The real problem is locality. Why am I located in me instead of in you? Why is it so much easier for me to see out of my eyes than it is for me to see out of yours? What's the connection between my perspective and my body?
The idea that self-awareness/consciousness ("I am me") is the big problem is weird. I have no problem locating that in the material world. If I program a computer to poll all of its peripherals, report on its RAM and processors, and adjust how it runs its programs based on that, that's as much self-awareness as I have, if not more.
Your body is doing the experiencing. It is what's perceiving.
Your mind is just your body's UI for the world and your body is the user.
Because it expresses your thoughts. Your mind has access to them in a way that it does not have access to anyone else's thoughts.
In particular, that access includes memories of having them and taking the actions necessary to post them. If you lost those memories, and your words were not identified as being yours, you would no longer regard them any differently than you do anyone else's (it is not even certain that you would agree with them.)
Note that the above statements involve no presupposition of materialism, but they are consistent with it. In particular, from a physical point of view, it is obvious why one would only have privileged access to one's own thoughts and experiences.
edit: I can use a computer to remind me to use a computer to remind me about something. I can lose the use of my hands and eyes by severing biological wires. I can't pinpoint a distinction between me and the computer. I can't pinpoint a distinction between me and you, other than distance and mechanical connection (which we currently have, with some latency and signal distortion.)
The car is a thing, like your body. The speed is what the car is doing, like your mind is something your brain is doing. No problem, nothing to accept.
My own mind is something I am doing, just as I am typing just now. It should be obvious enough that neither is something you are doing.
"Causation" is purely interpretation; the universe has nothing to do with that. People invented causation to help understand the universe, but there is nothing fundamental about it. So long as you think you need causation of any kind to understand consciousness, you will get nowhere.
No, you cannot deduce dualism from what I said. You filled in assumptions that aren't present and which I don't assert. It's just physicalism (materialism is an outdated term[1]) but would also work for neutral monism[2].
> I can't pinpoint a distinction between me and the computer. I can't pinpoint a distinction between me and you, other than distance and mechanical connection (which we currently have, with some latency and signal distortion.)
What? Maybe you need a psychiatrist now? This sounds like dpersonalization or derealization.
The fun question is, what exactly is connected to those sensors and experiences them and where is the location of that thing?
It's like we're sitting with a VR headset in our brain, playing that game we call life. But, where exactly are we and how is that headset connected to our sensors?
Again, your body.
Think about it. Your body is experiencing what your brain has generated out of your sensory input.
You don't need a homunculus, you are a body. You are your body and there's nothing else to you.
It's like you're asking why is this computer that I generated this data visualization from this data on this computer displaying this data visualization on this computer. Umm, because that's what you asked it to do and that's the default? For anything else to have happened, you would have had to redirect the output to a network and then go receive it on a different computer.
> What does it mean for a body to be "mine?"
You are your body.
> So - does water flowing down a hill have a perspective? Where is it located?
Why would it? Does it sense and produce a mind? Not that I'm aware of. You could go the pansychism route if you want though. See David Chalmers or something.
> can I say that I'm any less the water as I am my hands, even though I'm controlling the water, getting feedback from the water, subjecting the water as much to my nervous system as I am subjecting my hand itself?
According to enactivism, no. [1] In general, see embodied minds theory. [2]
> Why would it? Does it sense and produce a mind?
I don't know what a mind is supposed to be in this context, or its importance. I don't identify my perspective with my thoughts. My thoughts are something a body does. My perspective is just my location. After death, my thoughts will cease. My location will not change.
If you are going to ask questions, you should at least be able to justify their relevance, if asked.
You're obliterated, then perfectly reassembled on the other side. Is that still "you", "subjectively"? Should you or others even care about that question? And, if not, damn, that's ego-killing af.
But you go to sleep every night. Is the person who wakes up "you"? Many of the atoms in the person who woke up were in that person's stomach, and many of the atoms in the person who went to sleep are in the air. Does the difference from the transporter thing matter? No reason it should. The person who went to sleep is not here. The one who woke up can spend that person's money, wear that person's clothes, remember passwords. Close enough is close enough.
You might choose not to spend that person's money, next day. But they won't be needing it, and you do. So, no problem.
If you perceive a problem, you are just tying yourself in knots, and are guaranteed to make no progress.
Of course, I, the original, will not be the copy, but if I go in knowing I'm not the copy, the the copy will come out knowing he's not the copy. Thus, you should go in believing there's a 50% chance you are the copy, and then both the original and the copy will come out with a logically consistent belief.
