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Re:I don't trust Signal by guiraldelli on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:15AM (#17724356)
I am happy to see I am not the only person in the world that feels like this about Signal.

The interesting fact is that I "Ctrl+F" this page for Wire and I have seen nothing, even though this comment is about something that made me switch over Wire from Signal: to date, that's the unique instant messaging that has FOSS'ed both the server and the clients. (OK, the article also says about Matrix.)

I admire Wire for a number of reasons, but certainly FOSS'ing all their code is one the main reasons. (The other is... Haskell! And also Rust.)

And just to point out, not only Wire bug-fixed the library implementation of the Signal protocol, as they use the Signal protocol. And their web interface is very good!

Oh, yes... And they are not based in USA.

EDIT: I am not affiliated with Wire, but just a happy customer. :)

Re:I don't trust Signal by Vinnl on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:26AM (#17724447)
> that's the unique instant messaging that has FOSS'ed both the server and the clients.

Signal's server code is open source as well: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server

And apparently the client can verify that the server is running that code: https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/#trust-but...

Re:I don't trust Signal by Boulth on Thursday August 09, 2018 @02:43PM (#17727173)
Server and the contact directory service are two different things. The remote attestation is just for a small part of the code (SGX code have a lot of constraints, including size). Also, I don't know if it changed but the new contact discovery service was not in production last time I checked.
Re:I don't trust Signal by Gaelan on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:16AM (#17724875)
Note: my understanding of SGX is that this still requires trust of Intel. Still, far better than nothing
Re:I don't trust Signal by saurik on Thursday August 09, 2018 @09:41PM (#17730072)
It also requires there to not be a hardware sidechannel exploit on the device running SGX... such as the variants of Spectre that have ben trickling out every few weeks now all year... so yeah: Moxie's trust of SGX is pretty damning.
Re:I don't trust Signal by Vinnl on Friday August 10, 2018 @05:50AM (#17731930)
As I understood it, the "trust" comes down to: "it has some limits, but it's strictly better than nothing". I wouldn't call that damning.
Re:I don't trust Signal by mathnmusic on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:24AM (#17724430)
Signal, in an indirect way, requires 1/6th of the world's population to part with their biometrics. It requires phone number, and in India, getting a phone # requires Aadhaar, which is a centralized, biometrics-based ID (photo, fingerprints AND iris at the moment).
Re:I don't trust Signal by angry_octet on Thursday August 09, 2018 @08:38PM (#17729789)
Are you seriously telling me that everyone in India is using the phone number which matches their biometrics? Lol.

Besides which, there are well established ways to get a Signal number online, like Google Voice or VoIP telephony companies.

Re:I don't trust Signal by j16sdiz on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:49AM (#17724645)
I see this as a good thing because it effectively rate limit the spam bot creations
Re:I don't trust Signal by lucb1e on Thursday August 09, 2018 @12:57PM (#17725982)
I think there are better solutions for that such as CAPTCHAs, rate limiting, etc. We don't need to resort to giving out biometrics to solve spam bots.
Re:I don't trust Signal by alexnewman on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:09AM (#17724813)
Ya really think phone numbers are hard to get?
Re:I don't trust Signal by FrozenTraffic on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:18AM (#17724908)
Since there is someone above claiming that getting a phone number in some countries "requires" biometric identification, I'd say yes.
Re:I don't trust Signal by snaky on Thursday August 09, 2018 @12:01PM (#17725354)
As usual with restrictions and regulations, it's easy to obtain for bad guys and not easy for good guys.
Re:I don't trust Signal by okatsu on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:28AM (#17724460)
I was on Wire for a time and even got other people on board. Then the experience suddenly degraded out of nowhere. The desktop and web clients would never finish syncing. Some other stuff I don't remember. I really liked the app though.

I mean the unfortunate reality of chat programs is that there are so many that when I'm having weird problems I'm not gonna spend time opening issues on GitHub and sending logs; I'll just go back to what works. That's even more true for my non-technical friends.

Re:I don't trust Signal by Tomte on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:34AM (#17724524)
This. User experience is everything.

In my case, not Wire, but Signal. My Signal contact list is exactle two people long. Trying to get people to move from WhatsApp elsewhere is hard, especially if some of them even additionally installed Threema a few years back when Facebook bought WhatsApp.

But at least two people. With one of them I was regularly conversing on Signal, so much that she even preferred it to WhatsApp.

One day she messaged me on WhatsApp again. She said Signal had not set notifications for my messages a few times now, and she's fed up.

I never had that problem. Maybe she misunderstood or misconfigured something. But it doesn't matter. Signal is dead to her.

It's really easy to lose perspective as a developer how much this usability stuff matters. Sure, we all pay lip service to it, tell each other how bad the UI on some tool is and fake humility about our missing sense for anything design (including UI design).

