The CA part is only to verify that the machine you are talking to is who it says it is.... in reality all this really verifies is that they filled out a form and there is probably a money trial somewhere leading to a real entity.
But I've never understood why the identity is so tied to the transport security. It would make everyone's life easier if HTTPS could be used WITHOUT identity verification (for 90% of cases this would make the world a better place)
We'd still want to purchase third-party identify verification... and browsers would still present this in the same way ("green padlocks" etc)... but even without verification every connection could be encrypted uniquely, and it would raise the bar considerably for a great number of sniffing-based issues would it not?
EDIT: I guess what I'm saying is a social issue: We've put so much effort into telling everyone that "HTTPS is totally secure", that we've left no room for a system that is "Mostly secure, unless someone has compromised the remote system/network" .... maybe it's too late to teach everyone the difference between "encrypting a letter" and "verifiying that the person you give the letter to is who they say they are"
I guess if you did something weird like flip the protocol upside down such that all people would have "internet licenses" and enter them into the browser they're using at that moment (or better yet, lets charge each user $50/yr PER BROWSER LICENSE) and it became the sites problem to encrypt to the end users key... One way or another I think you have to verify the identity of at least one side WRT MITM?
All this change is meant to ensure is that all HTTP/2.0 traffic is encrypted, not that it is all authenticated. For authenticated communication, we continue to have what HTTPS is today.
The main issue is retraining people to not think that "https" means "safe". That's something that browsers are already good at, however, because there is already a world of difference between the user experiences of visiting a site with a trusted cert and visiting a site with an untrusted cert.
The practicality of enormous secret drag-net operations like the NSA has been running would decrease dramatically if TLS had been the norm rather than the exception, even with unverified certificates. You can't opportunistically MITM 100% of connections without somebody noticing.
It is a shame that cleartext connections have to be the out-of-the-box default in every web server. Security should be the default, and I think the CA mess is to blame for that not being the case.
The sane thing to do would be generating a random self-signed certificate if the administrator didn't set up any explicit certificates. That would prevent passive attacks, and can be built on top of with technologies like certificate pinning and Convergence to mitigate active attacks.
It would be nice if there were two kinds of connections. Encrypted unauth and encrypted auth. That seems strictly better than offering unencrypted connections. Your browser could still display the "wide open to attack" icon for encrypted unauth if you like.
The entire reason people think TLS should have "unauthenticated encryption" (which is in the literature kind of an oxymoron) is that they don't like the SSL CAs.
I don't like them either.
But the SSL CAs are a UI issue. Instead of dinking around with the browser UI to make worthless "unauthenticated encryption" sessions appear different, why not just build a UI for TACK, let people sign their own certificates if they want, but then pin them in browsers so those sites can rely on key continuity instead of nothing.
Five years from now, if TACK pinning becomes the norm, I think it's a safe prediction that basic TLS certificates will be free from multiple vendors. Moreover, the corruption of the CA system will matter less, because unauthorized certificates will violate pins and be detected; the CAs that issue them can be evicted.
While we're at it, why don't we just fix the UI for managing CA roots? It hasn't changed since the mid-1990s.
I am baffled by why anyone would actively promote an insecure cryptosystem as a cure for UI problems, or even as an alternative for some entirely new cryptosystem like MinimaLT.
The perfect is the enemy of the better.
This is a perfect example of <strikethrough>"good enough is the enemy of good"</strikethrough> "not completely broken in every possible way is the enemy of barely good enough" that is so prevalent in web security. If we don't use this chance we have now to secure internet traffic we will continue to be completely vulnerable to rogue WiFi AP like http://www.troyhunt.com/2013/04/the-beginners-guide-to-break... and to companies as well as countries snooping their employers/citizens traffic via huge proxies for years to come.
You want to connect to it securely, but the fridge really has no way to prove to you who it is through any kind of third-channel.
Hell, forget about fridges. It's the router you just got at Best Buy.
It's not that you don't know who the guy is, you just don't rely on a 3rd party to tell you that. See how SSH fingerprinting works.
If browsers would make it easier to "permanently accept" a self-signed certificate (right now it's usually a multi-step process with blood-red warning messages at every step) we'd have the same situation as SSH keys.
It doesn't, as a MITM prevention technique, for a gullible population. It doesn't even work for non-gullible population that's been trained to always hit "Y" on first connection from a host to a new server... err... I mean first connection to a MITM who then talks to the new server for you.
