Overconfident people ofc do not contribute positively to the system, but they skew the system reward's calculation towards them: I swear I've done that work in that direction, where's my reward ?
In a sense, they are extremely successful: they managed to do very low effort, get very high reward, help themselves like all of us but at a much better profit margin, by sacrificing a system that, let's be honest, none of us care about really.
Your problem maybe, is that you swallowed the little BS the system fed you while incentivizing you: that the system matters more than yourself, at least at a greater extent than healthy ?
And you see the same thing with AI: these things convince people so deeply of their intelligence that it blew to such proportion that NVidia is now worth trillions. I had a colleague mumbling yesterday that his wife now speaks more with ChatGPT than him. Overconfidence is a positive attribute... for oneself.
If one contributes "positively" to the system, everyone's value increases and the solution becomes more homogenized. Once the system is homogenized enough, it becomes vulnerable to adversity from an outside force.
If the system is not harmonious/non-homoginized, the attacker would be drawn to the most powerful point in the system.
Overconfident people aren't evil, they're simply stressing the system to make sure it can handle adversity from an outside force. They're saying: "listen, I'm going to take what you have, and you should be so happy that's all I'm taking."
So I think overconfidence is a positive attribute for the system as well as for the overconfident individual. It's not a positive attribute for the local parties getting run over by the overconfident individual.
Of course, the result is that people get fed up and decide that the problem has been not that democratic societies are hard to govern by design (they have to reflect the disparate desires of countless people) but that the executive was too weak. They get behind whatever candidate is charismatic enough to convince them that they will govern the way the people already thought the previous executives were governing, just badly. The result is an incompetent tyrant.
The problem is a bit deeper than that, because what we perceive as "confidence" is itself also an illusion.
The (real) algorithm takes documents and makes them longer, and some humans configured a document that looks like a conversation between "User" and "AssistantBot", and they also wrote some code to act-out things that look like dialogue for one of the characters. The (real) trait of confidence involves next-token statistics.
In contrast, the character named AssistantBot is "overconfident" in exactly the same sense that a character named Count Dracula is "immortal", "brooding", or "fearful" of garlic, crucifixes, and sunlight. Fictional traits we perceive on fictional characters from reading text.
Yes, we can set up a script where the narrator periodically re-describes AssistantBot as careful and cautious, and that might help a bit with stopping humans from over-trusting the story they are being read. But trying to ensure logical conclusions arise from cautious reasoning is... well, indirect at best, much like trying to make it better at math by narrating "AssistantBot was good at math and diligent at checking the numbers."
> Hallucinating
P.S.: "Hallucinations" and prompt-injection are non-ironic examples of "it's not a bug, it's a feature". There's no minor magic incantation that'll permanently banish them without damaging how it all works.
Say, they should be 100% confident that "0.3" follows "0.2 + 0.1 =", but a lot of floating point examples on the internet make them less confident.
On a much more nuanced problem, "0.30000000000000004" may get more and more confidence.
This is what makes them "hallucinate", did I get it wrong? (in other words, am I hallucinating myself? :) )
when i try to remember something my brain often synthesizes new things by filling in the gaps.
This would be where I often say "i might be imagining it, but..." or "i could have sworn there was a..."
In such cases the thing that saves the human brain is double checking against reality (e.g. googling it to make sure).
Miscounting the number of r's in strawberry by glancing at the word also seems like a pretty human mistake.
AI doesn't have a base understanding of how physics work. So they think it's acceptible if in a video some element on the background in a next frame might appear in front of another element that is on the foreground.
So it's always necessary to keep correcting LLMs, because they only learn by example, and you can't express any possible outcome of any physical process just by example, because physical processes can be in infinate variations. LLMs can keep getting closer to match our physical reality, but when you zoom into the details you'll always find that it comes short.
So you can never really trust an LLM. If we want to make an AI that doesn't make errors, it should understand how physics works.
>LLMs can keep getting closer to match our physical reality, but when you zoom into the details you'll always find that it comes short.
Like humans.
>So you can never really trust an LLM.
