Recommended alternative: 2FAS (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.twofasapp) which allows you to import the secrets from Google Authenticator via QR codes, and has a local backup feature (e.g. to a USB drive).
This has all the "looks nice", but I have no reason to trust this recommendation over any other social engineering.
Since then, I always use at least two 2FA apps at the same time.
You didn't have to do anything, either, the update just instantly corrupted some 2FAs. How can an app not do a TOTP? It's literally just math.
I had to recover a few MFAs from backup codes due to that.
Big brains at google didn't understand the number '2' in 2FA
I know, 2FA loses the entire point when it's synchronized. But, well. People lose their stuff all the time!
This could be made easy for users by having each device share a public key with the third party (Google, in this case), then the authenticator app on one device could encrypt secrets for the other devices.
This would be vulnerable to Google lying about what a device’s public key is, of course, but enduring malice is less likely (and potentially more detectable) than one-time misbehaviour.
Sadly the problem Google is actually trying to solve is providing security for the dumbest people you've ever met. Dumbasses are entitled to security too!
I'm talking people who've lost access to their e-mail, and their phone number, and their 2FA all at once. Then they've also forgotten their password.
No password manager, no backup phone, no yubikeys, no printed codes, no recovery contacts, nothing.
The only time I'd consider transferring a secret like this is secure is within an HSM cluster. But these are exceptionally hardened devices, operating in very secure environments, managed by professionals.
Your TOTP seed on the other hand is stored on any of the thousands of types of phones, most of which can be (and are) outdated and about as secure as a sieve. These devices also have no standard protocol to transfer. Allowing the extraction via cable is still allowing the extraction, the cable "helps" with the transfer. Once you have the option to extract, as I said, you add some extra steps to an attack. Many if not most attacks would maybe be thwarted but a motivated attacker (and a potential payoff in the millions is a hell of a motivator) will find ways to exfiltrate the copy of the keys from the device even without a cable.
This is plain security vs. convenience. The backup to cloud exists because people lose/destroy the phones and with that their access to everything. The contactless transfer exists because there's no interoperability between phones, they used different connectors, etc. No access to the phone is a more pressing risk than phishing for most people, hence the convenience over security.
Sure, when I make a new account I can easily enroll the token hanging on my keychain, but what about the backup token lying in my safe? Why can't I easily enroll that one as well? It's inconvenient enough that I don't think I could really recommend it to the average user...
When I make an account, if I have at least two authenticators around me, I'll set up the hardware authenticators or make sure it's got a decent recovery set up. As time goes on I'll add the rest of them when it's convenient. If I don't have at least two at account creation or I don't trust their recovery workflow, I guess I'll just wait to add them. No big deal.
If I'm out and I make an account with $service but I only have my phone, I'll probably wait to add any authenticators. When I'm with my keys, I'll add my phone and my keyring authenticator to it. When I sit down at my desktop sometime in the next few days and I use $service I'll add my desktop and the token in my desk drawer to it. Next time I sit down with my laptop and use $service, I'll add that device too. Now I've got a ton of hardware authenticators to the account in question.
It's not like I want to make an account to $service, gotta run home and have all my devices around so I can set this up only this one time!
If you do, you're in a tiny minority of users. Well, even if you have one you're in a tiny minority, but having two laying around is extremely unusual.
Do most people with hardware authenticators not also have laptops, desktops, or phones? They just have an authenticator, no other computers?
This person I replied to already has two hardware tokens. They probably also have a phone that can be used with passkeys, they probably also have a laptop which can be used with passkeys, they might also have a tablet or desktop which can be used with passkeys. That person probably has 3-6 authenticators, and is probably with two of them often if they carry keys regularly.
Their point is to ensure the private keys cannot be extracted, not even by the owner. So when you need to sign that firmware update, or log into a system, or decrypt something, you don't use a certificate (private key) file lying around that someone can just copy, you have the HSM safely handling that for you without the key ever leaving the HSM.
