The bigger security problem is that it was being run on devices that evidently weren't limited to secure communication tasks (such devices wouldn't have a journalist in their contacts). That suggests at least some people were using personal phones, which seems like a terrible idea.
I don't see how this would work. If you're the leaker, do you just add the journalist to the group yourself? How are you going to explain that? I think there are more anonymous ways to leak stuff than adding someone else to the group chat. Or does signal not show who added someone?
I am reading it now.
https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/signal-app-owned-china-it-safe-use...
Edit: nothing to see here.
"So, is Signal App owned by China? The answer is no... Signal is run by the Signal Foundation, a non-profit based in San Francisco... Amidst this controversy, it's crucial to remember that Signal's roots are firmly planted on American soil, dispelling any notion of Chinese ownership."
This is an abysmal mistake on the big stage for a bunch of new people on the job. That it is the intelligence community makes it feel so much worse.
At minimum, Mike Waltz is retired special ops, Rubio has had high-level clearance for ages from his time in the Senate, same for Gabbard in the House. None of them responded "Hey, this is poor op-sec and illegal, perhaps take this to an approved messaging service?"
Basically a journalist was added to a discussion group of high ranking politicians.
This journalist is well known within those circles and has plenty of access to those people regardless.
The conversation may have been war plans, but the action is pretty uncontroversial across both parties, and went off without a problem so the impact of the leak was nil.
Seems like a great topic for making political hay, but twins that a mistake that can be easily corrected.
I can't imagine having my personal secure commentary being put out into the public and I don't have national security under my belt.
To start with, classified information is ONLY supposed to viewed in a SCIF. Secondly, it should never be loaded onto private devices. The private phones of national security leadership would be prime targets for every hostile intelligence agency in the world. It matters little if the information was encrypted in transit if the host device is compromised.
One would have to be a fool to not trust all of the classified tools and safeguards the US government uses only to then use a commercial app on commercial phones to communicate classified data in public while stateside and abroad. Just the fact that someone could accidentally add an unauthorized person to the chat is but one reason it was crazy for them to do this.
Boogedy Boo!
Seriously though... how is it people still do not understand policy proposals from think tanks is normal and not some blueprint/roadmap for any specific administration?
These organizations literally exist to build out a "menu" of potential policies and game out how the policy might be implemented. It doesn't mean every policy will be implemented - or any at all. There's also many organizations that do this work - not just one ominous organization.
Additionally, this fabled "Project 2025" has become some sort of catch-all for "anything I don't like". Literally anything someone doesn't like is somehow part of this "Project 2025" - despite near-zero people actually reading all nine billion pages of policy proposals.
No, but we prefer the fearmongering... keeps those donations flowing.
The policy goals of the ACLU, Clinton Foundation, etc are inputs to the Democratic Party's operations. Why would it be controversial to note that the Heritage Foundations's published policy is similarly an input to the Republican Party's operations?
I'd also note that mentioning George Soros being involved in anything gets condemnation here, so the same thing applies to both sides to at least some extent.
We're 79 days in, and 42% of the policy objectives outlined in the document are complete, with another 15% in progress. Over 50% of the objectives have been actioned within the first 100 days. I've seen general contractors execute on a blueprint slower than this administration.
What they did is illegal. Any rank and file that did the same would be in prison for a decade, no questions asked.
In general, it seems like you're trying to "3d chess" incompetence into strategy, but try taking a step back and looking at it with clear eyes. This was a bad decision, plain and simple. Nobody is taking responsibility for it, and that makes it worse - these people are in charge of the largest intelligence and war machine on the planet. This is not okay.
As a consequence, any enforcement now would be viewed as extremely selective.
I have been exposed to a lot of classified information in meetings in DC that were supposed to be unclassified. This isn’t an isolated incident, it has been a systemic issue across every administration for as long as I’ve worked in DC.
People should focus less on the incident and more on why this has been normal for decades.
The underlying tension is that doing things the official way is extremely slow and speed matters. There is a longstanding bias toward taking more risks in terms of information exposure because being slow carries its own significant risks. Speed of decision making is critical and that has proven to be impossible if every interaction has to happen inside a SCIF. It is a tension the intelligence community is still grappling with.
IIUC, the "rank and file" go to prison for violating their NDA. At the highest level these people are appointed and don't have an NDA which is why senators / representatives can leak without punishment.
Here's a pretty good order of operations when your policy breaks the law or is so odious as to feel the need to hide it from other duly elected representatives in government:
1. Stop breaking the fucking law.
The rule of law matters. Even if it doesn't matter to you or Trump.
If you're talking about fear of leakers, the response to that is to tighten the distribution of information and start a counterintelligence investigation.
In any case the simple risk calculus is, what is the risk of adversaries getting a hold of this information and causing grave and lasting damage to national security and death vs the risk of political rivals leaking something. Pretty simple decision there and one that any cabinet member should get right.
So why should we default to the position of not trusting those systems when every previous administration has used it without issus.
There is no evidence, reporting etc that says the government has deliberately compromised the government’s own secure systems. And for what purpose is beyond me.
1. Trump’s team was spied on by the FBI. 2. Government employees have access to government systems.
Conclusion? There is a possibility that Trump’s team again be spied upon through the government systems and consequently have sabotage done upon them. Therefore, avoid government systems as much as possible.
Calling this unfounded conspiracy theory is just running away from this very straightforward and simple argument.
Also, is there proof that these government systems are completely secure? Without that proof, why should they be using those systems? (He who controls the null hypothesis and all..)
This is a phenomenal level of stupidity - to use illegal channels of communication because of the bad vibes they are feeling from other people?
Did it help? How many adversary spy agencies has duplicate signal accounts for these officials and see all of the communication live?
