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Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by VLM on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @08:01AM (#6724884)
I'm sitting here still trying to think of a way to prevent MITM attacks if you have no idea who the guy is on the other side... Maybe I need to drink more tea this early in the morning?

I guess if you did something weird like flip the protocol upside down such that all people would have "internet licenses" and enter them into the browser they're using at that moment (or better yet, lets charge each user $50/yr PER BROWSER LICENSE) and it became the sites problem to encrypt to the end users key... One way or another I think you have to verify the identity of at least one side WRT MITM?

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by peeters on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @10:20AM (#6725682)
So you don't prevent MITM attacks...it's still a step up from cleartext.

All this change is meant to ensure is that all HTTP/2.0 traffic is encrypted, not that it is all authenticated. For authenticated communication, we continue to have what HTTPS is today.

The main issue is retraining people to not think that "https" means "safe". That's something that browsers are already good at, however, because there is already a world of difference between the user experiences of visiting a site with a trusted cert and visiting a site with an untrusted cert.

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by tptacek on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @10:47AM (#6725913)
It's not a meaningful step up from cleartext, because a passive attacker can become an active attacker with just a couple spoofed packets or control of a single DNS resolver.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by tveita on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @11:19AM (#6726190)
It is a meaningful step up, because the passive attack is entirely risk free for the attacker, while an active attack carries with it the risk of detection.

The practicality of enormous secret drag-net operations like the NSA has been running would decrease dramatically if TLS had been the norm rather than the exception, even with unverified certificates. You can't opportunistically MITM 100% of connections without somebody noticing.

It is a shame that cleartext connections have to be the out-of-the-box default in every web server. Security should be the default, and I think the CA mess is to blame for that not being the case.

The sane thing to do would be generating a random self-signed certificate if the administrator didn't set up any explicit certificates. That would prevent passive attacks, and can be built on top of with technologies like certificate pinning and Convergence to mitigate active attacks.

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by tptacek on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @12:36PM (#6726809)
This appears to be a comment that seriously suggests removing authentication from TLS as a countermeasure to NSA surveillance.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by tedunangst on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @12:47PM (#6726899)
Not entirely. I kind of agree. I think I even posted a nearly identical comment once.

It would be nice if there were two kinds of connections. Encrypted unauth and encrypted auth. That seems strictly better than offering unencrypted connections. Your browser could still display the "wide open to attack" icon for encrypted unauth if you like.

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by tptacek on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @12:57PM (#6726990)
Why?!

The entire reason people think TLS should have "unauthenticated encryption" (which is in the literature kind of an oxymoron) is that they don't like the SSL CAs.

I don't like them either.

But the SSL CAs are a UI issue. Instead of dinking around with the browser UI to make worthless "unauthenticated encryption" sessions appear different, why not just build a UI for TACK, let people sign their own certificates if they want, but then pin them in browsers so those sites can rely on key continuity instead of nothing.

Five years from now, if TACK pinning becomes the norm, I think it's a safe prediction that basic TLS certificates will be free from multiple vendors. Moreover, the corruption of the CA system will matter less, because unauthorized certificates will violate pins and be detected; the CAs that issue them can be evicted.

While we're at it, why don't we just fix the UI for managing CA roots? It hasn't changed since the mid-1990s.

I am baffled by why anyone would actively promote an insecure cryptosystem as a cure for UI problems, or even as an alternative for some entirely new cryptosystem like MinimaLT.

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by tedunangst on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @03:19PM (#6728176)
It's just a matter of what can be done today vs tomorrow vs next year.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by tptacek on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @03:47PM (#6728360)
All of these things are simply gated on browser vendors. That's the overhead. Why would you push for a new UI for insecure connections when you could instead lobby for TACK?
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by tveita on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @04:12PM (#6728566)
Of course not! I am suggesting that connections should be encrypted by default, whether the endpoints can be authenticated or not.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by ars on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @10:57AM (#6725996)
That's still a step up. Now you need to be an active attacker, and not just a passive one.

The perfect is the enemy of the better.