Cant really trust a human either. That's why we set up elaborate human systems (science, checks and balances in government, law, freedom of speech, markets) to mitigate our constant tendency to be complete fuck ups. We hallucinate science that does not exist, lies to maintain our worldview, jump to conclusions about guilt, build businesses based upon bad beliefs, etc.
>If we want to make an AI that doesn't make errors, it should understand how physics works
An AI that doesnt make errors wouldnt be AGI it would be a godlike superintelligence. I dont think thats even feasible. I think a propensity to make errors is intrinsic to how intelligence functions.
Physics is just one domain that they work in and Im pretty sure some of them already do have varying understandings of physics.
Of course we make all kinds of little mistakes, but at least we can see that they are mistakes. An LLM can't see it's own mistakes, it needs to be corrected by a human.
> Physics is just one domain that they work in and Im pretty sure some of them already do have varying understandings of physics.
Yeah but that would then not be al LLM or machine learned thing. We would program it so that it understands the rules of physics, and then it can interpret things based on those rules. But that is a totally different kind of AI, or rather a true AI instead of a next-word predictor that looks like an AI. But the development of such AIs goes a lot slower because you can't just keep training it, you actually have to program it. But LLMs can actually help program it ;). Although LLMs are mostly good at currently existing technologies and not necessarily new ones.
Think about the strawberry example. I've seen a lot of articles lately where not all misspellings of the word "strawberry" reliably give letter counting errors. The general sentiment there is human, but the specific pattern of misspelling is really more unique to LLM's (i.e. different spelling errors would impact humans versus LLM's).
The part that makes it challenging is that we don't know these "triggers." You could have a prompt that has 95% accuracy, but that inexplicably drops to 50% if the word "green" is in the question (or something like that).
What we call "hallucinations" is far more similar to what we would call "inventiveness", "creativity", or "imagination" in humans than anything to do with what we refer to as "hallucinations" in humans—only they don't have the ability to analyze whether or not they're making up something or accurately parameterizing the vibes. The only connection between the two concepts is that the initial imagery from DeepDream was super trippy.
It's not "inventive" to assume one math library will have the same functions as another, it's just losing sight of specific details.
Not really. At least, it's just as much a reflex as any other human behavior to my perception.
Anyway, why does intention—although I think this is mostly nonsensical/incoherent/a category error applied to LLMs—even matter to you? Either we have no goals and we're just idly discussing random word games (aka philosophy), which is fine with me, or we do have goals and whether or not you believe the software is intelligent or not is irrelevant. In the latter case anthropomorphizing discussion with words like "hallucination", "obviously", "deliberate", etc are just going to cause massive friction, distraction, and confusion. Why can't people be satisfied with "bad output"?
AKA. extrapolation. AKA. what everyone is doing to a lesser or greater degree, when consequences of stopping are worse than of getting this wrong.
That's not just the case of school, where giving up because you "don't know" is guaranteed F, while extrapolating has a non-zero chance of scoring you anything between F and A. It's also the case in everyday life, where you do things incrementally - getting the wrong answer is a stepping stone to getting a less wrong answer in the next attempt. We do that at every scale - from inner thought process all the way to large-scale engineering.
Hardly anyone learns 100% of the material, because that's just plain memorization. We're always extrapolating from incomplete information; more studying and more experience (and more smarts) just makes us more likely to get it right.
> It's not "inventive" to assume one math library will have the same functions as another, it's just losing sight of specific details.
Depends. To a large extent, this kind of "hallucinations" is what a good programmer is supposed to be doing. That is, code to the API you'd like to have, inventing functions and classes convenient to you if they don't exist, and then see how to make this work - which, in one place, means fixing your own call sites, and in another, building utilities or a whole compat layer between your code and the actual API.
No.
What people call LLM "hallucinations" is the result of a PRNG[0] influencing an algorithm to pursue a less statistically probable branch without regard nor understanding.
0 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudorandom_number_generator
Consider the errors like "this math library will have this specific function" (based on a hundred other math libraries for other languages usually having that).
I believe we are saying the same thing here. My clarification to the OP's statement:
What we call "hallucinations" is far more similar to what
we would call "inventiveness", "creativity", or
"imagination" in humans ...
