News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:I don't trust Signal by hprotagonist on Thursday August 09, 2018 @09:51AM (#17724147)
But we have to trust that Moxie is running the server software he says he is. We have to trust that he isn’t writing down a list of people we’ve talked to, when, and how often. We have to trust not only that Moxie is trustworthy, but given that Open Whisper Systems is based in San Francisco we have to trust that he hasn’t received a national security letter, too (by the way, Signal doesn’t have a warrant canary). Moxie can tell us he doesn’t store these things, but he could. Truly secure systems don’t require trust.

We have at least one data point that says that Signal stores exactly two integers about you, or did when the subpoena was issued: https://www.aclu.org/open-whisper-systems-subpoena-documents

things can always change, but that’s evidence submitted in court under the penalty of perjury, which is a fairly strong claim.

Re:I don't trust Signal by guiraldelli on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:15AM (#17724356)
I am happy to see I am not the only person in the world that feels like this about Signal.

The interesting fact is that I "Ctrl+F" this page for Wire and I have seen nothing, even though this comment is about something that made me switch over Wire from Signal: to date, that's the unique instant messaging that has FOSS'ed both the server and the clients. (OK, the article also says about Matrix.)

I admire Wire for a number of reasons, but certainly FOSS'ing all their code is one the main reasons. (The other is... Haskell! And also Rust.)

And just to point out, not only Wire bug-fixed the library implementation of the Signal protocol, as they use the Signal protocol. And their web interface is very good!

Oh, yes... And they are not based in USA.

EDIT: I am not affiliated with Wire, but just a happy customer. :)

Re:I don't trust Signal by Vinnl on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:26AM (#17724447)
> that's the unique instant messaging that has FOSS'ed both the server and the clients.

Signal's server code is open source as well: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server

And apparently the client can verify that the server is running that code: https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/#trust-but...

Re:I don't trust Signal by Boulth on Thursday August 09, 2018 @02:43PM (#17727173)
Server and the contact directory service are two different things. The remote attestation is just for a small part of the code (SGX code have a lot of constraints, including size). Also, I don't know if it changed but the new contact discovery service was not in production last time I checked.
Re:I don't trust Signal by Gaelan on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:16AM (#17724875)
Note: my understanding of SGX is that this still requires trust of Intel. Still, far better than nothing
Re:I don't trust Signal by saurik on Thursday August 09, 2018 @09:41PM (#17730072)
It also requires there to not be a hardware sidechannel exploit on the device running SGX... such as the variants of Spectre that have ben trickling out every few weeks now all year... so yeah: Moxie's trust of SGX is pretty damning.
Re:I don't trust Signal by Vinnl on Friday August 10, 2018 @05:50AM (#17731930)
As I understood it, the "trust" comes down to: "it has some limits, but it's strictly better than nothing". I wouldn't call that damning.
Re:I don't trust Signal by mathnmusic on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:24AM (#17724430)
Signal, in an indirect way, requires 1/6th of the world's population to part with their biometrics. It requires phone number, and in India, getting a phone # requires Aadhaar, which is a centralized, biometrics-based ID (photo, fingerprints AND iris at the moment).
Re:I don't trust Signal by angry_octet on Thursday August 09, 2018 @08:38PM (#17729789)
Are you seriously telling me that everyone in India is using the phone number which matches their biometrics? Lol.

Besides which, there are well established ways to get a Signal number online, like Google Voice or VoIP telephony companies.

Re:I don't trust Signal by j16sdiz on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:49AM (#17724645)
I see this as a good thing because it effectively rate limit the spam bot creations
Re:I don't trust Signal by lucb1e on Thursday August 09, 2018 @12:57PM (#17725982)
I think there are better solutions for that such as CAPTCHAs, rate limiting, etc. We don't need to resort to giving out biometrics to solve spam bots.
Re:I don't trust Signal by alexnewman on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:09AM (#17724813)
Ya really think phone numbers are hard to get?
Re:I don't trust Signal by FrozenTraffic on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:18AM (#17724908)
Since there is someone above claiming that getting a phone number in some countries "requires" biometric identification, I'd say yes.
Re:I don't trust Signal by snaky on Thursday August 09, 2018 @12:01PM (#17725354)
As usual with restrictions and regulations, it's easy to obtain for bad guys and not easy for good guys.
Re:I don't trust Signal by okatsu on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:28AM (#17724460)
I was on Wire for a time and even got other people on board. Then the experience suddenly degraded out of nowhere. The desktop and web clients would never finish syncing. Some other stuff I don't remember. I really liked the app though.

