As far as I'm concerned as long as it's possible to re-enable the 3rd Party CA (or disable Secure Boot altogether) it's not tragic considering this only applies to a specific kind of machines ("Secured Core PCs") and not to mainstream ones
It is trivially easy to boot from a USB pendrive; most computers will do it by default if there's no preinstalled OS, many devices have a hotkey you can press/hold which redirects towards booting from USB, and even Windows itself will outright let you do it from the Settings app. You don't even have to interact with the system firmware setup program.
On the other hand, disabling secure boot (or taking ownership of it) is designed to be as difficult as possible, intentionally. Many vendors will actually have a Scary Boot Prompt or the like which makes you double-acknowledge when you change Secure Boot settings, and even reminds you (on every boot) that you have Secure Boot disabled.
It is also unfair by itself that MS OSes will boot without requiring the user to fiddle with the system firmware, but non-MS OSes won't. This puts a glass ceiling on non-MS operating systems regarding how easy their setup flow can be.
Unfair? You're talking about systems that come with Windows pre-installed. Of course these systems are going to be configured for booting Windows out of the box.
>Unfair? You're talking about systems that come with Windows pre-installed. Of course these systems are going to be configured for booting Windows out of the box.
I think it more _accurate_ to have said "of course these systems are going to be configured to boot nothing but Windows out of the box", which is ... drum roll please.. anti-competitive. Facially, and blatantly anti-competitive.
We really must not conflate "predictable behaviour" or "established behaviour" with "acceptable behaviour" in any part of life including corporate crime.
If your instructions read: "turn off secure boot", MS has already won. Some users will, most won't, and many company IT departments would not allow you to on principle (because it's company hardware and they want it secured because it is their problem if it isn't).
That's the thing, you don't have to disable that. You just have to re-enable that CA if you have a model that has Device Guard enabled by default.
> It's an extra hurdle.
Hurdle that doesn't matter at all. If you have the skillset to install an OS, changing a setting in UEFI is nothing.
This is an extremely weird argument. So called Live CDs come from an era where CD drives were ubiquitous and even back then installing an OS (provided you did not want to install two OSes at the same time) was as simple as installing any other piece of software. If anything, with all these secure boot shenanigans it requires more skill to install an OS than when a smartphone was not even a thing. This argument advocates for walled-garden IT. This argument used in support of restrictions under the hood arguments for IT stuff to be hard in principle.
Also please keep in mind that it's not Secure Boot you have to disable, it's a CA you have to re-enable on machines that came with Device Guard pre-enabled.
You keep arguing all over the place that this is an insignificant obstacle, but do not address the very core of the debate: whether only MS keys being installed by default is for security purposes in the first place and whether it does actually increase security. We are not arguing how many hoops to install Linux (or whatever) is too much. we are arguing whether certain OSes should be easier to install at all.
In that case though, it's not "only MS keys" really, it's not enabling one CA. In the end if there's a strong need, Canonical, Red Hat or the likes could start building their own CA and negotiate it to be included, would be very fair and probably wouldn't be affected by this toggle. But they do not seem interested however in the much easier MS UEFI CA-signed Secure Boot, Ubuntu does it fine, but Fedora can't sign DKMS modules and the rest are even worse.
So the thing is, the problem of "trust" is very complex and putting in the work is very expensive. Microsoft has chosen to do this to improve their customers' security, they offer others the opportunity to participate and few are actually willing. That's not their fault really.
In the end they'd get slapped so hard by antitrust if they ever truly removed that toggle and the option to run other software. (Unlike Apple or other mobile vendors, who can do whatever they wish, with no such uproar over what is way worse than the toggle discussed here.)
That assertion is a bit too absolute; I am comfortable installing an OS using the USB installer because I have done it many times. I haven't had to change UEFI settings yet and I'm worried that doing something wrong will lock me out (in case of a botched OS install, I can just start over).
