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Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by beeboobaa on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @12:24PM (#38546852)
Yet again we're shown that secure boot and TPMs are security theatre designed for DRM and not to protect you, the user.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by jeroenhd on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @04:36PM (#38549828)
No, I think this shows that adding customisability features to please a small minority of users into low level components can be a huge security risk. Secure boot and TPMs aren't the problem here, the inclusion of user-configurable images and insecure image decoders is.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by sounds on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @05:00PM (#38550129)
Secure boot and TPM that only come with PCIe card drivers signed by the Microsoft CA are definitely the problem here.

If it weren't closed and controlled by one large corporation's interests, there wouldn't be a monoculture, which would make this less severe of a vulnerability.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by jeroenhd on Thursday December 07, 2023 @09:44AM (#38556889)
There's nothing preventing you from installing your own CAs in normal decices. There are some ultra locked down devices (often made by Microsoft, or made extremely cheaply to low standards) and I think that practice should be banned. That's not the case in the laptops and PCs I've come across, though.

Of course, managing your own CA is a pain, but because of Linux's design an externally manageable CA system isn't practical. I believe Fedora is quite close to releasing UKI kernels that will let you import Fedora's keys dor upstream kernels, but those will likely break the moment you need DKMS for proprietory or too-bad-for-upstream drivers.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by sounds on Thursday December 07, 2023 @09:56PM (#38564894)
> There's nothing preventing you from installing your own CAs in normal decices [sic]

Please consider what it would take for me to reflash and install a new digital signature in the UEFI device driver for at least the following PCIe devices: (1) a GPU (2) a network card. It's a requirement that the device can cold boot after the reflash on an enthusiast motherboard that costs less than $200 retail with no other changes except the reflash, because that's what average consumers could do. If an average consumer could follow your procedure and not void their warranty, you win.

PoC or GTFO.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by jeroenhd on Thursday December 07, 2023 @11:00PM (#38565286)
Here's an extensive guide on loading your own CA keys into UEFI motherboards: https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware...

Loading custom CA keys into the UEFI store doesn't void your warranty and is available as a standard menu option on every UEFI setup screen I've seen. The key store can usually also be reset to accept Microsoft's keys again for when you want to run Windows.

As long as you know the password to your UEFI firmware setup, you can enroll keys or reset the key store. Of course this process is way more complicated than necessary (especially in Arch's documentation), but there's nothing preventing vendors like Canonical or Fedora from pre-signing kernels and drivers.

If you want to use your/your vendor's keys for existing drivers, you/the vendor can also have sign those files.

The only difficult step for the end user is enrolling the MOK key, which requires selecting the right option in the UEFI setup and a reboot or two. Anyone can set up a repository of presigned keys and kernels you can rely on, whether that's you or your favourite open source project.

The problem is a lack of availability because the people who would need this, open source enthusiasts running Linux or *BSD, often just disable secure boot entirely. Nobody has made a nice GUI for managing this stuff either, because everyone who messes with this stuff knows the command line anyway.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by sounds on Friday December 08, 2023 @12:04AM (#38565656)
You lose: this is not a PCIe device.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by jeroenhd on Friday December 08, 2023 @10:33AM (#38570230)
In that case I have misunderstood you. What do PCIe devices have to do with secure boot?

As far as I'm aware, the Platform Key is used to validate UEFI drivers' signature, so configuring Secure Boot as detailed in the Arch wiki will also provide you with the possibility to sign a UEFI driver.

I'm not sure if there are any open source UEFI drivers out there (I don't think anyone has bothered), but you could write them if you wanted to. Kind of like Windows drivers, there's just not a lot of interest in open source UEFI drivers. Secure boot isn't preventing you from writing your own drivers.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by DaiPlusPlus on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @05:51PM (#38550588)
> No, I think this shows that adding customisability features to please a small minority of users into low level components can be a huge security risk

Customization of the POST boot logo image should be as simple as burning an image to a simple flash ROM which remains untrusted and data-only (no-execute) - the fact that performing these ostensibly harmless customizations will introduce a security issue just leads me to believe an intelligence agency is involved somehow...

I mean, it makes sense: one can probably convince the leaders of Hamas or Cuba that it's worthwhile to let the 14yo great nephew twice-removed of an inner party cadre member to replace their laptop's capitalistic imagery from ASUS/Acer/Razer/Dell with some JPEG with far more revolutionary appeal - they'd never suspect a thing...