I mean the unfortunate reality of chat programs is that there are so many that when I'm having weird problems I'm not gonna spend time opening issues on GitHub and sending logs; I'll just go back to what works. That's even more true for my non-technical friends.

Re:I don't trust Signal by Tomte on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:34AM (#17724524)
This. User experience is everything.

In my case, not Wire, but Signal. My Signal contact list is exactle two people long. Trying to get people to move from WhatsApp elsewhere is hard, especially if some of them even additionally installed Threema a few years back when Facebook bought WhatsApp.

But at least two people. With one of them I was regularly conversing on Signal, so much that she even preferred it to WhatsApp.

One day she messaged me on WhatsApp again. She said Signal had not set notifications for my messages a few times now, and she's fed up.

I never had that problem. Maybe she misunderstood or misconfigured something. But it doesn't matter. Signal is dead to her.

It's really easy to lose perspective as a developer how much this usability stuff matters. Sure, we all pay lip service to it, tell each other how bad the UI on some tool is and fake humility about our missing sense for anything design (including UI design).

But we don't really get it.

Re:I don't trust Signal by walterbell on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:35AM (#17724531)
Wire mobile apps have been reliable through several years of daily use. Does not require a phone number and Wire is working on interoperability with other E2E messaging services, via the IETF MLS protocol.
Re:I don't trust Signal by okatsu on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:36AM (#17724539)
I'm happy for you. Buf that doesn't undo what happened to us.
Re:I don't trust Signal by walterbell on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:38AM (#17724557)
Have you filed a bug report on github?
Re:I don't trust Signal by okatsu on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:41AM (#17724589)
I already mentioned in my comment above that when a chat app misbehaves I don't spend time doing that and that my friends are even less likely to. It might seem unfair to you but that's just how it is. If it doesn't work I move on. Best of luck to Wire though.
Re:I don't trust Signal by leetbulb on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:55AM (#17724689)
I love wire. Never have any issues with the desktop client nor mobile app. Even though it's Electron, it seems to be extremely focused on security. Unfortunately, it suffers from the same metadata issues as Signal. If you really need higher security messaging, p2p is your best bet, but then you may face correlation attacks by ISPs and whatnot... Maybe we all just need to get our HAM radio licenses :)
Re:I don't trust Signal by angry_octet on Thursday August 09, 2018 @08:42PM (#17729803)
Well, Electron is a security trash fire. I wouldn't use it for anything if need to be remotely secure. Hopefully will be replaced by webasm in the near future, though that will likely have problems too.
Re:I don't trust Signal by samstave on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:16AM (#17724869)
How is HAM secure? (I don't know anything about HAM)
Re:I don't trust Signal by detaro on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:17AM (#17724883)
It's not secure by definition, since encryption is forbidden in ham radio.
Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:30AM (#17724483)
An open-source server is certainly a step up from Signal, but since Wire doesn't support federation (either in their ToS or in practice) I'd favour Matrix.
Re:I don't trust Signal by lorenzhs on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:39AM (#17725120)
> An open-source server is certainly a step up from Signal

https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server.

You are spreading a lot of incorrect or misleading information about Signal in this thread. That makes it difficult to assume that you're arguing in good faith here.

Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Thursday August 09, 2018 @03:01PM (#17727363)
I stand corrected - though, as another reply said, it makes little difference if you can't actually use a forked server in practice.

I don't know what I could say to convince you I'm just an ordinary person concerned about my privacy, but ultimately it doesn't matter: you should definitely consider the possibility that I'm a bad actor and take nothing on faith. Equally, you shouldn't trust that Marlinspike hasn't been compromised either.

A little thought experiment: Put yourself in the NSA's position in 2013. GPG has been out there for years and, despite your best efforts, you can't break it directly when users follow proper security practices. (You have to compromise those users' computers instead, and that's vastly more expensive; every time you use one of your rootkits or exploits you run the risk of burning it, so they're reserved for high-value targets). The world is suddenly a lot more interested in privacy, and while popular culture doesn't grasp the intricacies of key exchange or forward secrecy, there are enough cryptography experts around that any obvious downgrade from GPG will be noticed and picked up on (this is just after the conclusive failure of your Dual_EC_DRBG efforts). What do you do? How do you get the public to accept something easier to compromise?

