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Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by downrightmike on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @01:21PM (#32073069)
The real problem is lately we've been seeing malware that lives in UEFI from APT (Edit: Advanced Persistent Threat actor, usually state sponsored) groups. That means it is persistent and will typically disallow updating the UEFI once infected. And almost everyone hates OS updates, and the smallest percentage are willing to update firmware, because it can brick a device, so UEFI isn't going to get updated. This is one of the few things you MUST trust, even if you want to follow zero trust.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by legalcorrection on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @02:09PM (#32073683)
>the smallest percentage are willing to update firmware

Not commenting on the broader issue, but this attitude has to change. Firmware updates cannot be seen as optional anymore.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by phkahler on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @02:21PM (#32073840)
Firmware should have a physical switch to enable updating it. Fuck self checked signatures. There, fixed all the BIOS and firmware exploits for you. You're welcome.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by mjg59 on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @03:10PM (#32074381)
Firmware vulnerabilities aren't necessarily used to target the firmware or to try to gain persistence - vulnerabilities in SMM handlers, for instance, can be used for privilege escalation at runtime.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by R0b0t1 on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @03:13PM (#32074416)
That is true, but disabling firmware update (should) limit the available persistence for the malware.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by mjg59 on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @04:37PM (#32075343)
Limit, but it doesn't remove all avenues of attack. Firmware config needs to be writable at runtime (things like cold boot attack protection require state to persist over power cycles, even if you don't think other firmware config should be modifiable without physical presence), and the code that parses that could still contain vulnerabilities. Making firmware mostly read-only would mitigate certain classes of attack, but not all of them.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by R0b0t1 on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @06:18PM (#32076427)
Perfect is the enemy of good enough.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by mjg59 on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @07:33PM (#32077185)
I'm responding to "There, fixed all the BIOS and firmware exploits for you". It doesn't actually fix all the potential exploits, and it makes it more difficult to apply the updates that would be required to fix them.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by R0b0t1 on Friday July 15, 2022 @11:01PM (#32114887)
Fair enough. That last bit is a really good point.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by ChrisLomont on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @08:38PM (#32077659)
That will be a problem for lots of centrally managed, distributed networks, like point of sale machines managed by a central entity.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by dredmorbius on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @10:32PM (#32078416)
"For every complex problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong"

Popular rephrasing of the H.L. Menckin original.

https://quoteinvestigator.com/2016/07/17/solution/

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by legalcorrection on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @02:24PM (#32073881)
That only works for IT-managed devices (and even then, is very expensive in terms of labor). Consumer devices need auto-update to protect them from known vulnerabilities. Auto-update is hard to get right, but your product is defective by design if it doesn't support it.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by phkahler on Thursday July 14, 2022 @03:17PM (#32100364)
You can auto-update AND tell the user to flip the switch as part of the update process.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by downrightmike on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @02:45PM (#32074117)
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by metadat on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @04:31PM (#32075257)
Sometimes firmware updates make the system worse or even completely bricked. If the machine already working and stable, I've learned it's a risky / bad idea to eagerly apply firmware updates.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by bayindirh on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @05:50PM (#32076145)
Flash media is cheap nowadays, and HP EliteBook series laptops store a couple of previous BIOS versions on board to make rollback possible. Also these higher end laptops can try previous version of their firmware if they fail to boot with the latest one.

Failing to see how Lenovo can't implement something like that.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by TheBrokenRail on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @07:04PM (#32076927)
I know my ThinkPad gives me a "self-healing BIOS" message whenever I update the firmware (on a side note, fwupd is amazing), which according to Lenovo's Twitter is a BIOS backup (https://twitter.com/lenovo/status/1297785406239514624?lang=e...).
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by legalcorrection on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @10:36PM (#32078441)
Bad idea because firmware bugs are a growing attack vector and you are leaving yourself exposed to known, easily-exploited vulnerabilities by not staying up to date.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by omegalulw on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @02:11PM (#32073707)
I mean sure, but no one is forcing users to install software from APT groups. That's a choice people make. The general point is that you should be able to use hardware for general computing. There can be a switch that by default limits to software signed by your original manufacturer but that should toggleable by the end user.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by _jal on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @02:15PM (#32073749)
> but no one is forcing users to install software from APT groups. That's a choice people make.

... what?

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by vlovich123 on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @02:24PM (#32073870)
OP probably misunderstood it as Advanced Pacakge Tool, the system Debian uses for package management (ie APT sources) instead of Advanced Persistent Threat which is what the quote is talking about (ie sophisticated hackers, usually state backed/state owned that attack your machine).
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by babypuncher on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @02:55PM (#32074227)
They said "APT groups" which makes me think they were not talking about the package manager.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by downrightmike on Wednesday July 13, 2022 @03:55PM (#32087986)
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by bayindirh on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @05:52PM (#32076169)
> I mean sure, but no one is forcing users to install software from APT groups.

Yeah, the members of said groups handle that part, so the software installs automatically. No forcing and consent is necessary in most scenarios. :)