Not just politicians in general, but people, of course, are always surprised how expensive housing is, but then reject any kind of streamlined mass-manufactured option.

They are conditioned to worship at the altar of small businesses and good ol' craftsmanship. (And plot after plot they blindly erect yet another replica of the standard American Dream with the compulsory backyard where they truly can be free, and conduct HOA approved activities, and complain about the neighbor making a noise with their fucking weedwhacker, and complain about the other neighbor that has a problem with the smoke from the occasional backyard cooking.) Otherwise it's gentrification, more traffic and oh, ew, maybe even affordable-unit-dwellers.

It's true that small businesses and craftsmanship are not efficient, but that's not usually the main reason why houses are expensive. They are usually expensive because of planning controls. Look at the price of land: in places where houses are expensive, land with planning permission is by far the largest component of the cost of a house. Building work being expensive is usually a consequence of this.

Having said that, I've no idea where you live so it could be completely different in your area

The standard tract built house erected in 100 days by DR Horton/Lennar/etc is the streamlined, mass manufactured option.

Any more streamline than that is apparently more costly or otherwise unappealing to people. It isn’t not small businesses building most homes in the US, they are large, and sometimes publicly traded businesses.

Every once in a while someone will bulid a house in a day. However it is more costly to do this. you either need expensive really fast cure concrete or a low quality wood foundation. You need to carefully plan who is where and when so plumbers and electritions are no standing in the same spot (think sink with an outlet nearby). You need to specify where everything is to a pipe and wire are not in the same place with enough slack that the pipe can be put in. You pay your crews to arrive early so as soon as the last crew is done with a section next con start.

your 100 day house has slack built in so if one crew is running late the next isn't affected. This means you can tightly schedule the labor a month in advance.

Tract home builders are building hundreds of homes in quick succession. 1 house in 100 days, but also 500 houses within 2 years.

There is no slack, because each team has to be operating in lockstep so work never stops, otherwise margins tank and a profitable project becomes a loss.

The expertise of managing and executing this non trivial task is why those businesses succeed, and why landowners outsource development to them.

There is slack - but the slack is in the house schedule not the human. A house can sit for several work hours with nothing going on and not care. The humans working on the house do not like being idle - they are working for money and when they have no work they get no pay and in turn that makes it hard for them to pay their own bills. The bank cares a bit about idle time, but the interest charges from a few hours here and there of idle time isn't that much and so that is where builders put the slack in. Of course those interest charges still add up and so there is effort to reduce them but the costs of scheduling a crew and then not being ready for them adds up even more than interest.

They are still too small to innovate (to take risks, to invest in better technology), the jobs are also small for better tooling, everything requires too much on-site labor, etc.

SFH is itself a waste of money. And land, which is especially expensive where housing costs are high. For every small house different crews need to go there, prepare the site, do the foundation, etc.

Half of the hard costs is labor. (Which is, again, usually high in areas with high housing costs.)

https://www.construction-physics.com/p/what-makes-housing-so...

And of course the opportunity cost due to lost density effect is substantial, blablabla.

The tragedy is that there's a huge discontinuity here, and overcoming that would require a lot of capital (social, political, financial).

And in general construction productivity is extremely meh, to phrase it politely.

https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-insight...

>people, of course, are always surprised how expensive housing is, but then reject any kind of streamlined mass-manufactured option.

It's a pretty specific type of person who rejects the construction of streamlined social housing - somebody who definitely doesnt pay rent and someone who probably receives it.

No it is people wha have no idea how mass produced a conventional house is. They think there is something for a factory to do. Then they go elsewhere and complain how houses all look the same these days.

Yeah a competent framing crew can bang together a 2-story 4000 square foot home from sticks in 2 weeks.

Transportation costs are so high that it's often cheaper to stick-build a house than to bring in a manufactured one.

The manufactured ones only win when it's very tiny (think: trailer) or when you do an entire development with them, and even then you often need a rail line or something to make it work.

Even the "put together on site" kit ones run into problems that the stick-built basically avoid, like things not lining up exactly right.

We're building houses, maybe not enough, and almost certainly not exactly where some people want to live, at the price they want. But they're being built.

Note that stick built most of the wood is cut to size at a factory. If the wall is 8 foot, then you just grad the precut stack of 92-5/8" studs (after adding the top and bottom plates that works out to 8 foot with some needed slop for the ceiling and flooring), likewise you will get 104-5/8" for 9 foot walls. No other wall size is common in the US because then you have to cut all the boards on site for higher costs. Likewise the windows and doors are standard sizes from a factory. No plumber is making pipes on site, they just use a factory made pipe, valve, sink... A modern house really is a kit, there are just enough different size options and styles that there are many factory options and it seems each is custom even though most of the parts are standard.

Yeah, when people think "modular home" they think pre-assembled wall panels, etc, but those have other problems (like it's hard to wrap the insulation around the walls when you have to connect them).

Real expensive custom homes are where you change dimensions so that non-standard parts are needed (not even things like wider doors, but non-standard widenesses).

People do a lot of inconsistent things, a pretty bad one among these is complaining that housing is expensive, and then paying ~40% of the cost just for land every time someone wants to live somewhere, and when folks recommend putting homes on top of each other a plurality opposes this. (insert surprised pikachu image)

Of course there's a lot of things to automate. As I mentioned in this comment half of hard costs is labor.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42932445

> Not just politicians in general, but people, of course, are always surprised how expensive housing is, but then reject any kind of streamlined mass-manufactured option.

You can build a tract of homes in 90 days (or less) using stick frame. They won't be fancy, but they'll be up to code (and with a little extra cost (<10%) and effort, they can be made much more efficient than just code).

A crew of 4-5 guys (plus some subs) can build a custon home in 80 days:

* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LYd73YP57Ik&list=PL8XEQ1XKYN...

If you pipeline that and use a standardized, cookie-cutter plan an entire row can be build out in a similar time frame. Production builders do it all the time:

* https://www.newhomesource.com/learn/custom-or-production-bui...

There are of course mass-manufactured elements that can speed things up, like using trusses. There are also now services for pre-cut framing that saves on-site effor of measuring and such:

* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2FdAdxjSpw&list=PLDYh81z-Rh...

