Please post a security page. It literally doesn't need anything more than an email address and a PGP public key.
By the way: if Rubygems needs security help, it looks like there's quite a number of people who are willing to pitch in. When I published a FreeBSD crt0 bug back in 1996, I was given commit privs. I thought that was a pretty effective way to co-opt adversarial researchers.
I know dealing with this stuff is no fun. Try to keep in mind, though, that people like Ben Murphy and Hal (Postmodern) are on your side. Again, maybe consider formalizing that relationship a little!
The purpose of the key is to allow people to report security vulnerabilities without worrying that by doing so they're giving ammunition to people snooping emails.
e.g
Github's is in their site footer.
37signals' is in their site footer.
Twitter's is linked off the sidebar in their "About" page.
Google's and Facebook's are the top search result for their site and "vulnerability" "security".
These are all fine options.
Telling people to avoid using RubyGems and to audit if they've used it recently helps protect users.
Responsible disclosure is about avoiding giving bad guys new attack vectors and ensuring that the maintainer has the best chance of fixing the issue before a blackhat discovers and exploits it. That doesn't apply in this case.
I agree, but how do people audit? I think it's time to start putting application dependencies, like rubygems and npm modules, under version control, not in the same repo, but in a different repo.
Mikeal Rogers has some good reasons why, but there gets to be too much commit noise if you have big dependencies, and put them in the same repo. A separate repo solves this.
Nick. I dont support today's PoC, I don't, really. But I told you. Twice in a week. I feel deeply sad now.
I'm sorry about this. I don't know what else to say. I wish we didn't have to deal with this kind of problem in the Ruby community.
Do you think it makes sense to disable pulling down gems until you know for sure nothing in S3 is compromised?
It'd probably go a long way if you guys considered making an easily-discoverable security page with information on who to contact, how you prefer that contact to take place and how long they should expect to have to wait to hear back from you.
Just a suggestion!
Its amazing to see that one can just type 'gem blah' and magically things get installed.
Once again, Thank you for maintaining rubygems.org! You're doing a great job :)
Cheers,
Neya
Oh, and +1 for the security page
A full post-mortem is coming, but here's what happened from my perspective. I got mentioned on twitter about this thread while I was on the bus. I asked @evanphx to put the site into maintenance mode immediately.
Once I got on wifi, I downloaded the "exploit" gems and found that they used the Psych hack to post config/initializers/* and config/*.yml to Pastie. Luckily, none of our API keys were actually in those files - our config is a bit different since you can still run RubyGems.org on Heroku, which needs to put secret keys in the ENV.
I deleted the exploit gems permanently along with the throwaway account that posted them...that's why this post's URL is a 404.
I've reset our S3 keys just to be sure and any other keys we had on our production site. From what we know right now, no other changes on our S3 bucket have taken place, and we're going to check the logs to make sure. Once we get a real fix for this issue out, pushing gems will be enabled again.
Just a general PSA -
Please, if you find an issue like this, be nice. Tell the maintainers privately. Don't post to Reddit, HN, or a public Gist. RubyGems.org is completely volunteer run. No one gets paid to work on it. Thanks for your patience everyone.