Security measures are imperfect and always will be. I don't think you can argue that those imperfections grant somebody authorisation when it has already been made clear to them that they aren't authorised. If somebody has been banned from accessing a service, I don't think 200 OK can reasonably be construed as lifting that ban.
On a network you have to first identify yourself and then request access.
If you have been specifically asked to not access that (open) network in the past the onus should be on the network to keep a record of you.
If you knowingly change your identity to bypass that level of security, then yes you are now trespassing.
Arguing that an IP address is an identity "for this case" or "this argument" has the same fundamental problem. No, an IP address is not an identity and blocking an IP address is the physical world equivalent of putting up some traffic cones on a sidewalk. You can still get to where you want to go but you now have to "walk around" or "work around" as we call it in the digital world.
The only "clear message" it sends is, "don't use that IP."
> The only "clear message" it sends is, "don't use that IP."
Are you saying with a straight face that anyone at Power thought it was a coincidence that suddenly they couldn't access Facebook from very specific IP addresses?
Then it should stop authorizing Power to do so. Why would it let the credentials work for Power unless those credentials authorized Power access? That's the problem. The simple solution is 2-factor authentication.
This is a solved problem. If you have "open access" of your web services and and access is non-disruptive, I don't know why this should be a criminal violation. It shouldn't be criminal just because it doesn't fit with your business model.
What if you tell me to stop doing it, but my friend is allowed and he types all of the commands that i tell him to type and then he sends me the data? That's why it doesn't quite make sense.
It doesn't make as much sense for a publicly accessible website and user tokens. It makes sense from a tort point of view, but not from a criminal point of view. The next step away would be for users to install an app that logs into facebook and forwards the data to the centralized server.
Note: I'm not at all sure it should be enforceable, and the idea makes me uncomfortable, but I can't come up with a good reason.
This is a bit different from the common problem where someone guesses a URL and gets hit with unauthorized access. There, they merely lacked explicit permission to access the system in question, and the weird legal argument is that building a URL by hand implies unauthorized access. Here, the access followed a letter explicitly telling him not to access their system.
Also, even though facebook themselves sometimes ask for the credentials to your other services (i.e. email accounts so they can scan for shared contacts), I bet their user agreements stipulate that your credentials for facebook should not be shared. I doubt they'd be stupid enough to punish their users for this, but is there some law that would be useful here for taking action against Power for encouraging users to breach their agreement with fb?
NOTE: I'm not a lawyer so you'll need to check with one before relying on what I've just said to be correct!
You've just made quite a few APIs illegal.
It's not really relevant to this case.
Also, the laws against identity theft do not always (ever?) reference the victim's knowledge. In California, if you impersonate someone and profit as a result, you are guilty of false impersonation. The law doesn't care if the person you're impersonating knows.
So yes there is one node that is going out of the widely accepted "social" norm but its Facebook.
Instead of changing one node, your solution is to change all other billions node.
If what you say about "requests" and "responses" is both true and dispositive of the issue of authorization, then you're saying that virtually every SQL injection vulnerability on the Internet is also an "authorized" form of access to people's backend databases. Nobody should be prosecuted for those either. After all, most of those attacks take the form of simple HTTP requests --- in fact, many of them are triggerable simply from GET URLs.
How does this definition of "authorization" make sense?
A better argument would be that the IP address blocking is a security control and that Power circumvented that. However, that's a very, very thin security control akin to placing a "patrons only" sign next to a bench outside a store.
Is it rude to sit on the bench if you aren't going to buy anything? Maybe. Could the owner ask you to leave? Sure. Could you just come back later and sit down again? Yep. Would it be possible to have someone prosecuted with a felony charge for doing that? Absolutely not.
The service Power provides to its customers is but a mild annoyance to Facebook at best and certainly not worthy of criminal prosecution.
If the owner asks you to leave and expressly forbids you from returning, you are guilty of trespass if you do so. The owner is not obligated to install a physical barrier to prevent you from entering. You are legally obligated to stay off the owner's property if they request that you do so.
You are not, however, legally obligated to never walk up to the edge of the property and ask the owner standing there if you can come onto the property.
I would say that the SQL/HTTP equest with the SQL injection is _per se_ legal. The damage that it has intentionally caused is what the law should punish.
