Q. How do I know that Tarsnap is secure?
A. Read the source code.
Q. Ok, but you're really smart, what's stopping you from putting in a backdoor and hiding it really well?
A. I don't want to get tortured, and ensuring that I can't decrypt your data protects *me*.A canny torturer would read the Smart People on a public forum red-teaming cperciva's mind.
All it does is, should that occur, prevent you from giving the torturer what they want to end the torture.
OTOH, convincing the torturer by, among other means, public statements in advance that you have failed to consider this anhd believe that not having that ability prevents torture, and that for this reason you do not have it, might prevent torture. But that's a big gamble on potential future torturers believing your public statements of motivation.
But I can't be coerced into adding a backdoor into past versions of Tarsnap, because I don't have a time machine.
And then wait for a scheduled backup with the backdoored client.
Though XZ says that's impossible, so I won't lose sleep over that scenario.
Honestly, I really wish the Tarsnap server was open source. I imagine it has not been released as such because that would probably hurt the business a lot, especially given that the costs per GB are currently approximately 50 times more than I would pay for simple object storage on B2.
I built our company's first backup solution on Tarsnap, but when I projected out what deploying that to our entire fleet would cost, I rebuilt on Restic. We currently pay something like $250/mo for our backups, as opposed to the approximately $12,500/mo they would cost on Tarsnap.
By the way, I absolutely love spiped. It beats the pants off stunnel in both stability and performance. Maybe Colin should close-source that and start charging $0.25/GB for traffic that flows through there too? :P
He's been doing this long enough, I'm not even prepared to dunk on him for picodollar pricing anymore.
That is to say, it's entirely possible that you were already tortured and the backdoor is already there by using the same logic - no time machine needed
Like already said unfortunately the only safety would be reading the code
Surely some three letters organization probably could pull that off, but it add risk to their operation that the operation could be leaked.
This is basically a point I've made in a few of my talks about security and cryptography: The point of cryptography isn't to guarantee that your data is safe; it's to raise the cost of an attack to the point where a potential attacker decides not to attack. In particular, there's usually a human involved somewhere (sending or receiving information, or both) and humans are squishy and fragile; but torturing people attracts far more adverse attention than torturing data.
In either case, you'd have to fool the internet army, who are watching the source code of projects such as this like a hawk.
There is a line in RickAndMorty about this, which I won't repeat here. To paraphrase: the one thing worse than bring tortured for information you have is being tortured for information you don't have.
Q. How do I know that Tarsnap is secure?
A. Read the source code.
This is a "good enough" but less than reassuring answer in the post-Solar Winds world. (It wasn't before, but less so since the advent of "package managers" and the like.) How would someone evaluate the quality and security of the build process and minimal dependencies (which might have their own problems [0])?As a non-security person thinking of how might one could evaluate this: Could adversarial builds (say performed in and using tools commonly available in several locations with different types of government spying) generate the same binary? Could that act as a sort of proof of an untainted toolchain? Or a canary for where a build process is tainted?
Do we have any proof they aren't also doing that besides being on telegram and every other messenger?
Also, in my country they usually just write the ordinary website name on the wall and add "VPN Tor" whatever that could mean. Maybe they try to hint that Tor and VPN are apps for drug trade? Do Tor and VPN have moderation and do they cooperate with law enforcement?
In the phantom secure story the intent was crystal clear. In the Telegram case it seems that the refusal to cooperate with investigations cast enough doubts to arrest the CEO and put him in similar shoes.
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/phantom-secure-takedown-031...
That's a distinction between end-to-end encrypted applications and cosmetically "secure" apps like Telegram.
Although, ironically, if the French are arresting him now that says good things about Telegram and their willingness to dob customers in.
> Telegram uses the MTProto 2.0 Cloud algorithm for non-secret chats[1][2].
