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Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Thursday August 09, 2018 @05:03PM (#17728489)
> GPG has an infinitesimally small user base. Many tech savvy users still struggle to use it correctly. Moxie has explicitly stated that his aim is not to build the perfect secure messenger app, but a messenger app that provides the greatest amount of security to the greatest number of users.

But what's the threat model where Signal makes sense? For a less-than-nation-state attacker, basic TLS as virtually all messengers support is surely adequate. For a nation-state attacker, phone-number-as-ID is a bigger vulnerability than anything Signal helps with, and central servers means that Signal can simply be blocked outright in any case. If we're talking about, say, Turkey cracking down on protesters, they would probably rather those protesters were using Signal (where arresting one means you get the phone numbers - and therefore locations - of all their friends) than the likes of Facebook or Discord or what-have-you.

> Signal is not designed for you. Highly sophisticated, highly paranoid users already have a variety of options for securing their communications. Signal is designed to provide the greatest possible amount of security to the greatest possible number of users, which necessarily requires that some tradeoffs are made in the interests of ease-of-use.

I'd be fine with that if Marlinspike didn't also trash-talk those more secure tools.

Re:I don't trust Signal by jdietrich on Thursday August 09, 2018 @08:15PM (#17729691)
There are nation-state attackers and nation-state attackers. Most oppressive regimes don't have the technological resources to perform complex attacks on relatively tough systems, but they can perform pervasive monitoring on layer 1, use dodgy certificates to undermine TLS and bribe or coerce corporate actors. Most people in functioning democracies aren't particularly worried about becoming the target of the full might of a three-letter agency, but they might be worried about bulk collection via L1 or PRISM intercepts.

Signal is a vast improvement over SMS, plaintext email or any commercial messaging application, but it's no more difficult to use. It's relatively foolproof, in that user error can't fatally undermine the security model in most cases. It's not perfect, but it's easily the most secure chat app that I could confidently persuade non-techies to actually use. A highly secure app that you don't know how to use offers you no security at all.

Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Friday August 10, 2018 @05:55AM (#17731939)
> they can perform pervasive monitoring on layer 1

Indeed (particularly as telecoms are often state-owned in those regimes), which is what makes phone-number-as-ID such a bad idea.

> use dodgy certificates to undermine TLS

Difficult in these days of certificate transparency and HPKP.

> bribe or coerce corporate actors

If that's your worry surely you want to rely on a big corporation rather than Signal. Look at e.g. Brazil having to block WhatsApp entirely because Facebook wouldn't play ball with them. Facebook has deep pockets that mean they can afford to do that kind of thing.

> Signal is a vast improvement over SMS, plaintext email

Agreed

> or any commercial messaging application,

Not convinced that there's a significant improvement here. Plenty of commercial messaging applications have encryption. If the server is under an attacker's control then you're vulnerable, but I'm not convinced that isn't the case with Signal too.

Re:I don't trust Signal by UncleMeat on Thursday August 09, 2018 @08:00PM (#17729607)
The threat model is "the backend server has a security flaw and gets exploited, dumping a bunch of information about my chats" or "the backend server is run by a company that wants to use the contents of my messages for analytics and I don't want that" or "a rogue employee with access to databases but not enough access to ship rogue code wants to read my messages".