I want my network to tell me a DNS server to use. As I own my computer I can override that, but much of the time I want to use the network provided DNS server.
The cat is out the bag, so to speak. I foresee a lot of adware, spyware, and malware leveraging DoH now to evade just about every DNS-based monitoring/blocking/provisioning solutions.
Anyway, the right layer to monitor for Internet traffic has always been the IP layer (VPNs notwithstanding).
Adware, spyware, and malware has always had the ability to avoid system DNS. At its most basic, they could hardcode lists of IPs into their malicious code. At its most complex, the same building blocks that DoH/DoT use were available to them: they could build similar tools that tunnel over HTTPS/SSH/etc, whichever protocol they felt was least conspicuous on their target system. Drop a list of hostnames into a pastebin post, tell your malware to check the list for updates, profit.
DoH in Firefox simply makes the above issue harder to ignore. Before this, an enterprise or individual sysadmin could implement DNS inspection at the border, see logs showing their users browsing naughty websites, and feel like they’d made progress. But they’d always be blind to attackers (or nefarious users) who just didn’t bother using the stock DNS offering to bootstrap their hijinks. Detecting that has always required device-level monitoring or further MITM of traffic; learning about DoH makes that more obvious to sysadmins, but it doesn’t materially change what adversaries were able to do already.
Which makes the malware more fragile, because the hosts are often compromised machines themselves, or are the targets of takedowns. If they include only one IP at a time (as they can do with DNS) then when that machine gets cleaned by the owners, they have no way to switch to another one. If they list several machines then anyone analyzing the malware has a list of multiple compromised machines to go have them all cleaned at once. Also, then you can add the IP address to a block list and they can't update it like they can with DNS.
> At its most complex, the same building blocks that DoH/DoT use were available to them: they could build similar tools that tunnel over HTTPS/SSH/etc, whichever protocol they felt was least conspicuous on their target system.
Malicious javascript in a browser doesn't have access to SSH or similar. And that's assuming their code can even reach your machine if your Pi-hole is blocking the DNS name of the server hosting it.
> DoH in Firefox simply makes the above issue harder to ignore.
It makes it harder to prevent. Someone sends the user an email link to a URL containing an unpatched browser exploit or a link to a malicious binary. If the Pi-hole blocks the domain and/or the IP address in the email, the attack is prevented. If the browser bypasses the Pi-hole, you have malicious code actually running on the user's machine, and that's a much bigger problem.
> Also, if they use an IP address then they can't be using SNI to host it on the same IP address as several other domains
Sure they can, just hardcode the "Host" header value as well
> Malicious javascript in a browser doesn't have access to SSH or similar.
They can access HTTP though, which is more than enough.
Over HTTP from what? You would need name resolution or a hard-coded IP address to make an HTTP request.
And the thing this is preventing isn't just what the malware does after you're already infected, it's the path to receiving malware to begin with.
For non-tech companies, replace with any relatively popular wiki.
The goal is “make a connection over HTTPS or other normal-looking protocol, to a destination that is both justifiability relevant for normal user traffic and allows the attacker to seed the next-step”. And it turns out there are lots of sites that fit that bill.
They're not going to leave malware payloads sitting there. Pastebins etc. get abused as malware command-and-control systems all the time, and of course some gets through, but countermeasures happen. Whereas for a DoH server it would be operating as designed.
The issue is “how do I tell my bootstrapper where to get a payload from in an inconspicuous way”. To solve that, you find a benign site with existing business purpose (like GitHub or a wiki or a pastebin), and you insert your desired IP address. So maybe you add it as new file in a repo under your cool new fake GitHub account, and the file just says “1.2.3.4”. Now you can tell your bootstrapper to make an HTTPS request for that file, which looks boring to any introspection because outbound requests to GitHub are normal, and to use the resulting IP to request the payload.
Your compromised payload host gets shut down? Spin up a new one, and update the file on GitHub with the new IP.
A simple GET request to https://github.com/adkafdjsh20/cool_repo/blob/master/dns.txt would work for DNS purposes.
Also, there are countermeasures for malware domains themselves, as you can report them to registrars.
https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/configuring-networks-di...