My answer is: you find a different front to attack GPG from. You talk up different kinds of attackers. You dangle a new, desirable security property that GPG doesn't have, and a theoretically clean construction - and then you compromise the metadata subtly, down in the weeds of usability features, letting you identify the higher-value targets. You get people used to using a closed-source build that auto-updates, and have a canned exploit ready (a compromised PRNG or similar) to use on those targets. And you get people to enter their phone numbers so that you can always track their location and what hardware they're running if you do have to attack their device more directly.

Maybe I'm being paranoid, but it seems distinctly odd that we see such a push behind an app that compromises so many features that were previously thought essential to security, just as the move for encryption is finally gaining momentum.

Re:I don't trust Signal by jdietrich on Thursday August 09, 2018 @04:19PM (#17728092)
GPG has an infinitesimally small user base. Many tech savvy users still struggle to use it correctly. Moxie has explicitly stated that his aim is not to build the perfect secure messenger app, but a messenger app that provides the greatest amount of security to the greatest number of users. He has explicitly stated that he has made some design decisions that slightly compromise the ultimate security of Signal, but are necessary to establish a wide user base and avoid traps that could drastically compromise the security model because of user error.

Signal is not designed for you. Highly sophisticated, highly paranoid users already have a variety of options for securing their communications. Signal is designed to provide the greatest possible amount of security to the greatest possible number of users, which necessarily requires that some tradeoffs are made in the interests of ease-of-use.

Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Thursday August 09, 2018 @05:03PM (#17728489)
> GPG has an infinitesimally small user base. Many tech savvy users still struggle to use it correctly. Moxie has explicitly stated that his aim is not to build the perfect secure messenger app, but a messenger app that provides the greatest amount of security to the greatest number of users.

But what's the threat model where Signal makes sense? For a less-than-nation-state attacker, basic TLS as virtually all messengers support is surely adequate. For a nation-state attacker, phone-number-as-ID is a bigger vulnerability than anything Signal helps with, and central servers means that Signal can simply be blocked outright in any case. If we're talking about, say, Turkey cracking down on protesters, they would probably rather those protesters were using Signal (where arresting one means you get the phone numbers - and therefore locations - of all their friends) than the likes of Facebook or Discord or what-have-you.

> Signal is not designed for you. Highly sophisticated, highly paranoid users already have a variety of options for securing their communications. Signal is designed to provide the greatest possible amount of security to the greatest possible number of users, which necessarily requires that some tradeoffs are made in the interests of ease-of-use.

I'd be fine with that if Marlinspike didn't also trash-talk those more secure tools.

Re:I don't trust Signal by jdietrich on Thursday August 09, 2018 @08:15PM (#17729691)
There are nation-state attackers and nation-state attackers. Most oppressive regimes don't have the technological resources to perform complex attacks on relatively tough systems, but they can perform pervasive monitoring on layer 1, use dodgy certificates to undermine TLS and bribe or coerce corporate actors. Most people in functioning democracies aren't particularly worried about becoming the target of the full might of a three-letter agency, but they might be worried about bulk collection via L1 or PRISM intercepts.

Signal is a vast improvement over SMS, plaintext email or any commercial messaging application, but it's no more difficult to use. It's relatively foolproof, in that user error can't fatally undermine the security model in most cases. It's not perfect, but it's easily the most secure chat app that I could confidently persuade non-techies to actually use. A highly secure app that you don't know how to use offers you no security at all.

Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Friday August 10, 2018 @05:55AM (#17731939)
> they can perform pervasive monitoring on layer 1

Indeed (particularly as telecoms are often state-owned in those regimes), which is what makes phone-number-as-ID such a bad idea.

> use dodgy certificates to undermine TLS

Difficult in these days of certificate transparency and HPKP.

> bribe or coerce corporate actors

If that's your worry surely you want to rely on a big corporation rather than Signal. Look at e.g. Brazil having to block WhatsApp entirely because Facebook wouldn't play ball with them. Facebook has deep pockets that mean they can afford to do that kind of thing.

> Signal is a vast improvement over SMS, plaintext email

Agreed

> or any commercial messaging application,

Not convinced that there's a significant improvement here. Plenty of commercial messaging applications have encryption. If the server is under an attacker's control then you're vulnerable, but I'm not convinced that isn't the case with Signal too.

