Given that, why would it make sense for a service to assume that publishing a key signals that they should use it by default for a given communication channel?
Why else would one publish a key and make it discoverable, if not that it be used?
I've published a key so that people can verify the signatures on some software releases. I don't expect anyone to try sending me an email encrypted with that key. And I really wouldn't expect such an email to work.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3....
I believe separate keys for encryption and signing is the default in most implementations.
Another situation might be that, yes, the user wants encrypted mails, but are debugging their setup, part of which activity is uploading their key to openpgp.org. Until they get their stuff working, they don't want encrypted mails from the wild.
A related situation might be that something breaks in the setup of a user who receives encrypted mails. They'd like to pause them and get regular mails, without the hassle of deleting the key.
You should 100% be able to set a flag on the key server what you are set up to automatically receive using the key.
Perhaps another flag for automatic vs non automatic would help.
Besides, is the criticism that people are using published keys for email? It seems people are outraged that they received encrypted data using keys that they themselves advertised. The specific medium for data transfer doesn’t seem to matter here.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3....
Seriously Proton, just add a god damn prompt! And while you're at it, submit an RFC for a "please use by default" field in certs. Bonus points for a "this key is on a yubikey in a safe so if you use it you better have RCE in production to report" field as well or, hell, just a "key description" text field that clients can show the sender before using the key.
Could you imagine if individual users had to opt-in to using TLS? Nobody would use it. The large push for using TLS everywhere has helped internet security a lot. Enabling the use of OpenPGP everywhere would also help much more than serving the use case of "this key is on a yubikey in a safe", because almost nobody is going to do that anyway.
Browsers will often attempt that connection, and then tell the user ~"Hey we tried to connect with HTTPS, but the server didn't respond. Do you want to try an unencrypted connection"
But there's no case where Chrome will look and see "oh look, akerl has published a cert on this other site, we're going to just send traffic encrypted to that cert when we connect to his website".
Obviously, OpenPGP works differently from TLS, and TLS does not have a concept of key servers - but key servers are absolutely not a new invention for OpenPGP, and it shouldn't be surprising that if you upload your key to one, you might get an encrypted email.
Rolling out end-to-end encryption in a federated system where it wasn't there before, is hard :) But we're trying to do so, anyway.
OP claims to have no memory of having gone through the steps in the published draft standard. The steps involved are at least somewhat more rigorous than merely submitting a key and address to a database, so I'm leaning toward believing OP and questioning the database, especially since the project appears only to have been started in 2019 so completely forgetting having ever gone through such a process seems less plausible than questioning the database.
Further suspect may be the standard, itself (hence "draft"). Why it doesn't require a domain to publish a policy per address for the domain or at least publish that the domain approves usage of the policy seems a rather large oversight* given how it can break email, so this still leads me to be suspicious of Proton as draft standards should be considered "beta", and passively be explicit opt-in (no prompts - user must dig somewhere into the settings to enable).
* I've only briefly skimmed it, so maybe I missed the part covering this.
Also, the WKD draft has nothing to do with what's going on here. KOO is not the same thing as WKD, and is not in beta. It's a key server, and the concept of key servers has been around for ages. (WKD has been quite widely adopted as well, despite being only a draft, but that's an orthogonal discussion. It would definitely be better if it became an RFC.)
Protonmail is not a person.
If the allegation is true, it looks like Protonmail decided to munge e-mails without anyone opting into it.
Spontaneously doing anything unusual with e-mails is a bad idea, until it becomes a standard behavior that everyone else does.
How about a prompt?
Your recipient [email protected] has registered a public key with openpgp.org.
Would you like to encrypt this mail with they public key?
If you know that the recipient is prepared for encrypted e-mails, say Yes.
If unsure, choose "No".
[ Yes ] [ No ] [ ] Don't ask again for this recipient2. Your mom would likely understand "If unsure, answer No", and end up sending a normal e-mail. That text should be in bold, probably. Some of the verbiage could be behind some "learn more" link, where there is space and scope for a better explanation.
It is probably better if the switch is on the receiver's side, as some kind of Boolean field in the key registration record.
It is pretty interesting seeing the various different design philosophies for computer UIs compete in this thread:
the typical Linux approach (ask the user a convoluted question, expect them to understand it and expect an informed response - if/when the user selects wrong, tough shit)
the Windows approach (ask a convoluted question but give an out for the 99% of people who don't understand it - if the user still selects wrong, tough shit)
the Apple approach (don't ask the question at all and choose a sensible default, because 99% won't care - 99% of users get the exact result they wanted to begin with)
That's exactly what anti-encryptionists would want.
However, we don't want to make it opt-in if we can avoid it, even if that's what would make sense for Linux, Windows and Apple; it's not what would make sense for Proton. You can't change the world by copying someone else :)
But once you leave the ProtonMail ecosystem, I expect you'll find that enabling PGP automatically doesn't work most or all of the time. It likely only works occasionally or even rarely.
> You can't change the world by copying someone else :)
Please take this as gently as I intend it: ProtonMail is unlikely to change the world on user privacy, at least when it comes to email. Larger providers are too entrenched, and most people won't care enough about privacy to change their email address (and very few people have a custom email domain to move between providers).