Someone previously mentioned Pi-Hole. Pi-Hole provides the DoH canary domain in it's default configuration, therefore if you run an up to date Pi-Hole on your network you will have DoH disabled. It is recommended (and there are good instructions on the Pi-Hole website) to set up cloudflared or a similar DNS resolver which implements DoH as the backend to Pi-Hole, allowing it to use DoH when leaving your network but still act as the local network's authoritative name server.
If you choose to be a network operator, there are some additional complexities you must think about. For those (majority of) users that choose not to be network operators, DoH is nearly transparent for them and provides significantly improved security and privacy by preventing local cache poisoning, DNS injection, and DNS snooping attacks on their browsing.
Additionally, while the default in Firefox is a non-filtering endpoint currently, you can manually configure the use of a filtering DoH endpoint like those provided by CloudFlare 1.1.1.1 for Families if you wanted to do so. Nothing prevents this, and it can be configured via policies network-wide in Firefox using the enterprise policy mechanisms.
I still don't really understand this. Yes, it solves that problem, but how is it not also defeating the entire premise? If you had a DNS server from an adversarial network operator, they could just resolve the canary. So it means the browser's DoH is only secure if you can trust your network operator's DNS, at which point, what was its purpose supposed to be?
And the fear is that at some point someone is going to try to "correct" that by removing the check for the canary.
There's still some specific cases where DoH is problematic, but these are being eliminated over time as the technology matures. As an example of this, split horizon DNS in corporate environments is a good choice. Right now, the only realistic way to provide this is with Do53, so DoH must be disabled, but with Microsoft adding DoH support into the Windows 10 DNS Client, they are likely soon going to also support it on Windows DNS Server, which would enable businesses to make use of DoH internally and to simply set the endpoint by enterprise policies.
DoH is a few different things, but at it's most basic it's transport security for DNS, which is a fundamentally good idea any way you slice it. At some point in the future, plaintext DNS will effectively cease to exist and that's a /good thing/. There are several different implementations of encrypted DNS in the wild besides DoH (DoT and DNScrypt as examples), whichever you choose, any option that encrypts DNS both on your local network and across external networks improves privacy and security.
It takes a pretty long time to transition fundamental protocols like this, but a future where more things are sent across encrypted transports is a good future. Plaintext DNS is incredibly vulnerable, and it's also in an area which isn't heavily visible to most users, which is not a recipe for success.
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/DOH-resolver-policy
This is all publicly documented. As Mozilla rolls DoH out to other regions they will add additional TRR partners and CloudFlare won't be the only choice.
And in many cases the user is the network operator. What the browser is doing is taking away the mechanism to set local policy. Ordinarily you hand out the DNS you want your devices to use via DHCP, and they use it. If you move that from the OS to the application and the application ignores the DHCP setting by default, now you've lost the ability to set a uniform policy for all your devices and applications. It becomes an arduous manual process to change the setting in every application on every device, and then you probably miss half of them.
DNS has historically been set by network policy so that it's easy for network operators to map hostnames to their local network resources. The point of the design wasn't to enable traffic monitoring or content blocking by altering the results for hosts that aren't under your control.
For most people, their local DNS is someone like Comcast or Verizon, way less trustworthy than CloudFlare. We shouldn't reduce the privacy of the majority of people just to increase it for a small minority of people by default.
Are you referring to the whole CA system being an untrustworthy racket?
What is the burden for using HTTPS assuming you DO want to be able to inspect and block HTTPS resources at a network level? Very extensive compared to plain HTTP.
Who doesn't want that? I have a pihole (and use OpenDNS). Bypassed it all yesterday, as an experiment, to look at an anime site my eldest started using and immediately was hit with a pretty impressive and convincing phishing attempt (mimicking my ISP).
Pretty much all of us on HN seem to use some form of 'DNS' based filtering (pihole, or even just hosts file). UK ISPs offer DNS based filtering as a default (and have to filter some pages by law, and are encouraged to filter others [through threat of law]) ... but a lot of people want that, many many families, schools, businesses.
Certainly I don't want it to be easier for advertising and malware to bypass my chosen DNS-style filtering.