The building of the structure is not the bottleneck, it is the approval process and NIMBY road blocks that can add 2(+) years to a project.

In my experience pre-built framing just moves the error down into the foundation.

> In my experience pre-built framing just moves the error down into the foundation.

There are ± tolerances at every interface, so if you're off a bit on the foundation, you can balance things out in the rough frame, so by the time you get to finish framing things are pretty square/plumb/level.

But if the pre-built stuff is ±0, then there's no wiggle room in that part of the build, so the rest of it has to be that much tighter as you've not nowhere to adjust things.

It's not just the cost of building the house. Utilities and infrastructure (and the taxes to pay for it all) add up. Now, if you were to build smaller, densely, and close enough to amenities that residents could walk or bike to their daily activities, or to public transit that can take you farther away, you save a significant amount on initial AND recurring costs. And what's better, people WANT that! Or, a least, they're willing to eat the downsides in order to benefit from the upsides, including lower costs. But there lies the rub: when these types of places get built, they get offered at market pricing, not in a way that reflects their lower costs. So people say, "Why spend the same for less?" and move to a traditional suburb (or, more likely, put off home-buying altogether).

The problem with housing in America always comes down to the way it was financialized and securitized: too much relies on "line go up, forever". There's no room for new blood/capacity (read:competition), there's no room for "investments" to lose value.

One of the problems is that the people who need housing aren't buying new houses.

Nobody is going to spend $x on a brand new house without having some say in it, and so those houses tend more and more toward "high end/luxury". After all, why go through the hassle of all the paperwork and building and NOT sell for the highest price you can get?

Same thing happens with cars; the market for car buyers is much larger than the market for new car buyers, but only new cars ever get made. Nobody is making used cars, or even the absolutely cheapest possible, which affects the whole supply.

Most new houses are only slightly custom. You generally start with a floor plan from the builder, and then choose the color of the walls or other minor details. Sometimes a new house is cheaper than a used one because you can move into a used house much quicker, while a with new house you have to wait for them to finish. Usually a new house is more expensive than a comparable used house, but not by much. Even a fully custom home is generally not much more expensive because your builder will tell you what costs a lot of money (if you ask for 8.5 foot ceilings the builder will talk you into 9 foot because those are much cheaper since precut parts are available), and what is insignificant. Generally walls can go anywhere and are cheap to move around.

Market prices is not the problem. The problem is getting these bigger projects through permitting is. The cost savings are lost in litigation.

https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/market-rate-housing-will-make-...

Charitably, that's a very flawed blog post. Studies of housing affordability in Finland should not be used to make points about America. Finland has a number of legal protections that shield its citizens from the rampant price-fixing, collusion, investor-oriented building, and other predations of the American market.

That's not to say housing construction regulation isn't a problem. It is, but two things can be problems at the same time.

Without reading your link: this is a problem across new and existing builds, so it can't be an issue wih permitting. Housing cost growth has outpaced wage growth for decades. We are reaching an inflection point of unaffordability (unequally distributed geographically, of course). The problem is that market rates must support a number of (often unnecessary or inflated) concerns, including but not limited to permitting and litigation. Profit for a rotating cast of securitized mortgage holders is another major one. Insolvent municipalities that can't see property taxes fall is another.

> they get offered at market pricing, not in a way that reflects their lower costs

Well, duh!

Yep, speed is pretty good, though there's still a long way to go.

As mentioned in this comment[0] land and labor are still the dominant part of the costs. So if municipalities would allow and prefer denser housing cost would be lower.

And of course if we are already talking about quasi-standardized (cookie-cutter) units, then there's even more reason to scale up projects so prefab components could be shipped in. (Though of course we again run into the tragedy of small scale. Metro areas are made up of too small suburban cities, they don't want a big project, they don't have the infrastructure for it, they don't want the extra traffic, and so on.)

[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42932445

> get good at things by doing them repeatedly and optimising

In an environment where information is shared freely and widely.

> So of course if we build a couple of naval ships every decade, maybe a giant train line every 30 years or similar, it will be done terribly.

That's a reasonable explanation but it's not exclusive. You can still face these challenges and not do a terrible job. There is plenty of evidence this is the case.

> Then there’s lots of hand wringing about how we can’t do this any more.

Of course we can.

> so far behind China in industrial capacity now.

We just don't want to pay first world wages for the work. The arbitrage has been beneficial for a few decades as long as you're not concerned about high quality capacity. Which is what you'd want for a war.

In the 1970s the Netherlands tried to save it's shipyards (from Japan and Korea at the time China was nothing).

There's just no point to it your oil tankers end up more expensive so nobody will want to buy them.

There is the real problem. World demand doesn't need enough oil tankers to support the level of automation needed to be competetive.

navy is different in that it is worth building your own and having that automation just in case.

> In the 1970s the Netherlands tried to save it's shipyards

They have several successful ship building companies today. Is your point that it didn't work? That doesn't seem born out by the reality of today.

> There's just no point to it your oil tankers end up more expensive so nobody will want to buy them.

So the quality is equivalent? And there are no buyers who require high quality in their ships?

The Netherlands still has very successful shipyards but they focus on government contracts (navy, coastguard, ferries) and (super) yachts.

The giant container ships and mammoth tankers are all built in Asia.

>In an environment where information is shared freely and widely.

Umm, no.

Ever heard of loose lips sinking anyhing?

You're going with war propaganda to make a point about commerce?

Well I would have to figure it's quite common for people not to have a clue who Lorne Greene was, and probably don't attend that many big old international ships in the average year for very many decades either.

> > get good at things by doing them repeatedly and optimising

> In an environment where information is shared freely and widely.

The whole reason you need to do it yourself is because information does not get shared freely and widely. You practice, you learn, you know for the future.

> > So of course if we build a couple of naval ships every decade, maybe a giant train line every 30 years or similar, it will be done terribly.

> That's a reasonable explanation but it's not exclusive. You can still face these challenges and not do a terrible job. There is plenty of evidence this is the case.