"You are free to tell me whatever you want, but beware: if you catch me offguard and make a damage, then you will be punished for it."
At no point did either party intent to cause harm, but it happened anyway.
Really, I quite like the British framework for this sort of issue: anything can be illegal or legal, it depends on context and motivation.
If you had permission to access the website otherwise, and exceeded authorized access because of a bug, you would not have met the "knowing" requirement and would not have violated the CFAA.
Or are computers special for some reason?
I would compare to chatting with someone and talking them into committing suicide. Wasn't there a court case about this a couple of years ago? This is something that is only considered a serious crime if it is successful. Otherwise, it's just being creepy and annoying, who would accept those calls/chats anyway.
It's unfortunate that people accept and even love fundamentally unsafe designs of computer operation, where they are not in complete control of what their computer does, and then get upset when their computer does something quite actively opposite of what they wanted. This is inevitable! The biggest difference is in the prevalence.
None of those things are really like the others either, except that they are all still (lesser) crimes even if you're not successful.
> I would compare to chatting with someone and talking them into committing suicide. Wasn't there a court case about this a couple of years ago? This is something that is only considered a serious crime if it is successful. Otherwise, it's just being creepy and annoying, who would accept those calls/chats anyway.
Probably depends on the state. If it's a crime to convince someone to commit suicide, it's probably a crime to attempt to do so. In California, attempting a crime is a crime in itself.
> It's unfortunate that people accept and even love fundamentally unsafe designs of computer operation, where they are not in complete control of what their computer does, and then get upset when their computer does something quite actively opposite of what they wanted. This is inevitable! The biggest difference is in the prevalence.
"Fundamentally unsafe"? Unplug your computer if you want fundamentally safe. Otherwise you are always fundamentally unsafe. Access to your house is not "fundamentally safe", but if someone kicks in your door and barges in, few will tell you that it's your fault that for not living in a concrete bunker.
I can't punch you in the face over the computer, but I can take a swing at you in front of my monitor even I don't know where you are afk. Is that alright under the law?
That was rhetorical; of course it's alright. I'm doing it right now, for all you know.
And yeah, it's not possible B&E until you('re caught) B&E. You might have to commit trespass to get that close, but that's a different law.
The perversion is when you get charged with B&E for walking into a building open to the public just because security didn't stop you from going inside.
And what reason is that?
> I can't punch you in the face over the computer, but I can take a swing at you in front of my monitor even I don't know where you are afk. Is that alright under the law?
That's not taking a swing at me. That's you swinging wildly in the air in front of your monitor. Yes, that's legal, if pointless.
> And yeah, it's not possible B&E until you('re caught) B&E. You might have to commit trespass to get that close, but that's a different law.
As Thomas noted, attempted breaking and entering is a crime as well.
> The perversion is when you get charged with B&E for walking into a building open to the public just because security didn't stop you from going inside.
I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. Are you saying that unauthorized access is like breaking and entering? A better analog for the case here is trespass. You won't be guilty of breaking and entering if you enter a mall after being asked to stay out, but you will be guilty of trespass. No one is required to post guards to keep you out. Simply tell you is enough to legally obligate you to stay out.
The distinction between doing that and entering a building open to the public is exactly the distinction the CFAA makes.
So the position you hold is that people on the Internet should be allowed to hijack each others computers, lest the law begin determining the legality of contents of files or electricity on wires?
As I said: that's a coherent position. It's not one I hold or would personally find tolerable, and I think the long term public policy consequences would be surprising to people who hold that position out of a rooting interest for underdogs (people are quick to forget that money buys more exploits every year than principle ever has). But I don't know that I could rebut arguments based on it simply based on logic.
Just like guns, and going to the bank aren't illegal. In some places going to the bank with a gun isn't illegal. But pointing a gun in a bank at a teller and saying "give me all the money" is illegal.
Right, it's entirely about intent. Assuming you live in a place where you can legally open-carry a gun into a bank, it's still illegal for you to stare down the teller while motioning to the gun if you're doing so with the intent of stealing money from the bank. It's not about what you say or don't, or how you indicate that you want the money. It's entirely about whether you intend to steal from the bank. If the teller gets freaked out just because you're open-carrying and hits the alarm button, you've not committed a crime unless you had intent.
