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Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by zwnow on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:10PM (#44838660)
Isn't Tor dead? Wasn't it infiltrated long ago?
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by 8organicbits on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:15PM (#44838724)
What makes you believe that?
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by zwnow on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:18PM (#44838757)
Read some story about some authority having set up tons of servers within the tor network to bust some criminal activity effectively making it not anonymous anymore. Was a while back on HN
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by thewebguyd on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:30PM (#44838895)
The feds and other equivalent agencies in other countries have been running exit nodes for years, but its still better than most solutions even if not perfect. Anyone who has gotten caught though likely wasn't because of any flaws in Tor (or said exit nodes) but because of other lapses in OpSec.

That being said, yes, feds can de-anonymize traffic, probably reliably at this point. There are only about 7-8000 active nodes, most in data centers. The less nodes you hop through, the more likely that traffic can be traced back to the entry point (guard node), and combined with timing can be reasonably traced back to the user. Tor works best with many, many nodes, and a minimum of three. There's not as many nodes as there needs to be so quite often it's only 3 you are going through (guard node/entry point, middle node, exit node)

Plus browsing habits can also be revealing. Just because someone is using Tor doesn't mean they also have disabled javascript, blocked cookies, aren't logging into accounts, etc.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by bombcar on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:40PM (#44839022)
> Anyone who has gotten caught though likely wasn't because of any flaws in Tor (or said exit nodes) but because of other lapses in OpSec.

There have been some cases where some consider the "other lapses in OpSec" to be parallel construction to disguise a Tor vulnerability/breach, and others where the government has declined to prosecute because they'd have to reveal how they know.

If Tor were compromised, we'd likely not know. It's highly likely that it's fine for "normal people" things.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by ls612 on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:45PM (#44839686)
At least back in the Snowden days it was very unreliable for the US to deanonymize Tor traffic based on those documents.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by lenerdenator on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:56PM (#44839779)
That was over a decade ago. They've almost certainly progressed since.

... now my back hurts and I want the damn kids off my lawn.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by ls612 on Friday August 08, 2025 @02:07PM (#44839880)
I mean if anything it’s harder today in many ways for the government than it was during the Snowden days, because that prompted tech people to take internet security seriously. Look at the cost trends for 0days over the past ten years.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by openasocket on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:49PM (#44839145)
Does controlling exit nodes necessarily help with deanonimizing? You would need control of the internal nodes for classic de-anonymization, or monitoring of both the exit nodes and the originating network for timing attacks. Also, exit nodes aren’t involved in hidden services. That 7-8000 figure you quoted: is that just exit nodes, or all nodes? My understanding was there aren’t a ton of exit nodes because anyone operating an exit node is liable to get harassed by people impacted by any malicious traffic originating from Tor. But that isn’t really an issue for internal nodes, and so there are more of them
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by thewebguyd on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:14PM (#44839397)
Controlling an exit node alone doesn't help, but controlling both entry and exit nodes does.

The tor project has network stats on their website: https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html

Looks like about 8,000 relays, inclusive of entry and exit nodes. Looks like about 2,500 exit nodes, and ~5,000 guard nodes. With that few I'd say it's reasonable to assume that a large number of both entry and exit are controlled by government agencies, at least enough to reliable to conduct timing attacks against a specific target they are interested in.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by gausswho on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:34PM (#44839588)
Am also interested in the current understanding of culpability in the US for operating an exit node.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by thewebguyd on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:42PM (#44839663)
> Am also interested in the current understanding of culpability in the US for operating an exit node.

It's a little ambiguous.

Section 230 (which continues to be under attack) provides some legal immunity, along with the DMCA is a safe harbor against copyright infringement claims for the Tor relay operator. Running a middle relay is generally fine and safe.

But, running an exit relay is risky. Even if you can't be held legally liable for the traffic coming from the exit, you could still get raided, and it has happened before where exit node operators have been raided after the traffic coming out of it was attributed to the node owner.

That being said, it's legal to run an exit node (for now). The problem is more so dealing with the inevitable law enforcement subpoenas or seizures, and having the money and resources to prove you are innocent.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by costco on Friday August 08, 2025 @05:59PM (#44842113)
This page on the mailing list has links to cases of people who were caught because of an unknown flaw in Tor: https://archive.torproject.org/websites/lists.torproject.org...

