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Re:Rubygems.org compromised by tptacek on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @12:12PM (#5140470)
If you want security notices to go to the Rubygems team, you have to set up a security page that tells people how to do that. Like everyone else, I appreciate your volunteer work, but no amount of goodwill creates the ability for people to read your mind.

Please post a security page. It literally doesn't need anything more than an email address and a PGP public key.

By the way: if Rubygems needs security help, it looks like there's quite a number of people who are willing to pitch in. When I published a FreeBSD crt0 bug back in 1996, I was given commit privs. I thought that was a pretty effective way to co-opt adversarial researchers.

Re:Rubygems.org compromised by qrush on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @12:14PM (#5140480)
Great suggestion, I'll add a security page today.
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by tptacek on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @12:29PM (#5140580)
Great!

I know dealing with this stuff is no fun. Try to keep in mind, though, that people like Ben Murphy and Hal (Postmodern) are on your side. Again, maybe consider formalizing that relationship a little!

Re:Rubygems.org compromised by jasonkester on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @12:32PM (#5140606)
What would the PGP key be for?
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by tptacek on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @12:34PM (#5140614)
The Rubygems team (or even just the person who writes the security page) can just generate a new one, for "[email protected]" or whatever, and it can be shared by the team.

The purpose of the key is to allow people to report security vulnerabilities without worrying that by doing so they're giving ammunition to people snooping emails.

Re:Rubygems.org compromised by willyt on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:19PM (#5141191)
Maybe I dont understand PGP and this is a stupid question, but if the site is compromised, would it not be possible for them to just put a different key up? One which they knew the private key for? How would you know the public key on the compromised site has not been changed unless you could compare it to the PGP key from before the site was compromised?
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by rmoriz on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @03:12PM (#5141490)
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by tptacek on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:38PM (#5141284)
Publishing the key is what allows you to detect malicious changes to the key.
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by JoachimSchipper on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:32PM (#5141257)
You can't, but having a security.html page gives attackers the possibility to contact you privately and securely; this reduces the chance that they'll decide to "contact" you by completely pwning your public site.
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by arjie on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:46PM (#5141344)
What if the key is endorsed by the individual people on the team? Their personal keys, which they keep, must sign the security team key. A replacement cannot have this endorsement.
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by jaytaylor on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:40PM (#5141299)
@JoachimSchipper do sec people inherently know to try hitting /security.html by convention, or should there be links to it from the main site?
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by tptacek on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:48PM (#5141362)
They know to look for a link to the security page.

Github's is in their site footer.

37signals' is in their site footer.

Twitter's is linked off the sidebar in their "About" page.

Google's and Facebook's are the top search result for their site and "vulnerability" "security".

These are all fine options.

Re:Rubygems.org compromised by jaytaylor on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @04:39PM (#5141916)
Thank you!
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by kgo on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @12:35PM (#5140619)
You don't want to send an actual exploit in clear text to a possibly compromised email account. PGP encrypts, and provides some level of validation that the message can only be read by someone on the security team.
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by jazzyb on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @12:36PM (#5140626)
For encrypting the email with the exploit details. This is quite a common practice in the security industry.
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by zobzu on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:16PM (#5141161)
Like signing gems? cough
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by i386 on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @03:44PM (#5141657)
Signing gems should be mandatory
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by zobzu on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @09:38PM (#5143090)
Don't get me started on python eggs :)
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by homakov on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @04:58PM (#5142028)
i hope there is security@rubygems