Like running windows in a VM or using an HDMI capture card. And are they going to break running teams meetings when using moonlight etc. with this? If you are OBS capturing during the meeting does it get blacked out or just breaks your recording?
This is primarily about blocking accidental leaks by regular employees who were asked to not record but ignored it. This kind of reuse of content happens all the time in companies of any significant size and isn't entirely stopped by simple requests or watermarks. This tool gives companies one more option to protect against this very lame and boring but also very real threat.
I think you're seriously overestimating regular employees. A significant number of people will send you smartphone pictures when you ask for a screenshot - why would they suddenly start looking into on-device screen capture when taking a picture or video of some random presentation?
> A significant number of people will send you smartphone pictures when you ask for a screenshot
i think this should not be possible to be asked.
For example, an employee might want to record to cover their own ass (e.g., if being asked to do some morally questional things, which the employee could record then use as protection against the company going back on their word).
Having the ability to _control_ whether an employee can keep records independently of the company only serves to move more control away from the employee.
People know it’s not perfect. However, raising the bar discourages the spontaneous captures that people might try out of habit.
I don't mean to pile on but, you wouldn't use post processing, you would just take the information out of your screenshots and make a new slide deck if you wanted pass it off as official.
Not sure what "support" you expect for unsupported clients.
It's definitely not true that this feature breaks support for devices not owned by the manufacturer. The follow on question about whether all possible web clients / operating systems would be supported, I don't know. The article just says that web is supported.
“Web is supported” in this instance just means “the web, but only when mediated by google, microsoft or apple”, which is not the web as far as I'm concerned.
They also can prevent honest people from gathering proofs to cover or defend themselves: abusive boss, illegal requests, harassment...
for f in `ls -1 /pics/IMG_*.jpg|/usr/bin/xargs basename` ; do /usr/local/bin/magick convert $f -strip -quality 8$rand -shave 1$randx1$rand2 -resize 9$rand2% -attenuate 1.0 +noise Uniform out_$f && /usr/local/bin/exiftool -overwrite_original -all= out_$f && rm -rf $f ; done
Perhaps someone will find this useful ...
* Naive screencaps are much less traceable to the leaker than a naive photo is. Yes, someone can strip out EXIF data, but we've seen over and over again that they generally don't. And even without EXIF a naive framing on the photo is more likely to expose information about the location or identity of the person who took it.
* A photo of a webinar is going to (barring serious postprocessing) look much less official and be less legible than a screenshot, so the use cases for illicit captures are going to be fewer. Few people are going to try to take a phone photo of the top-secret meeting and use the slide in their next team all-hands, but many might forget the rules and than snap a screenshot really quickly for later use.
* Just having the ability to block the easy method of screen captures helps avoid cases where the person doing the capturing isn't actively malicious, just ill-informed. If a normal employee attempts a screenshot and is reminded they're not supposed to do that, they're not going to pull out their phone to take a photo, they're going to say "oops" and move on.
Yeah, there are threat models that won't be stopped here, but most of corporate InfoSec is wrapped up in protecting against pretty lame threat models that would benefit from this—mostly uninformed/ignorant employees screwing up without intending to be a threat.