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by bct on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @11:23AM (#6726222)
The worse is the enemy of the better too.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by ars on Thursday November 14, 2013 @02:49AM (#6731161)
It's easy to decide to avoid the worse. But deciding on the tradeoff for the better vs the perfect is much harder.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by tptacek on Thursday November 14, 2013 @04:34PM (#6735776)
This tradeoff is easy. UI that makes unauthenticated connections easier to accept is a bad idea; UI that makes certificate pinning work better is a good idea. Suggested tradeoff: pursue good idea, avoid bad idea.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by Perseids on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @04:52PM (#6728856)
> All this change is meant to ensure is that all HTTP/2.0 traffic is encrypted, not that it is all authenticated.

This is a perfect example of <strikethrough>"good enough is the enemy of good"</strikethrough> "not completely broken in every possible way is the enemy of barely good enough" that is so prevalent in web security. If we don't use this chance we have now to secure internet traffic we will continue to be completely vulnerable to rogue WiFi AP like http://www.troyhunt.com/2013/04/the-beginners-guide-to-break... and to companies as well as countries snooping their employers/citizens traffic via huge proxies for years to come.

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by danielweber on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @10:27AM (#6725735)
The "guy on the other side" is the fridge you bought at the store and just installed in your house.

You want to connect to it securely, but the fridge really has no way to prove to you who it is through any kind of third-channel.

Hell, forget about fridges. It's the router you just got at Best Buy.

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by hcarvalhoalves on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @08:25AM (#6724994)
> I'm sitting here still trying to think of a way to prevent MITM attacks if you have no idea who the guy is on the other side... Maybe I need to drink more tea this early in the morning?

It's not that you don't know who the guy is, you just don't rely on a 3rd party to tell you that. See how SSH fingerprinting works.

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by ams6110 on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @08:33AM (#6725032)
SSH keys work exactly like self-signed certificates. On first connection you get the "whoah, this isn't trusted, do you want to proceed" warning, and if you accept, you are not warned in the future unless the key changes.

If browsers would make it easier to "permanently accept" a self-signed certificate (right now it's usually a multi-step process with blood-red warning messages at every step) we'd have the same situation as SSH keys.

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by peterwwillis on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @09:49AM (#6725453)
HTTPS involves multiple servers that are interchanged regularly and commonly use different keys. The keys change regularly. There'd be no way to know if the key changing is part of regular operation or a man in the middle.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by bnr on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @10:06AM (#6725543)
Note that there's a difference between SSH fingerprints and (self-signed) SSL certificates. Multiple servers can easily share a certificate.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by peterwwillis on Thursday November 14, 2013 @12:40AM (#6730776)
It would be unwise to do so. In any case, phasing out old servers and certs for new ones is common practice. Using one cert everywhere (which would mean using one set of keys everywhere, which is a horrible idea) would require more downtime for maintenance of the certificates. It's not gonna happen.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by VLM on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @08:34AM (#6725035)
> See how SSH fingerprinting works.

It doesn't, as a MITM prevention technique, for a gullible population. It doesn't even work for non-gullible population that's been trained to always hit "Y" on first connection from a host to a new server... err... I mean first connection to a MITM who then talks to the new server for you.

There are ways to make the situation slightly harder like the extremely unpopular idea of putting SSH host keys in DNS and then securing DNS ... err .. probably securing DNS via a CA type backend.... Well even unsecured DNS holding SSH host keys is better than nothing, or at least it makes people more susceptible because they feel safer, or something like that.

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by mikeash on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @10:41AM (#6725861)
The odds of encountering a MITM attack on your first connection to a new server are low.

If it does happen, then the attacker will have to keep doing it forever, or else you'll get a warning the moment you manage to connect directly to the site without the MITM.

If your first connection is direct, then you're safe from MITM forever. If your first connection is compromised, then at least you'll likely discover that fact quickly.

I think this qualifies as "works".

Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by abstractConcept on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @08:01PM (#6729831)
This seems similar to the logic behind TOR entry guards: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by schrodinger on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @12:19PM (#6726662)
I think the point is that most users wouldn't notice having to press "Y" again to accept a new fingerprint.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by mikeash on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @12:21PM (#6726685)
ssh only gives you the "y/n" choice the first time you connect. If you've connected before but the key has changed, it throws up a very nasty warning and does not even give you the choice to continue. You have to manually edit your key file to remove the offending entry if you want to start using the new key.
Re:Moving forward on improving HTTP's security by jasonwatkinspdx on Wednesday November 13, 2013 @07:22PM (#6729642)
A fence doesn't stop someone with a ladder, but that doesn't mean fences are a bad idea.