Sure, if there is one source of beeps, then no beeps would be conspicuous, but when there are many things all beeping, having one of them stop beeping may not be so obvious at all.
A simple technological solution seems appropriate here. Have each machine that needs to work check in every couple seconds with each of two centralized monitoring machines. Have each monitoring machine alert the nurse desk if a monitored machine stops checking in. This is silent and has no single point of failure.
And a vendor lock-in is the goal of the vendor, both in medical and consumer space! Which is why such protocols rarely happen in either.
I suspect there are strong economic factors here. When a hospital buys a $2M imaging machine, the vendor is making money on the machine, not on ads, and that $2M machine had better interoperate with the HIPAA-compliant image archiving and distribution system the hospital already has from some other vendor.
There are also a wide range of interpretations of a single protocol. See the horror of HL7.
In terms of DICOM viewers, I’ll be the one who mentions Horos. If it doesn’t do what you want with a DICOM or have a plug-in that does, you are doing something quite unusual. Before the psych department come at me - I work in radiology. Functional imaging is best served with other tools, and I don’t understand them.
In the early 1980s Airbus adopted Dark Cockpit where the default state of all annunciator lights is off. If one illuminates then it indicates something worthy of attention. The colour of illumination indicates functional state; blue is good, amber is malfunctional.
Of course, one might very well argue that 'turned on' is not 'worthy of attention'
[1] http://www.smartcockpit.com/docs/A330-A340_Overhead_Pushbutt...
edit: when I say hooking it to the PA system, I mean that, if no one acknowledges the light or computer message or whatever, then an announcement could play after a set delay.
This article is a terrible treatment of the issue. The NYT article [1] or actual research papers are far better.
To try and sum up the actual issue that's being discussed: it's a tragedy of the commons situation, where the commons is a patient's sleep.
Every device and procedure priorities derisking above ALL else. In aggregate, this results in a huge negative impact on sleep.
The suggested change in behavior is to simply prioritize quality sleep somewhere about "irrelevant."
From the original research, a few points (from memory):
- Outcomes for non-critical patients are not substantially improved by the "every 2(?) hour vital check" regime. It's followed mostly because of legacy medical inertia
- There is little effort to batch interactions
- A substantial amount of sleep-disrupting noise is a modern hospital is non-functional
From personal experience at a good cancer research hospital in a major city, one omnipresent alarm was a low battery warning... for a device that was plugged into mains power. No one knew how to turn it off or fix it.
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/03/upshot/why-hospitals-shou...
The nurses are highly incentivized to batch interactions, just like waitstaff. What you don't see is that if the nurse has is working on the batch for patient A, and patient B crashes, then the nurse is too tied down to respond and calls in a colleague, who shows up to crashing patient B and tries to get up to speed.
E.g. This or that specialist wanted to run a test, so they sent someone or had a floor nurse draw. But none of this seemed to be sync'd to the regular interaction schedule.
> Same with audio on machines, that constant beep is annoying to you,
> but it means the machines are operating and you are getting your
> prescribed fluids - silence on a night ward is a sign something is
> wrong, and quickly precedes an emergency alarm.
Sure, but that stuff should be monitored from the nurses' station, not by patients who are trying to get some sleep.However, the downside of that solution is that the failure signal relies on correctness of the machine. In the current system, the failure signal is guaranteed to occur during failure with a zero false negative rate.
> In the current system, the failure signal is guaranteed to occur during failure with a zero false negative rate.
I can easily imagine software bugs that make the machine continue beeping even if the normal function doesn't work anymore.
Somehow, this sounds like an excuse for lazy design.
Nurses are trained to identify trends across many (sometimes too many) patients. Sure its inconvenient if a nurse monitors your blood pressure or oxygen levels every 2 hours after surgery, especially when you are sleeping, and especially if you recover perfectly.
But if you have a post-op internal bleed that occurs during the night, when you are asleep and unable to let someone know you are feeling woozy (because you are asleep), that's when trouble occurs. Frequent observations mean nurses can identify when things are going south before you get to an emergency situation.
Blood pressure drops sharply over 2 hours, monitor every 15 minutes, see if it stabilises. If it doesn't raise the alarm quickly.
Same with audio on machines, that constant beep is annoying to you, but it means the machines are operating and you are getting your prescribed fluids - silence on a night ward is a sign something is wrong, and quickly precedes an emergency alarm.