UK ISPs having mandatory DNS blocking is a great example of why DoH is important. The user should decide what they want, not the network operator.
Perhaps widespread use of encryption technologies means I can't do content blocking on proprietary appliances like the Chromecast for example. I think that's a necessary evil and I just won't buy such an appliance if it's that big of a problem. Only legislation can really fix that kind of problem anyway, it doesn't really matter whether Firefox implements DoH or not.
The other half of the problems are around defaulting to allowing cloudflare to inspect your traffic, instead of comcast. And the lack of integrity and encryption for the rest of the DNS infrastructure. And the expansion of the complex and difficult to secure x509 certificate regime which we should be moving away from. (Something like gossamer seems to be a big step in the right direction)
I want encrypted dns, just not a half-assed hack of an implementation that is going to be impossible to fix once deployed.
Regarding the rest of the DNS infrastructure, I agree there is more work to be done. But I see DoH/DoT/etc as a necessary step and not a "half-assed implementation" that needs to be "fixed".
> DoH in Firefox simply makes the above issue harder to ignore.
That's exactly what I mean [0]. The cat's always been there so to speak but now it is out there roaming around harder to ignore.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25123487 and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Script_kiddie
But tunnelling X in Y is not new at all and has a long tradition (even in regular protocol design). Is this really a shift waiting to happen in malware? As I would think, this has been available all along. Except for browser-based malware.
It does feel the world is moving away from a multi-level network to run everything over TLS/TCP (and probably eventually mainly TLS/UDP), taking away the power from me as a network and device owner, and giving it to the developers
In some parallel universe, TLS would have been part of TCP not a separate protocol and the Berkeley sockets implementation in the OS kernel would handle all encryption, certificate validation, etc, on behalf of applications. AT-TLS is a bit like visiting that parallel universe
(Strictly speaking, I'm not sure if AT-TLS actually is implemented in the OS kernel – or "nucleus" to use the z/OS terminology – it may actually be implemented somewhere else, say in the C library. I know some of it is actually implemented by a daemon called PAGENT. But, from the application programmers viewpoint, it is provided by the OS, however exactly the OS provides it.)
1) The ISP says what should be used
2) the lan either accepts that, or the operator puts their own values
3) the device either accepts that, or the operator puts their own values
Same as object inheritence. An ISP says "use this DNS server it's nearer", the network operator says "no thanks, I'll run my own with an upstream of google as I don't like your NXDOMAIN injects", the user says "actually I'll use cloudflare because I don't trust any of you"
That's all fine, and gives the power to the user.
Exceptionally if a device doesn't allow the network settings to be overwritten for some technical reason, it should simply accept what the lan sends it.
And so browsers are saying that the path should be.
1) The browser developers say what should be used.
2) The user either accepts that or puts their own values.
Ideally I think it should actually be something like
1) The OS vendor say what should be used.
2) The user either accepts that or puts their own values.
2.1) Lan operators can offer DNS servers which the user can (always) accept or (always) reject with reject being the default.
But this whole mess with browser DoH is because OS vendors are slow to move on this. Google Android does it kinda, Windows has it in beta, Linux works but it's a little DIY.
On a side note, I would love to see a system that adds out-of-band validation of an entity. e.g. My bank should have a QR code behind glass on the wall that I can scan, import a key and further validate their site at the application layer, above and beyond HTTPS and CA certs.
I guess this Mozilla Firefox change deprecates HTTPS Everywhere.
Either way, we've come a long way. For people in the Dutch security world, DigiNotar was a known joke. I knew about their terrible security (and the implications) back around 2000-2004. Although there have been more vulnerabilities too, such as Hearthbleed and POODLE.
I'm not familiar with HTST so I went looking but didn't find anything related to the web and HTTP, so I'm guessing you meant HSTS?
Of course you can just drop a rule blocking the IP address on your firewall, which will probably work for a while.
You could make the exact same kind of argument about widespread use of HTTPS for example. Do we want to allow encryption technology if it means the enemy can use it too? As a society we have agreed that encryption is a net positive even though terrorists and criminals benefit from it, but when malware uses it then that's too far?
