> The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.
It was obviously a security vulnerability. That the project didn't immediately re-write then close the PR and admonish submitter is astounding.
The takeaway from this is not "the submitter was wrong", it's "we need to move off of openjdk yesterday".
Did OpenJDK fix the bug only when Java4shell came out, or did they have a fix in progress? Gemini and Claude tell me the fix had already been in the works. Therefore your earlier:
> > > Given they (those best able to understand the significance of the crash) didn't consider the bug worth fixing,
is false, and indeed that was 'facts not in evidence'.
> If the submitter went through project zero we'd be well past the 90 day window. How is that not sufficient evidence?
There is no evidence of "they [...] didn't consider the bug worth fixing". On the contrary, there is evidence that they did consider it worth fixing.
Sorry, but why?
Why should someone discovering a bug in an enormously complex piece of software have any responsibility for assessing the security implications of that bug?
If the maintainers wanted to make it private they could have done so.
> The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.
That's obviously a security vulnerability. If they didn't understand that, how did they even find it?
Why invest more time to close it? The automation will do it for you.