A better argument would be that the IP address blocking is a security control and that Power circumvented that. However, that's a very, very thin security control akin to placing a "patrons only" sign next to a bench outside a store.
Is it rude to sit on the bench if you aren't going to buy anything? Maybe. Could the owner ask you to leave? Sure. Could you just come back later and sit down again? Yep. Would it be possible to have someone prosecuted with a felony charge for doing that? Absolutely not.
The service Power provides to its customers is but a mild annoyance to Facebook at best and certainly not worthy of criminal prosecution.
If the owner asks you to leave and expressly forbids you from returning, you are guilty of trespass if you do so. The owner is not obligated to install a physical barrier to prevent you from entering. You are legally obligated to stay off the owner's property if they request that you do so.
You are not, however, legally obligated to never walk up to the edge of the property and ask the owner standing there if you can come onto the property.
I would say that the SQL/HTTP equest with the SQL injection is _per se_ legal. The damage that it has intentionally caused is what the law should punish.
"You are free to tell me whatever you want, but beware: if you catch me offguard and make a damage, then you will be punished for it."
At no point did either party intent to cause harm, but it happened anyway.
Really, I quite like the British framework for this sort of issue: anything can be illegal or legal, it depends on context and motivation.
If you had permission to access the website otherwise, and exceeded authorized access because of a bug, you would not have met the "knowing" requirement and would not have violated the CFAA.
Or are computers special for some reason?
I would compare to chatting with someone and talking them into committing suicide. Wasn't there a court case about this a couple of years ago? This is something that is only considered a serious crime if it is successful. Otherwise, it's just being creepy and annoying, who would accept those calls/chats anyway.
It's unfortunate that people accept and even love fundamentally unsafe designs of computer operation, where they are not in complete control of what their computer does, and then get upset when their computer does something quite actively opposite of what they wanted. This is inevitable! The biggest difference is in the prevalence.
None of those things are really like the others either, except that they are all still (lesser) crimes even if you're not successful.
> I would compare to chatting with someone and talking them into committing suicide. Wasn't there a court case about this a couple of years ago? This is something that is only considered a serious crime if it is successful. Otherwise, it's just being creepy and annoying, who would accept those calls/chats anyway.
Probably depends on the state. If it's a crime to convince someone to commit suicide, it's probably a crime to attempt to do so. In California, attempting a crime is a crime in itself.
> It's unfortunate that people accept and even love fundamentally unsafe designs of computer operation, where they are not in complete control of what their computer does, and then get upset when their computer does something quite actively opposite of what they wanted. This is inevitable! The biggest difference is in the prevalence.
"Fundamentally unsafe"? Unplug your computer if you want fundamentally safe. Otherwise you are always fundamentally unsafe. Access to your house is not "fundamentally safe", but if someone kicks in your door and barges in, few will tell you that it's your fault that for not living in a concrete bunker.
I can't punch you in the face over the computer, but I can take a swing at you in front of my monitor even I don't know where you are afk. Is that alright under the law?
That was rhetorical; of course it's alright. I'm doing it right now, for all you know.
And yeah, it's not possible B&E until you('re caught) B&E. You might have to commit trespass to get that close, but that's a different law.
The perversion is when you get charged with B&E for walking into a building open to the public just because security didn't stop you from going inside.
And what reason is that?
> I can't punch you in the face over the computer, but I can take a swing at you in front of my monitor even I don't know where you are afk. Is that alright under the law?
That's not taking a swing at me. That's you swinging wildly in the air in front of your monitor. Yes, that's legal, if pointless.
> And yeah, it's not possible B&E until you('re caught) B&E. You might have to commit trespass to get that close, but that's a different law.
As Thomas noted, attempted breaking and entering is a crime as well.
> The perversion is when you get charged with B&E for walking into a building open to the public just because security didn't stop you from going inside.
I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. Are you saying that unauthorized access is like breaking and entering? A better analog for the case here is trespass. You won't be guilty of breaking and entering if you enter a mall after being asked to stay out, but you will be guilty of trespass. No one is required to post guards to keep you out. Simply tell you is enough to legally obligate you to stay out.
The distinction between doing that and entering a building open to the public is exactly the distinction the CFAA makes.
So the position you hold is that people on the Internet should be allowed to hijack each others computers, lest the law begin determining the legality of contents of files or electricity on wires?