That doesn't hold up under scrutiny. My pihole blocks ~11% of domain lookups (blocking 1000 queries per day for our household), turning it off vastly increases the unwanted content. It might seem is logical a ready hurdle, but it's a hurdle that practically works.
I don't follow the reasoning that says this is a small barrier to malware so we'll remove it.
What are we, end users, getting out of routing all our domain lookups to Cloudflare and ceding control of filtering?
If I were on a hostile network (say a hotel), then sure, I'll ignore their DNS server and use my own (or indeed just punch my way out via a VPN), but most of the time I use friendly networks, and I don't want to have to configure 20 different applications on a dozen different boxes to use a DNS provider of my choice. There's a reason I use DHCP in the first place.
Given your knowledge you can disable or even build firefox with DoH disabled , it is a sensible default for vast majority of users who do not know what DHCP is, or control their network. It cannotis trivial configuration for people who can control and do not want the DoH service provider given by Firefox.
Also many places do not allow VPN traffic either. It is not as easy to bypass monitoring in a locked down environment like typical corporate firewalls, college campuses etc. Yes for every block in place like deep packet inspection etc there is usually some workaround but these become increasingly difficult as more stringent the blocking becomes, and having options like DoH helps users who cannot or do not know how to run VPNs.
I have mixed feelings about the issue, but it's not that simple.
I run a variety of services on my LAN for my users and guests. That includes Unbound, so even though their browser doesn't know it, their queries are secure from my ISP. But more importantly I have other stuff behind hostnames (which are resolved by Unbound). For example, my guests can navigate to music/ and use a web interface to play any of the music in my library over the stereo.
Hopefully it's obvious why this is something useful to have.
Now that Firefox is intercepting DNS requests, a conversation with someone might go like this: "Oh, it's not working? Are you using Firefox? Yeah, Firefox broke this recently, let me get the IP address for you." And then I have to log in to a computer, ssh into the relevant system, and get its IP address on the LAN.
And that's just the beginning. Last I checked Cloudflare still can't resolve the archive.is / archive.today domains. Even though I use Cloudflare over TLS in Unbound, I fix this for myself and my users by sending these domains to Google instead. Anything as convenient and simplistic as Firefox just sending everything directly to Cloudflare can't do that.
From Mozilla documentation.
"localhost" and names in the ".local" TLD will never be resolved via DOH. [1]
Lan based services are pretty common use case. Mozilla is hardly going to release this feature without considering this.The Cloudflare / Archive.is point is esoteric debate and not a common occurence, DoH does support other providers than Cloudflare so not sure if this really a major concern
I don't think PFsense + Unbound supports appending .local to every hostname automatically, so I'd have to change every last one of my hostnames to whatever.local and that seems like a real pain. (Surely most people are not using whatever.local in their /etc/hostname, right?)
> The Cloudflare / Archive.is point is esoteric debate and not a common occurence, DoH does support other providers than Cloudflare so not sure if this really a major concern
Sure, but my general point is that there's all sorts of different reasons why it can be useful for a LAN administrator to override the remote DNS response in certain specific cases. Given that Firefox is using Cloudflare by default, the fact that you can change it also doesn't really help anything, since after all the thing I'm specifically complaining about is that stuff randomly breaks for any of your guests using Firefox.
Then it will automatically register them in DNS with that name: https://docs.netgate.com/pfsense/en/latest/services/dns/reso...
> The domain name from System > General Setup is used as the domain name on the hosts.
Then in the DHCP configuration, you set the domain name as well (defaults to using the general setting): https://docs.netgate.com/pfsense/en/latest/services/dhcp/ipv...
> Specifies the domain name passed to the client to form its fully qualified hostname. If the Domain Name is left blank, then the domain name of the firewall it sent to the client.
The client will automatically try adding the domain when looking up hostnames. Normally on Linux the FQDN is not specified in /etc/hostname but only in /etc/hosts.
Cloudflare broke a lot of traffic when the 1.1.1.1 dns server came up, google broke lot of dev setups when they got the . dev TLD, however it is not theit fault though.
archive.is didn't work for Cloudflare users because they purposely sabotaged the results for Cloudflare (they did actually return valid, but wrong, results).
EDIT: Although you might have a problem if the owners of the ".music" TLD decide to put something else there.
