(TLDR For anyone wondering, "recent HN issues" means HN very likely went down yesterday because of this same bug, when two (edit: two pairs, four total) enterprise SSDs with old firmware died after 40,000 hours close together. An admin of HN and its host both like this theory. See details in that thread.)
Edit: If you want to discuss that theory, it's probably better to do it in that other thread directly instead... dang and a person from M5 Hosting (HN's previous host) are both participating there.
- Unless you periodically do full-drive reads, you may silently accumulate bad blocks across multiple drives in an array. When you finally detect a failed drive, you discover that other drives have also been failing for months.
- A full RAID rebuild is a high-stress event that tries to read every disk block on every drive, as rapidly as possible.
- And finally, some drive batches are just dodgy, and it may not take much to push them over. And if identically dodgy drives are all exposed to exactly the same thermal stress and the same I/O operations, then I guess they might fail close together?
Honestly, RAID arrays only buy you so much reliability. Hardware RAID controllers are another single point of failure. I once lost two drives and a RAID controller all together during Christmas, which was not a fun time.
I do like the modern idea of S3-like storage, where data is replicated over several independent machines, and the controlling software can recover from losing entire servers (or even data centers). It's not a perfect match for everything, but it works great for lots of things.
I used to help manage a large fleet of database servers. We found that blocks could "rot" on the underlying storage, yet if they were read often enough they would be held in memory for months and never re-read from the underlying drive. Until you rebooted!
Unsurprisingly, 14 years later I still wouldn't recommend Seagate drives to anyone.
May have to go check my up hours on my drives now, I must have a few nearing that sort of write hours
Just how much difference is enough to be safe is the price question...
Both primary and failover servers had RAID arrays. I suspect RAID 10 (striped mirror), which would mean two drives would have to fail to take down a single server.
Four drives of the same manufacturer spec and batch would do that.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32031655
I've increasingly come to view systems operations / SRE as a risk management exercise, where the goal is to reduce the odds of a catastrophic failure. Total system outage is one level, unrecoverable total system outage is even worse.
Having multiple redundant backups / storage systems, in different locations, with different vendor hardware / stacks, all helps reduce risk of a single-factor outage. Though complexity risk is its own issue.
s/reduce/find an appropriate level for/
It's a common misconception that risk management and risk reduction are synonyms. Risk management is about finding the right level of risk given external factors. Sometimes that means maintaining the current level of risk or even increasing it in favour of other properties.
Quibbling over whether the proper term is risk management or risk reduction rather spectacularly misses the forest for the trees.
Risk -levels- are a choice and also a trade-off.
I don't know how long you've been in the business, but the change seems a relatively recent one, one that wasn't manifestly obvious to me, and one that has pretty much always seemed difficult to communicate to management.
Whether that's because business management is often about ignoring risks or treating it as inconvenient, or if I've just had a long string of bad bosses, I'm not sure.
I did make a point of looking through several of the books that were formative for me (mostly 1990s and 2000s publication dates), and there's little addressing the point. Limonchelli's book on time management for sysadmins was a notable departure from the standard when it came out, in 2008. I'd say that marked the shift toward structured and process-oriented practices.
That was about the time of the transition from "pets" to "cattle" (focus on individual servers vs. groups / farms), but pre-dates the cloud transition.
The stuff I've read that touches on this idea is almost all from 2006 and onwards, mainly 2010s. The earliest example is a bit of an outlier: Douglas Hubbard's 1985 How to Measure Anything -- but it's also only tangentially related.
The other real exceptions are books on statistics (where the idea of risk management -- at least in my collection -- seems to have gotten popular in the 1950s, probably as a result of the second World war) and financial risk management (which seems to really have taken off in the 1980s, probably in conjunction with options becoming a thing.) Statisticians and finance people (and by extension e.g. poker and bridge players) have known this stuff for a while.
Of course, hydrologists have been doing this stuff since the early 1900s at least, but extreme value theory has always been a kind of niche so I'm not sure I should count that.
----
That said, I did mention it was obvious to me. I still find it hard to convince management and colleagues of its importance...
I didn’t keep good track of such things but a lot of my early reading in the 70’s was in operations research and decision support systems, mostly sort of what we call operational analytics these days with a big helping of statistical process control too. World War 2 logistics practices and ‘50s and ‘60s “scientific management” fads generated a lot of material, some insightful. Many medium-sized businesses could afford significant R&D then, so you’ll find e.g. furniture factories developing their own computer systems from PCBs to custom ASIC components, just to manage statistical process control and decision support systems.
