In some parallel universe, TLS would have been part of TCP not a separate protocol and the Berkeley sockets implementation in the OS kernel would handle all encryption, certificate validation, etc, on behalf of applications. AT-TLS is a bit like visiting that parallel universe
(Strictly speaking, I'm not sure if AT-TLS actually is implemented in the OS kernel – or "nucleus" to use the z/OS terminology – it may actually be implemented somewhere else, say in the C library. I know some of it is actually implemented by a daemon called PAGENT. But, from the application programmers viewpoint, it is provided by the OS, however exactly the OS provides it.)
1) The ISP says what should be used
2) the lan either accepts that, or the operator puts their own values
3) the device either accepts that, or the operator puts their own values
Same as object inheritence. An ISP says "use this DNS server it's nearer", the network operator says "no thanks, I'll run my own with an upstream of google as I don't like your NXDOMAIN injects", the user says "actually I'll use cloudflare because I don't trust any of you"
That's all fine, and gives the power to the user.
Exceptionally if a device doesn't allow the network settings to be overwritten for some technical reason, it should simply accept what the lan sends it.
And so browsers are saying that the path should be.
1) The browser developers say what should be used.
2) The user either accepts that or puts their own values.
Ideally I think it should actually be something like
1) The OS vendor say what should be used.
2) The user either accepts that or puts their own values.
2.1) Lan operators can offer DNS servers which the user can (always) accept or (always) reject with reject being the default.
But this whole mess with browser DoH is because OS vendors are slow to move on this. Google Android does it kinda, Windows has it in beta, Linux works but it's a little DIY.
On a side note, I would love to see a system that adds out-of-band validation of an entity. e.g. My bank should have a QR code behind glass on the wall that I can scan, import a key and further validate their site at the application layer, above and beyond HTTPS and CA certs.
I guess this Mozilla Firefox change deprecates HTTPS Everywhere.
Either way, we've come a long way. For people in the Dutch security world, DigiNotar was a known joke. I knew about their terrible security (and the implications) back around 2000-2004. Although there have been more vulnerabilities too, such as Hearthbleed and POODLE.
I'm not familiar with HTST so I went looking but didn't find anything related to the web and HTTP, so I'm guessing you meant HSTS?
It does feel the world is moving away from a multi-level network to run everything over TLS/TCP (and probably eventually mainly TLS/UDP), taking away the power from me as a network and device owner, and giving it to the developers