We had incidents in the past just because the colleague had given the number to Google and those were corporate accounts.
Every time a service moves to SMS or phone calls for 2FA a cry can be felt across the universe by any security engineer/cryptographer.
If you are a person responsible for this: please don't. If my antiquated bank that is insured and doesn't really care can understand this, so can you, if you care just a bit.
You literally do not have a choice, last time I checked you had to setup SMS 2FA first. Once you’ve done that you can setup a better method and remove the SMS, but you have to remember to do it.
> If my antiquated bank that is insured and doesn't really care can understand this, so can you, if you care just a bit.
My bank certainly has not gotten that memo.
Suggestion to phone companies: When receiving such requests email and text the user saying "we've had a request to transfer your number, contact us if not you" rather than just cracking ahead.
The process has a security hole by design: SIM cards can get damaged/lost (usually with the phone) and you wouldn't want to lose your number just because you lost your phone or damaged your SIM card by accident. This hole is typically exploited by attackers after they have identified a high-value target. You basically outsource the control over your account to a telco employee.
Still can’t prove what happened but someone ported my number from my carrier to Sprint and it took easily 18 hours to undo it. And it required convincing sprint, which I had no affiliation with, that the original transfer was not intended, and that yes I want to reverse it out.
Crazy painful.
I suspect it's some work-life balance enhancing thing. :D
I don't really mind, since it also helps me bash Google services in front of my clients who still use them, without being aware of these failure modes.
Personally speaking, it's absolutely a no go service. I can probably handle service loss at home quite fine, but if I relied on google or other services with these "anti-abuse" features while traveling that would be very stressful. I usually print out everything important before departing so I don't rely on any electronics, anyway, because none of it is as reliable and as quickly accessible as a piece of paper or a bunch of cash.
Their expressed policy makes an interesting contrast with their behavioral policy of freaking out and locking you out of your own account if you ever try to sign in on a device they suspect might not belong to you.
And of course, they're godawful at recognizing whether a device belongs to you. They freak out and send me "urgent" emails (on a different gmail account) whenever my phone switches between wifi and the cell network. Responding "yes, that was me" does nothing to prevent this.
The fact that Google is inconsistent about it is probably due to Google generally not being good in UX and frequently making these kind of mistakes where it seems there are multiple teams doing their own things incompatible with each other.
You misspelled "product lifecycle management." Google's lack of accomplishments in this department is a testament to their research, innovation, and committment to the disciplines of Six Omega (6ω) process strategies.
I currently have an old (infrequently used) gmail account, with a valid recovery email, that I cannot log in to at all.
I don't have (or want) 2FA set up for it.
I tried an incognito window just now, and same problem ):
Never doing any buissness with ms again.
No github for you then ;)
And if you're talking about the hosted solution... we use that at work. We have what are effectively outages once a week on average.
I like the way Gitlab as a company is run and I really want to like it but... I use gitea at home and we're actively migrating away from it at work.
Don't use a major cloud provider. That's $20/mo with Digital Ocean.
Can confirm that gitea's pretty nice. It's not heavier than a web-based git host should be. I really like that it has a SQLite database option, since that's plenty good enough for low-tens of users and operationally simpler.
Or of course, just send the code to anyone and SS7 hijack that specific text message. You aren't hacking them, after all, you're hacking yourself or someone else.
What does this mean?
I am one of those people using option 2, by virtue of keeping a lot of old email accounts that I have set up to forward to my main account. So I don't usually need to remember which account if was, and just wait for the email to come through from the void
Now I can't use option 1 or 2 because I don't have internet access until Google approves my sign in. I can't use option 3 because I don't have a SIM card that would work locally. Thankfully Facebook login worked.
Are you insinuating that Google has this convoluted verification flow to intentionally harm people in some way? Or even to intentionally harm privacy or further business goals at users' expense?
Or are you just using "evil" to refer to anything you don't like?
That may not be what they intend, but that is result, regardless.
Yes (and obviously).
Google, and other SaaS, have used such dark patterns to collect more user identity data (user profile info is what they ultimately sell - even if sold to advertisers "anonymized", the profile is richer and more worth the more data they have on you).
Google forcing you to enter a phone number is dishonest/hostile and has absolutely not the slightest to do with any desire to make your account more secure.
It's basically just Google holding your account hostage to get your phone number.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/07/fixed-ftc-orders-faceb...
So, since it isn't effective for its stated purpose, are there other reasons it could be in place?
Two options from the top of my head:
1. you have email forwarding configured so received mails will be delivered to another account. That's generally configured in the settings of the provider (I.e. directly under account settings in Gmail iirc)
2. You have a logged in device which receives mails through an application password. You cannot read it out because it's masked and even if you could, it wouldn't help you because it's only allowed to receive mails, not login.
I don't think this is particularly rare, honestly.
But yes, it is obnoxious.
I can't think of another way not to get locked out in case I ever lose my phone.
Google, Paypal and a few others seem to be the worst offenders at "protecting me".
Gmail intercepted me and claimed to be worried that they couldn't recognize the device I was using. According to the flow, they wanted me to verify my identity in one of three ways: (1) I could verify the backup email address associated with the account; (2) if unable to do that, I could provide the 2FA code sent to that same backup email address (how would I be able to know this without being able to know what the address was?); or (3) I could provide a phone number -- previously unknown to Google -- on the spot, and then provide the 2FA code sent to that brand-new phone number. (How is this supposed to help them verify my identity?)
I went for option (2), the email 2FA code. After providing the code, I was informed that, before signing in to my existing gmail account, I must also provide a phone number and enter the 2FA code sent to my new phone number.
So I went back and went for option (1), typing in my backup email address. Same thing happened. Because Google "couldn't recognize the device I was using", I was not allowed to sign in to an account I obviously controlled without providing a phone number with absolutely zero authentication value.
I did find a workaround. If you attempt to sign in to an account afflicted in this way in an incognito browser window, Google will, for the moment, allow it.
"Don't be evil" is long gone.