It is about the precedent. Consider that the current fully secure Apple device situation is point A, and the fully exploited your private data is easily extracted by criminals easily cracked Apple device situation is point Z.

The FBI is currently arguing for point B - just this device. The argument is - it is so close to point A, there is no issue!

If the FBI wins point B, then they will argue for point C. - it is so close to point B, there is no issue!

If the FBI wins point C, then they will argue for point D. - it is so close to point C, there is no issue!

Repeat over and over.

At about point M or sooner an exploit or the extraction processes to the gradually less secure device would probably become available to governments through means legal or otherwise and we would probably hit point Z straight away.

Apple are trying to stop the inevitable by not starting, the FBI are arguing for point B.

It's not just the FBI. If Apple builds an OS update to make that specific iPhone easier to unlock, they'll be setting an international precedent for all countries that they do business in. So the Russians, Chinese, Saudis, etc will see it as an option when they want access to a phone that they see as in their national interest to unlock. This could even lead to a phone with US state secrets being cracked for a rival country.

And they wouldn't just ask Apple.

And they wouldn't be limited to devices in their jurisdiction belonging to the dead or incarcerated. Governments can ask Apple or Microsoft to push updates that copy data to controlled cloud storage accounts. The unwitting target will just unlock their device in their home country like they usually do before the trojan security update starts working.

Yep. Imagine your flight through Asia making an unplanned outage in Thailand and finding yourself in prison as a result of the lese majeste laws[1]. Except instead of it being because of a public Facebook post you made[2] while in another country, it's because of a private text you sent.

[1] This is not an imaginary scenario. [2] This has actually happened.

I believe you, but cite please

These stories are not difficult to find.

https://www.google.com/search?q=Thailand+lese+majeste+Facebo...

Foreign countries do not need legal precedent to ask Apple to do things.

The domestic government doesn't need legal precedent to ask Apple to do things either; it usually just helps in the case of political cover and the inevitable pushback from the public or other branches of government.

With regards to international politics, if the USA can demand that Apple unlocks devices for any reason, then the US government will have a hard time defending a decision to aid Apple in resisting a foreign power when it requests the same broad privilege.

This is step by step slippery slope fallacy.

You are not addressing the issue at hand. You are instead arguing that if we somehow don't take your side here, then there will never be another point at which we can argue the pros and cons of possible subsequent escalations or refusals.

Which is why it's a fallacy.

Alternatively, it may be an example of an actual slippery slope - and therefore not a fallacy.

I hadn't heard of this fallacy before, I agree that what I wrote may be interpreted as a good example of it. I shouldn't have used the word inevitable.

I don't think that if the FBI wins the current battle then all is lost. But I do think that the FBI intends to fight all the battles until they win the long game.

That said, I don't hold any side in the argument.

This is a valid pointing out of a common fallacy, and I do not think merits the downvotes.

The OP is using fallacious reasoning, even if it is accurate reasoning :-)

Somewhere in the middle, say point W, the image leaks and you wind up with the POTUS phone being tapped by Russia. Or by terrorists. Or a wanna-be POTUS assassin. It's worse than Pandora's box - once we open this box we will never be able to demonstrably prove that attempts to close it have succeeded, just like Ken Thompsons "cc hack"[1]. If and once Apple makes this image every Apple user on the planet, including the government, would be perpetually weary of it.

Basically, lim(consequences) = no guarantees that USA secrets are actually secret. If they can't keep the lid on one employee (Snowden) how on earth could they trust themselves with something this dangerous? 'Z' is inevitable.

The wording/example that Apple used really appeals to the common person, but you need to frame it for the government if you are talking to the government.

[1]: https://www.win.tue.nl/~aeb/linux/hh/thompson/trust.html

That does seem to be the argument. It's a slippery slope fallacy. There is no reason to assume this sets any sort of precedent.

And it should be pointed out that point A never existed. Apple's device is not fully secure, or they wouldn't be capable of complying with the FBI.