Re:I don't trust Signal by UncleMeat on Thursday August 09, 2018 @08:00PM (#17729607)
The threat model is "the backend server has a security flaw and gets exploited, dumping a bunch of information about my chats" or "the backend server is run by a company that wants to use the contents of my messages for analytics and I don't want that" or "a rogue employee with access to databases but not enough access to ship rogue code wants to read my messages".
Re:I don't trust Signal by ddevault on Thursday August 09, 2018 @12:20PM (#17725553)
The server might as well be closed source. We have no guarantees that Moxie is actually running this in production and he refuses to federate with third-party servers.
Re:I don't trust Signal by tptacek on Thursday August 09, 2018 @02:57PM (#17727330)
It's funny you put it that way. You're right: the server might as well be closed source. That is the point of end-to-end encryption.
Re:I don't trust Signal by lorenzhs on Thursday August 09, 2018 @01:49PM (#17726574)
This is addressed in https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/ – using Intel SGX, it's possible for the clients to verify that the server is running the code it should be running. I'm not sure whether this is already deployed, but it refutes any claim that Signal isn't serious about your concern.

I don't see how federation is related to this at all. We know you're bummed about it, you don't need to inject it into every subthread.

Re:I don't trust Signal by Boulth on Thursday August 09, 2018 @02:45PM (#17727199)
> This is addressed in https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/ – using Intel SGX, it's possible for the clients to verify that the server is running the code it should be running

Just the code inside the enclave and that's a very small amount of code, definitely not the entire server.

Re:I don't trust Signal by ddevault on Thursday August 09, 2018 @02:24PM (#17726967)
SGX is not a magic bullet, it's only part of a secure system. It's also come under some fire, check out this paper:

https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Swami-SGX...

SGX alone cannot solve this problem. Even in the idealized case, you can sniff traffic on the router to find out which user IPs are talking to each other and when.

Re:I don't trust Signal by tptacek on Thursday August 09, 2018 @03:04PM (#17727385)
Did you read that work? I did: I was on the review board that made the decision to accept it for Black Hat. Could you map Yogesh's research to something Signal is actually proposing to do and explain in any detail what the actual threat you're talking about is? Thanks.
Re:I don't trust Signal by ddevault on Thursday August 09, 2018 @04:43PM (#17728308)
I could, but I'm probably ill informed. I want to hear your specific rebuttal to this:

>Even in the idealized case, you can sniff traffic on the router to find out which user IPs are talking to each other and when.

Re:I don't trust Signal by tptacek on Thursday August 09, 2018 @04:51PM (#17728375)
That's a string that appears nowhere in Yogesh's research. Are you at this point conceding that the link you cited has nothing to do with this thread?
Re:I don't trust Signal by Sir_Cmpwn on Thursday August 09, 2018 @05:16PM (#17728583)
I concede that this:

>I did: I was on the review board that made the decision to accept it for Black Hat.

Probably makes you more qualified to talk about SGX than me, so yes, I concede that the paper may not be relevant because your understanding of it is probably better than mine.

With that, I asked you a more fundamental question, given that you are knowledgeable about this and may be able to provide an answer.

Re:I don't trust Signal by tptacek on Thursday August 09, 2018 @05:23PM (#17728626)
What I'm asking is whether you had a coherent argument about weaknesses in SGX based on Yogesh's research that would keep it from functioning in Signal's contact discovery scheme, or whether you saw the letters "SGX" in a thread and posted the first link you could find about issues with SGX. Maybe you should find a better link? They're out there.
Re:I don't trust Signal by brynjolf on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:37AM (#17725100)
There is a german guide to privacy I read that has some real issues with Wire, most that I agree with [0].

I will Google translate it for you (ironic):

> "10/06/2017: Wire.com operational Security

> Wire.com is referred to as a new star among crypto messengers. I briefly looked at the (experimental) Linux version of Wire.com and found some significant security flaws:

> Mannings Bug: Wire.com has good end-to-end encryption based on Axolotl. The chats are all but unencrypted (!) Logged on the hard disk of the computer. The logging can not be switched off.

> The unencrypted storage of encrypted communication is not a bug but an epic FAIL! > Access data: (Account name, password) to Wire.com account are also stored somewhere unencrypted on the hard drive. When starting the person does not have to authenticate in front of the screen but is automatically connected to all accounts.