Now port 53 can and often is intercepted (but sometimes it gets through when 443 doesnt)
It is not possible to sniff out DoH traffic via DPI as looks exactly the same as regular traffic
While running flash servers for media use in corporate environment (when flash was still a thing) back I used to run into similar problems with RTMP/ RTMPS constantly.
But anyway, it is your decision to use them - you can use 1.1.1.1 (CloudFlare), 8.8.8.8 (Google - if you don't mind the tracking) or any other DNS provider.
Many sysadmins will hate this.
> Full of spyware, and tracking.
What do you use? Google?...
I'll go further and say I want my router to handle this. It is unrealistic to expect every device on my network to natively support the standard, but it's pretty easy to have your local DNS endpoint reroute the traffic through DoH on it's way out of your network. Right now I accomplish this by running cloudflared upstream of my Pihole.
I don't like applications that do their own DNS resolution. I use a text-only browser that relies on the OS to do DNS resolution.
But imagine your DNS is filtered. Would you still want only a single source, e.g., your ISP? In that case, wouldn't you want multiple sources?
When in a DNS-filtered environment, e.g., a hotel, DOH outside the browser can actually be useful. For example, I can retrieve all the DNS data for all the domains on HN in a matter of minutes using HTTP/1.1 pipelining from a variety of DOH providers. The data goes into a custom zone file served from an authoritative nameserver on the local network. Browsing HN is much faster and more reliable when I do not need to do recursive DNS queries to remote servers. The third party resolver cache concept is still really popular, but IME most IP addresses are long-lived/static and "TTL" is irrelevant. I rarely need to update the existing RRs in the zone files I create and the number that need to be updated is very small.
DOH servers are not the only alternative source of DNS data.
Ideally, I prefer to avoid third party DNS altogether. Nor do I even need to run a local cache. I wrote some utilities that gather DNS data "non-recursively", querying only authoritative nameservers and never setting the RD bit. It is very fast. The only true "single source" of DNS data is the zone file for the particular RR at the designated authoritative nameserver(s). Everone else is a middleman.
I am not a fan of applications doing their own DNS resolution, even if they use DOH. But I have found the existance of DOH servers, i.e., third party DNS caches served over HTTP, can be useful.
The key is that if it's really your traffic, then you can easily reconfigure Firefox so that you can monitor it. The benefit of DoH is that if someone else is using Firefox on their own computer, you can't snoop on or hijack their DNS just because they're on your network.
Also, it is only a matter of time before ads (and websites) start using it to bypass browser DNS:
If you work in a setting in which web surfing is intercepted, and outright breaks pages, the in-browser DNS can be a godsend.
Oh joy.
I run DHCP for a reason. That reason is telling devices on my network what their settings should be. I expect those settings to be honored, not them doing the electronic equivalent of "okay boomer" and using whatever arbitrary settings they were told to by a corporation.
Your comment was obviously trying to strike a blow for one side of a well-known argument that's going on right now. There are a few problems with that. First, blow-striking is not curious conversation; we can't have both, and HN exists for the latter [2]. Second, these arguments are so well known that the threads they lead to get increasingly predictable as they get more intense [3]. I'm sure you can see how that's bad for curious conversation too.
[1] https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=false&qu...
[2] https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html
[3] https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&sor...
I work for a firewall co and we had taken a strategic decision to not allow plaintext traffic onto the internet (from cloud deployments). It's just lazy on the client or server operator's part to not have it so.
As an end user, I don't want the possibility of anything being tampered with along the route. As a content owner / webmaster, I want the same. So publisher and consumer are both aligned in their desire, making HTTPS ideal for everyone except for people reading/manipulating traffic along the way.
Our market is more backend API traffic so doesn't impact as much.
Someone did, almost two and a half decades ago. It's called the Internet Cache Protocol.
- Internet Cache Protocol (ICP), version 2 [0]
- Application of Internet Cache Protocol (ICP), version 2 [1]
--
Increased corporate/government control and centralisation. That is a huge "do not want" for many of the HN crowd, including me.