> In fact, it uses a split-key encryption system and the servers are all stored in multiple jurisdictions. So even Telegram employees can't decrypt the chats, because you'd need to compromise all the servers at the same time.
is false? If so can you cite a source? (The claim is just a summary of the FAQ https://www.telegram.org/faq#q-do-you-process-data-requests)
At least one employee must have the ability to intercept the code.
(Unless the user has 2fa enabled, but that is not the default configuration.)
There are probably easier ways if we knew more about how the administrate their infrastructure.
However I think the real question is: even if that's possible, can law enforcement compel Durov or an employee to do so?
The E2E encrypted comms are a red herring. There is plenty on Telegram that is public, plaintext and presumably illegal.
If Telegram refused to respond (note: not bend over and comply, just respond) to French legal requests in respect of plaintext criminal behaviour the way any other company would and should, that’s somewhat damning. If Durov went above and beyond and interacted with that content, his goose—as the author put it—is cooked.
Telegram does not store messages in plaintext. Period.
No matter how shrill the cries from Moxie Marlinespike and his adherents, E2EE is not the only form of encryption.
MTProto 2.0 is fully documented and everything the user linked described is true.
This was not a case of a user confusing encryption in transit, as you claim.
Do not use Telegram.
> As another HN user pointed out Telegram does not store messages in plaintext: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41348228
Telegram does not store messages in plaintext.
Your claim:
> That user seems to be misinformed, and appears to be discussing client-server encryption, not end-to-end encryption
Is categorically false. You do not get to redefine what encryption is. That is not your right.
You've been corrected repeatedly. If you continue to insist you have not made a false claim, you are then lying.
So far the best I've got is something along the line of: if you can get your chats when you log in with a new device, then so can a Telegram employee. With no proof of the claim of course.
For example the company servers could be hosted on an island with armed guards instructed to burn everything if anyone approaches and the decryption happens only on those servers: sure they have access by definition, but they really don't.
The point is: even if they could, should they do so when compelled by authority?
The guards could decide they’re not getting paid enough and steal the data. Or the government could arrest them. Or the government could MITM the data center. Or any hundreds of different scenarios.
At the end of the day, the only thing preventing somebody from accessing the data is that they just… don’t.
This is very weak security and it is why cryptographers and security professionals call it “effectively plaintext.”
I mean, having to modify server code in order to access data that is "effectively plaintext" is not so different from installing a backdoor inside the client: it's not like the user has any choice of client, so even for apps like whatsapp and signal that run E2EE one is still making a leap of faith.
If we add the fact that everything runs inside an os built by companies who may or may not be constantly spying on their users we could say that by definition there's a lot of stuff in our lives that lives in "effective plaintext".
I also want to repeat the original point that started this whole conversation: the point was how easy it would be for Telegram to access the chats and if the justice system can compel them to do so.
When people say it has the data in plaintext, I take as a "they can access them whenever the want right now without changes", and yes of course the could ultimately access the data (in fact they don't claim to be unable to). What they claim (and I believe it feasible) is that even if a judge seized all the assets and servers under his/her jurisdiction it would be impossible to decrypt any user data.
For example, since we are in the realm of speculations, I propose the following alternative to the plaintext or accessible decryption keys: the decryption could happen inside a nitro enclave making it essentially impossible to access the data without changing the application code.
I'm not saying that this is what happens, just that I don't think that one can so easily deduce that "they can access the data" just from the fact that "they send you chat history to you".
Messages are not stored in plaintext. The claim they are stored in plaintext is false.
One can have cogent arguments about one's preference for E2EE or not but the repeated claim here and elsewhere that messages are stored in plaintext is simply hearsay.
[1] https://core.telegram.org/mtproto/AJiEAwIYFoAsBGJBjZwYoQIwFM...
If you literally have plaintext documents responsive to criminal inquiries in a jurisdiction you are subject to, we don't reach the "internet censorship wars". You're in a place not dissimilar to a 1970s telephone company; the "random people can't simply declare themselves above the law wars". Don't be in that place. Encrypt end-to-end.