> This is not a bug but a FAIL! Remote Code Execution: The Linux Wire Client contains a lot of Javascript code. Updates for the Javascript code will be downloaded and executed via HTTPS from the Amazon Cloud. After a superficial examination, the authenticity of the executed code is not additionally cryptographically verified (this is a guess, not checked in the code!). Security therefore depends solely on HTTPS encryption. The HTTPS encryption of the contacted wire servers app.wire.com, prod-assets.wire.com and prod-nginz-https.wire.com does NOT meet the BSI's requirements for secure HTTPS encryption. These servers are Amazon Cloud Server and Cloudfront Server (not your own infrastructure).

> DANE / TLSA or HPKP are NOT used to validate SSL certificates of HTTPS connections. In addition, no CAA record is defined in the DNS, which should actually be mandatory for HTTPS for a month. The security of the transport encryption between client and server thus does not correspond to the feasible state of the art.

> Potent attackers could attack with fake but valid SSL certificates as man-in-the-middle the communication to the wire servers, in combination with the remote code execution possibly also attack the end-to-end encryption (assumption!), and there are enough potent attackers who want to attack the encryption of crypto messengers. The domain wire.com is not signed DNSSEC. Instead of the privacy-friendly OCSP.Stapling, OCSP.Get is used and several CAs are contacted to verify SSL certificates via OCSP. OCSP.Get can be easily tricked, as M. Marlspike demonstrated in 2009. It contacts third party servers that are not under the control of the operators (maps.googleapis.com, images.unsplash.com) to download anything.

> Conclusion: The operational security of Wire.com is not (yet) suitable for security-critical applications after a small, superficial test. In particular, whistleblowers should learn from Manning's example and not use it.

> Disclaimer: this is NOT an audit but a short test of the Linux version."

[0] https://www.privacy-handbuch.de/diskussion.htm

Re:I don't trust Signal by bjoli on Thursday August 09, 2018 @03:00PM (#17727350)
To be fair,they started pinni their certificates about 3 years after claiming their VoIP stuff was encrypted. So there was only A FRIGGING THREE YEAR WINDOW when someone in your root cert db could mitm your VoIP connection. So not really friendly neighbour Hacker Joe could do, but definitely a nation state or malicious employer.
Re:I don't trust Signal by Cowen on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:03AM (#17724252)
> We have at least one data point that says that Signal stores exactly two integers about you

For people wondering what they are:

> "The only information responsive to the subpoena held by OWS is the time of account creation and the date of the last connection to Signal servers for account [redacted]. Consistent with the Electronic Conununications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2), OWS is providing this information in response to the subpoena."

Their response to the subpoena then goes on to object to its overly broad scope, which asked for things that require a court order or a search warrant. They also object to the scope of the nondisclosure order included in the subpoena.

Re:I don't trust Signal by Vinnl on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:21AM (#17724414)
Is it even possible for the Signal servers to keep track of who you talk to, when, and how often? I was under the impression that those two data points they stored were the only thing they _could_ store, because the rest is sent to the servers encrypted.

Edit: Yes, apparently they have a method of doing private contact discovery and, IIUC, even a method for the client to verify that the server is running the source code they expect: https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/#trust-but...

Re:I don't trust Signal by subway on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:26AM (#17724449)
Signal has to be able to route messages from user a to user b through their centralized server, so at a minimum they are capable of logging "This user sent a message that we relayed to this other user".
Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:28AM (#17724461)
The signal server is responsible for doing the trust-on-first-use key exchange and letting you send offline messages to your counterparties. If your client could somehow be tricked into thinking that the other side was offline and you'd already sent them a large number of messages while they were offline, or that this was the first time you were talking to them, your client would leak a lot of metadata to the server. And given that the server is in charge of routing your messages to your counterparties, it seems like there's a lot of potential for a hostile server to trick the client in that way.

Theoretically it might be possible for a sufficiently paranoid client to cover all the bases. But it's certainly a huge attack surface.

Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Thursday August 09, 2018 @09:57AM (#17724193)
If Open Whisper Systems had received a national security letter requiring them to collect more information and keep it secret that they were doing so, how would you expect them to have responded to that subpoena?
Re:I don't trust Signal by tptacek on Thursday August 09, 2018 @03:02PM (#17727367)
This is a good question, because it illuminates design decisions that Signal has made that confuse nerds. For instance: Signal only recently got user profiles --- user profiles! --- because they took their time figuring out how to deliver them without sacrificing privacy. Take some time to look at how they implemented Giphy sharing to get an idea of what I'm talking about.