But we don't really get it.

Re:I don't trust Signal by walterbell on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:35AM (#17724531)
Wire mobile apps have been reliable through several years of daily use. Does not require a phone number and Wire is working on interoperability with other E2E messaging services, via the IETF MLS protocol.
Re:I don't trust Signal by okatsu on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:36AM (#17724539)
I'm happy for you. Buf that doesn't undo what happened to us.
Re:I don't trust Signal by walterbell on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:38AM (#17724557)
Have you filed a bug report on github?
Re:I don't trust Signal by okatsu on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:41AM (#17724589)
I already mentioned in my comment above that when a chat app misbehaves I don't spend time doing that and that my friends are even less likely to. It might seem unfair to you but that's just how it is. If it doesn't work I move on. Best of luck to Wire though.
Re:I don't trust Signal by leetbulb on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:55AM (#17724689)
I love wire. Never have any issues with the desktop client nor mobile app. Even though it's Electron, it seems to be extremely focused on security. Unfortunately, it suffers from the same metadata issues as Signal. If you really need higher security messaging, p2p is your best bet, but then you may face correlation attacks by ISPs and whatnot... Maybe we all just need to get our HAM radio licenses :)
Re:I don't trust Signal by angry_octet on Thursday August 09, 2018 @08:42PM (#17729803)
Well, Electron is a security trash fire. I wouldn't use it for anything if need to be remotely secure. Hopefully will be replaced by webasm in the near future, though that will likely have problems too.
Re:I don't trust Signal by samstave on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:16AM (#17724869)
How is HAM secure? (I don't know anything about HAM)
Re:I don't trust Signal by detaro on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:17AM (#17724883)
It's not secure by definition, since encryption is forbidden in ham radio.
Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Thursday August 09, 2018 @10:30AM (#17724483)
An open-source server is certainly a step up from Signal, but since Wire doesn't support federation (either in their ToS or in practice) I'd favour Matrix.
Re:I don't trust Signal by lorenzhs on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:39AM (#17725120)
> An open-source server is certainly a step up from Signal

https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server.

You are spreading a lot of incorrect or misleading information about Signal in this thread. That makes it difficult to assume that you're arguing in good faith here.

Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Thursday August 09, 2018 @03:01PM (#17727363)
I stand corrected - though, as another reply said, it makes little difference if you can't actually use a forked server in practice.

I don't know what I could say to convince you I'm just an ordinary person concerned about my privacy, but ultimately it doesn't matter: you should definitely consider the possibility that I'm a bad actor and take nothing on faith. Equally, you shouldn't trust that Marlinspike hasn't been compromised either.

A little thought experiment: Put yourself in the NSA's position in 2013. GPG has been out there for years and, despite your best efforts, you can't break it directly when users follow proper security practices. (You have to compromise those users' computers instead, and that's vastly more expensive; every time you use one of your rootkits or exploits you run the risk of burning it, so they're reserved for high-value targets). The world is suddenly a lot more interested in privacy, and while popular culture doesn't grasp the intricacies of key exchange or forward secrecy, there are enough cryptography experts around that any obvious downgrade from GPG will be noticed and picked up on (this is just after the conclusive failure of your Dual_EC_DRBG efforts). What do you do? How do you get the public to accept something easier to compromise?

My answer is: you find a different front to attack GPG from. You talk up different kinds of attackers. You dangle a new, desirable security property that GPG doesn't have, and a theoretically clean construction - and then you compromise the metadata subtly, down in the weeds of usability features, letting you identify the higher-value targets. You get people used to using a closed-source build that auto-updates, and have a canned exploit ready (a compromised PRNG or similar) to use on those targets. And you get people to enter their phone numbers so that you can always track their location and what hardware they're running if you do have to attack their device more directly.

Maybe I'm being paranoid, but it seems distinctly odd that we see such a push behind an app that compromises so many features that were previously thought essential to security, just as the move for encryption is finally gaining momentum.

Re:I don't trust Signal by jdietrich on Thursday August 09, 2018 @04:19PM (#17728092)
GPG has an infinitesimally small user base. Many tech savvy users still struggle to use it correctly. Moxie has explicitly stated that his aim is not to build the perfect secure messenger app, but a messenger app that provides the greatest amount of security to the greatest number of users. He has explicitly stated that he has made some design decisions that slightly compromise the ultimate security of Signal, but are necessary to establish a wide user base and avoid traps that could drastically compromise the security model because of user error.

Signal is not designed for you. Highly sophisticated, highly paranoid users already have a variety of options for securing their communications. Signal is designed to provide the greatest possible amount of security to the greatest possible number of users, which necessarily requires that some tradeoffs are made in the interests of ease-of-use.

Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Thursday August 09, 2018 @05:03PM (#17728489)
> GPG has an infinitesimally small user base. Many tech savvy users still struggle to use it correctly. Moxie has explicitly stated that his aim is not to build the perfect secure messenger app, but a messenger app that provides the greatest amount of security to the greatest number of users.

But what's the threat model where Signal makes sense? For a less-than-nation-state attacker, basic TLS as virtually all messengers support is surely adequate. For a nation-state attacker, phone-number-as-ID is a bigger vulnerability than anything Signal helps with, and central servers means that Signal can simply be blocked outright in any case. If we're talking about, say, Turkey cracking down on protesters, they would probably rather those protesters were using Signal (where arresting one means you get the phone numbers - and therefore locations - of all their friends) than the likes of Facebook or Discord or what-have-you.

> Signal is not designed for you. Highly sophisticated, highly paranoid users already have a variety of options for securing their communications. Signal is designed to provide the greatest possible amount of security to the greatest possible number of users, which necessarily requires that some tradeoffs are made in the interests of ease-of-use.

I'd be fine with that if Marlinspike didn't also trash-talk those more secure tools.

Re:I don't trust Signal by jdietrich on Thursday August 09, 2018 @08:15PM (#17729691)
There are nation-state attackers and nation-state attackers. Most oppressive regimes don't have the technological resources to perform complex attacks on relatively tough systems, but they can perform pervasive monitoring on layer 1, use dodgy certificates to undermine TLS and bribe or coerce corporate actors. Most people in functioning democracies aren't particularly worried about becoming the target of the full might of a three-letter agency, but they might be worried about bulk collection via L1 or PRISM intercepts.

Signal is a vast improvement over SMS, plaintext email or any commercial messaging application, but it's no more difficult to use. It's relatively foolproof, in that user error can't fatally undermine the security model in most cases. It's not perfect, but it's easily the most secure chat app that I could confidently persuade non-techies to actually use. A highly secure app that you don't know how to use offers you no security at all.

Re:I don't trust Signal by lmm on Friday August 10, 2018 @05:55AM (#17731939)
> they can perform pervasive monitoring on layer 1

Indeed (particularly as telecoms are often state-owned in those regimes), which is what makes phone-number-as-ID such a bad idea.

> use dodgy certificates to undermine TLS

Difficult in these days of certificate transparency and HPKP.

> bribe or coerce corporate actors

If that's your worry surely you want to rely on a big corporation rather than Signal. Look at e.g. Brazil having to block WhatsApp entirely because Facebook wouldn't play ball with them. Facebook has deep pockets that mean they can afford to do that kind of thing.

> Signal is a vast improvement over SMS, plaintext email

Agreed

> or any commercial messaging application,

Not convinced that there's a significant improvement here. Plenty of commercial messaging applications have encryption. If the server is under an attacker's control then you're vulnerable, but I'm not convinced that isn't the case with Signal too.

Re:I don't trust Signal by UncleMeat on Thursday August 09, 2018 @08:00PM (#17729607)
The threat model is "the backend server has a security flaw and gets exploited, dumping a bunch of information about my chats" or "the backend server is run by a company that wants to use the contents of my messages for analytics and I don't want that" or "a rogue employee with access to databases but not enough access to ship rogue code wants to read my messages".
Re:I don't trust Signal by ddevault on Thursday August 09, 2018 @12:20PM (#17725553)
The server might as well be closed source. We have no guarantees that Moxie is actually running this in production and he refuses to federate with third-party servers.
Re:I don't trust Signal by tptacek on Thursday August 09, 2018 @02:57PM (#17727330)
It's funny you put it that way. You're right: the server might as well be closed source. That is the point of end-to-end encryption.
Re:I don't trust Signal by lorenzhs on Thursday August 09, 2018 @01:49PM (#17726574)
This is addressed in https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/ – using Intel SGX, it's possible for the clients to verify that the server is running the code it should be running. I'm not sure whether this is already deployed, but it refutes any claim that Signal isn't serious about your concern.

I don't see how federation is related to this at all. We know you're bummed about it, you don't need to inject it into every subthread.

Re:I don't trust Signal by Boulth on Thursday August 09, 2018 @02:45PM (#17727199)
> This is addressed in https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/ – using Intel SGX, it's possible for the clients to verify that the server is running the code it should be running

Just the code inside the enclave and that's a very small amount of code, definitely not the entire server.

Re:I don't trust Signal by ddevault on Thursday August 09, 2018 @02:24PM (#17726967)
SGX is not a magic bullet, it's only part of a secure system. It's also come under some fire, check out this paper:

https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Swami-SGX...

SGX alone cannot solve this problem. Even in the idealized case, you can sniff traffic on the router to find out which user IPs are talking to each other and when.