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by acdha on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @06:46PM (#38551049)
> the fact that performing these ostensibly harmless customizations will introduce a security issue just leads me to believe an intelligence agency is involved somehow...

This is definitely the kind of thing intelligence agencies look for but considering the half century of C programmers utterly failing at decoding files safely makes me highly skeptical that anyone needed to compromise all of these vendors.

Also, the Hamas thing is a bit of a tangent but given that Israel had over a year’s advance notice I suspect that elite hacking is not a prerequisite.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by jeroenhd on Thursday December 07, 2023 @09:54AM (#38557007)
It is as simple as burning an image into ROM for many devices, that's the entire problem. As it turns out, UEFI vendors and secure programming don't seem to mix well, and this easy customisation option turned into a major infection vector.

If you think compact C file parsing libraries containing vulnerabilities are some kind of conspiracy by intelligence agencies, I've got bad news for you about almost every operating system out there.

Hopefully in the future vendors will pick up languages like Rust with better memory management security (though any programming language can contain vulnerabilities, of course), at least for critical components like UEFI firmware, but as long as the current code bases are used, we'll have parsing bugs. These firmwares have over a decade of legacy at this point, and if they haven't bothered fuzzing up to now, I doubt they will do in the future, let alone rewrite their parsers to be safer.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by bigstrat2003 on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @01:27PM (#38547697)
This is an absolutely terrible take. Just because the mechanism doesn't provide perfect security doesn't mean a) it provides none, or b) it isn't even trying to provide security.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by stefan_ on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:20PM (#38548288)
"Secure boot", despite the name, really has very very little to do with security and everything with only running "sanctioned" code, even if that sanctioned code is an ancient browser engine or 300 MiB worth of .text.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by halJordan on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @04:54PM (#38550060)
You're at the very least confusing threat models. The vendor is a source of trust. Not running unsanctioned code was never supposed to magically fix vulnerabilities. Acting offended when it didn't is just a bad look.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by r00fus on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @05:33PM (#38550413)
A sole vendor who is not trustworthy is not a source of trust. Microsoft has done little to earn trust other than to make money from users.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by dento on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @06:15PM (#38550791)
Again, you're confusing models here. "source of trust" is a technical term, and not a judgement about trustworthiness.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by ongy on Thursday December 07, 2023 @01:27AM (#38553483)
Secure boot also doesn't rely on Microsoft...

It's always amusing how much people don't understand either of secure or trusted boot and start rambling about it.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by Vogtinator on Thursday December 07, 2023 @04:17AM (#38554469)
In theory it doesn't, in practice it does. New hardware only trusts the MS first party CA out of the box (not even the 3rd party one for booting e.g. Linux distros!) and many systems do not allow removing the MS CAs from the trust store.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by fuzzfactor on Thursday December 07, 2023 @12:57PM (#38559506)
>Secure boot also doesn't rely on Microsoft...

OTOH, once the original Microsoft-signed SecureBoot keys for both Windows and Linux became compromised in recent years, triggering the need to blacklist those keys in everyone's firmware which requires an unprecedented worldwide need for a timely firmware update only if available from the original motherboard manufacturer, along with corresponding OS updates to match, neither of which has been fully accomplished yet, there was no-one to rely on other than Microsoft to mitigate the snafu.

More than just amusing, to "quote" Ballmer: "This is by design."

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by account42 on Friday December 08, 2023 @07:51AM (#38568417)
You're the one who is confusing threat models - namely the threat model I care about and the one Microsoft cares about. One has microsoft as the source of trust and one has them as an adversary.

> "source of trust" is a technical term, and not a judgement about trustworthiness.

No, its both. And when there is a mismatch then you have a problem.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by ajross on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:24PM (#38548326)
Better an ancient browser engine and 300 MiB worth of .text than a trojaned userspace launched by someone with a USB stick.

This is a bad take. Authenticated and validated secure boot is an important feature that keeps us all safe.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by amluto on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @04:03PM (#38549432)
Secure Boot, under its default configuration, doesn’t actually prevent running a trojaned userspace off a USB stick. It tries to block trojaned kernels on a USB stick, and does every bit as bad a job of this as you would expect given the quality of the spec, the quality of the code, and the degree to which the problem is not very well defined.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by JohnFen on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @05:17PM (#38550278)
> Authenticated and validated secure boot is an important feature that keeps us all safe.