I can't find a link, but I think people have done simulations and the privacy benefits of more hops are not as great as one might think. If you control the guard and exit, then traffic confirmation is relatively easy by just looking at timing and volume of traffic no matter how many hops are in between.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by 8kingDreux8 on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:38PM (#44839003)
I believe this is the thread you're talking about https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41584428
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by 8organicbits on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:55PM (#44839209)
The article talks about a user who was using very old software, which seems like a pretty straightforward mistake. There's a bunch of speculation in the comments about other things, but I don't really see sources cited, so it's hard to tell what informs those opinions.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by chews on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:54PM (#44839202)
It was always that way, Ross Ulbrect was connected to his dark website by tracing via exit nodes.

Tor was always a government tool.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by thewebguyd on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:30PM (#44839556)
> Ross Ulbrect was connected to his dark website by tracing via exit nodes

Ulbricht wasn't caught because of flaws in Tor, but he made other mistakes. He posted stuff on LinkedIn alluding to his activities, he used a real photo on his fake IDs to rent servers, he used his real name, posting a question on stack over flow about running a Tor service, he posted his personal gmail, looked for couriers on Google+, and lastly paid an undercover cop for a hit.

As for getting his location, once the feds gained acccess to silk road, they matched up activity logs, his posting habits were consistent with being in the pacific time zone, and they matched up his user name between his posts on silk road as altoid and he reused the same screenname, associated with his gmail address and full name, on other websites.

A series of stupid opsec mistakes got him caught, not Tor.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by lenerdenator on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:58PM (#44839790)
All of this should serve as a reminder that if .gov really, really wants you, they've got you.

Unless, of course, they want everybody, which even they don't have the resources to handle.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by mburns on Friday August 08, 2025 @03:16PM (#44840620)
It should (also) serve as a reminder that OpSec is important.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by throwaway290 on Friday August 08, 2025 @05:06PM (#44841687)
Maybe a reminder to also not sell heavy drugs to children or to order murder for hire?
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by cluckindan on Friday August 08, 2025 @05:56PM (#44842085)
When did he sell heavy drugs to children?

When did he sell drugs?

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by hsbauauvhabzb on Friday August 08, 2025 @06:55PM (#44842530)
Leaving out ‘When did he pay to have someone killed’ from your question is disingenuous, because he directly did that.

He facilitated drug sales. If you setup ‘clucks brick and mortar Silk Road’ you’d be just as guilty.

I don’t think that was ever rosses ethical objective though, I’m pretty sure he felt that drugs should be less illegal and safe. I’m under the impression that Silk Road had rules on what could be sold, and that post SR markets do allow those things, but I could be wrong.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by coderintherye on Friday August 08, 2025 @08:26PM (#44843036)
Allegedly. The charge that he paid to have someone killed was never brought into court and never ruled on. Federal agents had access to the site at that point and could have posed the chat. Not really provable one way or the other.

Not defending him, but clarifying that it's not proven "he directly did that"

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by Ray20 on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:53PM (#44839188)
The observable world around us.

In a world where Tor is not a honeypot of some three letter agency, there are implementations of projects like Jim Bell's Assassination Politics. In a world where Tor is not a honeypot its use would be banned, much like the use of Tornado Cash was banned and shut down until the secret services took control of it.

And we obviously don't live in such world.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by 8organicbits on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:01PM (#44839278)
> its use would be banned

There are many places in the world where direct access to Tor is blocked. There are many countries where use of a VPN is illegal, VPNs are required to log by law, etc. I disagree with this premise.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by trod1234 on Friday August 08, 2025 @02:21PM (#44840029)
Those countries seek destructive control of all within its sphere of influence.

There are generally two types of countries, those that seek agency, independence, and freedom of rational thought and action; which requires privacy, and there are those that seek ultimate control, imposing dependence, coercion and corruption of reason; from the top down.

The cultures that seek total control generally fall under totalism and are parasitic in nature. The ones that seek agency, freedom, and independence, Protean.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by nickslaughter02 on Friday August 08, 2025 @04:57PM (#44841620)
EU countries will soon join the club.

"VPN services may soon become a new target of EU lawmakers after being deemed a "key challenge"" https://www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-privacy-security/vpn-servi...