If we take the model the initial blogpost was about it's nicely documented: https://download.lenovo.com/pccbbs/mobiles_pdf/Enable_Secure...
I run Linux on a used ThinkPad I got on eBay and I have no idea what this sentence means.
If you read what Secured Core or even Device Guard consists of, Linux actually does detract from it. I use Linux daily on all my machines, I have no sympathy towards Windows at all, but Linux has certainly fallen behind in some aspects - boot integrity and boot anti-tampering is one of those aspects. And that's not all Secured Core provides in the end.
Secondly, no, they aren't all proprietary. If we start from the bottom then Secure Boot is neither proprietary or NDA'd. There are even open-source implementations of Secure Boot. We simply have a significant amount of feet-dragging and misconceptions out there, pointlessly making using just SB alone difficult and not the default, you can see a bunch of it in this thread as well.
I won't even get into measured boot to auto-unlock FDE/LUKS or god forbid LIM, those aren't difficult because of some supposedly NDA'd specifications. Damn, enabling IOMMU isn't that difficult either. Nobody else should be blamed for the poor state of those.
Lastly, some standard being initially released under NDA or being proprietary (which ones do you actually have in mind?) is a terrible justification to not improve things. Or find alternatives just as good.
I think them being NDA / proprietary is a reason we can't improve things, not a justification for it.
It's either a neutral organization signing certs which you then have to accept by default, or you get fined. Those are the only acceptable scenarios.
Apply some basic logic to the conversation.
Not commenting on the broader issue, but this attitude has to change. Firmware updates cannot be seen as optional anymore.
Popular rephrasing of the H.L. Menckin original.
Failing to see how Lenovo can't implement something like that.
... what?
Yeah, the members of said groups handle that part, so the software installs automatically. No forcing and consent is necessary in most scenarios. :)
Does it also not let you use your own keys? Because if it does, you don't have to turn SB off, just use your key to sign the UKI and a bootloader like systemd-boot. It should work with any distro, especially one that uses dracut to create the initramfs because it's a couple of lines of dracut config to generate a (signed) UKI instead.
Distros don't have to do anything distro-specific to get signed. Most distros use (Microsoft-signed) shim to chainload to something like grub.
But yes, it might be that the live CDs don't do that; I don't know. My experience with SB on all my machines has been to start with SB disabled and then I enable it afterwards with my own keys. I know the gparted and OpenSUSE live CDs support SB because I've booted off them after enabling SB.
You could boot the Ubuntu live CD (or something smaller like gparted), mount the other distro's live CD, chroot into it, and run the other distro's installer that way. Just be sure that you enable SB support so that the installation actually boots afterwards.
You still have to get your own version of shim signed if you want your distro to boot "Scary Boot Prompt"-free. I.e. if you just use RedHat's version of shim, that shim will transparently boot RedHat signed kernels, but refuse to boot SuSE's -- unless you whitelist SuSE's key manually into shim. It's not ideal in any way.
On top of that, I would prefer if my machine is by default, in a secure configuration when I buy it. Since the laptops come with Windows pre-installed and Microsoft signed bootloaders, it is fundamentally more secure than if the 3rd parties CAs are enables. I don’t want an attacker chain loading Linux and KVM beneath my Windows OS.
If your Windows install was protected by Bitlocker, and the decryption key was stored in the TPM, and the TPM was set up to require attestation to unseal the key, then such chainloading wouldn't be an issue. (This is also explained in the article.)
BTW, the default for the firmware interface is that it is not password-protected, so even this particular Lenovo device is vulnerable to the evil maid attack you're describing in its "default secure configuration", because the maid can just toggle that option to enable the UEFI CA, or even disable SB entirely. Unless Lenovo is planning to make the UEFI password a required step in their purchase order process, you can expect that the default configuration is going to be an unprotected UEFI. That's why the way to resolve the threat is not to prevent other bootloaders, but to prevent them from reading the data on disk.
