Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security
by abstractConcept on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @08:01PM
(#6729831)
This seems similar to the logic behind TOR entry guards:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security
by schrodinger on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @12:19PM
(#6726662)
I think the point is that most users wouldn't notice having to press "Y" again to accept a new fingerprint.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security
by mikeash on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @12:21PM
(#6726685)
ssh only gives you the "y/n" choice the first time you connect. If you've connected before but the key has changed, it throws up a very nasty warning and does not even give you the choice to continue. You have to manually edit your key file to remove the offending entry if you want to start using the new key.
If it does happen, then the attacker will have to keep doing it forever, or else you'll get a warning the moment you manage to connect directly to the site without the MITM.
If your first connection is direct, then you're safe from MITM forever. If your first connection is compromised, then at least you'll likely discover that fact quickly.
I think this qualifies as "works".