No, there is no way to avoid doing a terrible job when you are out of practice. Maybe you can mitigate some of the worst issues and outperform expectations for someone out of practice, but you'll never be able to compete with those who do it regularly.

> > so far behind China in industrial capacity now.

> We just don't want to pay first world wages for the work.

No, even if the chinese were paid the exact same wages as americans they'ed be able to outperform because, having done this work for decades, they've gotten good at it. They've found new and innovative methods to make things more efficiently, they've invested in machinery and infrastructure to be more productive, and they've cultivated an industrial culture which makes it easier to learn and apply such lessons going forward.

> If we ever did get in a war with them

is that normal to think like this?

do most americans think like this?

In an article about naval shipbuilding I would say thats a normal thought.

Defense planners think like this.

looking at this from the other side of the world, it feels like americans are so insecure, as if they are constantly frightened

And who would ever even attack the US? Massive military spending and they are isolated from all the potential enemies behind two huge oceans. Average american should worry about civil war or maybe nukes. Nothing else will ever reach them.

9-11 is a counter example. Asymmetric warfare is a constant threat.

A one-off terrorist attack (one that required years of planning) isn't a war, and cannot scale to a war.

It was enough for us to work with, invade a few countries and spend a few trillion.

They may not attack the US directly like the Japanese did, but China may want to take over its neighbours to expand. Just like Russia could.

I appreciate the worry for everyone else. Truly it makes a huge difference in global politics. Like parent I am still surprised how paranoid the US seems. It’s almost like growing up overprotected you become extremely fearful. There is almost no practical cost to US with going into war so the result is that US is constantly fighting and makes it the core focus of the society (along with innovation and more positive sides of US culture)

Pearl Harbor was devastating and Hawaiians probably have plenty of reason to worry about the defense going forward. Then again I looked up where it is and I am shocked how remote the islands are. I think it was first and foremost symbolic attack. Not a real threat to west coast.

The rest of the world should be very scared if the US isn't ready to go to peer-state war.

- Europe has under-invested in its military for 30 years.

- Japan by constitutional decree.

- South Korea is rapidly building out an armaments industry, but they're also still at war.

- The UK is gutted and unable to afford much of anything.

- India and Pakistan are laser focused on each other.

If China or Russia feel in an expansionist mood, who other than the US has the capability to stop them?

Historical echoes of the above dynamic are why Americans bristle at criticism of their military spending.

Sure, everyone's a pacifist until someone invades...

Yes and:

Pax Americana protects the global maritime order.

I believe, but cannot prove, that hegemony and "forever war" are inextricable. a la "if you want peace, prepare for war".

--

I'm not justifying or defending Pax Americana or American exceptualism. IMHO, there is no justice, fairness, ethical, or moral defence. Statecraft, world affairs, egemony are amoral. And while the status quo sucks, for some a lot more than others, I think we'll miss it when it's gone.

India is much more concerned with China these days.

> I was struck on this trip by how clearly India’s chosen rival is no longer Pakistan, but China. It does not matter if we are talking in military, technological, economic, or even cultural terms. The default comparison Indians make is with China.

https://scholars-stage.org/observations-from-india/

China and Russia are already expanding as we speak, being allied in the invasion of Ukraine

Russia has basically burned up their entire ex-Soviet equipment + munitions stocks blundering around in Ukraine. They're not really in a position to open another front with any substantial state.

I'd still be a bit worried if I was Georgia, possibly Moldova, maybe the Baltics if European defense commitments start looking even weaker, but to a large degree they're safer right now than they'd been with how badly depleted Russia is, not more at risk.

Poland's spending heavily right now (2025 projection is 4.7% of GDP) and rapidly up-arming itself. In terms of conventional conflict they're going to be in a pretty decent position.

I don't really see much in ways for Russia to be particularly "expansionist" beyond the places they're already an ongoing problem in. (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova).

Symbolic? The point of the attack was to eliminate the US as a threat to Japan by taking out its carrier fleet.

Regardless of whether or not Japan was a threat to the West coast, do you seriously expect a nation to stand by and simply shrug off something like that?

FWIW, Japan attacked a military base in am American territory, not then a state, and never had serious plans to invade America proper. They thought they could knock America out of the fight before America realized it was even in a fight with a decisive demoralizing victory that would leave Americans feeling that ceding control of the Pacific to Japan was rational and practical.

Obviously that theory didn't work for Japan then, but there's nothing to say nobody else couldn't make the same mistake again. The mentality of the American public may have changed considerably since WWII, maybe Americans are already demoralized and no longer certain of their own righteousness. Maybe the would-be attacker has some reason to believe they can influence the mentality of the American public using control of mass media popular with Americans. Or maybe they're just so certain of themselves and their advantages they think America will back down when push comes to shove because if the positions were reversed, they would back down and they project that onto America.

I think that the events that played out after September 11th show that Americans still have the same reaction.

There are reasons they might think this would be different. That would be (probably) 30+ years in the past, in that case American civilians were targeted, on American soil, using flights full of American civilians as the weapons.

I do think that America would probably go to war if US military bases or carrier groups were attacked by the Chinese, but I think it's plausible that China might come to believe otherwise.

Sarah Paine makes this point.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eebSpobsPmM

Fear of invasion creates massive military spending

Massive military spending creates peaceful times

Peaceful times create low military spending

Low military spending creates fear of invasion

Also the Canadians are the only ones who ever burned down DC.

It doesn't always work this way, and very much hasn't in the USA. It's been more akin to:

Fear of invasion creates massive military spending

Massive military spending creates a need for justification, and ability to invade

The need for justification, and ability to invade create wars abroad

Wars abroad create enemies and fear of invasion

Has there ever been a period in history where the dominant military power said "okay, no one can challenge us, let's roll back our military spending" and the peace remained?

I can think of a lot of previous hegemons who got complacent and lost everything.

I can't think of a period in history where most nations were democracies either, where most women could vote, or where most people had access to public education.

But alas, here we are.

And I can't think of a period in history where I can use a tiny device in my pocket to order a coat with same day delivery, but somehow invading Russia in winter still seems like a bad idea.