IMO the main issue is how far the government can lawfully push a third party to help with an ongoing investigation.

Putting aside the technical issues for a minute, let's say everyone agrees Apple ought to help the US government's investigation of the San Bernideno terrorism case. Fine, and Apple might want to help, but how does their desire to help weigh against the hassle and expense of creating a new build of the OS every time something bad happens? Will it eventually get to a point where every impounded phone, of which I have to believe there are millions, can have a warrant issued and Apple has to help get the data out? They'd have to set up an entire department just to comply with the FBI's requests. At the scale of global law enforcement, it doesn't look so unreasonable that this ongoing nusiance will cost a ton of money and impair their ability to operate for their shareholders.

There's the encryption stuff, and how we have a right to privacy, but the real question is just how far a company has to go when the government asks for help with an investigation.

The problem is that there is no mechanism by which iPhones can have a back door, but only for the good guys and only with a warrant. That does not exist. And it never can exist.

There is no grey area for compromise here. The encryption is either secure and free of known backdoors—and thus it grants real security—or it isn't, and it doesn't.

You are making that up. Of course there is such a mechanism. What do you think software signing is but a way for the good guys and only the good guys to run code on your device? It's exactly the same. All Apple has to do is make a piece of software that only runs on this phone and sign it. Then nobody can be attacked except this one phone. And it had to go through a warrant and all!

And to your last point: this software is not secure. That's why we have this backdoor option.

The problem with that thinking is that there is no firm definition of the "Good Guys", and the guys you think are good today, may not be so good tomorrow.

> this software is not secure. That's why we have this backdoor option.

It's not perfectly secure, but still awfully secure if even the US Government can't break it themselves.

> still awfully secure

I believe they were just sloppy:

http://abcnews.go.com/US/san-bernardino-shooters-apple-id-pa...

"San Bernardino Shooter's iCloud Password Changed While iPhone was in Government Possession"

The information wasn't "awfully" secured.

After watching this whole thing play out, I'm seriously wondering whether 'sloppy' was actually 'on purpose because this is a great chance to establish precedent'.

Now wait. If the passcode is complex then it is secure, which is a very typical requirement for security.

Which doesn't change regardless of the outcome of this FBI case.

Indeed, people who valued their security highly, like terrorists, would still have security, but the common person would not.

> All Apple has to do is make a piece of software that only runs on this phone and sign it.

(Emphasis added)

Just wondering how they can manage to produce something that will only run on this phone?

Easy. Since iOS software must be signed by Apple they could simply hard code a check for a specific device ID, and immediately exit if it doesn't match. Then they sign that specific binary.

That isn't really easy.

99% of the phone can be tampered with when running, after the signature is checked at install. They'd need to put that check in the secure enclave to make sure that it wasn't simply bypassed. That might not even be possible on that model.

By your definition then, the iPhone doesn't grant real security since Apple is capable of installing this modified iOS version.

So given that the iPhone is not secure, what do you think about whether Apple should execute this court order?

The iPhone does grant real security, it just requires the user to choose an encryption key that isn't trivially brute forced. (And depending on the circumstances, forego use of the fingerprint reader.)

If the dead attacker had a twelve character passphrase, any amount of help from Apple would be utterly useless. Apple could write all the back-doors they liked but if the content is encrypted and the key is unknown, brute forcing is the only option.

The addition of the secure enclave makes it potentially infeasible to extract the UID so that the brute forcing could be performed on a powerful supercomputer. It depends how well the enclave has been hardened against firmware changes. Can the enclave receive a seamless firmware update while in a locked state? Can the enclave firmware be rewritten to output the UID to the main CPU? We don't know.

The iPhone is secure when used with a complex passcode (something like 11 years to crack an 8 character password), even if Apple aids the FBI. So individuals who know and care enough, like terrorists, will still be just as secure.

But common people won't. So no, Apple should absolutely not destroy the security of hundreds of millions of individuals just because some government agency wants a shot at access to some dead guy's phone.

