Why do you say that? Compiling the source with the same compiler and flags, plus diffing the binaries would quickly show where the differences lie, and if they're hostile. Any half-decent reverse engineer could do this.
That would stand out more than if the source itself was backdoored in a non-glaring way. Open source has taught us that nobody ever reads the source.
Tools like bindiff have been around for years and take advantage of the fact that compilers don't randomize code generation. Instead, the callgraph and control-flow graphs largely reflect the structure of the original source code. Once you have leverage by exact-matching the parts of the binary that are nearly identical, you can build up and down the tree of nodes to find those that have more changes.
Crypto backdoors can be unbelievably subtle though. A single branch condition, a bit that is flipped, etc. can all lead to catastrophic failures. For example, a compiler optimization for dead code elimination led to some zeroization of key material being skipped. This kind of thing is extremely difficult to find and requires a careful understanding of the underlying code.
I agree with you that most differences can be found, but understanding the ramifications of those differences requires extremely careful analysis. A crypto flaw does not stand out from a mis-optimization.
That sounds like a pretty broken compiler, do you have a minimal example?
void
encrypt(void *data, size_t len, char *password)
{
char key[32];
turn_password_into_key(password, key, sizeof key);
aes_make_encrypted(data, len, key);
memset(key, 0, sizeof key); /* optimized away */
}
The compiler knows what memset does. It also knows that stack variables have no use after the function returns. Therefore, the compiler knows there is no reason to write zeroes to this memory, because the program will never read those zeroes. Hence, the compiler will delete the call to memset.Backdoors in source can be as simple as changing a single == to = or removing a minus sign in some seemingly innocuous place.
However there are plenty of examples of compilers aggressively removing code that causes undefined behaviour. Basically, when the compiler encounters UB, it can do whatever it wants to code that triggers the UB, which means possibly removing it. Compilers exploit this fact a lot because UBs happen a lot in "normal code". See here [2] for examples and explanations; I also can't help but mention John Regehr's blog [3] if you're interested in compilers, security, testing, safety.
[1] http://research.swtch.com/openssl
[2] http://blog.llvm.org/2011/05/what-every-c-programmer-should-...
[3] http://blog.regehr.org/archives/213 is a great article for example.
I hadn't realized this was the case. That's pretty interesting.
I'm actually surprised that more pro-crypto, pro-privacy types haven't disappeared behind internet pseudonyms. Certainly if I were running a project that I hoped would be useful for dissidents in an oppressive state, I'd do my best to run it as anonymously as I could manage.
There might be personal risks and project risks in revealing yourself, but very little to gain. Knowing the names of the developers might give people warm fuzzies but it probably wouldn't mean much as far as the true security of the software goes. If the name is "John Doe," that tells you nothing, and if it's "Phil Zimmermann" that still doesn't prove that the NSA hasn't forced him to compromise the stuff.
In the particular case of TrueCrypt, which accepts donations through PayPal and credit cards, the "anonymity" of the project members is likely to be pretty thin. I imagine an American prosecutor could have them found easily enough.
At the end of each official .exe and .sys file, there are embedded digital signatures and all related certificates (i.e. all certificates in the relevant certification chain, such as the certification authority certificates, CA-MS cross-certificate, and the TrueCrypt Foundation certificate). Keep this in mind if you compile TrueCrypt and compare your binaries with the official binaries. If your binaries are unsigned, the sizes of the official binaries will usually be approximately 10 KB greater than sizes of your binaries (there may be further differences if you use a different version of the compiler, or if you install a different or no service pack for Visual Studio, or different hotfixes for it, or if you use different versions of the required SDKs).
If the NSA has a backdoor, then they're not sharing it with other law enforcement agencies, and keeping it a better secret than everything else they were up to.
It was actually surprising to me that they shared ANY of them.
This is how intelligence agencies work -- they want to keep it a secret what they can crack, so the adversary will keep on using it, and they can keep on cracking it. For intelligence purposes.
Intelligence is different from law enforcement. Or at least, it used to be. In the US, theoretically the constitution means you can't use secret evidence against someone in court. But of course you can use secretly gathered intelligence for polticial/military/geopolitical purposes. The merging of intelligence and law enforcement is not unrelated to the push to keep more and more legal proceedings secret -- a significant threat to the constitution.
They'd be hard pressed to recommend any off-the-shelf products or practices right now? Because PKI is in shreds, nobody trusts trucrpyt, and TOR users have been rooted left right and centre recently.
Yeah, that's hella inconvenient. But not quite as inconvenient as being murdered or disappeared to a torture prison.
You can't always physically transport those files, and sometimes it may be more dangerous to do so (if you are wanted person for example). You also have issue if you are having those files transported cross border then you may get border issues (Philip Greewalds partner being help in UK). For speed and ease, it would have to be via the internet somehow. For higher security, it would have to be non-network connected computers and via USB. For even higher security it would be non-computer but then I would have to memorise everything and I don't have a photographic memory :(
I'm not sure what I would do in this case either tbh.
Or, perhaps, yes, organizing an uprising neccesarily means risking your life.
But here's schneier on air gaps for his recommendations against protecting yourself from very powerful attackers. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/air_gaps.html
If TrueCrypt is back-doored, the backdoors are likely only present in the binaries offered for download on truecrypt.org, not in the source code, where they would be more easily found. A cross-check of important routines might be informative. A back door would take one of two forms: either it'd smuggle a copy of the key somewhere, or it'd lower the key's entropy enough to be crackable. The former would be discovered by simple disk-space accounting, so it is probably not the strategy used. Reducing the key entropy would make any volume decryptable if it was first initialized by a backdoored copy of Truecrypt, while retaining compatibility with non-backdoored copies; so likely places are in the key-generation, or in the random number generator that feeds it.
Also noteworthy: the download links all work by POSTing to /dl, then being redirected. The Windows download link for me went to http://www.truecrypt.org/download/transient/e2ec88b9b7dfb3a8..., and it's not clear what that big hash is doing there - other operating systems use a different URL scheme (without the /transient/10bytes component). Their web server might occasionally give different binaries to people it doesn't like. All the downloads are over http, not https (except for signatures); and their site responds to https in a very odd way, responding with a valid certificate but always redirecting to non-https.