Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by koolba on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @09:42PM
(#50555413)
We’re all fools for thinking something as inherently dangerous as converting a decoding a base64 string or converting it to upper case should be performed in a non-airgapped environment.
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by TZubiri on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @08:07PM
(#50554702)
It should be pretty straightforward to replace regexes with good ole ifs, array acceses, and comparision operators, whether manually or with an LLM. Pretty low hanging fruit to shave off some kilobytes of attack vector
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by Spivak on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @11:59PM
(#50556238)
What you're describing is using a parser generator build to take a regex and turn it into code you can embed into your project. This already exists and you can use it now. https://re2c.org/
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @08:18PM
(#50554822)
There's what I think is probably an awesome bug here.
Windows-1252 encoding has a representation for lowercase German sharp 's' (ß), but not one for the uppercase. If you upcase a string containing a sharp 's', it gets normalized to "SS", which increases the length of the string by one character. The 1252 case conversion code doesn't handle this; it looks like it checks for headroom in the buffer one character at a time. So if the last character of a string you upcase is ß, it looks like you get a one-byte overflow (of 'S').
If that's really the bug (there's a claimed RCE POC), the heap grooming for it must be really fussy! I couldn't find any other character pairs that expand like this.
You can feed strings in 1252 to a Rails program through multipart POSTs, which get to pick their encodings.
The great thing about this bug, apart from how it illustrates how doomed we all are (if I'm right), is that it should by rights have the best vulnerability name of the year, because you get to work 'ß' into it.
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by p-e-w on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @09:27PM
(#50555314)
It’s not. There are multiple uppercase forms, including “SS”, “SZ”, and the uppercase ß character, all of which are well-established, which makes all of them correct according to the principle of linguistic descriptivism.
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by Georgelemental on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @10:18PM
(#50555620)
But according to the "principle" of blindly following the Unicode standard with no tailoring, the "correct" form is SS. (And Unicode's stability guarantees preclude ever changing it to ẞ)
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by pmontra on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @11:02PM
(#50555935)
Human writing systems themselves have that very same property. The stability of written language prevents them to adapt swiftly to changes to spoken language.
Knight / night is an example for English. That k should be gone, right? Or all those silent -ment and e in French.
Enter the computer and I'm not surprised that German speakers end up mostly with SS because that's what computers do when automatically upcasing words.
A lot of spelling changes are dictated by what's available on keyboards. In Italian we accept E' as È because we don't have that upper case character on our keyboard. Automatic uppercase on start of sentences fixed it where it's available and mobile keywords show an È as an option of you long press a shifted e. But what if you are writing Italian in an English locale form field with a hardware keyboard (here with an OS with English locale) or you have to write È in the middle of a sentence or, go back 30 or 40 years, you have to use a typing machine?
I'm am sure that every language that had to go through a phase of adapting to ASCII and to the limits on the layout of keyboards has similar stories to tell.
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by eviks on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @10:57PM
(#50555898)
Not only that, when you uppercase 1 char with precomposed diacritics, but uppercase doesn't have precomposed diacritics, so they expand into separate chars (max is 1 to 3 chars)
Both fixable, but as with a lot of Unicode stuff, might take a long while
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by dwattttt on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @11:33PM
(#50556114)
As is tradition, Raymond Chen has had something to say about this. The windows-1252 code page was introduced with Windows 1.0, and according to Wikipedia its final version shipped with Win98. String operations are just plain too hard.
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by tptacek on Thursday November 19, 2026 @12:22AM
(#50556367)
There is no good reason for really any Rails app to accept Windows-1252! This is reminiscent of the YAML vulnerability, which surprised most Rails users with the fact that Rails endpoints all accepted YAML to begin with.
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by slopinthebag on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @10:11PM
(#50555581)
oh boy. if only we had a language that could prevent this from happening. oh well, i guess there is nothing we can do but patch these things once they're discovered.
