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Re:Rubygems.org compromised by tptacek on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @12:34PM (#5140614)
The Rubygems team (or even just the person who writes the security page) can just generate a new one, for "[email protected]" or whatever, and it can be shared by the team.

The purpose of the key is to allow people to report security vulnerabilities without worrying that by doing so they're giving ammunition to people snooping emails.

Re:Rubygems.org compromised by willyt on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:19PM (#5141191)
Maybe I dont understand PGP and this is a stupid question, but if the site is compromised, would it not be possible for them to just put a different key up? One which they knew the private key for? How would you know the public key on the compromised site has not been changed unless you could compare it to the PGP key from before the site was compromised?
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by rmoriz on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @03:12PM (#5141490)
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by tptacek on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:38PM (#5141284)
Publishing the key is what allows you to detect malicious changes to the key.
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by JoachimSchipper on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:32PM (#5141257)
You can't, but having a security.html page gives attackers the possibility to contact you privately and securely; this reduces the chance that they'll decide to "contact" you by completely pwning your public site.
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by arjie on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:46PM (#5141344)
What if the key is endorsed by the individual people on the team? Their personal keys, which they keep, must sign the security team key. A replacement cannot have this endorsement.
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by jaytaylor on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:40PM (#5141299)
@JoachimSchipper do sec people inherently know to try hitting /security.html by convention, or should there be links to it from the main site?
Re:Rubygems.org compromised by tptacek on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @02:48PM (#5141362)
They know to look for a link to the security page.

Github's is in their site footer.

37signals' is in their site footer.

Twitter's is linked off the sidebar in their "About" page.

Google's and Facebook's are the top search result for their site and "vulnerability" "security".

These are all fine options.

Re:Rubygems.org compromised by jaytaylor on Wednesday January 30, 2013 @04:39PM (#5141916)
Thank you!