I think people are just totally off-base on this. The instances of government/corporation reactions to DOH that we have seen suggest that untrustworthy organizations and governments largely oppose the change. They would not oppose the change if it was in their best interest.
Worth noting that anyone can set up a DOH server. You can even set up your own server in your own house and use it the same way that you would a Pi-hole. To the extent that malware providers or IoT providers will use this to circumvent blocks, they already had the ability to do that -- and IoT services like Chromecasts have already experimented in the past with setting their own DNS providers and ignoring network settings.
We do not need to open up our networks to MiTM attacks to avoid centralization. Unencrypted DNS is a bad idea, it isn't complicated.
This is not responsive to my argument that it will impact most Firefox users. Most people won't change their defaults. Defaults matter. And that goes double when you need to dink with your own DNS server to override this crap.
a) the best provider available
b) more importantly, the most private provider available
But there's nothing about the technology locking Mozilla into keeping Cloudflare the default in perpetuity, and in any case, the solution to your concern is to adjust the defaults, not to throw out DoH entirely.
There's nothing about DoH in specific that's causing the concerns you have. Mozilla could have set Cloudlfare DNS to be the default even for regular, unencrypted DNS traffic. There's nothing inherent in DNS technology that would force them to respect your OS settings. If your concerned about Cloudflare taking over, rejecting DoH isn't the solution to that problem.
It's not an underhanded centralization push, it just so happens that when DoH was still new, there was effectively one provider that was widely available, that could confidently handle a large upsurge in traffic, and that made extremely strong privacy guarantees compared to the rest of the industry. At the time Mozilla started pushing DoH, most ISPs in the US didn't even offer it as an option at all. As that changes, I expect that browser defaults will change as well.
https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/firefox-dns-over-https#...
I get your concern about cloudflare, but I can tell you right now which of the two options I would trust more with this data, and it's not Comcast/AT&T/Cox/<insert shady ISP here>
For most users on the planet Cloudflare is a hell of a lot better than your ISP
Only Chrome is allowed to break stuff on the web, remember?
There is nothing about DoH that forces you to use a single company.
HTTPS upgrade feature has always been there in Brave.
Edit: I'm using system-wide DoT at the moment with CoreDNS but it doesn't work that well. Not sure why.
Hijacking this a bit - If plenty are stripping the encryption at an LB (like Cloudflare for example), how can you be sure that NSA is not wiretapping in Cloudflare's infrastructure where it is not encrypted? Seems like a really easy way to get unencrypted data and not care about if everything is HTTPS or not.
Are there any counterexamples to this? Do we know that Cloudflare or AWS is not doing this?
I've often daydreamed of a new HN freature where non-HTTPS links have a preceeding red marker "[HTTP only]" (or similar) but never could find the correct place to write it down. Considering that Firefox is now a minority browser :( perhaps there is still usefulness in this idea?
100% with you that by itself, browser HTTPS-only mode (even by default) is A Good Thing. In isolation, this is a no-brainer and Mozilla's doing the right call.
I'm not happy with DoH though, at all. I fall in the crowd who wants to control my own DNS on my own devices (and I do realize that for those less technically knowledgeable, the status quo is putting that in the hands of the network admin or even ISP, but at least in principle they have the means to do so if they just figure out how, which is relatively trivial). DoH effectively completely cripples things like pihole. I'd have to start whitelisting IPs/hostnames for port 443 :/
Another practical negative consequence is the further centralization of TLS termination in (most notably) Cloudflare and Akamai, as I am sure this will de the default for those who are now rushed to TLS-enable currently uncompliant endpoints. Great sieves for XEyes and private tracking industry.
None of this - DoH, nor HTTPS-only - is required. It's not even on by default (yet). If you have some specific wishes; it's trivial to pick a different DNS system, or leave https-only off.
Additionally, DoH and https-only aren't really closed or locked in in any way. There's a cloudflare-base DoH option that's used by default, but just as you can pick your own DNS servers, you can also pick your own DoH servers. Sure, it's new (and thus not on by default), so selection is still fairly limited. But even ISPs are starting to offer DoH, and surely others will too. There's no reason to assume that you won't soon be able to pick from several choices for your DoH setup, including local or LAN options.
