Actually, no. This is a terrible idea.
Think about the psychology of what you are telling people: "You have two choices - one is normal security, which you use on 80%+ of the rest of the internet, and one is 2fa which you only use on the annoying services that badger you into it. On the first one, if you lose your password you can do a password reset. On the second one, if your laptop and phone get fried in a rainstorm / car crash / act of children, you lose access to everything forever, no recourse and no recovery. And by the way, we totally encourage you to choose the second one... "
Yes, online services that store credentials and backup passwords mitigate this somewhat, but they also add an attack vector via keyloggers, or make you dependent on the third party's security measures.
And I probably don't need to point out to the HN crowd just how badly internet services are moving towards no-recourse solutions to petty problems to save money. Yet another one doing this is not a good thing.
1. Go to the site 2. Touch the "Sign in" button 3. When prompted touch the fingerprint sensor
That's it. Did a bunch of complicated stuff happen? Yes, but the user didn't do any of that, so they needn't care.
More seriously - yes, you still need a more complicated recovery procedure for extraordinary cases, but these are now truly extraordinary cases, rather than, as the original thread claimed, just a routine nuisance for the user.
Having only one copy of the MFA device is of course a bad idea.
It is of course up to people if they want to enable additional security and of course have to put up with increased friction and difficulty.
Myself I consider what would it mean if someone got access to my Github, Gitlab, and/or email accounts and have decided that I will put up with the cost (buying U2F tokens) and hassle (having to use the U2F token to login).
The alternative is the much higher chance that someone could at some point get into one of my accounts.
The post I responded to basically did:
> That's it. Did a bunch of complicated stuff happen? Yes, but the user didn't do any of that, so they needn't care
but! how many keys to your car or to your home have you got? i'm willing to wager that you've got more than one. in the same way you never should have one key to your account, especially with hardware keys, but 2fa code apps should also apply.
For important accounts I wonder if we should have the ability to tie them to a physical address or something else possible to verify.
No. I just use my U2F token that I have on my keychain. Or the one I have in my office. Or the one I have in my safe.
I also backup my TOTP codes using GPG and my Yubikey can store up to 32 TOTP codes on it.
Can you explain any solution for any problem that is reasonable for ALL of the billion+ people that login to some kind of cloud service? ;)
I would argue that this is a negative thing. Sites should at least give the option to disable password reset.
Another annoying thing is that some sites do not consider your password enough even if you do not have 2fa enabled and they insist on sending you a mail (thanks github! - I can't connect to my account there because the registered mail was in my old domain) or an sms (thanks google/twitter! I had not even provided my phone number yet somehow giving it to you will verify that it's me)
Password reset email is great if you forgot your password, but this just means you can't make it more secure than your email account.
I'm saying this as I'm looking at my 1Password database which also contains all my 2FA keys because, yes, all 2FA apps I tried so far treat these keys as way too valuable and the risk of losing them as I move from device to device is just too high.
Do as I say, not as I do I guess :p
I feel confident to rely on the security of my machine and 1Password specifically, though I am aware that I can't really claim my accounts to be secured by 2FA.
> If you would like to turn a site’s offering of TOTP into true two-factor security, you should not store your TOTP secret in 1Password (or in anything that will synchronize across systems).
They mention multiple times that if you want true 2FA the second factor needs to be on a different device or a physical key like a YubiKey.
Then they say that “two-step” security offered by 1PW + 2FA is probably enough for most use cases, and that 2FA in 1PW still has additional value because (a) some sites require 2FA and (b) one-time passwords offer protection against sniffing passwords over insecure networks.
https://blog.1password.com/totp-for-1password-users/
The fact that 1PW even auto-copies the code to your clipboard after auto-filling a password so that you can paste it in when prompted raised my eyebrows when I first used the feature, though. It's very convenient but it's obvious at that point that you're throwing away the protection that storing the key on a second device would offer, even if 1PW requires you to authenticate before the app will open.
When I set up TOTP on a site, I save the QR code as a PNG file (via the Grab application on my Mac) and the text version of the code in a text file. (If the site provided some one-time use recovery codes, those all go in the text file). Those two files go into a directory, that directory gets made into a tarball, which then gets encrypted, then stored in my "recovery" directory which later gets saved in an encrypted backup.
That's all after I scan the QR code into an authenticator app on my phone.
Moving codes to a new device is then just a matter of decrypting and extracting them from my recovery directory and scanning them on the new device.
I keep my keys in analog form - I print QR code for every service. We know how to handle valuables stored on paper.
You can store the TOTP seeds in more compact form by converting QR code screenshots to alphanumeric using zbar barcode tools.
In my experience it has difficulty parsing some QR codes created using CSS due to tiny borders between blocks. Those can be fixed by applying a small gaussian blur followed by sharpening (use imagemagick for maximum automation) to fill out the borders.
Edit: packages available in Ubuntu (zbar-tools) & Fedora (zbar), source code at https://github.com/mchehab/zbar
* when setting up 2FA, a website shows a QR code
* I screenshot the QR code, and print it out on an A4 sheet, with an annotation of what service it is for
* I scan the QR code from the A4 sheet on two different phones.
* Back on the website, I continue 2FA setup process only after the A4 sheet is printed, and both phones show the same codes
* The A4 sheet goes in a folder for safe keeping
* One phone goes in my desk drawer for daily use
* The other phone goes in my "go" bag that I take with me on short trips etc.
Both phones are used exclusively for Google Authenticator:
* they have no extra apps
* they have a screen lock
* they are always in flight mode
Started doing this when I got burned by having to extract GA's sqlite file from mostly-dead Nexus One over adb.
The app puts a no screenshot request, so you have to scan the qr code from another phone.
Without it, he has 30 seconds to login and put the code by just opening the app and looking at the code.
Not much of a feature, but might help some users
https://github.com/krisu5/aegis-icons
Just extract the zip, and you can input any photo to the Aegis app
As far as cloud storage goes, standard notes might be a good option, I don't use it for 2FA, but it's an extension they provide.
I think the bigger issue is that people's 2fa codes are still tied to their phone. You can lose your phone at any moment, which is why i've always disliked apps like Google Authenticator which don't let you export 2fa keys (for good reason).
I personally use 1password, but there's definitely room for a cloud storage solution that safely holds 2fa credentials