What happens when the PRC or Saudi equivalent of the FBI demands the same for an FBI agents phone? Why should the populace and Apple have to suffer for making the world more secure?

> So no, Apple should absolutely not destroy the security of hundreds of millions of individuals

Wait, how did you get to that point?

If the government honestly wanted that iPhone cracked it'd turn to someone like Chipworks and simply subpoena whatever info they needed from Apple.

They're forcing Apple to kill its own children as a sick sort of game.

+1

>I'm really trying to figure out what this case is really about, vs. what the players are saying it is about.

If the government hacks the iPhone themselves, they don't get the legal precedent they are so desperate to establish in this case. This paves the way for legislation that forces technology companies to install backdoors in software/hardware. This case is not about the data on the phone itself, the government is simply continuing the crypto wars.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars

I think that Apple is concerned about class action lawsuits that will target Tim Cooks claims that not even apple can access customer data.

They are really in a terrible position. No CEO wants to do interviews dedicated to a conflict with law enforcement. This is about a massive pile of unaccessable cash and the threat of a major lawsuit.

It makes sense that cook wants to invest in legislators who will listen to their lobbying cash and provide class action protection over gambling in the courts.

The government is not capable of hacking the phone themselves.

Theoretical question: can the FBI create the modified OS without Apple, and simply command Apple to sign it with Apple's private key, so that it can be installed on this phone without entering the passcode?

Granted without the source code it would be quite difficult, but in theory, is signing the software with Apple's bootloader private key which is the same for each class of phones the only thing required?

Nothing, but that would be terrible. We WANT Apple to do it because they could ensure the software is device locked.

Apple could just bindiff to figure out what changed in the FBI's version.

Yes that would be possible.

It's weird to me that the phone will accept updates while locked...

> It's weird to me that the phone will accept updates while locked...

I suppose this was left there to be able to reset the phones to the factory state after 10 wrong attempts to enter the code.

My understanding was that the malformed update would allow them to bypass the 10-attempt limit and also the delays between attempts, allowing a brute force attack. Meaning a device with a sufficiently strong password would still be capable of being secure, barring any secret government technology that we don't know about that can crack 64 character random passwords(which probably does exist).

HOWEVER, if I'm not mistaken, the newer iPhones (the one in question is a 5c) hold the delay-between-attempts limit IN HARDWARE, so a firmware upgrade would do nothing. The encryption is all done in dedicated hardware on the device. Someone please correct me if I'm wrong.

Each attempt takes 80 ms. That's in hardware. There is a separate retry delay that increases exponentially then tops out at 1 hour per unsuccessful attempt. The 10-try limit is the number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts before the device erases its stored encryption keys (effectively wiping itself).

It seems that the attempt limit at least is not hardcoded and can be updated, as it has been increased in the past by an iOS update. I would suspect the same is true for the attempt retry delay time. Either way, this is only specifically applicable to devices newer than the 5c, which doesn't have a Secure Element (or "Secure Enclave" in Applespeak).

In any case, given a software image made to the FBI's specifications, the time to crack a phone depends on the complexity of the user passcode. If the user had a 4-digit numeric PIN it could be cracked in under 15 minutes. On the other hand, with a sufficiently complex passcode the expected time to brute force the device could be literally in the millions of years.

You're correct. Each attempt takes 80ms as a hardware limitation.

I'm pretty sure iOS updates are signed per device, as that's why everyone backs up their signatures for old versions (so that they can go back while Apple isn't signing them). So Apple could only sign this backdoor for one device.

http://www.saurik.com/id/12

Did you miss the part where the government said they were fine with Apple keeping the custom iOS software version in their possession, and not giving it to the government?

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/02/20/us/politics/ap-us...

"Apple may maintain custody of the software, destroy it after its purpose under the order has been served, refuse to disseminate it outside of Apple and make clear to the world that it does not apply to other devices or users without lawful court orders," the Justice Department told Judge Sheri Pym on Friday. "No one outside Apple would have access to the software required by the order unless Apple itself chose to share it."

