I know that is what was promised, but I do wonder how many of Starship’s design goals the program needs to miss on before the general public starts to wonder if maybe goals are not the same thing as guarantees.
What? Based on what? We’ve had two orbital flights ever. And they’ve gone pretty well.
Raptor isn’t shaping up to be a sufficiently reliable engine. They are still having shutdowns and failures on every flight. That could be a huge problem for cheap and rapid reuse because it implies that quite a lot of inspection and refurbishment will be needed for every engine they re-fly. This was a huge problem for the RS-25, and they only had to worry about three of those per flight. Starship has 13 times as many to worry about.
And then they’ve also been having trouble with the thermal protection system, which is also shaping up to require a lot more refurbishment than was originally promised.
In contrast, the propellant-transfer mission is entirely in the design-risk setting. It’s wild NASA is counting on something that risky for missions less than half a decade out.
I’d bet on Starship solving recovery refurbishment (they’ve done it before) and refining an engine (they’ve done before). Thermal protection is riskier, but even if that turns out a blocker, Starship still beats Falcon 9 in cost per pound.
As it is, Starship is proving to be a fairly straightforward example of a project that’s stuck in development hell due to excessive managerial meddling and unrealistic expectations.
It’s only getting this much goodwill because SpaceX also produced Falcon 9, which famously also needed 14 flights to safely reach orbit, and definitely did not get there on the first try and deliver cargo to the ISS by flight 4. /s
There are so many knobs to turn. Everything is conjecture because it's only the beginning. One thing for sure, Superheavy/Starship in the future -- a year, two years, five years from now, will be very different that what was used for this flight.
During launch its relatively fine as you are flying into a designated safe zone, but since its designed to survive re-entry there is a much higher chance of parts surviving and hitting something on the ground. We already saw that with multiple of the Starship V2 flights.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacecraft_cemetery
were these other craft not headed for Point Nemo? if not then wtf
https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/2019/10/31/ooops-whit...
The 11 Starships that have gone through re-entry have so far had no issues with reaching their designated landing zone/spot in one piece (except from some minor parts melting off in their earlier V1/V2 flights). So far SpaceX has shown that they are willing to play it very safe, but there is always a risk and their future re-entries will also do go over land like Flight 15 did.
The motor had like 30 blades and a few of them developed cracks each time, so you have to open it, inspect each blade and replace the bad ones. IIRC Feynman was very afraid one of them would break and cause another crew lost. Luckily it didn't happen, but they have a last chance in Artemis.
The metal encase of the solid rockets would get deformed in the splash, so they have to make them round again.
The heat shield has to be completely replaced by design.
...
(Starship still has unique tiles near flap joints and edges, but the main hull itself has mass produced tiles.)
As for a different approach, try Stoke's active cooling solution:
https://www.stokespace.com/news/building-rockets-to-fly-and-...
The big one though is that it had schoolteachers inside. The Starship is robot drone. If it blows up on reentry it isn’t a huge deal.
Shuttle had to fly humans, and had to maintain its human-rated spaceflight safety rating. This meant that any design change or modification had to be tested extensively to ensure it didn't kill the crew. This took multiple design iterations, took a long time, and was not cheap.
After the initial design of the ship, it made the program very risk averse. Changing anything required a lot of testing, so it was easier to not change it. Shuttle got stuck because it became too difficult and expensive to iterate; Congress did not give NASA enough funds to overcome this, so the project stagnated.
For Starship, it flies without humans so it can rapidly iterate and evolve. SpaceX can make radical design changes, perform minimal testing, then put these changes on the next flight and see what happens. Sometimes it fails catastrophically (which is the main reason Starship keeps blowing up). They can also push the ship close to failure limits, and see how the ship performs, without worrying about humans on board. This allowed rapid iteration and faster evolution of the vehicle.
Shuttle's real problem was it was just an uneconomical design. It was foolish to expect government and its cost-plus contractors to be able to optimize for cost.
The government has no problem with programs producing tangible value that also cost lives. Consider the military, police, search and rescue, and really any activity where people do anything with nonzero risk. The lives lost are part of the cost.
Example: Astronaut Tim goes on an EVA to perform an emergency repair after a micrometeorite damaged the space station. A malfunction of his space suit kills him. Everyone agrees that Tim died a hero doing a high-risk activity that needed to be done, and almost no one would say it means we can't do spacewalks or can't send astronauts to space anymore.
Compare to Challenger or Columbia: The whole crew dies randomly on the way up or down during a routine mission. A program which became known for having like, a 10% chance of that happening would be horrifying (in my opinion).
But Shuttle was an economic as well as a safety fiasco. So there was no good motivation to keep using it.
The biggest tragedy of the Shuttle program was the 12 figure cumulative budget it consumed, equivalent to many thousands of lives.
Assigning a finite value to human lives (in the US, it's around $12M) is absolutely essential to evaluating policy tradeoffs.
> people are unrealistic about the value of human lives
Which one is it?
Given 2 is true and extreme, politics dominates all, and anyone acting like you would have been thrown out of political power as fast as possible. So no, "the cost of" does not pertain only to materiel and technical development, etc.
No, those are just par for the course, a necessary cost for a military that can deliver its intended function.
Manned space has the problem it was set up as theater, not to deliver value independent of the theatrics.
If a space program costs billions of dollars a year, but cannot tolerate any deaths, it should just be abandoned, since it clearly isn't delivering enough value to justify those billions of dollars.
This is not true... The shuttle mission was highly automated. Launch, orbit, reentry was all automated. They only needed human pilots to land on the runway because their algo's weren't good enough. Which, again, was one of many design failures of the shuttle. Having humans on board only slightly increased the chance of success according to nasa. other failures were their ablative heat shield ontop of the ceramica, the carbon-on-carbon plating around the aluminum housing, using aluminum as the body and fins instead of steel, AND DROPPING THEIR BOOSTERS IN THE FUCKING OCEAN.
As opposed to dropping them in the desert or a town? The risk appetite was not there at all to figure out safe capture of the boosters. And if they had the allowance to tackle that problem, it would have been better focussed on improving the shuttle itself, fixing the problems GP has outlined.
Of all the issues, "dropping their boosters in the fucking ocean" probably doesn't even make top 10.
Again, stage zero is a huge enegineering challange and issue that Nasa didn't even attempt to solve because it was too hard.