The technological measures have to account for human behaviour. Otherwise you just end up with almost everyone not being able to access almost everything almost all of the time. People are forgetful, irrational, stubborn and stupid. So are institutions. Put them together and you have a social engineering dream world (literally our current world).
If you added up all the costs of the people at the lowest extremes (by various metrics), I'd venture to guess that we could increase our prosperity (by various metric) by an order of magnitude.
Example: When I started my startup, we made the decision not to hire any salesperson who wasn't proficient in using a computer (we have no IT support line). We also made the decision to not sell to any customer that couldn't figure out how to use the website (we have no telephone support).
I cannot even tell you how multiplicative the benefits are. The 2% employees who couldn't use a computer or clients who couldn't use the website were responsible for 90% of the issues we had at my prior company. Everything from regulatory complaints, to lawsuits, to ad-hoc report requests, to virus infected PCs, to... the list goes on and on.
Having smart people is great. Not dealing with idiots is equally important.
As your parent said, it's not 2%, it's more like everyone. No one is perfect all the time.
More importantly, it's one thing when hiring, but are you seriously suggesting 2% of the population shouldn't be able to use Twitter or online banking or other online services? 140,000,000 people should effectively face social death because you can't be fucked to help them?
This is backwards, we should be sacrificing profits and convenience to be more inclusive.
...and it's not correct to say that "everyone is imperfect sometimes" because the correlation between people who are problems across various metrics, is high.
It appeared that normally they not really check if it matches, but this time given the transfer amount they did. And it just so happened that the signature they had scanned in their system was the first one I ever made as a kid (30yrs ago) when I opened the account.
Finally after many retries they turned the monitor to show me the expected signature and let me practice it on a piece of paper, so it would pass some other approval stage.
With a 200 yard line waiting behind me, sweating profusely, I finally managed to reproduce something. The sale went through, luckily, and immediately after I ditched that bank account.
I believe most banks allow their customers to change their signature to something they can replicate more consistently — but it probably relies on showing up to a branch and producing sufficient ID.
Helpfully, they provided me with a screenshot of the one they had on file... one copy and paste later and the problem was resolved.
One copy and paste
Because they showed you the signature and let you practice, right?
I guess one, admittedly brutal, solution is for customers to act like the immune system. Call up, fudge your way through to something that should be protected, and then escalate to a manager and report that you got access to your own account with vague details; they can listen to the call log to verify.
Worst case is that the rep gets fired (which sucks..) but if enough reps get fired then future reps will be hired and trained more diligently.
Then after that I have to read off my 2FA code. In other words, they have to log in with the same 2FA that I do.
So a random customer service rep couldn't access my account without my phone in their hand, even if they managed to clone my SIM to get past the text message check.
Whats the point of this step
Then, people searching for things like "Microsoft tech support" would get the scammers number and call it. Google and other search engines will even pull that number from your site and handily present it to you at the top of the search results to make it appear even more legit.
Taking over unclaimed Google map listings for businesses is also really common.
Simply buying a toll free number that is close to the customer service number for a large company is bound to get you more inbound callers than you care to scam.
So no, absolutely no excuses for teaching people to share their 2fa codes.
Think about your own life: how often do you lose money because an insider hacked your credit accounts and bank accounts? How often do you get pulled over and your car taken away because someone changed the title/tags in DMV records? How often is your identity stolen by an employee at the IRS?
These bad things all happen to some people, of course, but the VAST majority of the time, they do not.
It is obvious that there are effective countermeasures to prevent and mitigate insider threats. Insider threat is not a new concept, and there are well-proven tactics for addressing it.
Around the same time, at a nearby call center, two employees were caught ordering multiple manager's laptops, which managers can use to access customer records from their home. These laptops were sent out to multiple addresses and never found.
Yes - no names for obvious reasons but where I work (trust me you've heard of them/probably use them and they are a huge tech company) it is very hard to get access to anything even slightly customer related. You need to go through multiple levels of review and approval (often your manager, their manager, and then directors/VPs) with genuine business justifications that actually looked at (no "asdf" here) to get access, and then it is usually only permitted for a window of months at most before it is auto-revoked. Then once you have access, every actual time you look at the data you need to provide justification (e.g. a ticket number that is actually checked to make sure it is open, not reused over and over, and not just 1234567890 etc and so on), and every single action you do with the data is tracked and audited so there is a complete 100% paper trail of who looked at what, when they did it, and why they were doing it, with traceability through to the tickets/bugs/etc for why there were even doing this in the first place. Abnormal things (e.g. systematic/repeated/etc) raises flags that do terrible things to your career. Each system/data source needs its own independent approval process.
There is no "god mode".
It is not uncommon for people to wait weeks for approvals to go through to access their own data to validate a bug fix etc. I think these safeguards are worthwhile - many would see them as a hindrance.
At past places, I implemented a call-centre UI once. We made it so that the service rep would initially not see anything about the customer, so the "Please can you confirm 3rd letter of your memorable word" or whatever meant that the service rep literally had a text box to type that letter in which had to match before they could proceed - they didn't see the whole world on screen and wait to see if the user got it right. I am not sure how common this is - when I do this from the customer side these days often the answer is immediately acknowledged by the rep without any kind of delay or typing noises so I am guessing they have my entire record on their screen and are just waiting for me to say the right things before continuing the call :(
Every month or two I’d fill in the google support text area explaining the problem. No response for ~4 years. Just this Feb, for whatever reason, I decided to call T-Mobile and report it. Problem was fixed by a higher up tech that described the problem as “very strange” and the “first time” he’d seen something like this. It took approx. an hour.