Was that the algorithm has no concept of correctness (nor the other anthropomorphic attributes cited), but instead relies on pseudo-randomness to vary search paths when generating text.https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.09733
https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.18248
https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2024-06-20-major-research-hallucin...
So I don't think it's that they have no concept of correctness, they do, but it's not strong enough. We're probably just not training them in ways that optimize for that over other desirable qualities, at least aggressively enough.
It's also clear to anyone who has used many different models over the years that the amount of hallucination goes down as the models get better, even without any special attention being (apparently) paid to that problem. GPT 3.5 was REALLY bad about this stuff, but 4o and o1 are at least mediocre. So it may be that it's just one of the tougher things for a model to figure out, even if it's possible with massive capacity and compute. But I'd say it's very clear that we're not in the world Gary Marcus wishes we were in, where there's some hard and fundamental limitation that keeps a transformer network from having the capability to be more truthful as a it gets better; rather, like all aspects, we just aren't as far along as we'd prefer.
We need better definitions of what sort of reasonable expectation people can have for detecting incoherency and self-contradiction when humans are horrible at seeing this, except in comparison to things that don't seem to produce meaningful language in the general case. We all have contradictory worldviews and are therefore capable of rationally finding ourselves with conclusions that are trivially and empirically incoherent. I think "hallucinations" (horribly, horribly named term) are just an intractable burden of applying finite, lossy filters to a virtually continuous and infinitely detailed reality—language itself is sort of an ad-hoc, buggy consensus algorithm that's been sufficient to reproduce.
But yea if you're looking for a coherent and satisfying answer on idk politics, values, basically anything that hinges on floating signifiers, you're going to have a bad time.
(Or perhaps you're just hallucinating understanding and agreement: there are many phrases in the english language that read differently based on expected context and tone. It wouldn't surprise me if some models tended towards production of ambiguous or tautological semantics pleasingly-hedged or "responsibly"-moderated, aka PR.)
Personally, I don't think it's a problem. If you are willing to believe what a chatbot says without verifying it there's little advice I could give you that can help. It's also good training to remind yourself that confidence is a poor signal for correctness.
The underlying requirement, which invalidates an LLM having "everything they'd need to know that they're hallucinating/wrong", is the premise all three assume - external detection.
From the first arxiv abstract:
Moreover, informed by the empirical observations, we show
great potential of using the guidance derived from LLM's
hidden representation space to mitigate hallucination.
From the second arxiv abstract: Using this basic insight, we illustrate that one can
identify hallucinated references without ever consulting
any external resources, by asking a set of direct or
indirect queries to the language model about the
references. These queries can be considered as "consistency
checks."
From the Nature abstract: Researchers need a general method for detecting
hallucinations in LLMs that works even with new and unseen
questions to which humans might not know the answer. Here
we develop new methods grounded in statistics, proposing
entropy-based uncertainty estimators for LLMs to detect a
subset of hallucinations—confabulations—which are arbitrary
and incorrect generations.
Ultimately, no matter what content is generated, it is up to a person to provide the understanding component.> So I don't think it's that they have no concept of correctness, they do, but it's not strong enough.
Again, "correctness" is a determination solely made by a person evaluating a result in the context of what the person accepts, not intrinsic to an algorithm itself. All an algorithm can do is attempt to produce results congruent with whatever constraints it is configured to satisfy.
Critically, creation does not require intent nor understanding. Neither does recombination; neither reformulation. The only thing intent is necessary for is to create something meaningful to humans—handily taken care of via prompt and training material, just like with humans.
(If you can't tell, I thought we had bypassed the neuroticism over whether or not data counts as "understanding", whatever that means to people, on week 2 of LLMs)
While it is not an idiom, the applicable term is likely pedantry[0].
> I'm not actually entirely convinced humans are capable of understanding much when discussion desired is this low quality.
Ignoring the judgemental qualifier, consider your original post to which I replied:
What we call "hallucinations" is far more similar to what
we would call "inventiveness", "creativity", or
"imagination" in humans ...