I see no reason to believe that democracies with women's suffrage and public education are immune to military competition. I certainly wouldn't want to risk massive upheaval of the world order which jeopardizes the existence of all those things to find out.

There’s a pretty realistic China/US war scenario. China invades Taiwan and then the US responds militarily. I’m not saying that this is a particularly likely scenario, but it’s far from impossible.

The nature and number of the naval assets that China is building suggests that China invading Taiwan is actually very likely. Westerners who don't understand why China would want to do that get hung up on their lack of understanding, think it an irrational act (bad for trade, etc) and therefore unlikely for China to do. What they're missing is the concrete evidence of China preparing to do it.

Those amphibious landing ships have one purpose; they're as clear a signal as Russia building field hospitals near the border stocked with blood.

A bit off topic, but Russian field hospitals and blood supply was only the last, most obvious indicator.

The build up of troops could have been written off as sabre rattling, they did the same a year or two earlier. Sending a bunch of naval assets the long way around Europe was a much more clear sign, at least for me that's when I knew they were actually going to invade (again).

Bingo.

The terrifying thing about China's shipbuilding and armament focusing is "Why would they be building these specific things if they weren't planning on invading Taiwan?"

The focus on amphibious capability doesn't have a lot of dual purpose use...

> Why would they be building these specific things if they weren't planning on invading Taiwan?

It's basic, obvious, and rational defense policy. Everyone does it.

Why does the US have thousands and thousands of nukes? It's to ensure the destruction of any adversary in case of nuclear war.

The US isnt the only country that's entitled to an arms stockpile.

There's a difference between building nukes vs. building amphibious assault ships and transports.

The former aren't much use if you want to invade an island. The latter are.

https://asiatimes.com/2025/01/china-building-monster-barges-...

Pretending like Chinese needs to stockpile amphibious assault capabilities for defensive purposes is sticking your head in the sand.

> There's a difference between building nukes vs. building amphibious assault ships and transports.

Nukes have essentially zero "defense" purposes. Yet all the great powers have them. It's called "good defense policy." All great powers do this.

> Pretending like Chinese needs to stockpile amphibious assault capabilities for defensive purposes is sticking your head in the sand.

Pretending that building out a military = instant invasion is paranoia.

Take a look at the USA military posture, including in Asia. See what forces are available.

So this means the USA is prepared to invade China any minute now? Plus nuke China, Russia because of the nukes?

"31 Amphibious Ships are 'Not Enough,' Expert Says" [0]

I guess the US is about to invade Cuba.

[0] https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/4/5/31...

Yes and: I vaguely recall that reunification was part of Xi's ideology, necessary for maintaining his domestic grip on power.

At this point in time, USA's isolationists may succeed in withdrawing from its foreign commitments. In which case, per your comment elsethread, realizing they no longer have USA's protection, Taiwan may capitulate.

Does anyone else not live off of propaganda here?

The Chinese civil war started in the 1900s, many many decades ago, not yesterday.

Every single last PRC leader has had a goal for reunification of China, including Mao, Deng, Xi, Hu, etc, etc.

Every last one of them.

The civil war didnt start yesterday.

Nope.

Thanks for the clarification. Next time I'll write "Xi, like every CCP leader before him, is wholly committed to retaking Taiwan."

It's important to understand what "reunification" means. The PRC is seeking "peaceful development" [1] towards the goal of reunification. To this end, the mainland encourages exchange, including investments and workers from Taiwan -- something like 1 to 2 million Taiwanese work or live in the mainland [2].

"Reunification" DOES NOT mean the absolutely idiotic policy that US "think tankers" imagine of the PRC scheming to invade the island as soon as military might exists. We have idiots in year 2000 writing drivel like "Jiang Zemin’s desire to make reunification his legacy indicate that Taiwan will be attacked soon" [3]. Hint: no such attack took place because this mindset exists nowhere but in the minds of the retarded think-tankers.

Secession of Taiwan is absolutely a red line, but outside of a move towards secession, the peaceful development will continue.

1: "actively promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations" - http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/SpecialReports/2024/Celebratingth...

2: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/12/opinion/international-wor...

3: https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2000/03/how-china-will-t...

China reunifies Taiwan: 100%

US responds militarily: not likely but possible

The only way the US will not respond militarily is if Taiwan chooses unification. By all accounts, Taiwan will not choose that. The US military has not been strategically shifting to the Indo-Pacific for more than 10 years now for no reason.

Trump is now in charge of the US and admires Xi and his dictatorship. He’ll find an excuse not to intervene or even better will pay peacemaker and trumpet how his intervention saved millions of lives and stopped a war by capitulating to China and refusing Taiwan aid. As he is doing in Ukraine.

Since Trump is in I’d expect invasion later this year or next. After invasion the people of Taiwan won’t be choosing anything.

I get that it is easy to say that Trump admires dictators, he is such great friends with them, they have compromising information on him and he will allow them to do whatever they want, however, he was president before and during that time China did not invade Taiwan. Also during that time; Russia did not invade Ukraine.

They did take Hong Kong during that time. It would've been pretty easy to point out that they were violating their agreements there, but he kept his mouth shut so they would sign his trade agreement. It's pretty clear who is wearing the pants in that relationship.

Russia invaded Crimea the year before Trump took office, and he didn't do anything about it during his first term.

*Almost 3 years before Trump took office.

Crimea was early 2014, inauguration was Jan 2017

It is a fact that he admires dictators, not sure why you feel the need to reframe it as ‘easy to say’?

He has been useful to Putin already (‘This is genius.’ Putin declares a big portion of the Ukraine — of Ukraine — Putin declares it as independent. Oh, that’s wonderful,” ) and will be again by pausing the disastrous invasion and refusing Ukraine aid. I can see him being similarly useful to Xi for similar reasons.

China was not ready last decade they have been clearly preparing the last few years and now is the time to do so.

I wouldn't be surprised if the response to an invasion of Taiwan looked very similar to the response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The world did nothing for about a week and it seemed as though leaders were willing to sit on their hands for a week to see if it ended quickly. When it didn't they moved from vague, hand wavy statements to economic sanctions.

If China tries to invade we very well could see a weak, hollow political response from world leaders unless China falters and is stopped initially.