Any information the Signal client reveals to the server is, indeed, something the USG could make a legal claim on. Probably even if Signal's server code doesn't now even collect it. The Signal team has been sounding that alarm for years: when you look at a chat program with fancy whiz-bang features, consider what those features expose (traffic-analytically, even). "Maybe have fewer features until we figure this out", Signal says.

The market does not agree, and that has been rough for Signal, and they deserve credit for the stand they are taking on it.

Re:I don't trust Signal by zmanian on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:03AM (#17724245)
NSL can't require to collect new business records. They can only compel you to disclose business records that you already have.

This is beyond the legal authority of an NSL.

Re:I don't trust Signal by kodablah on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:16AM (#17724371)
> This is beyond the legal authority of an NSL.

If the legal authority can't be challenged in public, how are you so sure this legal authority hasn't been skirted plenty? In an opaque system, what they can and can't do is only theoretical. Only sometimes are things disclosed well after the fact and often only in aggregate (such as numbers about how many NSLs are greenlit). This is what the author means by no trust required. They can't be asked to subvert it, even via extralegal means.

Re:I don't trust Signal by nickpsecurity on Thursday August 09, 2018 @12:56PM (#17725973)
The Core Secrets leak said the FBI "compels" U.S. companies to "SIGINT-enable" their products if they don't take money. SIGINT-enable means installing backdoors. So, yeah they can. They also do this with classification order mandating secrecy from organizations and people that are immune to prosecution. In the Lavabit case, they wanted a device attached to the network to do whatever they wanted with the company ordered to lie to customers about their secrets still safe via the encryption keys. That's always worth remembering for these discussions. Plus, most companies or individuals won't shut down their operation to stop a hypothetical threat.

So, you have to assume they'll always get more power and surveillance over time via secret orders if there's no consequences for them demanding it but people on other side can be massively fined or do time for refusing. Organizations about privacy protection simply shouldn't operate in police states like the U.S..

Re:I don't trust Signal by pdkl95 on Thursday August 09, 2018 @02:55PM (#17727301)
If for some reason those methods fail, they can use BULLRUN, which has a much larger budget[1] and specifically tasked with "defeat[ing] the encryption used in specific network communication technologies"[2].

[1] "The funding allocated for Bullrun in top-secret budgets dwarfs the money set aside for programs like PRISM and XKeyscore. PRISM operates on about $20 million a year, according to Snowden, while Bullrun cost $254.9 million in 2013 alone. Since 2011, Bullrun has cost more than $800 million." ( https://www.ibtimes.com/edward-snowden-reveals-secret-decryp... )

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Classification_guide_for_...

Re:I don't trust Signal by willstrafach on Thursday August 09, 2018 @02:54PM (#17727294)
That is a major accusation, can you provide source(s) to read more about this claim?

It is at odds with known cases, such as the fight with Apple over iPhone encryption.

Re:I don't trust Signal by nickpsecurity on Thursday August 09, 2018 @09:59PM (#17730150)
It's not at odds if you know how they work. The U.S. LEO's are multiple organizations with different focuses, legal authority, and so on. They also regularly lie to protect illegal methods and activities. Let's look at some data.

Now, first indication this isn't true was Alexander and Clapper saying they didn't collect massive data on Americans. If they did, they could've solved a lot of cases by your logic of action vs capability being contradictory, right? Yet, Snowden leaks showed they were collecting everything they could: not just metadata, not just on terrorism, and were sharing it with various LEO's. So, they already lie at that point to hide massive collection even if it means crooks walking.

Next, we have the umbrella program called Core Secrets. See Sentry Owl or "relationships with industry." It says Top Secret, Compartmented Programs are doing "SIGINT-enabling programs with U.S. companies." In same document, even those with TS clearance aren't allowed to know the ECI-classified fact that specific companies are weakening products to facilitate attacks.

https://theintercept.com/2014/10/10/core-secrets/

https://theintercept.com/document/2014/10/10/national-initia...

For Lavabit trial, see Exhibit 15 and 16 for the defense against pen register. Exhibit 17 makes clear the device they attach records data live and claims constitutional authority to order that. They claim only metadata but they lied about that before. Exhibit 18 upholds that the government is entitled to the information, Lavabit has to install the backdoor, the court trusts FBI not to abuse it, and they'll all lie to Lavabit customers that nobody has access to their messages (aka secrecy order about keys).

https://edwardsnowden.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/redacte...

