Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by modeless on Saturday May 10, 2025 @02:38AM
(#43943649)
I think you missed my point that the screen lock code is not at all like the account password in terms of resilience to forgetting. I know people who have forgotten their account passwords and lost photos etc, similar to what you describe. However, I know nobody who has lost access to the phone they use every day by forgetting the screen lock code. That is very unlikely.
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Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by tgma on Saturday May 10, 2025 @02:47AM
(#43943689)
I addressed it in the footnote: 6-digit encryption key without tying it to device is just security theatre (and people might still forget: many users are old). Longer passwords people will forget.
Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by modeless on Saturday May 10, 2025 @03:51AM
(#43943941)
It's not security theater. You didn't read, or didn't understand, the blog post I linked that explains how it provides strong security despite the low entropy passcode by using secure elements in the datacenter. I believe Apple does the same for the categories of data that are e2ee in backups when ADP is not enabled, such as keychain passwords (iMessage should be in this category and the fact that it's not is my whole complaint).
Here's that link again: https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...