I don't think the world will accept a blockade of Taiwan in the event of an invasion.

If there's a Chinese fleet or aircraft to the east of the island, there will be a naval battle.

Very different circumstances.

Ukraine was (and is) a very small economy literally right up against russia that had long been in Russia's sphere of influence if not under its direct control. Ukraine's fall would have had little meaningful impact on western powers other than losing some face in countering Russian aggression. Specifically to avoid losing that face, western leaders made it very clear from the get go that they would not step in to defend Ukraine, specifically so that they could conserve their strength in case they needed it against China. The universal assumption was that Russia, which was believed to have one of the most capable armies in the world would steamroll the Ukrainians and the country would fall in days if not hours. Only when the Russian advance stalled and it became clear that Ukraine with moderate support could hold out did the west start providing that support, and only after Ukraine made some impressive gains that demonstrated it could not only hold out but potentially drive the russians back did the west start sending serious aid.

Conversely, Taiwan is extremely integrated into the global economy and is a key part of America's pacific power. We have been backing Taiwan for decades. Taiwan is an island, and one with very few appropriate landing sites, making its invasion extremely technically challenging for any power, even one with a strong navy. China, despite its recent shipbuilding spree, still lacks naval and amphibious combat experience, and it does not have anywhere near the fleet size necessary to fully leverage its army's main strengths. We are all freshly aware of lessons learned from Ukraine's invasion: that the strength on paper of countries like Russia and China do not correspond to force projection capability, that providing substantial aid early on is critical, and that modern military equipment is not so powerful as to collapse an otherwise functional country in hours. The amount of aid Taiwan needs is less, and the willingness to give it is greater. Only a major shift in US behavior would cause it to not support Taiwan.

If China acted quickly in disabling American military assets in the region, it is conceivably possible that Taiwanese people could be demoralized and surrender to the PRC before America has a chance to muster more forces to the region. Even if this definitely wouldn't be possible, it's still possible that the PRC thinks otherwise and will try it, as Japan once did.

Any Chinese move on Taiwan starts with plastering Guam. :(

The counter to this is that it might make more sense for China to _not_ attack the United States with the anticipation that they sit it out. China attacking US forces/ naval bases makes it much harder for a president to sit back and say not our problem/ focus on economic sanctions.

Imagine if Russia started the invasion of Ukraine by bombing polish railways, so that the Ukrainians would not be able to get supplies/resources from the EU. I would think that the EU/Nato response to that would be much more severe than what happened in reality.

While Guam might be considered different, as most Americans cannot place it on a map and it is on the other side of the world, seeing caskets of all the US troops dying makes it pretty hard to politically shrug off as not our problem.

The game theoretic problem with this scenario (and thus why a Pacific escalation scenario is so dangerous) is that China has essentially all of its forces in the area around China, whereas the US and its treaty allies have their forces scattered around the world. Thus even if the US has a bigger military most of it won't be in theater on day 1 of a conflict, leading China to have every incentive to move as fast as possible and present a fait accompli to the West. If they choose to just do nothing to the US and hope America sits it out, it just gives the US time to redress this force imbalance in the region by moving in assets from around the world. That leads China to be strongly incentivized to strike US forces on day 1, in much the same way the IJN was incentivized to strike early and strike hard 85 years ago.

A naval invasion of Taiwan would be among the largest military operations in history, requiring immense preparation both to produce the necessary equipment and to move it into position, to say nothing of moving and training all the participating forces. In the era of satellite surveillance, the US would know months if not years in advance. They would almost certainly preposition forces in proximity both as a deterrent and as a potential response force. There's no comparing today's circumstances to a time when a carrier strike group could sneak up and launch a surprise attack on a US base.

Chinese naval assets, most particularly their large transports and landing craft, would be extremely vulnerable to antiship missiles. They're building those anyway, which suggests they have some sort of plan to use them after the antiship missile threat has been eliminated in the region. The most plausible way to accomplish that is to paralyze the American response by having Taiwan capitulate very fast, before the invasion actually takes place. Starting and finishing the war with the rapid destruction of key American military bases and surface assets (almost certainly using missiles, not a "sneaky carrier group") could shock Taiwan into a rapid capitulation, which in turn could neutralize (politically) the American fast attack subs that could otherwise decimate the vulnerable invasion fleet (which they are building, regardless of how little sense it makes to us.)

> They're building those anyway, which suggests they have some sort of plan to use them after the antiship missile threat has been eliminated in the region. The most plausible way to accomplish that is to paralyze the American response by having Taiwan capitulate very fast, before the invasion actually takes place.

There are a lot of very dumb assumptions baked into this. First, building something vulnerable to antiship missiles does not mean the plan is to use them under circumstances where anti-ship missiles aren't a threat. War necessarily involves casualties, and it is a perfectly rational strategy to endure some level of attrition. Next, wiping out american bases in close proximity does not eliminate the antimissile threat. Taiwan would be the ones firing anti-ship missiles, and after American forces are attacked they would have a nigh unlimited supply. Third, shocking Taiwan into a rapid capitulation is not a realistic strategy. Taiwan is a nearly unassailable fortress - with sufficient time and resources it could concievably be overwhelmed but the optimal strategy for Taiwan is to draw out the conflict as long as possible.

Again, the reason you know they are building the invasion fleet is because we can see it from space. This isn't even something limited to the worlds' most elite intelligence agencies, anyone with a few hundred bucks can buy sattelite images of chinese shipyards. Before China is in a position to launch an invasion the US attack subs will already be in the strait of taiwan, there will be three carrier groups on permanent assignment to the pacific, and Taiwan will be sitting on top of an arsenal that could sink thousands of transport ships. America doesn't have to wait for war to break out to put these defenses in place. A chinese missile barage is not some new threat, every base in the region has been preparing for this scenario for decades now, and they still have several more years to make further preparations. Would America take losses if China launched a strike? Of course. Would we be caught with our pants down and have our military capability completely wiped out, unable to recover before the war was over? Not a chance.