That the judge asked for a specific alternative was hopeful, though. I came up with a high-assurance, lawful-intercept concept as a backup option for event where there was no avoiding an intercept but you wanted provable limitation of what they were doing.

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/09/fake_cell_pho...

They regularly hide what techniques they have via parallel construction or dropping cases.

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/dea-and-nsa-team-intel...

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/fbi-would-rather...

So, you now have that backdrop where they're collecting everything, can fine companies out of existence, can jail their executives for contempt, are willing to let defendants walk to protect their secret methods, and constantly push for more power in overt methods. In the iPhone case, even Richard Clarke said he and everyone he knows believed the NSA could've cracked it. Even he, previously ardent defender of intelligence community, says FBI was trying to establish a precedent to let them bypass the crypto with legal means in regular courts.

https://www.newsweek.com/former-white-house-offiical-nsa-cou...

So, the questions would be:

(a) can they already do that legally or technically using methods like attaching hardware and software to vendors' networks/apps like in Lavabit trial?

(b) can the NSA or third parties bypass the security on iPhones publicly or in secret? Or did Apple truly make bulletproof security?

(c) did all this change just because FBI said they were honest, powerless agency hampered by unbreakable security in a press release?

I didn't think anything changed. I predicted they'd crack that iPhone the second they were blocked in court. They did. They knew they could the whole time. They lied the whole time. They wanted a precedent to expand their power like they did in the past. That simple.

Re:I don't trust Signal by lawnchair_larry on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:12AM (#17724328)
I’m pretty sure that isn’t true. They can be used to compel you to build interception capabilities.
Re:I don't trust Signal by gruez on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:14AM (#17724348)
source?
Re:I don't trust Signal by eli on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:27AM (#17724451)
It's complicated, but that's kinda what happened to the Lavabit "secure" webmail service. When the owner wouldn't install a backdoor, the FBI sought the private encryption keys so they could MITM the whole site.

https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/how-lavabit-melted-d...

Re:I don't trust Signal by angry_octet on Thursday August 09, 2018 @08:50PM (#17729845)
That isn't building an interception mechanism, it's revealing some private information Lavabit held.
Re:I don't trust Signal by Nasrudith on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:38AM (#17724548)
The big Apple vs FBI high profile lawsuit for one. Granted that was a telegraphed precedent seeking exercise by "accidentally" losing access to the work phone after the terrorists destroyed their personal phones before the attack.
Re:I don't trust Signal by drb91 on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:55AM (#17724694)
That was not an NSL.
Re:I don't trust Signal by Nasrudith on Thursday August 09, 2018 @12:51PM (#17725915)
True - they are less publicly tested but it is suggestive in its own way. If they could just NSL their way to access why bother with precedents? It is wild speculation but that is what lack of transparency has wrought.
Re:I don't trust Signal by lawnchair_larry on Thursday August 09, 2018 @12:00PM (#17725345)
I really can’t say. Take for what it’s worth.

Edit: I may be thinking of a FISA order as opposed to an NSL. Doesn’t matter though, obviously the concern is that they would be served with whichever does allow that.

Re:I don't trust Signal by StavrosK on Thursday August 09, 2018 @12:37PM (#17725746)
Does the NSL have any legal authority? Is it actually bound by laws? From what I understand, an NSL is "do what we tell you, because we're the NSA".
Re:I don't trust Signal by hprotagonist on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:00AM (#17724218)
precisely the way they did, which was to challenge the gag order, and win. That’s where the documents above come from, in fact.
Re:I don't trust Signal by dannyw on Thursday August 09, 2018 @09:58AM (#17724200)
NSLs don’t allow that.
Re:I don't trust Signal by thsealienbstrds on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:01AM (#17724743)
If I read that document correctly, it's more accurate to say that Signal stores at least two integers, rather than exactly. Signal did not provide information that does not fall under certain information categories, and they say that a court order would be needed to force them to disclose any of that information (if they possess any, which they deny).
Re:I don't trust Signal by Gaelan on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:19AM (#17724909)
But they did deny possessing any of that information in the subpoena reply, so if you trust that they are replying truthfully it is exactly 2.
Re:I don't trust Signal by oakpond on Friday August 10, 2018 @06:58PM (#17737301)
So, nobody has ever lied in a subpoena reply before?
Re:I don't trust Signal by alexnewman on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:05AM (#17724265)
Uhm... this is what would happen if it was a govt job