To be honest, I don’t get what you are really trying to understand or find out here.
I can respect this, but I think you have much bigger problems than consciousness if you're a materialist. Current natural philosophy and physics is far from anything resembling a materialistic worldview.
Where we are right now in both QM and GR can best be described as a highly precise description of what happens, but at the expense of forcibly ignoring the essence of what constitutes material reality. In the case of QM, the "just run the equations" view of the world has been dominant since Einstein reluctantly ceded ground on this issue. To put a finer point on it, unless physicists can provide a materialistic explanation for entanglement or wavefunction collapse, we're still very much in an ethereal, immaterial world.
(fwiw, I am something of a materialist, which is why I have thought of this problem beforehand.)
In fact, complex entangled states made of many interrelated "qubits" or degrees of freedom are one of the most promising candidates for the physical correlate of similarly-complex phenomenological experience. Complex-enough quantum computers might just feel stuff, as a matter of basic reality.
Yes, but what is material reality?
The current understanding of entanglement in QM is indistinguishable from math. And then we need to ask: are the equations real? Seriously, are they? Or are they just an approximate description of something we don't understand that well?
Because if entanglement is part of material reality as defined by the good ol' gauge theorists and the equations, then we really do live in a math equation, and it's not clear how or why that math equation runs the way it does. Or what it runs on for that matter. Or if it exists at all and our senses are just hallucinating this. This is fundamentally different from the understanding of philosophical, physical materialism.
The main alternative viewpoint to materialism, dualism, posits some further 'external' influence that acts on the world to account for phenomena we poorly understand like consciousness, and for some people psychic or religious phenomena. I think that's just fuzzy thinking, and I don't even really know what they mean. How can something not 'of the world' interact with the world? Surely 'the world' is everything that can act on or influence each other, right? I'm not sure how else to define it.
I really have no access to that. I've just taken a couple of extreme positions, and hope that one day somebody can come up with some way to reduce or test them materially, although I accept that I can't even speculate about a way to do it.
One is a panpsychism. The material world exists within a substrate of perspectives, and as material objects pass through them, the perspectives momentarily attach to those objects, and whatever is mechanically connected to them. This happens at an arbitrary rate (depending on the density of the perspective substrate and the relative speed of the material passing through it.) If we call the amount of time that a perspective is located "centrally" enough in a human nervous system to have access to it a "moment," then for a moment, that perspective thinks it is me. This assumes that perspectives are distinct for purposes of explanation, but they don't have to be - maybe an infinite number of perspectives think that they are me at any particular moment, and in the next moment, an entirely different set.
The other is that there's a particular geometry of electromagnetic activity that captures perspectives, and minds happen to conform to that geometry.
I don't think these are any more insightful than "the soul talks to bodies through the pineal gland." I can only hold onto them as more abstract and generalized. There's no material way to tell when you've captured a perspective, and we each only know of the existence of one with certainty. We could be Buddhist and say that the universe is one fragmented confused perspective, or say that we're a bunch of islands; either way, we have no material basis for those beliefs. The only thing we know is that we're not P-Zombies. We don't know that others aren't P-Zombies, just us.
Well, they predict what we observe, which is not a property of math in general.
Maybe the lesson of physics is that the material world is not like how we might imagine it, based on our everyday intuitions. If you accept that the world is not moving and not flat, that bodies continue in motion unless acted on by a force, and that Lorentz transformations represent the relationship between different inertial frames, then you already accept things that are counter to everyday intuitions. Hopes for explanations that are not ultimately grounded in "that, as far as we know, is just how things are" might be wishful thinking.
Even so, accepting non-determinism from QM does not cause me as much cognitive dissonance than the problem of conscioussness.
I think it's deeper than non-determinism. We can imagine an extraordinarily precise "random" number generator that is software, more than capable of fooling all measurements we as humans make of it. It would also be non-deterministic. It would also, importantly, not be real.
Until we can confidently say that the equations of physics are not actually themselves reality, we can't say materialism is even a thing. To be a materialist requires belief that what we know is a description of reality and not reality itself, and that would be true even if we had a deterministic "Newtonian" pre-QM view of the world coupled with advanced theory.
I've come to the same conclusion. Meaning no disrespect or insult to them, it seems to me that it must be the case that some folks just haven't noticed themselves.
P.D. Ouspensky talks about learning to "remember myself" in "In Search of the Miraculous" and describes how it was for him to practice changing from thinking one is self-aware to actually becoming self-aware moment-to-moment. There's a passage...