It also causes a great deal of trouble (at least for me), which is why disabling it is the first thing I do when I get a new machine.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by JoBrad on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @09:14PM (#38552009)
I feel like this is similar to “Disabling UAC is the first thing I do, because it causes problems”.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by JohnFen on Thursday December 07, 2023 @09:24AM (#38556648)
If UAC prevented me from doing what I what I want to do with my machines, I would totally disable it, yes.

None of this means that I'd be going totally unprotected. It means that I'm addressing my security risks in a different way that is compatible with my use of my machines.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by fuzzfactor on Thursday December 07, 2023 @12:44PM (#38559375)
UAC is similar to Microsoft SecureBoot to the extent they can both be user-unfriendly false-sense-of-security "features".

But UAC is not built into the motherboard, it's just a part of modern Windows, and it's only a factor when running Windows.

While UEFI, GPT, TPM, and SecureBoot immediately acted as major stumbling blocks to any OS not already installed on the PC at the factory. Insidiously smoothed over to behave on the surface for Windows 8+ no differently than under traditional BIOS, these were and still can be major stumbling blocks to the use of Linux or previous versions of Windows.

Plus with 20/20 hindsight as we have seen, CSM, regardless of the upcoming industry removal schedule for the CSM firmware modules, is not a full BIOS substitute for the real thing.

As predicted without having to possess 20/20 foresight at all.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by JohnFen on Thursday December 07, 2023 @03:58PM (#38561731)
> But UAC is not built into the motherboard, it's just a part of modern Windows, and it's only a factor when running Windows.

Yes, this is why I don't put a lot of thought into UAC stuff -- the only place I use Windows is at my job, where it's required.

Which means that SecureBoot is an even greater worry for me.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by stefan_ on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:29PM (#38548372)
If someone has access to the hardware you have lost already. The other argument people make is that it prevents "persistence", as in the "authenticated and validated" code is actually a remote code execution engine, but while it does that, at least it can't be modified to be.. even worse? It's little consolation really.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by ajross on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:33PM (#38548419)
> If someone has access to the hardware you have lost already.

Tell that to my Chromebook that you can't crack. Or a Macbook. Or your phone. Or even a UEFI device absent the occasional vulnerability like this. There are vulnerabilities, but they're comparatively rare and they get patched.

In fact this is simply wrong. Defense of systems against attackers with physical access is a mostly solved problem, and secure boot is the answer. It is not (and never will be) perfect, but it does work.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by Syonyk on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @05:13PM (#38550237)
> Tell that to my Chromebook that you can't crack.

Can I have it for a week or two, then send it back?

Chromebooks are quite robust against remote attacks, and they're fairly robust against local physical attacks, but "Put an external interface on the NOR SPI flash and put whatever you want there" defeats just about everything they do with secure boot, because you can put your own code there instead. Or, on at least some devices, just remove the write protect screw and run some incantations[0].

If you have physical access, very few systems are designed to be trustworthy in those cases. Even if you have a ROM root of trust somewhere, if it's on the board it can be desoldered and replaced with a different one (and I'm not aware of any hardware that does more than "write protect regions of the SPI flash - it can be done, but it's certainly not common).

Even the TPM can be physically de-encapsulated and be manipulated/have data read out, if it's a discrete physical device.

[0]: https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-information-f...

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by ajross on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @05:32PM (#38550410)
> Chromebooks are quite robust against remote attacks, and they're fairly robust against local physical attacks, but "Put an external interface on the NOR SPI flash and put whatever you want there" defeats just about everything they do with secure boot, because you can put your own code there instead

This hasn't been true for a decade or more. Boot ROMs are validated by on-chip firmware in the modern world (not just on Chromebooks, everywhere). You can flash the chip with your JTAG gadget, sure, but if doesn't have a signature that works it won't do anything but brick your board.

No, the obvious holes have long since been plugged. The design is secure. The implementation may have holes, but on the whole you can't break into an arbitrary box. You need to get lucky with a crack like the one in the linked article.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by Syonyk on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @06:46PM (#38551051)
Yes, and one can bypass those write protections with physical access.

I'm going with what's written here as truth - if that's out of date, well... wouldn't surprise me, really: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/wri...

> Note that even in case of the devices protected by the SE, opening up the device and disconnecting the battery would still disable write protection.