You mention pihole; and though I've never used it, they do have a page on DoH, and a superficial skim doesn't have any huge issues: https://docs.pi-hole.net/guides/dns-over-https/ - and looks like it's based on code described here https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/dns-over-https/clo... - and that supports upstream and downstream DoH, by the looks of it.
In other words: all change has some friction, but if you want local control: you still have it. The only thing you really lose is the ability for networks to hijack DNS of devices that don't trust it. And that's a feature, right? If you trust the network; sure, use that DNS if you want. But if you don't: better that its easier to avoid control by that network.
What downsides does DoH have?
I had to disable DoH on all 5 of my machines because it was enabled automatically.
> You mention pihole; and though I've never used it, they do have a page on DoH
pihole supports using Cloudflare as an upstream DoH provider, not acting as a DoH provider.
Some googling: it's on by default in the US now, not yet globally.
> pihole supports using Cloudflare as an upstream DoH provider, not acting as a DoH provider.
That's unfortunate; are you sure it's not just a little poorly documentend? At least the underlying software they link to https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/dns-over-https/clo... clearly mentions a proxy functionality, but maybe that's not on yet?
In any case: the point is that just as DNS proxying became easier over time, so will DoH proxying. There's nothing wrong with sticking to old tech as you chose to if it's not yet convenient for you to switch; especially if pihole supports upstream DoH, since presumably you trust the network between your device and your pihole ;-) - rendering the rest of the DoH benefits moot.
I'm sure time will resolve issues like that, but in the meantime, the vast majority of people that didn't customize their DNS and don't choose at all, or choose based on privacy or performance get a more private & secure option by default. I mean, it's transition pains are annoying, but it sounds like a good idea in general, so I suppose the transition costs are worth it in the long run, especially since the vast majority of users won't even notice. It's annoying to be in the camp that gets to bear the burden, for sure.
For me at least, the biggest criticism of DoH is that it's not necessarily a centralized config at the OS level and seems to be a step in the direction of the general theme "Browser As Your OS".
You can easily set it up to contact that, but enable some exclusions for specific domains if you wish to fallback to pihole.
It's probably not that efficient anyway to be using pihole's filtering in Firefox compared with just ublock origin anyway.
Pihole operates at the network level. It can block Windows Telemetry, ads on your Roku, smart devices trying to phone home, etc. Any guest devices that connect to your network also benefit without you having to install blockers on them.
It's not a replacement for ublock, it's used in conjunction with it.
My argument though is in the context of Firefox, in which case the benefit of the pihole bit is dubious when you can install ublock origins. Pihole doesn't provide much additional benefits that can't be achieved with ublock origin advanced filters.
Granted someone could argue what would be the benefit of using the dnscrypt-proxy at that point. In that context, you benefit from better privacy (DNS requests aggregated) and caching benefits.
No, it isn't. Never mind the fact that that isn't how PiHole works, I'm perfectly within my right to control how my home network functions.
In a broader sense, I guess the larger concerns is malware and trackware on various devices where DoH is used maliciously. Especially smartphones. Granted there is nothing stopping them today, but the normalization of DoH will put it in arms reach for everyone.
But agreed, it is a good idea. The only disadvantage I see is that some sites might not want to pay for a certificate and don't know how to easily obtain free ones. So it might kill some sites.
https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/kazakhstan-tries-...
If a domain owner gets a certificate and gives it, and a private key, to a third party, then that's their business.
Just for completeness, HTTPs does not necessarily guarantee you are connected to the right server. This depends on the CAs you trust.
For example, larger enterprises commonly inject their own CA into their workstations in order to prevent loss of sensitive data. This allows SSL inspection proxies to terminate all SSL connections with a valid, trusted certificate from the perspective of that workstation. .
This doesn’t guarantee the transport is end-to-end secure; I’m sure plenty will strip the encryption at an LB and then possibly send it back over the internet. But, I think it’s a good addition nevertheless. Here’s to hoping for more DoH and encrypted SNI adoption as well. No good reason to leave anything unencrypted if it doesn't have to be.
(I’m less happy with Firefox’s approach to DoH rollout, but I’m still glad to see DoH gaining some traction. Let’s hope the end result is worth it...)