The term for this behavior is anthropomorphism[1] due to ascribing human behaviors/motivations to algorithmic constructs.> Critically, creation does not require intent nor understanding. Neither does recombination; neither reformulation.
The same can be said for a random number generator and a permutation algorithm.
> (If you can't tell, I thought we had bypassed the neuroticism over whether or not data counts as "understanding", whatever that means to people, on week 2 of LLMs)
If you can't tell, I differentiate between humans and algorithms, no matter the cleverness observed of the latter, as only the former can possess "understanding."
0 - https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pedant
1 - https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropomorphism
A lot of us have had that experience. We use that ability to distinguish between 'genius thinkers' and 'kid overdosing on DMT'. It's not the ability to turn up the weird connections and go 'ooooh sparkly', it's whether you can build new associations that prove to be structurally sound.
If that turns out to be something self-modifying large models (not necessarily 'language' models!) can do, that'll be important indeed. I don't see fiddling with the 'temperature' as the same thing, that's more like the DMT analogy.
You can make the static model take a trip all you like, but if nothing changes nothing changes.
They are very good at fooling people; perhaps Turing's Test is not a good measure of intelligence after all, it can easily be gamed and we find it hard to differentiate apparent facility with language and intelligence/knowledge.
It is clearly happening as shown by numerous papers studying it. Here is a popular one by anthropic
You should learn a bit about media literacy.
In fact, it still very much seems like marketing. Especially since the paper was made in association with Anthropic.
Again. Learn some media literacy.
I wouldn't read into marketing materials by the people whose funding depends on hype.
Nothing in the link you provided is even close to "neurons, model of the world, thinking" etc.
It literally is "in our training data similar concepts were clustered with some other similar concepts, and manipulating these clusters lead to different outcomes".
Recognizing concepts, grouping and manipulating similar concepts together, is what “abstraction” is. It's the fundamental essence of both "building a world model" and "thinking".
> Nothing in the link you provided is even close to "neurons, model of the world, thinking" etc.
I really have no idea how to address your argument. It’s like you’re saying,
“Nothing you have provided is even close to a model of the world or thinking. Instead, the LLM is merely building a very basic model of the world and performing very basic reasoning”.
Once again, it does none of those things. The training dataset has those concepts grouped together. The model recognizes nothing, and groups nothing
> I really have no idea how to address your argument. It’s like you’re saying,
No. I'm literally saying: there's literally nothing to support your belief that there's anything resembling understanding of the world, having a world model, neurons, thinking, or reasoning in LLMs.
The link mentions "a feature that triggers on the Golden Gate Bridge".
As a test case, I just drew this terrible doodle of the Golden Gate Bridge in MS paint: https://imgur.com/a/1TJ68JU
I saved the file as "a.png", opened the chatgpt website, started a new chat, uploaded the file, and entered, "what is this?"
It had a couple of paragraphs saying it looked like a suspension bridge. I said "which bridge". It had some more saying it was probably the GGB, based on two particular pieces of evidence, which it explained.
> The model recognizes nothing, and groups nothing
Then how do you explain the interaction I had with chatgpt just now? It sure looks to me like it recognized the GGB from my doodle.
Machine learning models can do this and have been for a long time. The only thing different here is there's some generated text to go along with it with the "reasoning" entirely made up ex post facto
Predominantly English-language data set with one of the most famous suspension bridges in the world?
How can anyone explain the clustering of data on that? Surely it's the model of the world, and thinking, and neurons.
What happens if you type "most famous suspension bridges in the world" into Google and click the first ten or so links? It couldn't be literally the same data? https://imgur.com/a/tJ29rEC
that is the paper being linked to by the "marketing material". Right at the top, in plain sight.
If you were arguing in good faith, you'd head directly there instead of lampooning the use of a marketing page in a discussion.
That all said, skepticism is warranted. Just not an absolute amount of it.
Which part of the paper supports the "models have a world model, reasoning, etc." and not what I said, "in our training data similar concepts were clustered with some other similar concepts, and manipulating these clusters lead to different outcomes"?