But nothing that goes over the wire should be interpreted by prosecutors and judges as a criminal act. It's simply far too arbitrary what they will consider legal or not and the law should be reasonably predictable.
On the wire security is the responsibility of server operators and blame shifting has already undermined the influence of correct security practices far too much.
The law, as written, doesn't look at what "goes over the wire." It focuses on the end-result of getting access to a computer. I don't think that's arbitrary or unpredictable.
There are sites that, all the time and with authorized and well-meaning users, have unpredictable results when serving a page request. We call them bugs. :|
The law is out of its depth here, least of all because it is attempting to proscribe what it can neither reliably control nor measure.
Computers and networks are not magic and it makes no sense to pretend that laws cannot limit unauthorized access. We do need to improve many of the laws related to computers, but it's unreasonable to claim that there's no way for laws to cover computers in a reasonable way.
> The law is out of its depth here, least of all because it is attempting to proscribe what it can neither reliably control nor measure.
You could claim the same about trespass. The courts cannot control access to your property, nor can they monitor or measure such access. Nonetheless, they can prosecute and convict people who trespass on your property and in general, we tend to agree that this is a good thing.
If someone thinks that the Internet should be a public network, it seems reasonable for them to also think that you shouldn't be able to exclude someone from using it in a way that is legal for anyone else.
You might think differently, but I don't see how their position wouldn't be coherent.
Is there really a harm in calling it trespassing?
"Breaking and entering" appears to have originated as a English legal doublet [0] -- a pair of words with origins in different languages with similar meaning adopted as the language of the law changed. As an aid to clarity.
> Is there really a harm in calling it trespassing?
Well, yes, because:
(1) "Breaking and entering" already has another name, "burglary". [1]
(2) "Trespassing" is the name of another, broader and, by itself less serious, crime of intrusion onto property without permission.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_doublet
[1] See, e.g., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breaking_and_entering
You could try to change the names, but it honestly doesn't matter. Many people also don't know the difference between assault and battery. No one really thinks it's okay to threaten others with physical violence even if no blows are dealt, though. Similarly, no one really thinks it's acceptable to enter someone's home without permission even without literally "breaking in". The laws around these are generally reasonable even if the legal names aren't exactly what people expect.
If I download a huge list of credit card/account details that someone accidentally exposed on their website have I committed a crime? Certainly not! If I use those account details to commit fraud (or similar crimes) then it's a problem.
Aside: If someone is able to pull unencrypted passwords from any company's database the real crime there is the fact that the passwords were stored unencrypted in the first place!
I think there's a clear and obvious distinction between a maliciously constructed request and a normal request (e.g. the difference between inserting lockpicks in a door and inserting an actual, correct, legally obtained key in a door, or having at the door with a sledgehammer).
Put simply: sure, create civil liability for companies who deploy insecure software (watch how fun it becomes to be an indie software developer!). That shouldn't change any part of criminal law.
Now, if you are running a self-storage warehouse and you leave the master key lying around, your customers will almost certainly be able to sue you for negligence. The thief is still committing burglary, though.
We live in a polite society, we are supposed to be able to make rules and have people respect them regardless of whether they are technically capable of circumventing them.
Off-topic, but in a number of states, these are the same thing. e.g. California has no "breaking and entering" law. Burglary is just entering with the intent to commit larceny or a felony.
You know more about these issues than me, but I expect that people who are thinking this way might be thinking in terms of an analogy of a conversation with a bank teller (the analogy being that network communication is just like a conversation between your system and theirs).
So if an attacker talks to a bank teller working at a bank and tricks them into revealing lots of private information about other customers that they shouldn't reveal, and it later comes out that the bank had not provided training to the bank teller about customer privacy, and had given them access to all kinds of data that they didn't need access to (which they shared in the 'attack'), I would expect there to be some liability on the Bank.
I agree though - even though they've 'just' spoken to the teller (and perhaps not told any direct lies), this doesn't negate the culpability of the attacker - if they've deliberately set out to trick the teller then they've committed fraud. If the 'attacker' didn't set out to trick the teller, and the teller just confused themselves, then yes, I'd expect there to be no culpability on the attacker but culpability on the bank.
In cases where it's less clear (maybe the attacker tricked the teller into giving them information in a way different to that desired by the bank, even though the attacker is normally allowed to access that information), I would very much want to err on the side of caution.
