No, those lawyers are paid for by and directed by signal. Signal is responsible.

    $ sudo apt-get install signal
    Reading package lists... Done
    Building dependency tree... Done
    Reading state information... Done
    E: Unable to locate package signal

It should NEVER be more than 1 line of shell or 2 mouse clicks to install anything. This is 2022, not 1995.

It's faster to just search for "signal" in the snap store and hit "Install".

No way. I will never trust your binary.

There are a lot of users that prefer the established trust model of a Linux distribution. They're willing to trust the mostly unpaid debian maintainers for example... but not John Doe, the temporarily set back billionaire who's just about to make it big

wget -O- https://updates.signal.org/desktop/apt/keys.asc | gpg --dearmor > signal-desktop-keyring.gpg && cat signal-desktop-keyring.gpg | sudo tee -a /usr/share/keyrings/signal-desktop-keyring.gpg > /dev/null && echo 'deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/signal-desktop-keyring.gpg] https://updates.signal.org/desktop/apt xenial main' |\ sudo tee -a /etc/apt/sources.list.d/signal-xenial.list && sudo apt update && sudo apt install signal-desktop

This is also one of my fears with pushing non tech savvy people away from Apple/Windows and onto Linux without the Snap, Flathub, or other such curated stores that ship with the distro, without which they would need to touch the terminal and run commands found on the internet.

GNU/Geeks will keep shouting religiously how insecure Windows is because "grandma can download a dodgy .exe pretending to be a game and get viruses", but on Linux it's the same shit or worse, all you have to do is to convince a user new to Linux to paste and run a sudo command in the terminal as instructed by some scammy tutorial he found on Youtube when searching for "how to install Fortnite on Linux" and it's game over for him, since Youtube removed the downvote counter and the user had no idea he was running into a trap.

After all, for most Average Joes, copying some text feels far less dangerous than downloading and opening a strange file.

At least Windows Defender will most likely catch that malware you downloaded and warn you about it being harmful, but on Linux you have no such guardian nanny to save you. With sudo, it will do whatever self-destructive thing you tell it to do and not complain.

  curl -sfL www.marginalia.nu/install.sh | sudo sh -

Or cloning a git repo and building it?

But you can?

With .deb-files you're expected to verify the checksum. Maybe you don't, and even if you don't, you can theoretically go back and verify after as part of a forensic process. This checksum is also typically distributed across different mirrors, making bait-and-switch attacks difficult. It means that if you're going to do a supply chain attack, you must do it in the open.

Compiling from sources is a bit sketchy, but it is also the vector that is easiest to analyze, so I think they cancel out.

Is it really meaningfully easier to analyse? I get that it feels better, but I'd bet that the people saying this would fail to catch the backdoor every time.

I would instead manually download and unpack the app, create separate user for it, and run it in chroot. Much safer than your method.

Sadly, plenty of applications still take the old "apt-key" approach of adding the keys globally (e.g., installing keys to /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d), but I think Signal's installation process is the correct/recommended approach for distributing apt packages securely.

Sadly debian-based distributions do not respect the principle of least privileges and grant unnecessary permissions to installation scripts.

If it is critical or has the potential to compromise security, it should take however many lines that are required to ensure a safe installation. The landscape today is far too complex to expect simple deployments (one liners) to be safe. A few extra lines is a small tradeoff in that case. I shudder when I see curl|bash type installations being normalized.

I've had so many bad experiences with broken third party packages or worse, "installers".

Remember you are expecting the maintainer to not only be honest you are expecting them to secure his own machine as well.

I don't want to add random deb repositories for software like that.

What's your threat model here? Trusting Signal to provide the binary and host the servers, but not distribute the binary that connects to the servers?

Doesn't matter who provides the repository, because ownership can change. Even if you trust the current owner to be diligent and fair you have no control over what a future owner does. (Incidentally, buying widely used but badly maintained browser extensions and using them to distribute malware is a real thing.)

For example: the software everyone cares about is in a repo. The company uploads a version of a core library, such as glibc or libstdc++ in their repo and set it up with a very specific version number. Then they wait a bit, and upload a version of the much-cared software that declares a dependency against the specific library version. When the end users upgrade their packages, they also get a compromised core system library and all of a sudden ALL the software on their system is affected. The software you added the repo for has not been tampered with. But a backdoor from the core library is now present everywhere.

I worked with Nokia and Intel before and during the Maemo/Meego fusion. Back in 2010/2011 I had an early draft patch against libzypper that would have allowed to set certain package priority levels behind a fixed signing key, and made the above attack impossible. (Others were looking at how to confine the install scripts.) I went to a holiday in January 2011 and during that time, Elopcalypse happened. When I came back, the project no longer existed and my RFC patch never saw the light of the day.

Yes, there's a legitimate risk (and accompanying threat model) when trusting package repositories. But I don't understand the specific threat model that involves not trusting Signal's package repository while (1) trusting a random third-party package that (2) just redistributes (in the best case) the official binary.

[1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33455836

I trust Signal, the company, as an author of specific type of communications software. I hesitate to trust them with root on my systems. The company and their intentions are, for the best of my knowledge, benign - but I have seen far too many well-meaning packaging snafus over the past 25 years to add even them to my sources.list.d; and in fact, I believe that with the actions of the company over the past ~three years they have squandered lot of the goodwill they had built up. I'm sorry to say, but the theme to me has felt like one of miscommunication combined with a lack of foresight.

I do trust they have had good reasons for everything. But optics are important, and for stewards of such a critical piece of software Signal have come up with questionably announced surprises. In a domain where boring is the characteristic everyone looks for.[ß]

A bit more context. As of now, there are only two third-party APT repositories that I can stomach. The official Postgres repo, and the Deadsnakes PPA. Both are maintained by the actual package maintainers, so they benefit from the assumed baseline and robustness.

ß: btw, I understand the SMS stuff. From an engineering effort perspective it makes sense, given what shitshow the SMS/MMS protocol stacks are. And with RCS, future integration would not be guaranteed at all. But it still came as a surprise.

Sadly many Linux distributions do not have user-friendly ways to install third-party applications and as a result we see instructions on running curl via sudo bash.

But again: what's the threat model here? If you're worried about someone stealing your messages, then they don't need root access -- they just need to give you a malicious build of Signal. That's way easier in an unofficial ecosystem like Snap than it is with a third-party package repository that Signal's developers are signing for.

(My understanding is that you can also configure apt to limit packages on a per-source basis, but I won't recommend that since I don't think anybody bothers to do that.)

By installing signal-desktop you give Signal not only access to your messages (which is fine), but root access to the whole system which allows reading and modifying any file. Even if Signal doesn't have malicious intents, they might have vulnerabilities in their installation or configuration scripts.

My understanding (as an outsider) is that Signal doesn't object to you building yourself a copy of Signal Desktop for source, but they do object to anybody building it for others, especially when they brand it as "Signal." That doesn't seem especially unreasonable to me: E2EE is a domain where trust is established exactingly; a proliferation of unreviewed third-party builds compromises environmental trust.

That would still be your lawyers talking to their lawyers. The channels for handling DMCA takedowns are much more efficient than channels for handling something custom.