Also, the whole scenario you depict is quite unreasonable to expect of a default install - which is exactly what is being talked about.
What credentials? The bitlocker key is in the TPM. It's not something a human can enter.
>Also, the whole scenario you depict is quite unreasonable to expect of a default install - which is exactly what is being talked about.
I'm confused. Are you referring to the scenario of the Windows install with the bitlocker key in the TPM, or the scenario of the evil maid attack? The former is already how Windows works by default, and the latter is precisely the scenario that helloooooooo was talking about, so I'm not sure which one you're calling unreasonable.
And the fact they have no clue what the "recovery key" is, that is how most people realize they had Bitlocker on...
MS actually keeps a copy of _your_ PC's recovery key on their servers when you install Windows; that's one of the official reasons they have for requiring a MS account when you set Windows up: so that they can store your recovery key for you and give it back to you if ask nicely. (Moral implications of this best left for another discussion). This is for the personal editions of Windows, in the business editions of Windows; your IT (via ActiveDirectory) will store your recovery key for you.
Now, if this is a Microsoft account whose login creds you've stolen, and if the user doesn't have 2FA set up on their account / you are in a position to manipulate them into allowing the 2FA, then yes you can get into their Microsoft Account and access the data there. And if the recovery key is easily extractable from there as AshamedCaptain said in their comment, then yes you have access to the encrypted disk too. And of course if they reused those creds on other websites you have those too, yada yada.
But still, we are still talking about default configurations, right? You still haven't addressed my point that this evil maid attack already works on any machine where the UEFI isn't password-protected by default.
Yes, that is still an issue - for now. Which is arguably why these steps are being made. To close that hole one step at a time.
It's fine if that's what you're hoping for, but I just want you to be aware of that in case you weren't already.
But I do think it is reasonable for a "windows PC" (one where the device is sold with windows preinstalled) only can boot windows by default. As that is what will benefit the absolute vast majority of users (though to be fair, there is plenty of lower hanging fruits than the boot process for most users).
But it is wholly unreasonable for the owner of the PC not to be able to disable that by themselves (without internet access or anything). If the solution to that is to require a UEFI password to be setup (perhaps windows could set the UEFI-password to the same as the main user if it hadn't already been set) - and resetting the uefi-password would wipe any encryption keys in the TPM that is fine (as long as the option to reset the uefi password exist).
And further, not allowing the owner the control to dual-boot windows and any other OS is also wholly unreasonable (but I'm fine with the owner having to enable it in UEFI first).
One of the things Apple did kinda right was forcing you to buy Apple hardware to run OSX. It would be deeply ironic of Microsoft to cause the same end effect by locking Linux _out_ of all the Windows computers.
Do you have a reference for this? I didn't realize this was the case. Is it part of their "pluton" stuff?
No, it's not Pluton, they've been doing this at least for a decade.
If you're on a win home installation the password thing isn't even an option, you just get boot verification and have to retrieve the recovery key from your microsoft account if TPM trips (imo somewhat questionable by MS).
You can still chain load up windows on KVM at this point, however getting the Windows partition decrypted may be difficult and requires faking up a few TPM measurements.
Lenovo locks down hardware. I tried to upgrade the WiFi card in my Yoga 2 and got an "unauthorized hardware" message from the UEFI and it refused to boot until I removed the hardware.
I would not at all be surprised if they're just over reaching.
Lenovo is otherwise known for supporting Linux on their laptops. And yes I know you can jump through hoops and fiddle with scary (for ordinary users) bios options to "fix" this. The point is that you shouldn't have to and this is a bit too convenient for MS to keep competitors off laptops.
Basically, what is needed here is a neutral certificate authority not controlled by a single company with a reasonable process for independent operating systems to get a certificate.
I recently ran into this trying to boot linux on my old imac. Ubuntu actually works but forget about arch, manjaro, and a whole lot of other distributions. Imacs have no off-switch for secure boot that I know off.