You can already guess the point of a cluster now. With only one HSM there's a real risk that a maintenance activity, malfunction, accident, or malicious act will lead to temporary unavailability or permanently losing all the keys. So you have many more HSMs duplicating the functionality and keys. So by design there must be a way to extract a copy and sync it to the other HSMs in the cluster. But again, these are exceptionally hardened HW and SW so this in incomparably more secure than any other transfer mechanism you'd run into day to day.
And the fact that one of those doesn't lead to the other passes way over their heads.
IIRC on my platform, when they added the feature they turned it on by default, as an auto-installed update.
And if you're logged into the gmail app on the same device that also logs you into authenticator.
You didn't do anything wrong.
To answer my own question: tap the profile pic (top right on Android) and choose the Use Without an Account option. Removes codes from cloud storage and any _other_ devices. Mentioned in TFA.
Not true. See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42471459
I don't particularly like that my codes were apparently synced to Google's cloud without my being aware, or the ux that prevented me from noticing. But I'm pretty confident that, having disabled the cloud sync, Google no longer has my codes
(And in fact I verified this by installing the authenticator on a tablet before turning off sync on my phone. The codes vanished from the tablet.)
In principle, yes I should rotate all the secrets. Because google may have borked their data retention, or is just outright lying and keeping my secrets. In practice, though, for my personal account, I'm content that nothing has been compromised.
Based on just your intuition. Since you don't have access to the backend specs or code, assuming this isn't a responsible security practice. It is a shortcut you can choose to take personally but should never take with any professional credentials.
I'm going to point out that you responded "Not true." instead of adding a caveat about how you personally choose to ignore security best practices for personal accounts.
I could have been clearer, but that was in response to the asserion of "you can't revert".
My home in Texas had an IP address which a lot of databases had as supposedly being in Montreal. It was like that for years. Gotta love so many sites trying to default to French.
As a person who had to deal with other associates, I also found whitelisting only US address space led to a number of people being unable to connect from their homes.
As a person who had this happen to them, I had quite a lot of frustrations with services insisting they couldn't provide me service because Texas is in Canada apparently.
I'm actually working to get rid of any public IPs that isn't a VPN access point.
If it's not actually reaching you to log in and what not, how do you know it's legit or not?
How do you know it's US traffic or not in the end?
I'm not saying it's not something anyone can reasonably do, but I've both been the gatekeeper required to implement/support such a policy and been someone burned by it. It shouldn't be assumed the block lists are actually that good.
J'ai dû apprendre le français parce que les bases de données géo-IP sont des déchets.
So many sites defaulted to French due to shit geo-ip databases. So many account lockouts because of fears credentials got hijacked due to shit geo-ip databases. So many "sorry this isn't available in your country" messages because of shit geo-ip databases. So many stores defaulting to Canadian dollars because of shit geo-ip databases.
They're so annoying to be on the receiving end.
https://www.computest.nl/en/knowledge-platform/blog/advantag...
Passkeys are significantly more secure for everybody.
Passkeys are normally 256 bit ECC keys.
I seriously hope you don’t work in any security field.
- Passkeys give the website no secret to keep.
Breach of the passkey public key is not an event worthy of credential rotation.
- Passkey authentication is submitted via a rigorously-defined mechanism intended for machine-to-machine communication.
Ever had your password manager try to fill the wrong field with your login credentials? Passkeys cannot make that mistake. There's no heuristic mechanism at play trying to figure out where to insert the passkey.
- Passkeys are immune to credential theft via MITM
Sure the MITM could hijack the session, but not the credential. (I know this one is a stretch, but you asked for anything)
Next day the phone broke, and I lost that account forever. I had not written the backup codes down anywhere.
But then if you DO have it, you have to deal with the situation in this story, where if you can compromise their one key account, you get all of their TOTP codes too.
Really what I would like is a root of trust which maybe is a cipher text which I can store in several physical locations, and then my security keys are derived from that root of trust. Then when I set up 2fa with a service it is using the root of trust and seeing that my security keys are is derived from that root of trust. This allows me to register the root of trust only once and then I can use any key derived from it.
This sounded absolutely crazy to me so I went to open Authenticator on my phone and lo and behold it offered me the option of linking to my account and "backing up my codes in the cloud" to which I declined.
But I had never seen this behavior before, so is this new? It did not seem to be enabled by default in my case.