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by Spivak on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @11:36PM
(#50556134)
Just completely rewrite CRuby which includes a JIT and has to maintain ABI compatibility for compiled extensions. I mean I'm certainly not volunteering for that project.
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by ethin on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @10:49PM
(#50555850)
Oh boy if you could develop a solution that would port C code over with completely safe rust semantics where feasible and without people having to clean up the disaster of a result, that would be nice, instead of you guys trying to demonstrate how superior you and your favorite language are. Because that is the only way you are going to port the world to Rust. Oh, and you have to support COBOL too. Probably a bunch of other old languages that have been around for longer than a lot of us have been alive.
Seriously, all these snarky posts about Rust being the god language really comes off as "look how utterly superior we are as Rust programmers and look how superior the Rust language is, this would never ever happen in Rust the god language". Yes, I'm annoyed by stuff like this.
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by rvz on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @10:22PM
(#50555667)
These are all C-based memory corruption vulnerabilities.
The reality of these type of bugs being found by autonomous AI models on established software should tell you by now that memory-unsafe languages are completely exposed.
This is who maintainers you are up against:
"Thanks to Stephan Lipp (Ada Logics) and Anthropic for reporting this issue."
Imagine attackers using abliterated models at scale who don't disclose these issues.
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities in Regexp and String case conver...
by Gigachad on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @11:36PM
(#50556135)
We have been screaming this for years before AI showed up. But instead of removing C wherever possible it was decided fine to just patch the bugs as they showed up.
https://calif.io/java4shell/
> OpenJDK13
Serves those cutting edge technology adopters right. I'm sitting on JDK8 baby!
Windows-1252 encoding has a representation for lowercase German sharp 's' (ß), but not one for the uppercase. If you upcase a string containing a sharp 's', it gets normalized to "SS", which increases the length of the string by one character. The 1252 case conversion code doesn't handle this; it looks like it checks for headroom in the buffer one character at a time. So if the last character of a string you upcase is ß, it looks like you get a one-byte overflow (of 'S').
If that's really the bug (there's a claimed RCE POC), the heap grooming for it must be really fussy! I couldn't find any other character pairs that expand like this.
You can feed strings in 1252 to a Rails program through multipart POSTs, which get to pick their encodings.
The great thing about this bug, apart from how it illustrates how doomed we all are (if I'm right), is that it should by rights have the best vulnerability name of the year, because you get to work 'ß' into it.
This seems like a bad property for a system that encodes human writing systems.
Knight / night is an example for English. That k should be gone, right? Or all those silent -ment and e in French.
Enter the computer and I'm not surprised that German speakers end up mostly with SS because that's what computers do when automatically upcasing words.
A lot of spelling changes are dictated by what's available on keyboards. In Italian we accept E' as È because we don't have that upper case character on our keyboard. Automatic uppercase on start of sentences fixed it where it's available and mobile keywords show an È as an option of you long press a shifted e. But what if you are writing Italian in an English locale form field with a hardware keyboard (here with an OS with English locale) or you have to write È in the middle of a sentence or, go back 30 or 40 years, you have to use a typing machine?
I'm am sure that every language that had to go through a phase of adapting to ASCII and to the limits on the layout of keyboards has similar stories to tell.
Both fixable, but as with a lot of Unicode stuff, might take a long while
Holy sh!t
https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20200804-00/?p=10...
https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20241007-00/?p=11...
Seriously, all these snarky posts about Rust being the god language really comes off as "look how utterly superior we are as Rust programmers and look how superior the Rust language is, this would never ever happen in Rust the god language". Yes, I'm annoyed by stuff like this.
as for porting, well, llm go burrrrrr
The reality of these type of bugs being found by autonomous AI models on established software should tell you by now that memory-unsafe languages are completely exposed.
This is who maintainers you are up against:
"Thanks to Stephan Lipp (Ada Logics) and Anthropic for reporting this issue."
Imagine attackers using abliterated models at scale who don't disclose these issues.
[0] https://github.com/ruby/ruby/security/advisories/GHSA-34m4-m...