Unless I'm missing something, the "read only" region is simply a normally write-protected region of the flash chip, and with physical access, there a range of ways to rewrite that region.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by forgetfreeman on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:58PM (#38548721)
I'm sorry but you've lost this argument the moment you advanced the claim that there are largely solved problems in the context of computer security.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by acdha on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @06:50PM (#38551078)
This might be more true if we didn’t have counter examples. It’s much easier to suborn a PC than a Chromebook or Apple product, and while that’s certainly not perfect nobody should be complacent about their enterprise laptops being softer target than an AppleTV.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by forgetfreeman on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @11:49PM (#38552954)
None of which alters the fact that there have been multiple reported attack vectors on both Apple and Google products in the last 2 months. They can be and are hacked daily.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by acdha on Thursday December 07, 2023 @07:47AM (#38555733)
Yes, but note that this attack works against a locked or powered off device. I’m not saying it’s perfect or that we can stop replacing C code, only that it’s safe to buy a used Apple or ChromeOS device in a way which is not true of a PC.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by sonicanatidae on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @03:43PM (#38549235)
+1 freeman. I work in and around this all day.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by stefan_ on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:38PM (#38548468)
Who is cracking anything? The problem with physical access is that at the end of the day your security is only as good as the flat flex cable transporting your key presses.

This is not some science fiction scenario; look at the "addin boards" they found in CryptoPhones (you know that thing was using secure boot!):

https://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/gsmk/ip19/implant.htm

Nobody cares to exploit or modify the software if at the end of the day what you are trying to protect is running across a PCB trace and they have physical access.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by k8svet on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @03:03PM (#38548777)
Very interesting link, though I'm very disappointing it doesn't include speculation on when/where/how the bug was introduced to the phone. Also, I'm pretty surprised I hadn't come across the info that Wikileaks was bugged. Thanks for sharing.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by jacquesm on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @03:36PM (#38549143)
Mad respect for whoever designed that, for a tailor made small series design that is an incredible piece of work. The component density alone is probably some kind of record. Note the Spartan 6.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by devbent on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @03:42PM (#38549224)
That literally seems like it taps the microphone wire to record raw audio signals.

Brilliant, but not a software or hardware issue. (Although actually having the device brick itself if it is opened up would have prevented the bug from being inserted).

Likewise secure PIN pads are easily "defeated" by a camera.

Plenty of TPM devices are encased in epoxy and designed to self destruct if tampered with. And lots of modern day devices (iPhones, game consoles) have stood up to years of attempts to exfiltrate their secrets.

Work arounds are possible, but the industry has, for better or for worse, figured out how to make secure secret stores.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by hulitu on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @04:46PM (#38549954)
> And lots of modern day devices (iPhones,

NSO ? I mean, am I the only paranoic that thinks that Apple fixes its holes only _after_ other people make them public ?

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by lwkl on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @04:58PM (#38550113)
There are a lot of companies that are paid big bucks by nation states to find vulnerabilities and not make them public. NSO for example. So yes Apple only fixes the bugs people or companies find that make them public. But not for the reason you are implying.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by MBCook on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @01:20PM (#38547601)
Apple has it working just fine.

Don’t blame shoddy implementations by companies who are only checking checkboxes.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by stefan_ on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:35PM (#38548438)
While Apple will spend billions on the latest techniques to ensure your iPhone can only run things Apple signed, there is meanwhile a real lack of enthusiasm around the basics like making the central messaging app not a native code shitshow invoking obscure (native of course) open source libraries they never update, you know, the basics. It's the latter that keeps getting their customers exploited.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by hug on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @05:53PM (#38550612)
Why are you emphasising native code? Is there something about native code being bad that I am missing?
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by geraldhh on Thursday December 07, 2023 @03:47AM (#38554282)
everything not running in a browser is bad, b/c it's not within reach of the fullstack shitheads /s
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by xerox13ster on Thursday December 07, 2023 @09:39AM (#38556827)
if they can't go down to the metal, they're not "fullstack" /s
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by chriswarbo on Thursday December 07, 2023 @09:02AM (#38556410)
Native code has more direct access to the system, e.g. accessing arbitrary regions of a process's memory via pointer arithmetic, invoking arbitrary syscalls, etc. In contrast, "managed code" like a JVM, CPython VM, etc. is subject to a more structured semantic model, which allows more restrictions to be imposed.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by Lammy on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @04:47PM (#38549984)
Even worse: they’re security non-theater designed to protect “the computing environment” from you, the user.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by nine_k on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @01:17PM (#38547548)
A TPM is a pretty useful thing, but all it can do is to securely store secrets.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by eimrine on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @01:19PM (#38547586)
To securely store some secrets from the user?
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by nine_k on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @01:24PM (#38547669)
Yes. E.g. there are cases when it's much better to lose your disk encryption key and the entire disk's contents with it than to let a third party see it. So the disk encryption key may live in a TPM. This is supported by LUKS, for example.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by mschuster91 on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:05PM (#38548136)
Still pointless when the key can be sniffed in cleartext by intercepting the communication between the TPM and the CPU [1]. You should always combine it with something only known to the user (i.e. a passphrase).