As I said: that's a coherent position. It's not one I hold or would personally find tolerable, and I think the long term public policy consequences would be surprising to people who hold that position out of a rooting interest for underdogs (people are quick to forget that money buys more exploits every year than principle ever has). But I don't know that I could rebut arguments based on it simply based on logic.
Just like guns, and going to the bank aren't illegal. In some places going to the bank with a gun isn't illegal. But pointing a gun in a bank at a teller and saying "give me all the money" is illegal.
Right, it's entirely about intent. Assuming you live in a place where you can legally open-carry a gun into a bank, it's still illegal for you to stare down the teller while motioning to the gun if you're doing so with the intent of stealing money from the bank. It's not about what you say or don't, or how you indicate that you want the money. It's entirely about whether you intend to steal from the bank. If the teller gets freaked out just because you're open-carrying and hits the alarm button, you've not committed a crime unless you had intent.
But nothing that goes over the wire should be interpreted by prosecutors and judges as a criminal act. It's simply far too arbitrary what they will consider legal or not and the law should be reasonably predictable.
On the wire security is the responsibility of server operators and blame shifting has already undermined the influence of correct security practices far too much.
The law, as written, doesn't look at what "goes over the wire." It focuses on the end-result of getting access to a computer. I don't think that's arbitrary or unpredictable.
There are sites that, all the time and with authorized and well-meaning users, have unpredictable results when serving a page request. We call them bugs. :|
The law is out of its depth here, least of all because it is attempting to proscribe what it can neither reliably control nor measure.
Computers and networks are not magic and it makes no sense to pretend that laws cannot limit unauthorized access. We do need to improve many of the laws related to computers, but it's unreasonable to claim that there's no way for laws to cover computers in a reasonable way.
> The law is out of its depth here, least of all because it is attempting to proscribe what it can neither reliably control nor measure.
You could claim the same about trespass. The courts cannot control access to your property, nor can they monitor or measure such access. Nonetheless, they can prosecute and convict people who trespass on your property and in general, we tend to agree that this is a good thing.
If someone thinks that the Internet should be a public network, it seems reasonable for them to also think that you shouldn't be able to exclude someone from using it in a way that is legal for anyone else.
You might think differently, but I don't see how their position wouldn't be coherent.
Is there really a harm in calling it trespassing?
"Breaking and entering" appears to have originated as a English legal doublet [0] -- a pair of words with origins in different languages with similar meaning adopted as the language of the law changed. As an aid to clarity.
> Is there really a harm in calling it trespassing?
Well, yes, because:
(1) "Breaking and entering" already has another name, "burglary". [1]
(2) "Trespassing" is the name of another, broader and, by itself less serious, crime of intrusion onto property without permission.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_doublet
[1] See, e.g., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breaking_and_entering
You could try to change the names, but it honestly doesn't matter. Many people also don't know the difference between assault and battery. No one really thinks it's okay to threaten others with physical violence even if no blows are dealt, though. Similarly, no one really thinks it's acceptable to enter someone's home without permission even without literally "breaking in". The laws around these are generally reasonable even if the legal names aren't exactly what people expect.
If I download a huge list of credit card/account details that someone accidentally exposed on their website have I committed a crime? Certainly not! If I use those account details to commit fraud (or similar crimes) then it's a problem.
Aside: If someone is able to pull unencrypted passwords from any company's database the real crime there is the fact that the passwords were stored unencrypted in the first place!
I think there's a clear and obvious distinction between a maliciously constructed request and a normal request (e.g. the difference between inserting lockpicks in a door and inserting an actual, correct, legally obtained key in a door, or having at the door with a sledgehammer).
Put simply: sure, create civil liability for companies who deploy insecure software (watch how fun it becomes to be an indie software developer!). That shouldn't change any part of criminal law.
Now, if you are running a self-storage warehouse and you leave the master key lying around, your customers will almost certainly be able to sue you for negligence. The thief is still committing burglary, though.
We live in a polite society, we are supposed to be able to make rules and have people respect them regardless of whether they are technically capable of circumventing them.
Off-topic, but in a number of states, these are the same thing. e.g. California has no "breaking and entering" law. Burglary is just entering with the intent to commit larceny or a felony.
