News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Twitter internal panel linked to account hijackings by sneak on Thursday July 16, 2020 @10:16AM (#23859199)
> Every customer service rep that works at any of those places -- all 500 or 5000 or 50,000 of them -- can pull up info on anyone at any time. The only thing that prevents that is rules. There are no technical countermeasures.

Yup. Doubly so for sysadmins, many of which have abhorrent data security practices.

My personal solution is to use cover names, disposable phone numbers, and unique email addresses (the + trick is insufficient) for most services. My assumption is that the data is eventually either going to leak, or be used to threaten or harm me in some way.

If none of the PII overlaps with me, it becomes a lot harder for such an event to affect me.

The only downside is that sometimes you get companies (Airbnb, Instacart, some others) that have CSRs that demand a government photo ID to do certain tasks. Of course I don’t have any documents for these cover names, so usually the workaround is to just abandon that account, make another, and re-place the order or transaction in a way that doesn’t flag it for manual review/intervention.

Works pretty well for me most of the time.

Re:Twitter internal panel linked to account hijackings by novok on Thursday July 16, 2020 @05:22PM (#23863975)
What are the form of the emails? [email protected], [email protected] ? What if the service requires constant SMS OTP that you cannot opt out of?
Re:Twitter internal panel linked to account hijackings by sneak on Friday July 17, 2020 @01:20AM (#23867311)
I use both forms, including AnonAddy for the latter. For services that insist on frequent SMS OTP I usually just replace them with a different service, or I use dtmf.io.