I propose a scheme where the sender pays e.g. 5 ct per e-mail (low enough that it does not matter for legitimate use, but high enough to make spam unprofitable). BUT with the following twist: The receiver can generate API tokens that allow free e-mail delivery.
So when I sign up for e.g. Twitter, I can give them an API token for my mail address so they can send notification mails to me for free. If they decide to start spamming me, or if they decide to sell my token to a spammer, I can just revoke the token and the spam flood stops instantly.
I have not found any flaws in this idea yet. RFC!
Natural solution is a pricing list, but then USA spammers could route via cheapest geographic servers.
How do you get paid? Banks will put a transaction cost making sending email cost stupid money. So, bitcoin? But the built in energy costs for processing a transaction will force a floor on the transaction pricing that's too high?
If a token leaks you'll have to fiddle about to allow a sender's emails to get through ; I guess you could automate that if your MUA had credentials to inform genuine senders of API key updates.
Then you funnel all that junk into a special folder (black hole) that you can either ignore or check if you are expecting a legit request for your attention.
The more I think about it, the more I love this idea. All email that shows up in your inbox is there because you have to explicitly allowed it.
The one controversial part of this is deciding who is permitted to redeem the bond, i.e. who is the central arbiter of what is and isn't spam? Well, fortunately we already have an entity like that, de facto, since we have the Big 4 email providers ("Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo, and AOL", or any other similar group that all mail servers must, in practice, comply with the demands of).
In the system I'm proposing, if any of these big providers detect a domain being involved in spam (or N out of M providers, to reduce the risk of false positives), they could redeem the bond. Of course, the bond would be structured such that the only recipient was a non-profit, like the IETF, or possibly an entity like ICANN. That way there is no financial incentive to make false positive claims.
As for how this system would be introduced, that's the easy part. All pre-existing domains would be grandfathered in, so that no current email users would be negatively affected. (Indeed, there is a moral hazard that some email providers would support this system precisely because it only affects new entrants to the market). There would simply be a flag day, after which if you register a new domain, and want to send emails from it, your domain registrar would have a check box saying "Yes, I am happy to be charged an extra $10 and have put it in a bond so that I can send email to the Big 4 providers". After sending a certain amount of legitimate email, a Big 4 provider could then send a transaction which makes the locked funds return to the original issuer of the bond.
Finally, to decide how big the bond has to be, we can look at data like this:
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/06/bad-men-at-work-please-d...
If spammers are going to extra effort to save a few dollars on their registration costs, then their margins must be pretty tight. It also means that domain reputation systems are working, since spammers have to keep bulk buying new domains:
http://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2013/papers/imc247-haoA.p...
The obvious downside is that since the system is fundamentally just cryptography it doesn't discriminate between spam and legitimate bulk mail (password resets, newsletters, mailing lists, etc.)
I don't really see the payment as a big problem. This has been discussed previously, mostly initiated by the big email services
The sender pays the reader. If the reader is the one deriving the value from this communication, they would pay the sender out of band as compensation.
Along with the billions of spam SMS that are also supposed to be sender-pays, sadly
Alternate but similar - sender holds the email until the receiver fetches: https://cr.yp.to/im2000.html
I'm not sure it actually helps that much to cut down spam but anything is worth a try at this point.
Email is designed around asynchronous clients, e.g. the ability to write everything offline, connect for just long enough to queue them all up in some server, then disconnect while that server passes them along. By the time the receiver (server or client) knows that they've been sent a message, the sender may be long gone.
Hashcash only works if:
- It can't be bypassed. Without a mechanism to tell senders how much to include, receivers must set their price near zero to avoid discarding legitimate messages which guessed the wrong amount. Keeping messages without any/enough hashcash would defeat the purpose of the thing.
- The sending client does the work. Since servers are always online and reachable via a known address, we could have them negotiate an amount; e.g. the receiving server checks the message for hashcash, returns an error stating that a certain amount is required, the sending server tries again with more hashcash. The problem is, getting the sending server to mine hashcash won't stop spammers: they'll just use other people's servers, like gmail, hotmail, etc.
I've written about this before, but I think that a generic protocol for negotiating hashcash would be really worthwhile. Maybe it could be made to work for email, but even if not there are plenty of synchronous protocols which could use it.
In particular, there's no reason to keep a fixed price; we can figure out a price using the same heuristics as existing spam filters: can we verify the sender, have we seen spam/ham from them before, do they appear on black/whitelists, etc. This way the pressure can be kept on spammers, whilst the majority of normal traffic can go through with little effort. Note that this fixes the mailing list problem too, e.g. if users add the list address to their whitelist, or if they send a message in order to subscribe (hence triggering the "allow this, it's a reply to our message" heuristic).
I also think this would be a nice alternative to API keys, since it would keep things more "open" for experimenting and mashups, whilst giving providers a way to avoid abuse (API keys could still be provided, as a way to significantly lower the amount of hashcash required).
The idea was dead on arrival.
I have view on the spam thing. The whole "your idea will not work because" meme is hugely destructive of innovation in email. It sucks energy and mindshare. It's classic old timer put down.
What would (imnsho opinion) have fixed spam is sender pays. I've debated this with a lot of people. We're 50/50 on it. Fifty agree with me, fifty million don't.
Jmap is utf8 clean btw.
(I used to do email for a living in the eighties when life was simple and bang!chains!worked)