There are ways to make the situation slightly harder like the extremely unpopular idea of putting SSH host keys in DNS and then securing DNS ... err .. probably securing DNS via a CA type backend.... Well even unsecured DNS holding SSH host keys is better than nothing, or at least it makes people more susceptible because they feel safer, or something like that.
If it does happen, then the attacker will have to keep doing it forever, or else you'll get a warning the moment you manage to connect directly to the site without the MITM.
If your first connection is direct, then you're safe from MITM forever. If your first connection is compromised, then at least you'll likely discover that fact quickly.
I think this qualifies as "works".
It is much more secure to visit a site with a self signed certificate than to visit the site over http. And yet, browsers start flashing red when you do that. At the least, they should show red on http, yellow on self signed https, and green on trusted https.
One actual use case that could be solved in a better way than today would be login portals where a user have to be logged in to access the Internet.
Today, this is typically solved by issuing a redirect of some kind to the client (in the future, I guess it will receive a 511).
For HTTPS, the choices are a: Dropping the packets, ensuring extra costs in the support organizations when users wonder why their internet doesn't work. b: Doing a MITM and issue a redirect to the login portal that way.
Different operators choose different solutions here. Neither choice is good. Having a way of telling the client, that yes, while the connection is still encrypted, it didn't end up at the place it expected.
Might it be possible to add to TLS so that there are some way of issuing gateway redirect? Perhaps, perhaps not. I've seen precious little action in that area.
Personally, I would find great use for the authentication function of OpenSSH as a separate program. In other words, a program that does one thing only: it verifies an endpoint is who it says it is.
Newer info about fiber splitters invalidate that assumption.
Low-cost SSL brands like PositiveSSL and RapidSSL are so cheap nowadays, some registrars hand them out for free if you buy a domain. And they're compatible with every version of IE on Windows XP, unlike those free certs from StartSSL.
That's still a lot of devices.
In this case, that's also going away hard next year when Microsoft discontinues support for Windows XP. At that point it'd be really tempting to suggest switching to Firefox or Chrome, both of which do support SNI.
IPv6 has 128-bit addresses, which works out to about 4 billion ^ 4 addresses, not 4 billion ^ 4 billion addresses.
Not everything on the web is sitting on a well-known server.
Think about printers for a moment: now all the printers providing http interfaces need to include a way to install an organizational cert on them (at least for a lot of organizations). That means that there needs to be an out of band step in setup (and maintenance) to add the cert, or a way to do so from an http interface. The later just screams "giant security risk" for a dozen reasons.
Oh, really?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-in...
I've spent a lot of time recently working out how to securely allow a set of christmas tree lights with an embedded linux controller[1] with wifi connect via OAuth to your Twitter or Facebook account while being controlled from your phone. The lack of workable/affordable ways to have SSL keys on the device that your phone will trust makes life _very_ interesting - and getting the password-equivalent OAuth tokens into the device has been a fun challenge.
[1] Gratuitous self promotion - http://moorescloud.com/ go pre-order one now to justify getting UL certification so we can sell 'em in North America! _Please!_ ;-)
This is false. Good security is layered security.
How on earth do you make such an argument make sense?
Services that really need an unlimited number of subdomains are a tiny minority, and market prices reflect this. For the time being, someone like WordPress.com can probably afford $60-$100/year for a wildcard certificate. Everyone else just sticks to subfolders like Twitter does.
After all, nobody will be preventing you from running a website. Your priorities and economic circumstances might prevent you from using pretty subdomains, but that's no different from the current reality where short and memorable dot-com domains cost thousands of dollars.
This matter has nothing to do with the version of IE and everything to do with whether Windows root cert update is turned on.
With that http will be encrypted with no certificate check and https will still have the good 'ol check.
CA's are a single point of failure for security.
The CA never gets the private key. Instead they get a certificate signing request (CSR), which only contains the public key part. They sign that.
Oh, and then there is perfect forward secrecy, which basically means that even the servers private key is not the one used to encrypt the actual data (after the initial handshaking, and only for suitable cipher suites, subject to downgrade attacks).
Disclaimer: at least, thats how its properly done. Some CAs offer a "send us your cert and we'll sign it", and dumb people who shouldn't be admins use it because it's (slightly) easier to use.
But you got the conclusion right, the notion of CAs is problematic.