A world where using an unsupported browser or a scraper or unknowingly clicking a link or writing software that accesses data that you are otherwise allowed to read can make you liable for committing a serious crime would be a very worrying world.
I explicitly reject that I want to negate criminal liability because of the hosts liability. If there are poorly designed access controls in place which are illegally eluded, both should be liable. If there are none, then only the host should be liable.
FB : "Don't read this, Mr. X" PW : leaves the room, puts on a different hat PW : "Can I read this?" FB : "Sure!"
No GP is saying IP/TCP/HTTP does not define legality of a packet and you (not you) should not put such fragile server on Internet on first place.
Of course you can make laws to make some requests illegal. But even then you will have non-local nodes to worry about. Not to mention the change in softwares/hardwares as a result. Oh, the number brain cycles wasted.
Please fix your server its hard but not impossible.
Authorization really only makes sense in the context of command and control (i.e. getting someone to do something that you want, and getting them to stop doing something that you don’t want).
But (as you know), the Internet operates by negotiation, where autonomous components adjust their goals (and sub-goals) based on their best understanding of the environment. Components don’t exchange commands, just information, and they make their decisions based on not only on the content of a message, but also its provenance. Thus, fraud is the actual impeachable act, since what we really care about is the authenticity of a message.
Admittedly, this regime does not allow for the prosecution of something like a SQL-injection attack (though it probably could be stretched to do so); but ideally, SQL-injection vulnerabilities would almost always be treated as negligence.
Of course, we all know that the world is not ideal and compromise is necessary (it would be ironic for me to suggest otherwise), but it would be nice to do the experiment.
(Yes, this is just recapitulating the arguments for capability-based security)
(On the other hand, while the Internet is not a command-and-control environment, it probably needs one on a meta-level.)
How do you mean? Isn't the negotiation of autonomous components fine principle for the Internet?
I would liken SQL injection to asking if you can enter the building by throwing a brick through a window. Regardless of the content of the request, the requester knows the requestee doesn't want to receive requests in that fashion.
As several other users have pointed out, intent is important (and in the case of a SQL injection, pretty explicit).
Instead, I think we should look at the authorization angle. The company in question appeared to be using the widely accepted OAuth scheme for exactly the purpose that it was intended: acting on a user's behalf to get data (here, contact information). That's why the whole thing exists, and that's why companies like Facebook and Linkedin have as much information about their users as they do--because they themselves pursue this exact behavior.
It seems kinda incongruous to say that user authorization is fine when you have the lawyers to back it up, and not fine when you don't. This seems like Facebook being anticompetitive against the wishes of their users.
I think SQL injection would be analogous to "asking permission to enter a bank with a shotgun", as the OP put it.
I realize this is a good scenario for authoritarians like yourself, but from the network point of view it's problematic.
Refusing service and calling the cops when a customer tries to empty your cash register are similarly different things.
Now, in some cases, you may reasonably infer that the property owner consented based on the computer allowing the access. "I thought I had permission because I was able to get the data from the computer" should be a defense. But that rationale disappears when the property owner makes its intent clear by other means.
If you're on example.com/documents/foo and think there might be something relevant on example.com/documents/, try and gain access without coming across a warning or terms of service reasonably located, this is clearly acceptable.
Now if example.com warns you that they consider this unauthorized action and blocks your ip... well, that changes things.
Wait: When did accessing Facebook require a license? Shouldn't the fact that Facebook is publicly-accessible make that argument moot?
I don't think there's a good analogy to be made here. Facebook lets anyone use their service for free, publicly advertises it as such, and exposes loads of APIs to the world in order to facilitate that.
What we have here is a company using those APIs in a way Facebook doesn't like. So what? It's not like Power's access of Facebook results in any sort of excessive burden on Facebook's servers. It just isn't compatible with their business model.
Governments should never be in the business of protecting business models.
Accessing other peoples' private property requires a license. That's true even when the property owner offers use of the property to the public. In that case, the license is implicitly granted, but can be explicitly revoked. E.g. shoppers have an implied license to walk into a mall, but malls are still private property and the owner can revoke that license at will.
> Governments should never be in the business of protecting business models.