Re:I don't trust Signal by tptacek on Thursday August 09, 2018 @03:04PM (#17727385)
Did you read that work? I did: I was on the review board that made the decision to accept it for Black Hat. Could you map Yogesh's research to something Signal is actually proposing to do and explain in any detail what the actual threat you're talking about is? Thanks.
Re:I don't trust Signal by ddevault on Thursday August 09, 2018 @04:43PM (#17728308)
I could, but I'm probably ill informed. I want to hear your specific rebuttal to this:

>Even in the idealized case, you can sniff traffic on the router to find out which user IPs are talking to each other and when.

Re:I don't trust Signal by tptacek on Thursday August 09, 2018 @04:51PM (#17728375)
That's a string that appears nowhere in Yogesh's research. Are you at this point conceding that the link you cited has nothing to do with this thread?
Re:I don't trust Signal by Sir_Cmpwn on Thursday August 09, 2018 @05:16PM (#17728583)
I concede that this:

>I did: I was on the review board that made the decision to accept it for Black Hat.

Probably makes you more qualified to talk about SGX than me, so yes, I concede that the paper may not be relevant because your understanding of it is probably better than mine.

With that, I asked you a more fundamental question, given that you are knowledgeable about this and may be able to provide an answer.

Re:I don't trust Signal by tptacek on Thursday August 09, 2018 @05:23PM (#17728626)
What I'm asking is whether you had a coherent argument about weaknesses in SGX based on Yogesh's research that would keep it from functioning in Signal's contact discovery scheme, or whether you saw the letters "SGX" in a thread and posted the first link you could find about issues with SGX. Maybe you should find a better link? They're out there.
Re:I don't trust Signal by brynjolf on Thursday August 09, 2018 @11:37AM (#17725100)
There is a german guide to privacy I read that has some real issues with Wire, most that I agree with [0].

I will Google translate it for you (ironic):

> "10/06/2017: Wire.com operational Security

> Wire.com is referred to as a new star among crypto messengers. I briefly looked at the (experimental) Linux version of Wire.com and found some significant security flaws:

> Mannings Bug: Wire.com has good end-to-end encryption based on Axolotl. The chats are all but unencrypted (!) Logged on the hard disk of the computer. The logging can not be switched off.

> The unencrypted storage of encrypted communication is not a bug but an epic FAIL! > Access data: (Account name, password) to Wire.com account are also stored somewhere unencrypted on the hard drive. When starting the person does not have to authenticate in front of the screen but is automatically connected to all accounts.

> This is not a bug but a FAIL! Remote Code Execution: The Linux Wire Client contains a lot of Javascript code. Updates for the Javascript code will be downloaded and executed via HTTPS from the Amazon Cloud. After a superficial examination, the authenticity of the executed code is not additionally cryptographically verified (this is a guess, not checked in the code!). Security therefore depends solely on HTTPS encryption. The HTTPS encryption of the contacted wire servers app.wire.com, prod-assets.wire.com and prod-nginz-https.wire.com does NOT meet the BSI's requirements for secure HTTPS encryption. These servers are Amazon Cloud Server and Cloudfront Server (not your own infrastructure).

> DANE / TLSA or HPKP are NOT used to validate SSL certificates of HTTPS connections. In addition, no CAA record is defined in the DNS, which should actually be mandatory for HTTPS for a month. The security of the transport encryption between client and server thus does not correspond to the feasible state of the art.

> Potent attackers could attack with fake but valid SSL certificates as man-in-the-middle the communication to the wire servers, in combination with the remote code execution possibly also attack the end-to-end encryption (assumption!), and there are enough potent attackers who want to attack the encryption of crypto messengers. The domain wire.com is not signed DNSSEC. Instead of the privacy-friendly OCSP.Stapling, OCSP.Get is used and several CAs are contacted to verify SSL certificates via OCSP. OCSP.Get can be easily tricked, as M. Marlspike demonstrated in 2009. It contacts third party servers that are not under the control of the operators (maps.googleapis.com, images.unsplash.com) to download anything.

> Conclusion: The operational security of Wire.com is not (yet) suitable for security-critical applications after a small, superficial test. In particular, whistleblowers should learn from Manning's example and not use it.

> Disclaimer: this is NOT an audit but a short test of the Linux version."

[0] https://www.privacy-handbuch.de/diskussion.htm

Re:I don't trust Signal by bjoli on Thursday August 09, 2018 @03:00PM (#17727350)
To be fair,they started pinni their certificates about 3 years after claiming their VoIP stuff was encrypted. So there was only A FRIGGING THREE YEAR WINDOW when someone in your root cert db could mitm your VoIP connection. So not really friendly neighbour Hacker Joe could do, but definitely a nation state or malicious employer.