This is what kills CA security. Anyone at a employer with over 5 people in the IT dept probably has someone who can insert a CDROM but has no idea how to set up CA and SSL stuff installing intranet internal servers using https and a self signed cert.
So we're carefully raising a whole generation of users programmed to accept any self signed cert, after all "thats how the benefits website is at work" or "thats how the source code mgmt site is at work". Then they go home, and oddly enough their bank presents a new self signed cert, or at least they think its their bank, and much as they have to click thru 10 times a day at work, they click thru the same popup at home and then enter their uname pword and ...
Paradoxically as a budget weapon its excellent because you probably have good enough physical security at work and frankly its usually not something worth protecting anyway, but it is incredibly annoying so you can bring up at budget meetings that IT can't afford to fix the SSL cert errors on some meaningless server because they can't afford it, etc. Not technically true but J Random MBA managing something he knows nothing about, can't figure it out, so its a great budget weapon. Highly annoying but doesn't really hurt anything.
To fix this you'd need something like an enterprise programers union standard union contract rule that enterprise programmers will never, ever, ship enterprise software that allows a self signed key. Good luck defining enterprise software, I suppose.
And in the spirit of idiot proofing leads to better idiots, requiring no self signed keys means idiots will create their own root and train users to import any root they ever see anytime they see one. Then distribute a non-self signed key signed by the imaginary "Innitech CA services" root. What could possibly go wrong with training users to do that?
In fairness if you have a heterogeneous network of legacy windows, some macs for real work, legacy blackberry and both real smartphones, distributing it "everywhere" can get kinda hard.
If you want pinning, there are better solutions: http://patrol.psyced.org/
CAs will always be able to MITM you. Like I said: "the notion of CAs is problematic."
There are two caveats:
1) certificate pinning: your browser has a hard-coded list of certificates for all major websites (e.g. Chromium: https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/src/n... (scroll down!))
2) there are add-ons (ie Certificate Patrol) that warn you when the certificate changes
Live within their means, or it will cost you $25 (because of "revocation costs").
StartCom are pretty awesome, but be aware of potential pitfalls.
To quote them:
"Class 1 certificates aren't revoked free because we receive too many requests daily (specially for the Class 1 free certs) and would we have revoked them all, our certificate revocation list (CRL) would have been blown out of every proportion."
In a further back-and-forth, the admin proceeded to tell me how much bandwidth I would cause them (I don't even care about being added to a CRL for a personal domain).
Edit: Sorry, you did say a wildcard cert, which sounds like a paid cert, so would offer more "service" I'm guessing.
1 - Not an NSA joke, more that "hey, voter registration and property tax rolls are public and online; you could just verify that, no?"
The problem is how to get those certificates and be sure they are the right ones. The problem was already solved in the pre-Internet world: letterhead, signatures and postal mail.
Trustworthy commercial entities could really distribute their certificates in paper form (or maybe on a business card) as an official document. Customers then scan these into their computing devices and, if they choose, sign them.
I doubt that anyone is pushing HTTPS based on the authentication function. It is the need for encryption that is probably the impetus.
Is it a problem?
Imagine if every former "free" technology (tcp/ip, email, http, c-compiler, whatever) demanded you pay $100 annually to use it. How many hackers creating things which we now take for granted do you think would have been discouraged from doing just so?
Security is nice, but that doesn't mean it's worth it or required all over, at any cost. De-facto requiring a paid "license" to operate on the internet is not the right way to go.
I would assume that you pay more than $100/y (which is expensive for a domain validated SSL cert, btw) unless you're using a free hosting provider at which point it's not your decision what protocol to use anyways.
No, it wont let me run a multi-million user site, but that's not my aim, nor should it be needed to let people new at the game fool around.
Putting the bar higher and higher to just being able to fool around is so utterly the wrong way to go.
I wonder if anyone on this site remembers what is was like to be 8 years old and already being able to program your first program on your TRS-80 or Commodore 64.
No money needing to be spent, no need to seek permission. Just hack. Get immediate, direct feedback. Instantly gratifying. That appraoch gave us a generation of computer-professionals unlike any other. Why are we so eager to put the road-blocks on now?
that means you pay for your internet connection and for the hardware you run the website on. Why is also paying for a certificate a problem?
