I used to think this was because they were intimidated by law enforcement, but they claimed otherwise. The recent UK attempt to backdoor Advanced Data Protection has made me believe them a bit less.
But it’s all or nothing and has to be applied to the entire account.
Google provides it: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43933626
False. Google has done it with their backups. And Apple already does it too! Keychain passwords, health data, and a lot of other stuff is end-to-end encrypted in backups even when ADP is disabled, with recovery options if you lose your devices, no yubikey required. They simply choose not to apply the same solution to message data.
Unlike the account password that users need only once in a blue moon, users are required to practice entering their screen lock code at least once a week to continue using their device. Probably more often in most cases. And it's much shorter.
Chrome sync also supports e2ee, and using it requires that you set a sync passphrase that is separate from your Google account password. The account password is known to Google servers and so can't be used to secure e2ee data. The screen lock code, in contrast, is never stored in a form accessible to Google.
^: I concede that this might be an acceptable thing to assume they won't get to forget. At the same time, I don't think this is a worthwhile encryption given the average 4-6 digit passcode length because you do not have the ability to mix in on-device keys (otherwise backups can't restore in other devices without another key).
Here's that link again: https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...
To some degree sure, but the real issue with Signal is the app UX royally sucks, not having to do much with security trade-offs per se.
I've seen many non-technical end users use Signal, immediately upon trying it, with no problems. I've never seen someone have a problem.
I understand that our opinions don't agree, so I cite Apple's market research and design decision to bolster my case.
But I will stop there. Maybe just peddle your BS to ask folks to shut up elsewhere. Who are you even to know whom I know or not?
Truth be told, I don't think most users even care that the company their messenger comes from can read their messages. All of the people I chat to on Telegram seem absolutely fine with it. I begrudgingly accept their chats (I don't want to be that guy that people need to install a special app for to communicate with, as much as I'd like Matrix or XMPP to succeed).
And to be honest, who cares if Apple's backups are encrypted. They can push a software update to undo that encryption any time they want to. The only people you need to protect your backups from are criminals (but that's what your password and 2FA is for) and law enforcement ("but I'm not a criminal! I have nothing to hide!"). You can't use Apple's phone/Facebook's messenger without accepting the risk that Apple/Facebook will undo all the security they claim to have added to their software.
Of course this is true, but it's such a reductive view of the broader security picture.
If messages are plaintext, they can be leaked by a hacker, accessed by an insider, not wiped from some drives they throw out for recycling... None of these attack vectors require the provider being evil, so removing them already reduces your exposure by a lot.
Secondly, if you're being targeted by hackers that have already gotten into the messaging provider, looking at some rows in a database is waaay easier and safer than somehow sneaking exhilaration code into the next release build of the app.
Finally, if your main adversary are government agents with a warrant, there is a huge legal difference between forcing the company to ship malicious code (possibly to all users) and simply printing out a few rows in a database. IIRC Apple has already won at least once in US court on this exact point.
1. That their messages won't be lost when they migrate between devices.
2. That their messages won't be lost when their device is stolen and they set up the new one from nothing but a password.
3. That Apple's password recovery flows work like any other password recovery flows, AKA that forgetting your password is a minor inconvenience, to be overcome at the Apple Store at worst, not a data loss disaster.
4. That they don't have to spend $$$ on some strange device called a "Yoobby Key", which they don't understand and will lose anyway.
There's no way to satisfy those demands and have your desired level of security, hence why iCloud backup encryption is a strictly opt-in feature.
There are tradeoffs to be made here, and Signal made different tradeoffs, which makes it significantly more secure but also significantly more annoying to use for somebody whose main life interest isn't figuring out why tech works the way it does. Apple does the best it can under the constraints they are given.