The only attack TPM-backed disk encryption prevents is someone imaging the disk.

[1] https://blog.scrt.ch/2021/11/15/tpm-sniffing/

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by dan000892 on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:46PM (#38548579)
…or booting from alternate media to retrieve data from the disk in situ (depending on which measurements are used to seal the key in the TPM).

“Don’t let perfect be the enemy of good.” Vulnerabilities/limitations should be understood and you have every right to determine that TPM+PIN is the minimum control that addresses threats you’ve modeled and reduces risk to a tolerable level, but TPM-only encryption is not pointless. It reduces risk by increasing required attack complexity without impacting usability. That’s enough for a lot of people.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by chrismorgan on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:37PM (#38548454)
> The only attack TPM-backed disk encryption prevents is someone imaging the disk.

The last section of the article you link says TPM 2.0 may fix the sniffing attack. It’s also worth noting that “someone imaging the disk” was really easy if you got even fairly brief access to the computer, whereas the other attacks that may still be viable involve invasive surgery and specialised knowledge of the hardware in question.

(This is my understanding as a developer not particularly informed about boot arrangements, upon reading some relevant material. I could be wrong or have missed some nuance.)

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by hulitu on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @04:49PM (#38550002)
> The last section of the article you link says TPM 2.0 may fix the sniffing attack

English is not my native language but, as far as i know, _may_ expresses uncertainity.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by devbent on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @03:44PM (#38549244)
> You should always combine it with something only known to the user (i.e. a passphrase).

The fact this isn't mandatory blows me away. I remember when my work machine first got TPM full disk encryption, a passphrase was needed.

A few years later? Meh. Who needs "real" security.

Of course I get it is a convenience trade off, it almost always is.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by mschuster91 on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @04:04PM (#38549439)
It's especially because Microsoft doesn't want to deal with people who manage to forget their unlock code or those who die without having a break-glass kit deposited at a bank locker, leaving their relatives in quite the mess.

I get it, for everyday people TPM-only is enough, but anyone remotely security-minded (or anyone traveling to the US and thus subject to the whims of the CBP) is better served with a good passphrase.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by tsimionescu on Thursday December 07, 2023 @03:04AM (#38554026)
If CBP wants to know what's inside your laptop, and you're not an American citizen, your options are to show them or go back to where you came from, and possibly never be allowed back again. Missing a passphrase may mean you're not even presented with this option, though in principle you still should be asked even if the device were completely unlocked and unencrypted, but few would take the second option anyway, so for the majority of travellers, the passphrase is not really extra protection.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by defrost on Thursday December 07, 2023 @03:18AM (#38554110)
It's proven sufficient to show them what they expect to see.

Variations on plausibly deniable rubberhose | TrueCrypt bare metal vmhosts allow for parallel OS's - one that can be booted by default and be "family friendly" with all the apps and photos | IMs etc expected and another (or many) OS's that have non obvious triggers to allow for passphrase entry into journalists document vaults.

The evidence for parallel OS's is two fold:-

* non obvious drivers almost always overlooked and essentially never noticed in border patrol scans, and

* "unused" areas of drive storage with contents indistinguishable from white noise (or multi pass disk shredding).

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by tsimionescu on Thursday December 07, 2023 @03:36AM (#38554208)
That is a while extra level above what was being suggested.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by Avamander on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @01:21PM (#38547611)
From everyone, if needed.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by eimrine on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @01:55PM (#38548024)
Everyone minus vendor and his jurisdiction, I guess.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by nine_k on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @07:38PM (#38551425)
Not really, unless you assume that every TPM chip has a backdoor.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by LoganDark on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:12PM (#38548216)
Yes, exactly. The user is the enemy.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by immibis on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @08:53PM (#38551888)
If a TPM is going to be supported, I want to be the one to install it - whether that means inserting a USB key, or soldering it onto a circuit board.