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by kelipso on Friday August 08, 2025 @05:27PM (#44841860)
Probably because those governments don’t control the honeypot.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by bevr1337 on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:29PM (#44838888)
It's been assumed that three-letter agencies operate many exit nodes for a hot minute. I don't know if this is a special case of infiltration because it's TOR SOP.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by HDThoreaun on Friday August 08, 2025 @03:30PM (#44840770)
This isnt necessarily malicious. As the OP states TOR only works if a lot of people use it for regular browsing. The government wants it to work for the covert stuff so they need buy in from regulars and improving the service is how to do that.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by impossiblefork on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:36PM (#44838984)
I personally can't see how it can be secure without dummy messages.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by yieldcrv on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:10PM (#44839364)
Its not a binary thing, Tor updates all the time

Many comments talk about exit nodes for surveillance, but there is a totally different vector of use and considerations that dint apply when you aren't trying to access clearnet

And even on darknet it depends on what you’re doing

Reading the NY Times’ darknet site or forum or even nuet browsing darknet markerplace from Tor Browser, whereas I would use a Tor OS like Tails or dual gated VM like Whonix for doing something illicit

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by markasoftware on Friday August 08, 2025 @03:26PM (#44840715)
It depends on your threat model. Tor is focused on hiding from small-scale passive adversaries (eg, you're in Iran and don't want the Iranian government to see what you're doing. Or your ISP. Or any single node operator). Even the original Tor paper makes it clear that Tor isn't secure against a "global passive adversary" that can observe a large portion of global internet traffic, like the five eyes likely can today.

If you want to avoid global passive adversaries, a mixnet like Nym can work. I'm also working on a related project which takes a different approach of building your own circuit of proxy servers manually with lots of traffic padding: https://github.com/markasoftware/i405-tunnel

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by zwnow on Friday August 08, 2025 @03:51PM (#44840972)
I just use it to get books for free so idk about all the state regulation stuff.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by matthewdgreen on Friday August 08, 2025 @07:36PM (#44842790)
Nym is cool, but it has many of the same vulnerabilities as Tor. You can set higher per-node delays in principle, which means your packets will also take longer to get there. But this makes it hard to use most network protocols.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by niceguy4 on Friday August 08, 2025 @09:41PM (#44843385)
I don't believe these solutions protect against flow correlation observations. If a global adversary is monitoring the entry and exit points, they can identify the user without needing to decrypt the traffic. There are research papers that demonstrate attacks on both these models.

Onion endpoint sites use encrypted traffic and the padding strategy, too and are still susceptible to the correlation attack.

There's a security blog that publishes research papers on different attack models. It's a total PITA to find but I'll see if I can locate it.

edit: JFC... finally found it: https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/

Correlation attack concept: https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-337-p...

Attack against Mixnet and Nym: https://petsymposium.org/popets/2024/popets-2024-0050.pdf

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by markasoftware on Saturday August 09, 2025 @12:22AM (#44844014)
There's some subtlety here so my apologies for the long reply.

Nym/Loopix (and I405, though it's so experimental I feel bad even talking about it) completely defeat end-to-end correlation attacks, where an attacker tries to find statistical similarities between the encrypted traffic on the first hop (from the user's home network to some proxy), and the final hop (from some proxy to the final destination clearnet site).

Tor is trivially vulnerable to end-to-end correlation attacks. In addition to the paper you posted, my favorite is http://petworkshop.org/2007/papers/PET2007_preproc_Sampled_t... , which describes how an adversary monitoring just a small fraction (<0.1%) of traffic at key internet exchanges could deanonymize many Tor users.

Nym/Loopix and I405 defeat end-to-end correlation attacks with the same basic idea: Send fixed-rate traffic on the first hop, regardless of whether the user is actually trying to send any tunneled traffic. Both sample from a statistical distribution to decide when to send the next packet, and they send an empty packet if there is no actual data to send. In this way, the traffic being sent on the first hop does not depend at all on the inner cleartext data the user is sending/receiving.

The Mixmatch paper, which AFAIK is the only published attack against Nym/Loopix, is NOT an end-to-end correlation attack. It relies on the attacker controlling one or more Nym "gateways" (equivalent of guard nodes in Tor) and therefore being able to decrypt traffic from users whose first hop goes through that gateway. Further, I believe that the attack described in this paper becomes increasingly difficult as the number of users increases, and the authors of the paper include Nym developers who are actively making changes to make this attack harder. It's not a fundamental weakness in Nym/Loopix, the way that E2E correlations are for Tor.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by dostick on Saturday August 09, 2025 @03:47AM (#44844788)
Isn’t i2p supposed to replace Tor?
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by markasoftware on Saturday August 09, 2025 @11:59AM (#44847541)
nope they were both started within a year of each other. Lots of Tor fans will tell you that I2P is overly complicated. And indeed it seems to have had more vulnerabilities over the years.