You know more about these issues than me, but I expect that people who are thinking this way might be thinking in terms of an analogy of a conversation with a bank teller (the analogy being that network communication is just like a conversation between your system and theirs).
So if an attacker talks to a bank teller working at a bank and tricks them into revealing lots of private information about other customers that they shouldn't reveal, and it later comes out that the bank had not provided training to the bank teller about customer privacy, and had given them access to all kinds of data that they didn't need access to (which they shared in the 'attack'), I would expect there to be some liability on the Bank.
I agree though - even though they've 'just' spoken to the teller (and perhaps not told any direct lies), this doesn't negate the culpability of the attacker - if they've deliberately set out to trick the teller then they've committed fraud. If the 'attacker' didn't set out to trick the teller, and the teller just confused themselves, then yes, I'd expect there to be no culpability on the attacker but culpability on the bank.
In cases where it's less clear (maybe the attacker tricked the teller into giving them information in a way different to that desired by the bank, even though the attacker is normally allowed to access that information), I would very much want to err on the side of caution.
A world where using an unsupported browser or a scraper or unknowingly clicking a link or writing software that accesses data that you are otherwise allowed to read can make you liable for committing a serious crime would be a very worrying world.
I explicitly reject that I want to negate criminal liability because of the hosts liability. If there are poorly designed access controls in place which are illegally eluded, both should be liable. If there are none, then only the host should be liable.
FB : "Don't read this, Mr. X" PW : leaves the room, puts on a different hat PW : "Can I read this?" FB : "Sure!"
No GP is saying IP/TCP/HTTP does not define legality of a packet and you (not you) should not put such fragile server on Internet on first place.
Of course you can make laws to make some requests illegal. But even then you will have non-local nodes to worry about. Not to mention the change in softwares/hardwares as a result. Oh, the number brain cycles wasted.
Please fix your server its hard but not impossible.
Authorization really only makes sense in the context of command and control (i.e. getting someone to do something that you want, and getting them to stop doing something that you don’t want).
But (as you know), the Internet operates by negotiation, where autonomous components adjust their goals (and sub-goals) based on their best understanding of the environment. Components don’t exchange commands, just information, and they make their decisions based on not only on the content of a message, but also its provenance. Thus, fraud is the actual impeachable act, since what we really care about is the authenticity of a message.
Admittedly, this regime does not allow for the prosecution of something like a SQL-injection attack (though it probably could be stretched to do so); but ideally, SQL-injection vulnerabilities would almost always be treated as negligence.
Of course, we all know that the world is not ideal and compromise is necessary (it would be ironic for me to suggest otherwise), but it would be nice to do the experiment.
(Yes, this is just recapitulating the arguments for capability-based security)
(On the other hand, while the Internet is not a command-and-control environment, it probably needs one on a meta-level.)
How do you mean? Isn't the negotiation of autonomous components fine principle for the Internet?
I would liken SQL injection to asking if you can enter the building by throwing a brick through a window. Regardless of the content of the request, the requester knows the requestee doesn't want to receive requests in that fashion.
As several other users have pointed out, intent is important (and in the case of a SQL injection, pretty explicit).
Instead, I think we should look at the authorization angle. The company in question appeared to be using the widely accepted OAuth scheme for exactly the purpose that it was intended: acting on a user's behalf to get data (here, contact information). That's why the whole thing exists, and that's why companies like Facebook and Linkedin have as much information about their users as they do--because they themselves pursue this exact behavior.
It seems kinda incongruous to say that user authorization is fine when you have the lawyers to back it up, and not fine when you don't. This seems like Facebook being anticompetitive against the wishes of their users.
I think SQL injection would be analogous to "asking permission to enter a bank with a shotgun", as the OP put it.
I realize this is a good scenario for authoritarians like yourself, but from the network point of view it's problematic.
Refusing service and calling the cops when a customer tries to empty your cash register are similarly different things.
If what you say about "requests" and "responses" is both true and dispositive of the issue of authorization, then you're saying that virtually every SQL injection vulnerability on the Internet is also an "authorized" form of access to people's backend databases. Nobody should be prosecuted for those either. After all, most of those attacks take the form of simple HTTP requests --- in fact, many of them are triggerable simply from GET URLs.
How does this definition of "authorization" make sense?