In this case, the government is just protecting the property owner's right to exclude other people from its property. You can build a business on that right--e.g. Disney Land builds a whole business on excluding people from its theme parks unless they pay--but the protection exists even when no business model takes advantage of it. E.g. I can allow everyone in the world to use my pool for free, except Bob. No business model to protect--I just hate Bob and want to spite him. In fact, Bob isn't even doing anything bad on my property--I just hate his haircut. The government still has to enforce my right to exclude.
Private property trespassing is not the same mechanism at all as making requests on behalf of a user.
If anything, this whole thing is more like an owner telling a dim clerk to ignore a particular person inquiring at a window, and then the person wearing a fake mustache.
The examples from physical laws articulate the principles underlying those laws. One of those principles is that the mechanism of the trespass is totally irrelevant. It doesn't matter if Bob gets into my pool by sweet-talking a dim-witted security guard or rents a plane and does a HALO jump. All that matters is the end result: he's using my property even after I told him not to. Why should that principle be modified for the digital world?
Now, I think that in the digital world, it can be harder to know what the property owner intends than in the physical world.[1] I think it's reasonable to require a higher standard in the digital world for proving that the alleged trespasser actually had notice he was no longer welcome. And the 9th Circuit did that when it held that a TOS was not sufficient notice. But that's not in play here--Facebook clearly and unambiguously communicated its intent to Power. Why should anything else be required?
[1] Maybe it's also harder to know when someone's property was accessed intentionally. But the CFAA has a pretty stringent standard for that--the access must be "knowing." Accidentally sending packets to Facebook's computer and getting a reply would not be enough. And there is no claim here that Power didn't "access" Facebook's servers nor is there any claim it did so "unknowingly."
However in this case when you receive a cease and desist letter informing you that you don't have permission yet you explicitly ignore it and take steps to circumvent any technical restrictions that were put in place, that's where it crosses the line.
Facebook as a way to prevent this access that's guaranteed to work. They could block the user's account.
Furthermore the Judge's argument regarding a bank barring someone from entering if they are carrying a shotgun is bogus. They could just as well use an example of banning someone if they are carrying a cuddly toy. Using a gun in the example is a transparent attempt to appeal to emotion. There's nothing in Power Ventures activities that could be reasonably equated to openly toting a deadly weapon in a bank.
How's that even remotely "crazy"?
If I merely ask you "I don't want to see you here again", and you come back, you don't get much problems with the law. If I get a restricting order on you, and you came back, I can have you arrested.
There are different levels of being "told not to do something", and some popup has less power than a TOS, which has less power than a cease and desist, which has less power than a full court order, etc...
I'm not a fan of this ruling but your argument proves too much.
Your opinion is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how the law works.
Under the CFAA, to "intentionally accesses a computer without authorization" is a federal crime under most circumstances. If you don't have a written authorization from Facebook before you send your first HTTP request, you're already a criminal.
Of course, the prosecutors interpret that to mean, at various times, exactly whatever they feel it should mean. You can't tell in advance what that will be. But the judges and the jurors will pretty much follow whatever they say because they don't understand what happened. In that case, it's natural for them to just go along with whatever the FBI's paid 'experts' tell them.
That's how we keep law and order in a free country.
This is a semantic difference so it doesn't matter that the CFAA that they consider the crime "intentionally accessing a computer without authorization" - he didn't remote desktop to the machine and log in and access the file system and get information. He used the OAuth protocol which is afforded over public channels exactly as prescribed to say "This user has granted me access to this information, please give it to me" and Facebook has said "here you go"...
This is akin to asking for the information, being issued a cease and desist to prevent you from asking for it again and then using the Freedom of Information Act to request information and subsequently being arrested for being in possession of that information on the grounds that you illegally obtained that information by breaking and entering and accessing files you weren't authorized to access... which you can see is clearly not true.
If there's a bug in the server and someone exploits it to gain unauthorized access -- even if the user has been warned via terms of service that doing this is unauthorized -- then by your interpretation this shouldn't be considered unauthorized access. Power was explicitly warned their behavior was unauthorized, had their IP banned, and Power implicitly acknowledged this ban by changing their IP.
>Ultimately, Facebook still controls access to its servers; it just hasn't figured out a good policy for denying certain requests.
Not having a lock on your door does not give everyone permission to walk into your home.