I'm going to guess that sometimes they will: driven onto areas where there's no existing article, some of the time you'll get made-up stuff that follows the existing shapes of correct articles and produces articles that upon investigation will turn out to be correct. You'll also reproduce existing articles: in the world of creating art, you're just ripping them off, but in the world of Wikipedia articles you're repeating a correct thing (or the closest facsimile that process can produce)
When you get into articles on exceptions or new discoveries, there's trouble. It can't resynthesize the new thing: the 'tokens' aren't there to represent it. The reality is the hallucination, but an unreachable one.
So the LLMs can be great at fooling people by presenting 'new' responses that fall into recognized patterns because they're a machine for doing that, and Turing's Test is good at tracking how that goes, but people have a tendency to think if they're reading preprogrammed words based on a simple algorithm (think 'Eliza') they're confronting an intelligence, a person.
They're going to be historically bad at spotting Holmes-like clues that their expected 'pattern' is awry. The circumstantial evidence of a trout in the milk might lead a human to conclude the milk is adulterated with water as a nefarious scheme, but to an LLM that's a hallucination on par with a stone in the milk: it's going to have a hell of a time 'jumping' to a consistent but very uncommon interpretation, and if it does get there it'll constantly be gaslighting itself and offering other explanations than the truth.
I wouldn't say zero intelligence, but I wouldn't describe such systems as intelligent, I think it misrepresents them, they do as you say have a good depth of knowledge and are spectacular at reproducing a simulacrum of human interactions and creations, but they have been a lesson for many of us that token manipulation is not where intelligence resides.
Must it have one? The words "artificial intelligence" are a poor description of a thing when we've not rigorously defined it. It's certainly artificial, there's no question about that, but is it intelligent? It can do all sorts of things that we consider a feature of intelligence and pass all sorts of tests, but it also falls down flat on its face when prompted with a just-so brainteaser. It's certainly useful, for some people. If, by having inhaled all of the Internet and written books that have been scanned as its training data, it's able to generate essays on anything and everything, at the drop of a hat, why does it matter if we can find a brainteaser it hasn't seen yet? It's like it has a ginormous box of Legos, and it can build whatever your ask for with these Lego blocks, but pointing out it's unable create its own Lego blocks from scratch has somehow become critically important to point out, as if that makes this all total dead end and it's all a waste of money omg people wake up oh if only they'd listen to me. Why don't people listen to me?
Crows are believed to have a theory of mind, and they can count up to 30. I haven't tried it with Claude, but I'm pretty sure it can count at least that high. LLMs are artificial, they're alien, of course they're going to look different. In the analogy where they're simply a next word guesser, one imagines standing at a fridge with a bag of magnetic words, and just pulling a random one from the bag to make ChatGPT. But when you put your hand inside a bag inside a bag inside a bag, twenty times (to represent the dozens of layers in an LLM model), and there are a few hundred million pieces in each bag (for parameters per layer), one imagines that there's a difference; some sort of leap, similar to when life evolved from being a single celled bacterium to a multi-cellular organism.
Or maybe we're all just rubes, and some PhD's have conned the world into giving them a bunch of money, because they figured out how to represent essays as a math problem, then wrote some code to solve them, like they did with chess.
These tools aren’t useless, obviously.
But people do really learn hard into confirmation bias and/or personification when it comes to LLMs.
I believe it’s entirely because of the term “artificial intelligence” that there is such a divide.
If we called them “large statistical language models” instead, nobody would be having this discussion.
I have tried various models out for tasks from generating writing, to music to programming and am not impressed with the results, though they are certainly very interesting. At every step it will cheerfully tell you that it can do things then generate nonsense and present it as truth.
I would not describe current LLMs as able to generate essays on anything - they certainly can but they will be riddled with cliche, the average of the internet content they were trained on with no regard for quality and worst of all will contain incorrect or made up data.
AI slop is an accurate term when it comes to the writing ability of LLMs - yes it is superficially impressive in mimicking human writing, but it is usually vapid or worse wrong in important ways, because again, it has no concept of right and wrong or model of the world which it attempts to make the generated writing conform to, it just gets stuck with some very simple tasks, and often happily generates entirely bogus data (for example ask it for a CSV or table of data or to reproduce the notes of a famous piece of music which should be in its training data).