The thing is that an amphibious invasion will likely not be the first move in the war. China will almost certainly strike hard to try and neuter US air and seapower close to the First Island Chain, and then impose a blockade to starve Taiwan into submission. The war would then center around the US and its allies trying to penetrate China's A2AD complex and keep food and supplies coming to Taiwan, while China builds up an invasion fleet after extensive use of airpower against Taiwanese ground installations that could threaten a beachhead.

That would be really hard considering that the Ryukyus reach almost adjacent to Taiwan.

Yeah taking some of the Ryukyus to build airbases and host anti ship missile forces would probably be an early objective to support the blockade. Depending on how bad the US is hit in the initial stages it wouldn’t even be out of the question to see an amphibious operation against Okinawa.

China would basically need to invade Japan to cut off Taiwan, ensuring that the USA and Japan are involved very early, so that makes an up front amphibious operation more likely.

I don't think you are getting the idea. ANY military operation of this scale, be it a massive blockade, an invasion, a coordinated strike on multiple US bases, they all are impossible to hide. Such large scale conventional strikes are exactly what these forces and the systems that support them are designed to deal with. There isn't going to be a point where China has knocked out the ability of Taiwan and its allies to defend the island and give China the opportunity to prepare for a minimally contested invasion. On day one they are going to be fighting a well prepared force that knew the attack was coming.

You can strike US air and seapower close to the first island chain, but the airpower will be replenished in hours and the seapower in days. Blockades require a massive naval advantage, otherwise the attacking navy can concentrate its forces and defeat the blockading navy in detail. That's before we just consider the anti-ship missile threat which would make operating near an unfriendly Taiwan extremely costly even with no naval opposition. Taiwan already has supplies to last for months in the event of a blockade, and would certainly stockpile more on the eve of a major conflict. That's going to be a lot of attrition.

The major reason China is concerned about the first island chain is because it is actually quite vulnerable to the gaps in the chain being closed off and itself blockaded. The islands of the chain have much more direct access to the pacific, meaning they are much more resistant to blockade. The US and its allies can shut off the lifeblood of China's economy and industrial power without sailing anywhere near Chinese defenses. Either China will have to sail out to dislodge them on their terms, or the Chinese people will have to endure a long period of high attrition and economic hardship with little demonstrable gain. That's not to say it would be impossible for China to win, but they're going to have to go up against an extremely powerful military alliance that has a lot of positional advantage in a protracted war and win a fair fight.

Rushing Taiwan, despite being a bad idea, is probably the best strategy they could have. Its odds of success are low, for the reasons already discussed, but if they are the right combination of clever and lucky they might be able to exploit some unrecognized weakness. If they can get control of the island, a lot of things flip in their favor. The island's natural resistance to invasion would make them nigh impossible to dislodge (for comparison during WW2, the US judged an attack on Formosa to be impossible despite the Japanese only having about 170,000 troops there and the local population being hostile to Japan). Access to the pacific would make it more difficult to effectively blockade China; they still could, but it would take more resources and more would slip through. Finally, having won something, the Chinese people would be more tolerant of the war's costs. I think this is a losing gamble, and believe the Chinese invasion ships are best used as bargaining chips for negotiation (as in 'we'll sink $10 billion worth of ships to avoid tariffs which would cost us $100 billion'), but perhaps someone high up in the Chinese leadership has a different opinion.

> Thus even if the US has a bigger military most of it won't be in theater on day 1 of a conflict, leading China to have every incentive to move as fast as possible and present a fait accompli to the West.

I disagree. I've think we've seen and will continue to see China acting slowly on this, because their primarily incentivized to not attack. This, on three fronts:

- China is not looking for a vassal state. It's looking for national reunification. War is a terrible way to incorporate people into your nation. Effective perhaps, but very much a last resort.

- Time isn't on Taiwan side— TSMC is losing is edge. The technological gap between TSMC and Chinese silicon companies is shortening with each year that passes by, and this is meaningful not only because TSMC is 25% of Taiwan's GDP [1], but also because it's the most strategic export they have geopolitically. World leaders care more about any disruption to the supply of cutting-edge chips than they care about the name of the island on a map. This is specially true for the USA, and the reason why they want TSMC to manufacture in Arizona.

- Time is very much on China's side. In the past couple of decades China has consistently become more competitive with the USA in most strategic aspects, and bettered it's strategic standing overall. If your chances of winning are increasing every year, you don't want to attack today; you want to wait until you think your chances of winning have peaked.

If anything, I'd argue the USA is in a tough spot. If a war is going to happen, it would be in the USA's interest that it happens soon, albeit after they can secure advanced-chip production outside of Taiwan.

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TSMC#:~:text=Taiwan's%20export...

A very quick war against American forces in the region followed by Taiwanese capitulation could leave the Taiwanese public largely untouched by the war, which would serve the CCP's goal of national reunification. This hinges on the US dropping out of the war and licking their wounds after Taiwan gives up on the first or second day, rather than continuing the war even though the Taiwanese government has now 'consented' to the invasion. China's perception of the social circumstance of America is therefore, arguably, the most important consideration for the timing of this war. The best time to do this is when Americans are demoralized and doubting their own righteousness in world affairs, doubting the competence and merit of their military leadership, with their own problems to worry about at home, with isolationist-inclined leaders.

10 years, plus or minus a few. That's my guess.

> The best time to do this is when Americans are demoralized and doubting their own righteousness in world affairs, doubting the competence and merit of their military leadership, with their own problems to worry about at home, with isolationist-inclined leaders.

I personally disagree with this read for two reasons:

1. I think this underestimates the USA's capacity to sway public opinion. Especially if it's helping on a war of defense (vs a war of attack) the USA government could IMO very much ease opposition. We saw this when Russia invaded Ukraine; a quick media and public response in support, various angles explaining why the USA/NATO should be involved (from fear to righteousness), Russophobia/Putin-phobia, etc. To this day, the main argument against the support of Ukraine I see widely and in public discourse isn't so much "is it the right thing to do", but rather just about the cost.

2. I think the USA can very much wage a war in spite of strong popular opposition too. We've seen this during the invasion of Iraq and the middle east. Most damningly perhaps we saw this during the Vietnam War. The war lasted 20 years, from 1955 to 1975, in spite of huge protests especially starting in the mid-sixties.