At one extreme, you have Scandinavian-style allmansratten, wherein the right to wander is firmly entrenched in the culture, and trespassing requires an obvious, posted, and defended boundary. If your door has no lock, that is an implicit invitation for any wanderers to enter, also under the implicit condition that they comport themselves appropriately as your guests, even if you are not actually there.
At the other extreme, you have military bases, where you must show identification and your invitation at fixed points of entry, and you might get shot without warning if you are in an area that you have not been specifically authorized to be in.
So there are actually states in the U.S. where you can enter an unlocked home during daylight hours, sit on the couch and read a magazine, make awkward small talk, then leave before sundown, and no crime has occurred. And then there are other states where the homeowner or leaseholder could shoot you as you did that, without saying a word, and not commit a crime.
But I know of no jurisdiction where a trespass warning, where the visitor is specifically told to leave and not return, does not trump all of that. If you have been ejected from someone's property, and return to it at a later date, you are trespassing, period. It does not matter if you have disguised yourself such that you are not recognizable to anyone else as the same person; you still are that person, and that person is not allowed to be there.
Out of curiosity, which state(s) are these, and (if you happen to know), what laws surround it? Why sundown, for example?
So if you look in, for instance, New Hampshire Title LXII, Chapter 635, as long as you have no intent to commit a crime, nor any reasonable expectation that you are not allowed within, you can open and enter any unlocked door you find and not be charged with some form of unlawful entry. But it doesn't even take a locked door to stop you. A handwritten note taped to the door, reading "keep out", would be sufficient to trigger unlawful trespass, a lesser crime than burglary/housebreaking.
If you look at Pennsylvania's Title 18, Chapter 35, you can see a wordy example of the boolean expression (( A & B & C ) or ( A & B & ~C ) or ( A & ~B & C ) or ( A & ~B & ~C )), when only the last case is referenced by another section. Could use some refactoring. They also added a special "meth burglary" section.
If you look at California penal code sections 458-464, you can see that shoplifting is considered a lesser form of burglary, where the "breaking" is by deception, and the intended crime valued less than $950, and replaces both the burglary and the theft. In California, you can be charged with burglary of a tent or motor home, whereas the aforementioned states restrict it to fixed buildings.
As far as I know, the distinction between night and day is an artifact of history, from before the era of cheap artificial lighting. But all state laws differ. Where they do not, it is usually because the provisions implementing the common law definitions have not changed. It's usually pretty easy to find the sections of state law dealing with actual crimes against people, property, and peace. And many of them rarely change. One wonders why any state would even need a full-time legislature when most of the truly necessary laws are already written.
Using the same line of reasoning, you could explain away every computer breach in history as being authorized by the entity that suffered the breach...
There are certain concepts that we often seem to forget when we're using the Internet day in and day out. Things like: "Facebook provides a service," "they're a private company," "you do not have an inalienable right to the service," "the service costs them money to provide," "content creators have certain IP rights to the content they create, but this does not translate into a fundamental right to use the Facebook service," "servers are real physical things," etc.
I can't believe how many people are going along with the whole "comparing Facebook to your rented apartment" line of thinking...
Two more cases to consider: the landlord has a "no sharing keys" policy, and it has told the maid, "you may not enter, regardless of which keys you have".
The law, of course, doesn't try: it turns on whether the person who made the requests should reasonably have known whether they were authorized to make that request.
A client which is on the same network as a server can request data from the server, and the server chooses how to reply. The internet is just a really big network, so for an internet-facing computer the assumption is that anyone can request data. The analogy of the request-response process to physical space isn't--as the judge claimed--someone entering a building, but rather someone asking permission to enter the building. Asking permission to enter a bank with a shotgun is very different from actually entering and is not itself a crime (as far as I'm aware).
Every interaction between the client and server begins as a request from the client. If the server replies "yes, have some data" it's nonsensical that this could be construed as gaining unauthorized access, as Facebook claims. Ultimately, Facebook still controls access to its servers; it just hasn't figured out a good policy for denying certain requests. This is a technical problem which should be solved through technical means (e.g. blocking IP addresses) or by changing its terms of service with its users.
Unfortunately, rather than solving the problem itself, Facebook has convinced the federal government to work on its behalf through an especially blunt weapon known as the CFAA. This risks changing the entire legal framework in which everyone else is required to operate. Technology moves much faster than the laws governing it, so we may not appreciate the full impact of this decision until later. That should give even proponents some pause.