> Two hours later I woke up in the Tavricheskaya, that is, far away. I was going by izvostchik to the printers. The sensation of awakening was extraordinarily vivid. I can almost say that I came to. I remembered everything at once. How I had been walking along the Nadejdinskaya, how I had been remembering myself, how I had thought about cigarettes, and how at this thought I seemed all at once to fall and disappear into a deep sleep.
I suspect people who think that consciousness is not a hard problem must be still "asleep" in this sense, effectively P-Zombies, although the potential is there to become self-aware beings.
- - - -
> as a materialist, I have a really hard time accepting that my self/experience can't be explained materialistically.
Okay, fair enough, but then you have the infinite regress problem. How do you explain material itself materialistically?
Some folks don't enjoy tying themselves in knots. You are absolutely welcome to spend your precious seconds of limited life on it, but it doesn't make you superior, however much you would like to think it does. It's just a choice, like between working and playing.
You could also choose not to tie yourself in knots, and then you would not be blocked, and could begin to make sense.
Like for instance, the experience a human would have when relaxing in a hot tub with their friends, is "better" in some important, real sense compared to the experience of dying in a trench in WWI?
If not, I probably can't convince you that there is a hard problem having to do with consciousness where we'd benefit from knowing all the answers. But if so, I could give it a try.
A system for understanding consciousness that depends on objective merit will face very stiff competition from those that don't.
Maybe “you like the experience of drinking tea” is a totally compatible statement with “I don’t like the experience of drinking tea” in an objective sense.
I would say it’s not that consciousness depends on objective merit, but that it could be the other way around.
Is being a "P-Zombie" inferior to being self-aware? By what metric could such a comparison be made? Is the water inferior to the wave?
Also, "tying themselves in knots" != "noticed themselves", if anything it's the opposite: all knots untie.
"Noticing yourself" is something literally everyone does. Not everyone ties themselves in knots. The alternative to tying yourself in knots is to think clearly without inventing falsehoods.
"P-zombies" is just another word for solipsism. The moment somebody proposes either, you know there will be no more clear thought.
I frankly have zero evidence that anyone else but me is experiencing consciousness. And there’s nothing you can utter that can change that.
Consciousness is a hard problem until you realize that most of it is an illusion. Which is the very reason that it is so hard to understand: there's nothing to understand, because it's not real.
That's my take, maybe not exactly the same as Damasio and Seth's, but compatible with theirs.
But I do believe in Wolfram's "principle of computational equivalence", and thus that anything that can implement a turing machine can also implement any other complex system, including consciousness.
Finally, I don't know if I can make a meaningful distinction between feeling and experiencing. I believe a feeling is an experience.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_monologue#Absence_of_...
I now worry about some form of future cyborg racism where those without the gift are considered untouched by god or subhuman
To answer the hard part.... To be completely honest, I think qualia are dualistic emanations of the One Source of Truth and understanding, and describable as convex optimizations in the kinds of spaces that Incompleteness deals with. I think love and honor are hyperparameters for the hypercomputers that we refer to as our hearts and that simulation is much more likely than material because of dichotomy / reality gap.
After all, if my decisions do not flow from my state, including my experience, memories, preferences, etc, how can we say they are meaningfully mine? I fully accept a degree of randomness in the process, quantum mechanics is a thing, but randomness is just noise. No determinism, no agency.
This can also be probed with science. If we know how the brain wires itself, what it is computing and representing then I think we'll find these patterns in the brain.
This is how I best understand these things. I can also go into more detail how I came to think about this this way and how I got to this point.
Start instead with SE, and then any sort of material universe can be the contents of it.
By the way, there is a whole line of debate on the sense or nonsense of the ever-present "what it is like" phrasing:
>‘What it is like’ talk (‘WIL-talk’) — the use of phrases such as ‘what it is like’ — is ubiquitous in discussions of phenomenal consciousness. It is used to define, make claims about, and to offer arguments concerning consciousness. But what this talk means is unclear, as is how it means what it does: how, by putting these words in this order, we communicate something about consciousness. Without a good account of WIL-talk, we cannot be sure this talk sheds light, rather than casts shadows, on our investigations of consciousness.
(Jonathan Farrell - ‘What it is Like’ Talk is not Technical Talk)
PS: I like your P-Zombie joke :D
On a more serious note, as a materialist, I have a really hard time accepting that my self/experience can't be explained materialistically. It's like I have this nice theory of everything, but it fails when I try to apply it to myself. Reminds me of Gödel's incompleteness theorem.