This argument just doesn't add up to me.

Regardless of this court order, Apple already has possession of keys that can sign iOS updates to disable security features. So this "master key" already exists.

Meanwhile the government is saying that Apple can delete the tool the moment after the court order is executed, so then what is there to steal?

I just don't get the argument that this tool is any more of a "master key" than the actual "master key" Apple already has.

Monday, create a tool for phone A. Tuesday, delete the tool. Wednesday, recreate that same tool, but now for phone B. Thursday, delete the tool. Friday, recreate that same tool, but now for phone C. ...

What do you think is going to happen? Oh yeah, there's the git logs too.

This is not about one phone. It never was. It's about establishing a behavior.

Also, there's no master key. It does not exist. Apple does not have an "actual master key". Maybe Google does, but Apple has said quite clearly, that no such software or key to decrypt phones exists.

The master key they have is the ability to sign firmware updates for all phones that could disable security. The point is, it isn't a new master key. If the key was somehow lost, Apple phones would be vulnerable, just like in the dystopian hypotheticals being thrown around here.

You're thinking of this from the wrong angle. What the FBI is working to build is a legal master key to get information from modern smartphones. It's not difficult to determine this is their objective, as the director of the FBI has asked for as much from Congress.

If you didn't realize that, it's easy to see how you're caught up in the wrong argument.

This begs the question: can FBI in theory write the modified OS without Apple, and just command Apple to sign it with Apple's private key so it can be loaded without knowing the passcode and booted?

The problem is, Apple designs the software, loads it onto the device, and gives it to the government so they can do their brute force on it.

What's preventing the government from just copying the software off the device and keeping it for themselves? Obviously they'd have to do some work to make it universal, but do we really think an agency with pretty much unlimited budget, and brilliant mathematicians, couldn't get it done?

"To do some work to make it universal" = code change = thrown hash (the signature which requires the Apple key to create, and proves the software hasn't been tampered with, will be broken/no longer valid)

Cryptographic hashes like SHA and AES are designed for "dispersion" meaning, in the idea case, flipping only one bit of the input leads to a 50% probability of every single bit in the hash flipping. So while it's theoretically possible to make a change to the code, and find a way to insert that change that both (1) does the same thing and (2) hashes the same way as the original build, it's probably beyond the realm of what even a motivated attacker could do today.

The warrant allows that the phone could be entirely in Apple's possession with the FBI having only programmatic access to the PIN input. Imagine, say, an isolated SSH server with serial access to a PIN input API.

Interesting question. I don't know the answer but would be interested to hear anyone with more information weigh in.

did you miss the part where the government said they would never do this ever again?

once the precedent is set, the floodgates will open.

Here you go: http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/answers/

Facebook 'protecting' user data is so laughable that it suggests this is all public reassurance theatre.

Corporations make good PR so you can trust them with more of your personal data, while PRISM still is operating, Facebook and Apple are still cooperating with NSA.

The more and more NSA friendly corporations back Apple the less I trust all of them.

> while PRISM still is operating, Facebook and Apple are still cooperating with NSA.

[citation needed]

Apple's endgame is saving face and customer trust. Just last year they were touting customer controlled security and privacy. This year the FBI wants them to help access a phone and what do you, they actually can! Oops. Failure on Apple's part which I'll come back to. Now, it sounds to me like Apple is just going to disable the auto-erase on pin failure and retry timeout, but not many people will understand that.

The FBI's endgame is requiring companies to build backdoors into their devices. Once they are able to successfully compel a company such as Apple to help them break into the phone, they are very close to compelling congress to pass laws to require that the option be available in the first place. "Hey, the court told them to do it before so why should they be allowed to block future need?". Here is where Apple's screw up comes into play. After all this they could shore up the security gaps to further remove themselves from the equation, but after a successful court order the FBI will move to block them from making an even more secure device.