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Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf] by matthewdgreen on Friday May 09, 2025 @07:28AM (#43935650)
Apple has the opportunity to add “extra security” features like disappearing messages, or to treat certain chats the same way they treat your web history (back this chat up, but require my passcode.) For the latter feature one can argue that it’s too advanced for the ordinary Apple user. But disappearing messages are a common security feature in virtually every messaging app, and Apple still won’t deploy those.

I used to think this was because they were intimidated by law enforcement, but they claimed otherwise. The recent UK attempt to backdoor Advanced Data Protection has made me believe them a bit less.

Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf] by trollbridge on Friday May 09, 2025 @08:01AM (#43935832)
You can set messages to auto-delete. (I do this so I won’t get into the bad habit of relying on finding ancient messages.)

But it’s all or nothing and has to be applied to the entire account.

Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf] by matthewdgreen on Saturday May 10, 2025 @08:33AM (#43945129)
Yes, but that setting is different from what disappearing messages offers, since it only applies to your account and not the accounts of your conversation partners. Disappearing messages is a really nice feature that’s widely supported across many messengers. Apple is really the exception for not offering it.