Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by modeless on Saturday May 10, 2025 @03:51AM
(#43943941)
It's not security theater. You didn't read, or didn't understand, the blog post I linked that explains how it provides strong security despite the low entropy passcode by using secure elements in the datacenter. I believe Apple does the same for the categories of data that are e2ee in backups when ADP is not enabled, such as keychain passwords (iMessage should be in this category and the fact that it's not is my whole complaint).
Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by tgma on Saturday May 10, 2025 @01:09PM
(#43947192)
I stand corrected then. I knew about Apple doing HSM-based key escrowing server-side, but did not know Google has applied the same technique to Android backups.
Here's that link again: https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...