At any rate, it seems like you're copying Facebook: "move fast and break things". Not great when we're talking about messaging. You're breaking email for some people, and some of those people are your users. OP may not be one of your users, but OP's mom is, and you have broken her ability to send her son email with this misguided policy.
> most people won't care enough about privacy to change their email address
Note that with this change, you don't need to change providers to get end-to-end encrypted email: you can let your email client or a browser plugin (like FlowCrypt or Mailvelope) handle OpenPGP for you, and (let it) upload your key to keys.openpgp.org, and we'll send you encrypted email. Obviously, signing up for Proton is still easier, but email is a federated system, and so I think it's important to invest in the feasibility of federated E2EE as well :)
Otherwise, it seems like you're fine with breaking email delivery to everybody using that ever having published an OpenPGP key (and verified their email address) to the public keyserver.
Privacy was indeed preserved -- at the cost of communication.
This seems like the ideal. If the message could look like
> This message from [email protected] was encrypted by PGP using the public key for [email protected] retrieved from www.keys.openpgp.org
> -- BEGIN PGP MESSAGE -- ...
Would that leak anything the email provider and every forwarding server couldn't already have known? Not sure if clients support this kind of mix of plaintext and PGP: of course you could put the metadata in the headers, but clients won't show random new headers by default and Google isn't going to help you encrypt messages they would prefer to read.
But that does require all clients to make this easy for the user.
But we don't. And while we don't, users have a reasonable expectation that they can send an email and the other person can read it.
Why even use Proton then? What is the point?
> If unsure, choose "No".
I'm not familiar with any of this at all, but this sounds to me exactly how it should work: upload and verify the key, so people know they can use that key to send you encrypted email.
The thing protonmail might consider is to put an unencrypted standard message in the body that the message is encrypted because the recipient has published a key, so the recipient understands that it's encrypted and why it's encrypted.
The whole point of associating an encryption key with your email address on a public keyserver is so that you get encrypted mail!
And PGP/GPG keys are used for more than just email, so just because you have a key on a keyserver doesn't necessarily mean you want your emails encrypted with it.
2. Keys have types. These keys were marked for use for encryption. You can upload keys for signing only if you wanted to.
I'm not surprised; these people think a lot more about these sort of things than I do.
One possible addition might be that maybe you could specify whether people should use the key to encrypt whenever possible, or only when security is absolutely vital. That's a setting that could pass the decision to encrypt to the sender (if clients support this).
You opt in by having an email address and by having a published key associated with that email address.
- It is necessary to upload a gpg public key to a keyserver in order to publish packages in some public repositories, such as maven central, or one of several linux distribution repositories
- They needed it in order to send or receive email from an entity that required using PGP, but don't use it normally.
- They tried using PGP for email, found out how painful it was to use, then decided it wasn't worth the effort and stopped.
As an active protonmail user, unfortunately they have a long history of this. My major gripe is that they manipulate emails that I've sent over the desktop bridge. If you sign your emails locally, this of course completely breaks the signature. And if you are sending emails to mailing lists, their internal email header fuckery has a history of eating things like reply-to headers that they can't find a local copy of in your mailbox.
I love their web interface and I am a big advocate of their other features but I am begging Protonmail to just give users the option to send their emails without interference through the desktop bridge.
The recommended way to send signed emails is to let Bridge do it for you; you can enable this with a setting in Proton Mail called "Sign external messages".
Our goal is to make it easy to send and receive signed and encrypted emails. That's what Proton Mail is for. If you want to set up PGP signing and/or encryption yourself, a different service may be more suitable.
That's why Proton Bridge exists: to be able to decrypt all emails, including internally forwarded ones, and present them to the email client unencrypted - and vice versa when sending. Obviously this involves some muching of the emails, for better or worse.
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wussler-openpgp-...
Fastmail just seems to be blowing Proton Mail out of the water in terms of IMAP/SMTP/JMAP. They are actively working on the protocols. Proton doesn't seem to be.
Aha, another sufferer! There must be dozens of us, DOZENS I say!
This is not a "cover your corporate ass" legalese privacy policy, it's intended to be clear and understandable. We also did check it with a lawyer specialized on privacy.
Of course if you don't like it, you're free to not use our community service :)
Log retention is only part of the equation. How long does the project keep the email addresses?
Now, at least one statement is incorrect. Can you verify your key in your sleep?
Now, it is debatable whether the ecosystem is ready to be doing this at (some) scale by default. I agree it's not, dealing with e2e encrypted email is a less convenient experience than plaintext for most users. But not all - case on point, with Proton it's fine.
It's a valid question how opt in our out should work, with lots of implications and stakeholders involved. For better or worse, the status quo is that there is no signaling mechanism in openpgp (or keys.openpgp.org) at the moment to specify how a key should be used, so publishing a key is just a yes or no situation.
If op wants to offer encrypted email as a possible means of communication, but explicitly on an opt in basis, I would recommend a separate email address (or a tag, e.g. +encrypt) for that purpose.