I think some foreign leaders probably are reading summaries of these messages in complete disbelief and amusement.
No one in the Trump administration has come out and said the secure systems can’t be trusted.
Russian operated puppets have been spreading similar stuff everywhere they can. When MAGA ppl do something stupid, they’re instantly there flat out calling them lefties and communists, etc. to shift blame, confuse readers and devolve meaningful discussions into name-calling and pointless debate.
Assuming this is true, how did they determine what a "top" government official is? So if you're the SecDef you should use it but not the deputy SecDef? How would this guidance not pertain to all government officials?
No.
No, no, no.
Most classified information is NOT designated SCI. When classified info was mostly paper, it was placed in GSA approved safes in regular 'ole office buildings. You'd get to work, open your safe, and do your work. Most SIPRNet computers are not in SCIFs.
Heck, you can even mail classified documents via USPS. Confidential and secret documents can be sent registered mail.
"SCIFs are often employed for processing things that are only marked Secret or systems only handling Secret"
No. SCIFs are expensive. They are not built when they are not needed. They are only needed for SCI materials.
Once upon a time, I was visited very forcefully by the FBI at 0600. They used a battering ram to gain access to my domicile.
During the "interview" that took place later that morning, they requested some information from me. I told them that the information was contained in Signal conversations between two recipients, and the messages in question have "disappearing messages" turned on. tldr; the messages are no longer available.
Relevant parts of conversation that followed:
me: "Do you have signal?"
agent: "I have it on my phone if that's what you mean."
me: "No, do you HAVE it - as in, do you have access to messages sent between other parties?"
agent: "If we do, I am unaware of it, and we certainly don't 'have it' with regard to this matter."
Take that for what it's worth.... my takeaway was that they(the FBI at least) have not compromised Signal. This was late in 2019 for context.
The other takeaway...be careful who you trust. That all happened because I trusted someone I shouldn't have.
If they did have some kind of collection capability around Signal, they likely would not have risked burning it on you.
I've always thought the exact same thing. The harm was ~800m USD to a private company. Sounds big, but it's nothing compared to actual state sponsored anything.
Just to add some more (possibly useful) context from the encounter....
The FBI was not able to unlock many LUKS secured devices - at all. They had zero success over approx 30 days, and had to explore alternative methods to obtain key material.
The FBI was not able to decrypt blowfish2 (ie vim -x).
The FBI was not able to decrypt ccrypt secured files (ie aes256).
IF they can decrypt stuff, they'll only use it when it's has an actual benefit beyond a conviction and the keys are truly inaccessible. (e.g., person is dead, the keys are in an enemy state HSM, etc.)
Jesus Christ, this is dumb. Using a civilian app with civilian phones is literally the best way to get spied on, by either "your own" or foreign agencies. These people are going to get us all killed in a nuclear first strike.
Not sure how leaking state secrets is risking nuclear annihilation - unless they invite Putin or Xi mistakenly in their Signal Group and plan to bomb Moscow or Beijing but the coziness of the current administration with these 2 countries is certainly not making this scenario realistic at all.
Instead the reality is likely more boring: they just accelerate American decline
Please don’t reassure yourself by thinking that putting total incompetents in power is making anyone safer.
If you new that Signal was secretly a front by the CIA/NSA then you'd feel pretty comfortable using it.
Like, do you think they did the same thing with multiple journalists in an attempt to see who would publish and who would keep their mouths shut?
Bear in mind, when you join a Signal group you don't see the conversation history from before you arrived, only the live updates that take place during the time you're a member. Also, anyone in the group can view the list of group members and receives notifications about people being added to/removed from/leaving the group.
European governments do the same but with WhatsApp.
It was Mike Waltz who invited Jeff Goldberg to connect on Signal. It seems inordinately unlikely that he would have been uninvolved if it was an intentional leak.
They replace “ideologically compromised SCIFs” with…… 18 separate iOS devices that I’m sure are on 18 separate OS/app versions and device postures and…
Got news for you - want to compromise e2e encryption and Signal? You do it via what they did. So no, they are not correct.
but of course, this lot thinks the existing government is all corrupt / deepstate.
Obviously, Signal is not meant for this sort of thing, so it has no reason for such a feature. It’s not a failing of Signal, but it’s not fit for this purpose.
You can debate the seriousness of this sometimes. When it comes to impending military action though, revealing when and where US personnel will be conducting an operation in the future, there really is no debate. This is gravely serious.
a) It's an unintentional opsec failure. Perhaps there was an address book collision with another intended user. Perhaps it was fat-fingered. This seems likely.
b) It was an intentional leak. Perhaps overtly, perhaps covertly, by one or more of the channel members for unknown purposes. This seems less likely as there are better ways to leak with less blowback risk.
Regarding using Signal in the first place. Yes, this seems like bad opsec, but it's possible that the current admin working groups don't trust the official secure channels and assume they are compromised and they are being spied upon by their own or foreign agencies. That seems very likely, given the circumstances. In which case, it is still a possible opsec failure, but perhaps a less bad risk than trusting operational security to known adverse agencies. This is the more interesting case, imho, since the assumption on here is largely that these types of coordination should be happening on official government channels. But "government" is not necessarily a unified collective working towards the same goals. If you have a strong suspicion that agents within your own team are acting against your goals, then of course, you have to consider communicating on alternative channels. Whether that's to evade legal restrictions or transparency, like with the Clinton email servers, or to evade sabotage, I'm not judging the ethics, just considering the necessity of truly secure communication.
Is that trust in Signal justified? It suggests members at the highest security clearances believe Signal is not compromised. Are they correct? In any case, clearly there are more ways to fail opsec than backdoors.