> The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.
It was obviously a security vulnerability. That the project didn't immediately re-write then close the PR and admonish submitter is astounding.
The takeaway from this is not "the submitter was wrong", it's "we need to move off of openjdk yesterday".
Did OpenJDK fix the bug only when Java4shell came out, or did they have a fix in progress? Gemini and Claude tell me the fix had already been in the works. Therefore your earlier:
> > > Given they (those best able to understand the significance of the crash) didn't consider the bug worth fixing,
is false, and indeed that was 'facts not in evidence'.
> If the submitter went through project zero we'd be well past the 90 day window. How is that not sufficient evidence?
There is no evidence of "they [...] didn't consider the bug worth fixing". On the contrary, there is evidence that they did consider it worth fixing.
Sorry, but why?
Why should someone discovering a bug in an enormously complex piece of software have any responsibility for assessing the security implications of that bug?
If the maintainers wanted to make it private they could have done so.
> The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.
That's obviously a security vulnerability. If they didn't understand that, how did they even find it?
Why invest more time to close it? The automation will do it for you.
If I were the relevant maintainer I would have reached out to submitter privately and asked them to hold off more widely reporting this, and I would not have stopped the bot from announcing impending closure.
Would it be better to have some Oracle gpus running the dukebot? Are the robobun and friends better at real triage/escalation? Could we automate the robobots to register the `java2root.com` domain on its own, release a blog post and post it in twitter/hn upon every successful security issue?
Except soon you can expect LLM triage to be standard.
We would then find out if enough tokens would be invested in this one to figure out it was important, but any look is better than none.
We're not talking any large open source project here. We're talking about a project that, like Linux, runs much of the world's software infrastructure, and even bugs that could potentially be vulnerabilities need to be handled with great care.
Also, it's not really a leaked 0-day because there's ways to go from a bug to an exploit (even going from Calif's detailed public report to an exploit is not trivial, because exploits depend on the particular application; there has been no disclosed exploit that requires only the JDK).
Isn't there an expectation that non-security PRs refer to a public ticket? As a result, a private ticket is a pretty strong signal.
I'm guessing Oracle won't get back to the person later and say "thanks now fixed was actually a high sev vuln" (I can understand if everyone is short of time and can't keep track of such things?)
It was literal bug with provided fix. All it needed is someone to have a proper look.
But someone clowned a bot under a visionary thought "if nobody looked it must not be important" and here we are