I get the hobbyists approach, but especially for hobbyists I think it's better to stay with HTTP/1.1 which, as a plain text protocol is a lot easier to learn than the complicated ugly mess of HTTP/2.0. Also because of the SSL requirement, development will probably never happen over HTTP/2.0 - or do you want to create or even purchase new certificates for all your development projects?
A HTTP/1.1 server is something normal people can implement.
A HTTP/2.0 server is something for others to implement and a pain to debug.
I see HTTP/2.0 as a new transport protocol to transmit what we know as HTTP/1.1. None of the request/response semantics has changed between 1.1 and 2.0 (minus server push, but if you want to support older clients, you'd have to use other techniques anyways).
If you're just running your own little page, nothing is stopping you from using HTTP/1.1. Once your site is big enough to actually benefit significantly from HTTP/2.0, you will have the money for a certificate.
It's the latency for your clients you can shrink with 2.0, but you'd get bigger benefits from moving off hosting on a cable modem than by moving to 2.0. At that point, you'll have other, bigger costs to pay than the certificate.
Because the internet access and the hardware would have been bought regardless of the activity, for other purposes. (S)he was already paying for it, and used it for other purposes. Running a web site _happens_ to be one of its use, but is not the one goal. The fact that it is free to run a web site means that I can run my website on my laptop.
On the other hand, the certificate would have to be bought _only_ for this, because it is its only use: be able to play the HTTP/2.0 game.
The internet is no longer predominantly a hobbiests' playground and hasn't been in some time. Mainstream success leads to this sort of transformation by definition.
Are you kidding? Just a few decades ago you would need to pay a lot for machine time to be able to use computer. Today you can sit near a cafe with a $200 netbook and have a free internet access. In the 90's a .com domain cost ~$100. Just a few years ago TLS certificate cost close to the hundred, today you can buy one at around $10 per year or sometimes get it for free.
You have 10mbps connection! At your home! How much do you pay for it?
The thing is you are both missing the point:
The tech landscape is growing increasingly complex. We shouldn't be adding more obstacles to getting involved than we already have.
That's how horrible Legacy-things get built. We don't need to do that to our internet.
http://www.reddit.com/r/technology/comments/1qj1tz/http_20_t...
So now it's NO choice after all. If you want to run a "real" site, not only must you pay rent for your DNS, you are now also being extorted into paying money to CAs. CAs which can be subverted by the NSA, so they're effectively worthless anyway.
That's a bad move. Internet should be getting cheaper, not more expensive.
This whole HTTP 2.0 affair is turning into a real piece of extremely short-sighted shenanigans. Given W3C's green-light on DRM in HTML, we should start questioning if we want to entrust them with these sort of tasks in the future. They have gone completely off the rails.
And, again, HTTP 2.0 has nothing to do with CA prices.
I hope you understand it's mbit. If so, I've got 50mbps over here and I pay €50 (that's about $67 USD) per month, which includes 50 TV channels and interactive TV (I'm Dutch, I hope I described it correctly)
The situation (s)he describes is fairly common; I've got a Raspberry Pi and an old laptop running as servers over here, on which I do experiments and host small websites. They've got StartSSL certs, which suck, but they do their job at least. If you put enough effort in the process and not just blindly fill in the forms, you'll get there.
Did you think typing source code from a magazine (which they didn't carry in your home town because nobody else was interested) wasn't a roadblock or barrier?
Waiting to have access to the family TV so you could plug in your microcomputer? Or saving up to buy a second-hand 12" TV set so you could use it in the bedroom? Paying $1500 (in inflation adjusted dollars) for a Commodore 64 was a pretty big barrier.
If none of those were barriers for you, then I'm sure your parents would have sprung the cash for an SSL certificate.
And if none of those float your boat, you can always self sign if your willing to put up with the warning messages.
Your argument seems extremely hyperbolic.
I predict that https only http/2 will be doomed.
We are also "stuck" on IPv4 which hasn't been a problem.
Some sites may stick with 1.1 for a while, but my guess is there will be a ton more sites who will be adopting HTTPS because of this.
(hint: in most of the design options there wouldn't be CAs unless you used the https url scheme. See other messages in the linked thread too)
The reason why HTTPS isn't used more is because it's a major hassle and it's quite expensive (can easily double the yearly cost for smaller sites).
If using HTTP 2.0 requires buying SSL certificates, the smaller sites currently not using SSL will just be stuck on HTTP 1.1 forever.