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Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by zwnow on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:18PM (#44838757)
Read some story about some authority having set up tons of servers within the tor network to bust some criminal activity effectively making it not anonymous anymore. Was a while back on HN
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by thewebguyd on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:30PM (#44838895)
The feds and other equivalent agencies in other countries have been running exit nodes for years, but its still better than most solutions even if not perfect. Anyone who has gotten caught though likely wasn't because of any flaws in Tor (or said exit nodes) but because of other lapses in OpSec.

That being said, yes, feds can de-anonymize traffic, probably reliably at this point. There are only about 7-8000 active nodes, most in data centers. The less nodes you hop through, the more likely that traffic can be traced back to the entry point (guard node), and combined with timing can be reasonably traced back to the user. Tor works best with many, many nodes, and a minimum of three. There's not as many nodes as there needs to be so quite often it's only 3 you are going through (guard node/entry point, middle node, exit node)

Plus browsing habits can also be revealing. Just because someone is using Tor doesn't mean they also have disabled javascript, blocked cookies, aren't logging into accounts, etc.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by bombcar on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:40PM (#44839022)
> Anyone who has gotten caught though likely wasn't because of any flaws in Tor (or said exit nodes) but because of other lapses in OpSec.

There have been some cases where some consider the "other lapses in OpSec" to be parallel construction to disguise a Tor vulnerability/breach, and others where the government has declined to prosecute because they'd have to reveal how they know.

If Tor were compromised, we'd likely not know. It's highly likely that it's fine for "normal people" things.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by ls612 on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:45PM (#44839686)
At least back in the Snowden days it was very unreliable for the US to deanonymize Tor traffic based on those documents.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by lenerdenator on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:56PM (#44839779)
That was over a decade ago. They've almost certainly progressed since.

... now my back hurts and I want the damn kids off my lawn.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by ls612 on Friday August 08, 2025 @02:07PM (#44839880)
I mean if anything it’s harder today in many ways for the government than it was during the Snowden days, because that prompted tech people to take internet security seriously. Look at the cost trends for 0days over the past ten years.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by openasocket on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:49PM (#44839145)
Does controlling exit nodes necessarily help with deanonimizing? You would need control of the internal nodes for classic de-anonymization, or monitoring of both the exit nodes and the originating network for timing attacks. Also, exit nodes aren’t involved in hidden services. That 7-8000 figure you quoted: is that just exit nodes, or all nodes? My understanding was there aren’t a ton of exit nodes because anyone operating an exit node is liable to get harassed by people impacted by any malicious traffic originating from Tor. But that isn’t really an issue for internal nodes, and so there are more of them
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by thewebguyd on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:14PM (#44839397)
Controlling an exit node alone doesn't help, but controlling both entry and exit nodes does.

The tor project has network stats on their website: https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html

Looks like about 8,000 relays, inclusive of entry and exit nodes. Looks like about 2,500 exit nodes, and ~5,000 guard nodes. With that few I'd say it's reasonable to assume that a large number of both entry and exit are controlled by government agencies, at least enough to reliable to conduct timing attacks against a specific target they are interested in.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by gausswho on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:34PM (#44839588)
Am also interested in the current understanding of culpability in the US for operating an exit node.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by thewebguyd on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:42PM (#44839663)
> Am also interested in the current understanding of culpability in the US for operating an exit node.

It's a little ambiguous.

Section 230 (which continues to be under attack) provides some legal immunity, along with the DMCA is a safe harbor against copyright infringement claims for the Tor relay operator. Running a middle relay is generally fine and safe.

But, running an exit relay is risky. Even if you can't be held legally liable for the traffic coming from the exit, you could still get raided, and it has happened before where exit node operators have been raided after the traffic coming out of it was attributed to the node owner.

That being said, it's legal to run an exit node (for now). The problem is more so dealing with the inevitable law enforcement subpoenas or seizures, and having the money and resources to prove you are innocent.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by costco on Friday August 08, 2025 @05:59PM (#44842113)
This page on the mailing list has links to cases of people who were caught because of an unknown flaw in Tor: https://archive.torproject.org/websites/lists.torproject.org...

I can't find a link, but I think people have done simulations and the privacy benefits of more hops are not as great as one might think. If you control the guard and exit, then traffic confirmation is relatively easy by just looking at timing and volume of traffic no matter how many hops are in between.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by 8kingDreux8 on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:38PM (#44839003)
I believe this is the thread you're talking about https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41584428
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by 8organicbits on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:55PM (#44839209)
The article talks about a user who was using very old software, which seems like a pretty straightforward mistake. There's a bunch of speculation in the comments about other things, but I don't really see sources cited, so it's hard to tell what informs those opinions.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by chews on Friday August 08, 2025 @12:54PM (#44839202)
It was always that way, Ross Ulbrect was connected to his dark website by tracing via exit nodes.

Tor was always a government tool.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by thewebguyd on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:30PM (#44839556)
> Ross Ulbrect was connected to his dark website by tracing via exit nodes

Ulbricht wasn't caught because of flaws in Tor, but he made other mistakes. He posted stuff on LinkedIn alluding to his activities, he used a real photo on his fake IDs to rent servers, he used his real name, posting a question on stack over flow about running a Tor service, he posted his personal gmail, looked for couriers on Google+, and lastly paid an undercover cop for a hit.

As for getting his location, once the feds gained acccess to silk road, they matched up activity logs, his posting habits were consistent with being in the pacific time zone, and they matched up his user name between his posts on silk road as altoid and he reused the same screenname, associated with his gmail address and full name, on other websites.

A series of stupid opsec mistakes got him caught, not Tor.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by lenerdenator on Friday August 08, 2025 @01:58PM (#44839790)
All of this should serve as a reminder that if .gov really, really wants you, they've got you.

Unless, of course, they want everybody, which even they don't have the resources to handle.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by mburns on Friday August 08, 2025 @03:16PM (#44840620)
It should (also) serve as a reminder that OpSec is important.
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by throwaway290 on Friday August 08, 2025 @05:06PM (#44841687)
Maybe a reminder to also not sell heavy drugs to children or to order murder for hire?
Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by cluckindan on Friday August 08, 2025 @05:56PM (#44842085)
When did he sell heavy drugs to children?

When did he sell drugs?

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by hsbauauvhabzb on Friday August 08, 2025 @06:55PM (#44842530)
Leaving out ‘When did he pay to have someone killed’ from your question is disingenuous, because he directly did that.

He facilitated drug sales. If you setup ‘clucks brick and mortar Silk Road’ you’d be just as guilty.

I don’t think that was ever rosses ethical objective though, I’m pretty sure he felt that drugs should be less illegal and safe. I’m under the impression that Silk Road had rules on what could be sold, and that post SR markets do allow those things, but I could be wrong.

Re:Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy by coderintherye on Friday August 08, 2025 @08:26PM (#44843036)
Allegedly. The charge that he paid to have someone killed was never brought into court and never ruled on. Federal agents had access to the site at that point and could have posed the chat. Not really provable one way or the other.

Not defending him, but clarifying that it's not proven "he directly did that"