by the site you visit.
Nokia did this with some of the cheaper devices, and I think it was quite OK. It comes down to how much you trust that party, of course, and how critical your communication is.
if (location.protocol === 'https:' && queryString.search(/dlsource=hdrykzc/i) !== -1) // Patch for Lenovo - do not run on https sites
So yes, it seems someone at Lenovo was security-aware enough to demand an exception for HTTPS. Unfortunately the fine folks at Superfish either didn't understand or didn't care.I honestly don't know why Lenovo (and others) still make these third party deals. Just ship the machine with a blank OS, or install a vetted selection of open-source software (7zip, VLC, LibreOffice if they want). Just don't install crapware for the mediocre kickback it generates!
I always love when the same model (down to the part number) comes with a different configuration and board inside the case.
> To be clear, Superfish comes with Lenovo consumer products only and is a technology that helps users find and discover products visually. The technology instantly analyzes images on the web and presents identical and similar product offers that may have lower prices, helping users search for images without knowing exactly what an item is called or how to describe it in a typical text-based search engine.
Brilliant! It is behind a "Terms of User and Privacy Policy" text.
If it does, does it trust its own cert? Probably (certainly?), but if not, that would leave one in the curious (perverse?) position of being safer by using the proxy. superfish can mitm your connection, but nobody else with the key could.
[1] https://twitter.com/search?q=%23superfish&src=typd
[2] https://twitter.com/kennwhite/status/568270748638318593/phot...
... I wonder if there's an MBA / capitalism version of this, centering around short-term profit at the expense of everything else.
Bug 1134506 - Mark "Superfish, Inc." root certificate as untrusted in NSS
Trying all strings from the binary if any of them matches is a cheap and easy operation, so try it first, if it doesn't work use a more elaborate approach.
I assume his reasoning for looking for the private key was similar to: this program creates a new certificate authority and installs it on this computer. In order to do this, it must have all necessary tools for doing so, including the private key it uses to create those certificates, in memory somewhere. Even if that private key is stored encrypted somewhere, it has to exist unencrypted in memory at some point to be used.
> I tried the small dictionary john.dict that comes with John-the-Ripper, and it didn't find anything. But of course, I don't need a real dictionary. The password is probably also in the clear in the memory dump. I could just use the file super.txt as my dictionary! I tried this, but it was taking a long time, with 150k unique lines of text. It'd take many hours to complete. To speed things up, I filtered the list for just lower-case words
It's the lowest hanging fruit. I doubt he expected to find the password just sitting there, but since he did, here we are :)
But yes, keeping sensitive information hidden in plain text considered a security flaw.
That or maybe they are completely clueless about the security implications.
Lenovo's hardware support for Linux is great so unless there's something keeping you on Windows switching to a good Linux distro usually works fine on these laptops.
There is almost no machine out there running openly auditable code on all components.
Adding dodgy userspace software is easy and remunerative for Lenovo ( lots of $$$ from the software vendor for 'bundling' ).
Tampering with firmware is hard, expensive and doesn't seem to offer compelling return on investment. What's the business case?
The idea is something like
<img src="haveproblem.gif"
onError="this.src='noproblem.gif'/>
where haveproblem.gif is signed with the superfish cert (so you'll get an error if your machine does not have it, triggering the onError JS).http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxomitron
Interesting question to consider: what if the MITM was benevolent to the user? I.e. Lenovo included a similar ad-blocking proxy in their default installation? Would the public response have been as negative, or would it be considered to be a helpful addition akin to how most browsers now include popup-blockers?
In other words, are people more repulsed by the purpose (advertising)? Because I certainly think MITM'ing connections locally to remove ads a good thing... and with some devices like "smart" TVs apparently now phoning home and showing ads, I have no qualms about putting their traffic through a proxy to strip that crap out.
avast! was actually guilty of this a while ago (see https://lelutin.ca/posts/avast_conducts_MitM_attack_on_users...), and the article gives some good rationale why MITMing SSL at all without the user's explicit knowledge is bad.
The trust essentially moves from the browser to the proxy - while I don't know what Superfish does, Proxomitron definitely checks the certificate and pops up a warning dialog if there's something wrong.
why MITMing SSL at all without the user's explicit knowledge is bad
I think "without the user's explicit knowledge" is the key point here; if you install a security product then you somehow expect that it be able to inspect all your traffic for any maliciousness... as otherwise the "bad guys" will just make use of SSL to defeat that.
Apparently Superfish ships from Lenovo with the same private key on every machine. So all a bad guy needs to do is extract that private key from one machine, and now they can MITM all the Superfish Lenovo machines from basically anywhere on the Internet.
Has anyone confirmed the certificate validation behaviour in Superfish? I have a feeling it will be "none at all", which would be really bad...
More context at https://twitter.com/supersat
If someone installs a CA, Chrome will trust it. There's not much way around this: if someone has the capability to install a CA on your computer, they'd have the capability to modify chrome.exe to force acceptance of it.
Also, sometimes MITM'ing is desired. I'm doing it right now with Firefox and BurpSuite.
If Chrome were to block unknown roots for pinned sites, these sites would become inaccessible because the MITM proxy is still active. That's certainly not desirable in a controlled enterprise environment, but the same would occur when blocking this 'Lenovo root'.
[1] http://it.slashdot.org/story/14/03/05/1724237/ask-slashdot-d...
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/src/n...
Do you mean the proxy is remote? That is not the impression I have (otherwise having the private key locally makes no sense).
If it's local, then even with the private key extracted, and considering a lot of website force https nowadays, we should still have standard crypto between the lenovo computer and the website. EDIT: As long as the adware checks the website certificate AND doesn't trust it's own self-signed certificate in the store... yeah... a lot of ifs...
Anyway, thanks for the additional details, more helpful than "[...] the certificate allows the software to decrypt secure requests[...]", found in the article...
Standard crypto using that website's certificate. Which could be legit. Or could be an attacker's certificate, signed with this Lenovo root certificate.
Some criminals are about to make a lot of money.
http://www.komodia.com/wiki/index.php?title=SSL_Digestor#Cer...
"Also the module tries to verify that the certificate is indeed signed by an approved signer, it will use the CA store of the browser used to verify that (for Internet Explorer the Windows store will be used, and for Firefox the NSS store will be used), if the certificate isn't legit, the created certificate will be created in a way it would raise an alert to protect the user."
A huge ugly hack...
Now Lenovo is "soon" going to explain how to remove this certificate after the "uninstall" in a buried forum post...
http://forums.lenovo.com/t5/Lenovo-P-Y-and-Z-series/Removal-...
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/secu...
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1134506
Down around 0200 PST 2015-02-19
EDIT: credit
[1] cpeterso https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9072642
I guess Firefox should block that plugin as malicious.
That's the odd part of this. Browser plugins can modify the DOM (insert ads, change search results, etc) without proxying anything. So why do it? I wonder if they were fishing for an NSA contract to further monetize the installs.
The root certificate is the same across all installs, and the private key is present on the machine (necessarily, to operate the proxy): https://twitter.com/fugueish/status/568258997578371072
Someone will extract the private key in the next few hours, and then HTTPS will be basically completely broken for all Lenovo users -- anyone will be able to spoof any site to them.
Uninstalling the app does NOT remove the certificate: https://twitter.com/metsfan/status/568265468173107200
On the bright side, Firefox does not use the system certificates (it has its own list) and Chrome will no doubt push an update to block the certificate promptly.