> A very quick war against American forces in the region followed by Taiwanese capitulation could leave the Taiwanese public largely untouched by the war [...]. This hinges on the US dropping out of the war and licking their wounds after Taiwan gives up on the first or second day, rather than continuing the war even though the Taiwanese government has now 'consented' to the invasion.

This personally sounds like a bad wager for China. They're betting a lot on "the best case". Would Taiwan quickly capitulate? Would the USA drop out of the war quickly too? Would the general population actually be largely untouched? How hurtful would it be to China if Taiwan and the USA don't act this way, or if the war on the ground actually causes major damage? Since IMO China is not in a hurry, I think it'd be smarter to simply wait; for it's own power to grow, for Taiwan's to diminish, and for the USA to lose interest and/or the capacity to fight in this possible war.

10 years doesn't sound too short a time for me haha. I'll avoid guessing time frames here, but if I had to make a prediction, I'd say it's quite possible we see reunification without an international war happening here at all.

That's if we had a democratic president. We most certainly won't respond in the next 4 years to anything China or Russia does. The only thing they have to do for that benefit is not attack us directly.

Why do you think the party allegiance will make a difference?

I generally consider the republicans to be more likely to reach for military action, though the democrats have seemed pretty war hungry in the last decade or two as well.

Because one of them has a public bribe deposit box.

China didn't buy all that $TRUMP coin by accident.

Trump is by far the first president with questionable foreign ties.

>Why do you think the party allegiance will make a difference?

I think I could replace "democratic president" with specifically Biden or Harris and would still believe the chance of military confrontation with them is "unlikely" unless directly attacked, but with Trump it is zero

I agree that Trump makes a US military response less likely. But it’s still far from impossible.

China reunifies Taiwan: 20%

1.) too much corruption within the military. also no real war experience for 40 years

2.) not enough oil to supply all the ships needed for invasion. look at how Russia's column of tanks failed in the early invasion of Ukraine.

3.) China is broke and you need money for a war against US and Japan.

4.) China imports most of its food and oil

5.) Taiwan has very advanced anti-ship missile systems, homegrown and from US. and once a ship is sunk near the landing, that then prevents other ship from landing, basically piling up ship corpses.

US responds militarily: 70%

1.) Marco Rubio's first day on the job was to meet with AUKUS, which shows how important Asia and first island chain is

2.) Trump has said he would bomb China if China had occupied Taiwan under his presidency

Sorry, but most of this is uninformed gibberish. The PRC and its army (the PLA) have experienced nothing short of a breathtaking modernization for both the country and military.

Most of the points raise are simply wrong.

> 1.) too much corruption within the military. also no real war experience for 40 years

China has corruption, yet is able to modernize and build up the military at a pace exceeding the USA's, which spends at least 2x more.

> 2.) not enough oil to supply all the ships needed for invasion. look at how Russia's column of tanks failed in the early invasion of Ukraine.

China is one of the largest oil producers in its own right. It extracts around 4 million barrels a day. The rest is imported, but primarily used for cars -- China's industry and rail networks do not rely primarily on oil. Due to China's transition to electric vehicles, they may have hit peak imports of oil.

During the US Gulf War, even with the tyranny of distance, the DoD used about 400k barrels a day: "Even during the peak of US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and “normal” training activities and force movements, the Defense Department’s daily average fuel use was nearly four hundred thousand barrels per day—an amount equal to slightly more than 10 percent of China’s domestic crude-oil output.38" [1]

China produces about 4 MILLION barrels a day, which is 10x 400k barrels. Also, China would be fighting on the front door step.

3.) China is broke and you need money for a war against US and Japan.

China has MULTIPLE TRILLION dollar funds. Did I say MULTIPLE? [2]

Plus, there's the annual TRILLION dollar trade surplus.

4.) China imports most of its food and oil

China imports a lot, but they are self-sufficiency on a caloric basis. The oil imports are primarily for cars. The country doesn't rely on oil for industry.

5.) Taiwan has very advanced anti-ship missile systems, homegrown and from US. and once a ship is sunk near the landing, that then prevents other ship from landing, basically piling up ship corpses.

Read the Japanese government's assessment: "China’s military has the capability to land ground forces on Taiwan within as little as one week after imposing a naval blockade on the island, according to a Japanese government analysis of Chinese military exercises conducted last year." [3]

[1] - https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl...

[2] - https://www.amazon.com/Sovereign-Funds-Communist-Finances-Am...

[3] - https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20...

> China has corruption, yet is able to modernize and build up the military at a pace exceeding the USA's, which spends at least 2x more.

There's no evidence that China can wage a real war against Taiwan, much less near peer, despite having the units on paper, due to the corruptions. Russia has shown that because of military corruption, it's a paper tiger, much like China. There's a reason Xi Jing Ping is trying desperately to purge military leaders right now, but the military complex is fighting back.

> China produces about 4 MILLION barrels a day

which is for its own economy to function. A large naval plus army force would need significantly more oil to supply all the diesel ships, which each diesel ship require several thousand gallons of fuel per day. Unless you're saying China is willing to let its economy collapse in order to attack Taiwan, which is hilarious.

> China has MULTIPLE TRILLION dollar funds

This shows exactly that you have no idea what you're talking about. Everyone knows right now that China is dead broke and its local government is dead broke. The economy is suffering from deflation because its people have no money to spend.

> China imports a lot, but they are self-sufficiency on a caloric basis

Also you have no idea what you're talking about. When a country imports 80% of its food, it is NOT self sufficient

Carefully re-read my comments. AND read the links I provided. It will be a good educational experience.

china's "broke" because it owes money to itself, specifically to its own central bank. that's not as big a problem as privately owned debt because it means there are potential political solutions if the will is there. the problem is flexible.

also, china is not suffering from deflation. re-read the articles talking about it. they're talking about "deflationary risk", as in, there isn't deflation but there are concerns of potential deflation in the future. there is actually very small (positive) inflation in china

thirdly, china does not import 80% of its food. it imports 80% of its soybeans and some other specific items, but not food as a whole. there is a national policy to rely in domestically produces food for what are seen as the staples like rice and vegetables. imports are mostly in "luxury" food items such as soybeans for livestock feed and stuff like milk, with the idea being that in some sort of extreme situation people would have to cut back on meat and such, which would be survivable

That's because we're constantly frightened. They work pretty hard to keep us that way.