Upon rumination I full accept that I took the “easy way out” by filling in the text box vs trying to talk to someone. End result is that google lost a gvoice customer and no one calls me anymore. meh
The only way to get some assurance is run vendor app in your environment in a secure network without the ability to phone home.
The point about schemes like this is that instead of having to give 1000 support reps full access, you only give a few sysadmins full access. The likelihood of something going wrong with the data (through mistakes, willful abuse, extortion, whatever) goes drastically down.
In fact, once you got such a permission system in place, it becomes very attractive for the organization to use it. I mean, customers love it, they spontaneously write comments about it on Hacker News.
Even if you begin adopting it only for security theater (i.e. everybody still actually has full access), eventually some principled engineer brings up the idea to maybe remove full access for everybody cause now they have the access-granting system anyway, and this time they'll make a convincing case because the "move fast and break things" people have way fewer practical objections.
Isn't this the objective of Tim Berners-Lee Solid Project and their Personal Online Data storage (PODs) in the spec?
From what I have seen, it is common to have additional restrictions on accessing high profile individuals and specific groups data. There is also a ton of auditing around this stuff.
It is more primitive than what you described, but things are heading in that direction. It is a somewhat harder problem space because many parties need access to a customer's records in that domain.
Ultimately, the only reason things are even this far along in health insurance is the regulatory environment. It'd be nice to have stronger privacy laws that compel companies to build good controls.
When I worked at Apple Retail, there was an internal iCloud dashboard you could log into and see _metadata_ about customer accounts. You couldn’t see anything juicy, for Find My iPhone/Friends it was just the name of people would could see your location, not locations themselves. Number of documents, not access to actual documents.
But nothing was visible to you until you verified the customer through security questions, last four digits, etc.
Yup. Doubly so for sysadmins, many of which have abhorrent data security practices.
My personal solution is to use cover names, disposable phone numbers, and unique email addresses (the + trick is insufficient) for most services. My assumption is that the data is eventually either going to leak, or be used to threaten or harm me in some way.
If none of the PII overlaps with me, it becomes a lot harder for such an event to affect me.
The only downside is that sometimes you get companies (Airbnb, Instacart, some others) that have CSRs that demand a government photo ID to do certain tasks. Of course I don’t have any documents for these cover names, so usually the workaround is to just abandon that account, make another, and re-place the order or transaction in a way that doesn’t flag it for manual review/intervention.
Works pretty well for me most of the time.
I can’t verify this 100% unfortunately but they are notable because of how rare it is
This is simply not true. For example with banks, high-profile accounts can't be accessed by regular tellers. If someone attempts to, it is logged and someone is notified that Teller X tried to access the account.
Now that Twitter is being used for high-profile official communications, they need to re-design their employee control panels to limit, alert, and control what an employee can do with an account.
The fact that important credentials on so many high-profile verified accounts could be changed without notifying employees or locking the affected accounts until the actions are verified is unacceptable.
Banks just don’t give support reps remote access to accounts.
E-government services in Estonia have nice features, aimed at giving more control to the owner of the data [1]. Among other: "It allows the Citizen to query who has accessed his/her records. [...] In Estonia, this feature has led to some very public cases of government officials being caught accessing private data of Citizens - without any legitimate and authorized reason for such access."
i would bet that most of the places you are thinking about (banks, credit card, and so on) where you get on the phone with a rep, with a phone entry system ahead of the agent, the agent can only access that specific data during the call, the access is logged, and any other access (some other account) is flagged for review. by calling in you are granting access. most users simply don't care about privacy and extra hurdles are just asking for complaints. limiting access to specific accounts during live calls is a fair compromise and a tight control.
xero (they suck, so this is not an endorsement) requires you to give the rep access explicitly, as an option, when requesting tech support. of course i have zero doubt that senior reps can get access anyway (which would be audited), so the explicit control is more about signalling comfort to you about their security measures.
after google had the SRE stalker incident they implemented very tight access controls to user data.
i walked into a verizon store the other day to buy a hotspot. the rep could not get access to any info whatsoever (even billing status) until i acknowledged a message on my phone. it's clear they only had access to my specific data (ie, they don't get to enter any phone number and get access) for that specific interaction.
From their perspective, they want the ability to ban/kick/etc as special powers; but from my perspective that feature is an exploitation target that's vulnerable to any unknown bugs, and probably in twitter's case, social exploitation.
I would _much rather_ see all users be equally powerful and find some means by which the services can be designed such that everyone can be comfortable and safe.
Doesn’t mean there isn’t a way around it for some reps with special access. If you don’t have a PIN someone can go and open up multiple new accounts separate from your primary account in your name with different addresses. AT&T won’t even bother to tell you.
But you would need to educate people with access about the importance of impartial management of user data.
Banks had a culture enforcing neutrality and most importantly discretion. That is not true for modern payment processors like paypal or mastercard though.
You certainly don't want Twitter activists in such a role, regardless of political affiliation.
This is why the privacy and security guarantees of almost all companies, credit bureaus, banks, the IRS, the department of motor vehicles, etc., are worthless. Every customer service rep that works at any of those places -- all 500 or 5000 or 50,000 of them -- can pull up info on anyone at any time. The only thing that prevents that is rules. There are no technical countermeasures.
I'd like to see a system where it is physically impossible for a customer service rep to discover any info about me until I authenticate and authorize it. Or to at least offer me the option to lock my account such that I need to authenticate and authorize before any access is given to the customer service rep.
Does anyone know of customer service panels at big companies or government departments where this is the case? I.e., it is literally impossible for a rep to browse random customer information even if they are willing to break the rules? If it's been done somewhere, it would be interesting to hear how it was implemented.