The tor project has network stats on their website: https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html
Looks like about 8,000 relays, inclusive of entry and exit nodes. Looks like about 2,500 exit nodes, and ~5,000 guard nodes. With that few I'd say it's reasonable to assume that a large number of both entry and exit are controlled by government agencies, at least enough to reliable to conduct timing attacks against a specific target they are interested in.
It's a little ambiguous.
Section 230 (which continues to be under attack) provides some legal immunity, along with the DMCA is a safe harbor against copyright infringement claims for the Tor relay operator. Running a middle relay is generally fine and safe.
But, running an exit relay is risky. Even if you can't be held legally liable for the traffic coming from the exit, you could still get raided, and it has happened before where exit node operators have been raided after the traffic coming out of it was attributed to the node owner.
That being said, it's legal to run an exit node (for now). The problem is more so dealing with the inevitable law enforcement subpoenas or seizures, and having the money and resources to prove you are innocent.