Otherwise, how do I know that it really serves me? A TPM serves the first person who programmed it.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by ajross on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:23PM (#38548312)
This isn't related to secure boot or TPM/hardware-secrets-management. It's just an vulnerability[1] in some configurable[2] software running with privilege. This is downstream of the TPM keys for sure, and running validated blobs from the perspective of secure boot.

You could have this bug with or without that stuff, and it would be bad either way.

Or maybe you're trying to say that secure boot is an impossible problem and we shouldn't try? No, it clearly works. Boot cracks on UEFI devices are real, but comparatively rare.

[1] An image format parser bug

[2] To display that image at boot

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by amluto on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @04:09PM (#38549487)
> This is downstream of the TPM keys for sure

Not really. The UEFI firmware is supposed to extend PCRs in the TPM based on what it does, but it looks like these vulnerabilities allow taking over the firmware before it does this and thus allows spoofing of what goes in those PCRs. Which breaks TPM security.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by dist-epoch on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @02:40PM (#38548496)
Even bigger security flaws were found in OpenSSL, Firefox or the Linux kernel.

Are they also security theater?

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by halJordan on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @04:55PM (#38550080)
Of course they are. Openssl didnt prevent that malware from modifying a ufi driver so of course it's worthless.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by gruez on Wednesday December 06, 2023 @11:31PM (#38552844)
>Yet again we're shown that secure boot and TPMs are security theatre designed for DRM

Except I'm not aware of any DRMs that use TPMs or secure boot (the 4k DRM that bluray and netflix uses SGX), but I use secure boot and TPM to handle my FDE keys, which I use everyday.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by cryptonector on Thursday December 07, 2023 @02:20AM (#38553764)
TPMs can't make sure that there's no vulnerabilities. Are TPMs actually used for DRM?? Apparently not: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25193346
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by jiripospisil on Thursday December 07, 2023 @04:32AM (#38554555)
> Yet again we're shown that secure boot and TPMs are security theatre designed for DRM and not to protect you, the user.

I don't understand how this is not downvoted into oblivion. As others have already pointed out, this is absolute BS.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by alex7734 on Thursday December 07, 2023 @10:50AM (#38557699)
BS why?

Can a TPM not be used to remotely attest that you are running an unmodified OS and a TPM device that has been approved by the DRM implementer, before handing you an encryption key that never touches the disk?

Can you not restrict the list of approved OS to those that do not allow root/kernel access to the user?

Can you not restrict the list of approved TPMs to those that cannot be "easily" compromised? (i.e. only allow TPMs in the same die as the CPU)

Just because it's not used today does not mean it won't be used tomorrow. Microsoft has not completely pushed this through yet because they know that half of their userbase are pirates. But they are making preparatory steps for it, such as blocking systems without TPM or older CPUs out of Windows 11.

Just look at Android to see what it will look like in a few years.

Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by jiripospisil on Thursday December 07, 2023 @11:39AM (#38558472)
I have a Linux box set up with secure boot. I manage my own keys, I sign my UKI kernels. I use TPM2 for disk encryption in addition to requiring password. Where does DRM come into this? Where does Microsoft? I use neither. So no, secure boot and TPMs are not "designed for DRM and not to protect you, the user". The fact that some garbage companies have figured out how to use some of these features to harm consumers is another matter but so can millions of other things. Choose the companies you work with well, garbage gonna garbage.
Re:LogoFAIL: Secure Boot bypass with manipulated boot logos by alex7734 on Thursday December 07, 2023 @12:40PM (#38559326)
Like I said, just take a look at Android. If you don't have an approved ROM you cannot use banking apps. Or Netflix. Or play most gacha games.

Riot Games's anti-cheat for Valorant will already not let you play if you don't have a TPM and Secure Boot enabled, and I'm pretty sure you need to have factory (Microsoft) keys for it to work.

Google has recently backtracked on their WEI API proposal which would give websites access to TPM remote attestation, but it will be back once people cool off. Once it's released you can count on every website with ads (like YouTube) to slap it on just to ensure you don't block them.

The list of things you cannot do on your Linux box will just keep increasing over time.