Perhaps this will be solved, though after a couple of years of effort and a lot of money spent with very little progress I'm skeptical.
Are you invisibly qualifying this as the inability to generate interesting or entertaining essays? Because it will certainly output mostly-factual, vanilla ones. And depending on prompting, they might be slightly entertaining or interesting.
I have made some minor games in JS with my kids with one for example, and managed to get it to produce a game of asteroids and pong with them (probably heavily based on tutorials scraped from the web of course). I had less success trying to build frogger (again probably because there are not so many complete examples). Anything truly creative/new they really struggle with, and it becomes apparent they are pattern matching machines without true understanding.
I wouldn't describe LLMs as useful at present and do not consider them intelligent in any sense, but they are certainly interesting.
"Right, so what the hell is this cursed nonsense? Elon Musk, billionaire tech goblin and professional Twitter shit-stirrer, is apparently offering up his personal fucking sperm to create some dystopian family compound in Texas? Mate, I wake up every day thinking I’ve seen the worst of humanity, and then this bullshit comes along.
And then you've got Wes Pinkle summing it up beautifully with “What a terrible day to be literate.” And yeah, too fucking right. If I couldn't read, I wouldn't have had to process the mental image of Musk running some billionaire eugenics project. Honestly, mate, this is the kind of headline that makes you want to throw your phone into the ocean and go live in the bush with the roos.
Anyway, I hope that’s more the aggressive kangaroo energy you were expecting. You good, or do you need me to scream about something else?"
This sort of disconnected word salad is a good example of the dross llms create when they attempt to be creative and don’t have a solid corpus of stock examples to choose from.
The frogger game I tried to create played as this text reads - badly.
The whole thing seems Oz-influenced (example, "in the bush with the roos"), which implies to me that he's prompted it to speak that way. So, you assumed an error when it probably wasn't... Framing is a thing.
Which leads to my point about your Frogger experience. Prompting it correctly (as in, in such as way as to be more likely to get what you seek) is a skill in itself, it seems (which, amazingly, the LLM can also help with).
I've had good success with Codeium Windsurf, but with criticisms similar to what you hint at (some of which were made better when I rewrote prompts): On long contexts, it will "lose the plot"; on revisions, it will often introduce bugs on later revisions (which is why I also insist on it writing tests for everything... via correct prompting, of course... and is also why you MUST vet EVERY LINE it touches), it will often forget rules we've already established within the session (such as that, in a Nix development context, you have to prefix every shell invocation with "nix develop" etc.)...
The thing is, I've watched it slowly get better at all these things... Claude Code for example is so confident in itself (a confidence that is, in fact, still somewhat misplaced) that its default mode doesn't even give you direct access to edit the code :O And yet I was able to make an original game with it (a console-based maze game AND action-RPG... it's still in the simple early stages though...)
Re promoting for frogger, I think the evidence is against that - it does well on games it has complete examples for (i.e. it is reproducing code) and badly on ones it doesn’t have examples for (it doesn’t actually understand what it doing though it pretends to and we fill in the gaps for it).
As other examples I asked it for note sequences from a famous piece and it cheerfully generated gibberish, and the more subtly wrong sequences when asked to correct. Generating a csv of basic data it should know was unusable as half the data was wrong and it has no sense of whether things are correct and logical etc etc. There is no thinking going on here, only generation of probable text.
I have used GAI at work a few times too but it needed so much hand holding it felt like a waste of time.
LLMs seem to have similar issues along dramatically different axes, axes that humans are not used to seeing these kinds of mistakes; where nearly no human would make this kind of mistake and so we interpret it (in my opinion incorrectly) as lack of ability or intelligence.
Because these are engineered systems, we may figure out ways to solve these problems (although I personally think the best we will ever do is decrease their prevalence), but more important is probably learning to recognize the places that LLMs are likely to make these errors, and, as your comment suggests, design work flows and systems that can deal with them.
[0] https://youtu.be/2k8fHR9jKVM