That’s a funny statement because the other side of the world from the US includes places like Ukraine and central Africa (which is currently gearing up for a Third Congo War).

Enjoy the Pax Americana while it lasts. You won’t like what comes next.

Well if you look at history it is a story of almost continuous war so it would be very optimistic indeed not to consider it.

american history

Their role in the Punic wars was fairly small.

The returns to warfare changed significantly with the Industrial Revolution. Greater economic growth is now possible in times of peace rather than war.

The Paradox game Victoria 2 does a good job simulating this dynamic. Highest score is possible by sitting out ww2. https://acoup.blog/2021/08/20/collections-teaching-paradox-v... Is a nice write up.

But that doesn't stop various dictators from making war.

most wars after ww2 were made by…?

Terrorists in africa from what I can tell. But againts a dictator who I also would not support.

you don't hear of them though.

The general advice with respect to conflict strategies is to base your plans on what your (current or potential) adversary is capable of, not what you believe their intentions are.

The Chinese certainly think like this. The North Koreans are certainly on a constant war footing. The world is an extremely hostile place.

not a single chinese have a single thought about going war with the US

even the most hawks chinese can only think about how to defend and A2/AD if the US intervene in taiwan

gees what a psycho country/culture you live in

> not a single chinese have a single thought about going war with the US

Odd. Then who in China feels the need to outcompete US military technology? Why is China developing missiles like DF-27 that are difficult to counter and take out aircraft carriers? Who is coming up with these ideas and for what purposes?

This misconception is common among US official/think tanks especially related to DOD because the way Chinese government operated is so counter-intuitive from US perspective (probably many other governments). It's actually same as how China makes economics policy: First assess the "inevitable" future, than make a plan to better adapt to that future (e.g. Battery, EV, Solar...actually a lot more examples before those). This means China is constantly making policies considered "ineffective" because in many cases they don't have a clear goal (build the capbility for the sake of the build). On contrast US sets a clear goal first and build the capbility accordingly, which means you build the capbility for a purpose.

For some reason people can't translate the same process when talking about military capbility. The current assessment from China probably is some version of "China will be regard as superpower. to be regarded as a credible superpower, credible superpower level army is required". While most US officials think China builds this military power for a concrete goal (why spend money if you don't plan to use it?).

This misconception at least has been communicated by some US intellectuals many times though I think it's not very effective under current geopolitical climate.

I think China is building military capability because they think they need it. We don’t know why. If you think about the game theoretic aspects of this, then it makes sense for the US to preemptively mass forces nearby even if they believe China’s ambitions are peaceful. You can’t just assume that because your opponent is telling you that. And vice-versa if you’re China and you see the US massing forces.

The fact that Chinese fishing ships invade other territorial waters to steal fish and damage habitat and the fact that the premier wants to bring Taiwan back suggests a will to be the aggressor.

China didn’t increase defense budget accordingly and for now still sticking to the same gdp percentage (around 1.5%) so the spiral hasn’t started yet (surprisingly).

Also China is always aggressive to DPP which isn’t something new and US government well understood the reason and used to assure China they will deter DPP’s independence agenda (if you’re familiar with that history. also https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-china-true-sour...). Unfortunately there isn’t much political room now in US for that kind of assurance.

that's the refelection you'll have if your neighbor is a psycho whose first thought every morning is to decide whether he should go around to shoot something, especially after the psycho neighbor has shooted to many ones already

You understand of course that you can replace psycho in your sentence with either party and it just describes the others beliefs.

There are living citizens of both countries that have shot at each other in a hot war. It’s not unreasonable in that case yo think it will happen again.

China is actively annexing their neighbors in the ASEAN sea and constantly frustrated the US intervenes.

Their entire military deployment around there is based on fighting the US intervening in their military expansion, eg, against the Philippines.

> even the most hawks Americans can only think about how to defend and A2/AD if the Chinese intervene in taiwan

Works both ways.

i don't know which one is more crazier

you don't know where taiwan is

or

you know it well but still think it's totally normal and reasonable to do that

Perhaps Xi Jinping and his henchmen should also look at a map? In case they have trouble understanding, here's a hint: Taiwan belongs to that large part of the globe which is "not China".

Just like Panama and Greenland?

Yes. Or sort-of, at least. China is making serious military investments that seem targeted at achieving a capability to invade Taiwan while fending off US efforts to foil such an invasion. In contrast, I've seen no indication that the US is seriously considering taking Panama or Greenland by force except for the bluster from the chief blowhard. Still, that mark of shame will take a long time to wash off.

The nine dash line is objectively and hilariously bad.

If China wants to seize territory internationally recognized as part of other countries... why lie about it so poorly?

We have a saying, "speak softly and carry a big stick"

Americans can speak softly?

Only by comparison to Italians.

>This is what politicians just don’t seem to realise about industry and engineering.

Who gives these idiots power? Oh, that's right, we do.

Every two-bit is happy to screech about economics of scale out of one side of their mouth but you turn around and pick some other issue that they feel differently about and they want it regulated in whatever way they fancy, economics and long term feedback loops be damned.

The real problem is that western cultural norms (because let's be real here, this isn't just a US problem) don't sufficiently punish and dissuade people from being like this. It's not even lightly taboo unless you're a public figure and do it flagrantly, and even then nobody "cares", it's just an angle by which the people who don't like you get to fling rhetorical poo at you. And the problem runs bottom to top. It's not just the politicians, it's all of us.

Worse if someone does care, the other side see this and reflexively opposed it. So often good things one side starts are stopped by the other the next election and so progress could not be made.

The input cost prohibit economies of scale. The US cannot produce ships at scale without drastically lowering labor and material costs.

This is a features of deindustrialization, offshoring, specialization, etc. The so-called uncultured rubes decrying globalization have a point on this one.