> That said, I did mention it was obvious to me. I still find it hard to convince management and colleagues of its importance...
I think the reason I keep having to justify this every few years is the tendency towards abstractions in management which try to simplify things into “anecdotal analytics”, e.g. preferring a persuasive narrative over reality...for a good cynical perspective from the ‘50s I recommend C.M. Kornbluth’s “The Marching Morons” (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Marching_Morons>).
What’s funny is I seem to have to explain this to senior management anew every 6-7 years. I know they teach it in management school, but it in the real world somehow people fall into the false equivalence when they get promoted. Often they adopt a cartoonish view of things because they can’t get the quantitative signals and everything decision effectively reduces to what I ironically term as anecdotal analytics.
I have this amusing heuristic for risk acceptance which I often use to help people approach decisions: you should kick the decision up to someone with higher authority if your signing authority is less than: risk coefficient times quantified exposure, less mitigation cost where mitigation is within signing authority AND/OR budgeted and authorized spend. I like to view mitigation and opportunity cost/benefit in a similar way so I have some idea of equivalences when evaluating tradeoffs.
It’s not original with me, I must have lifted it from some decades-past HBR article or 60’s rant on quantitative business management.
I could rant on various aspects of risk management application all day, thank goodness I've managed to quit before I really got started sharing...in my experience it’s been very helpful when applied in real world engineering implementations.
The risk is being managed at the VC/investor level, by diversifying investment bets over numerous early ventures.
The death of any one of those isn't a concern for the VC, if the portfolio performance is sufficient. Of course, for the individual venture and employees, that risk is disaggregated.
More rigorous systems practices are seen as an impediment to early growth with any potential problems either something that can be ironed out later, or simply a post-liquidation concern that doesn't factor into the investors' interests at all.
At a mega corporation, you can't take risks which make complete sense for the project you're on independent of uncapped liability for the mothership.
There are misalignments like the one you describe but that's not what I'm talking about.
Ha, I used to suggest people consider “total failure of business” in exposure quantification...
For even more peace of mind, (and only when you can afford it, obviously) try decoupling your disk purchases a bit from when you're going to need them.
When you see a good price or a sale on a particular disk, grab it add it to your own personal "prebought disk pool". When it's time to either replace a disk or spin up a whole new array, now you have the benefit of diversification across time.
Upside was that I could definitely know they weren't from the same batch.
Downside was that I had to buy a Seagate, and I don't have good experiences with Seagate since my only Seagate drive had died an early death at the tender age of 3. Turns out that this was very much a downside since the Seagate drive died at the tender age of 16 months.
Anecdotally, I haven't had issues with Seagate but I'm sure it really boils down to which exact drives you're using and what batch they were in.
Some may be worse than others but diversification is the right answer anyway.
This is why my bicycle drivetrain should be a frankenstein combination of parts from different manufacturers?
/s
If we're ever both at the same conference show me a link to this and I'll buy the first round.
haha, pimp your ride!
I find hard drive warranties to be mostly an illusion. It's better now that full disk encryption is becoming better supported and potentially available on personal devices and not just corporate ones managed by IT professionals. However until recently the number of drives I've had in any personal/home system that I would have returned under warranty instead of securely destroying to prevent the risk of data leakage was zero. The number of phones I have ever traded in is similarly zero. It's horribly wasteful but until there are cast iron guarantees that all the private data we keep on these devices is going to be securely deleted it's the only sane policy IMHO (apart from never using these devices for anything remotely sensitive in the first place but that's all but impossible in modern society).
The issue here (as it was several years ago with the re-known Seagate 7200.11 issue [0]) is not about the odds of multiple (hardware) failures together (which may actually be a very rare case), in these case it is essentially a software failure, a counter that crashes the on-disk operating system (if we can call it so) be it an overflow of the counter or hitting a certain value.
The chances of having almost simultaneous failures is near to certainty for drives that are booted the same number of times and have been powered for the same number of hours, if the affected counters are related to these events.
[0] Some reference:
https://msfn.org/board/topic/128807-the-solution-for-seagate...
>Root Cause
This condition was introduced by a firmware issue that sets the drive event log to an invalid location causing the drive to become inaccessible.
The firmware issue is that the end boundary of the event log circular buffer (320) was set incorrectly. During Event Log initialization, the boundary condition that defines the end of the Event Log is off by one. During power up, if the Event Log counter is at entry 320, or a multiple of (320 + x*256), and if a particular data pattern (dependent on the type of tester used during the drive manufacturing test process) had been present in the reserved-area system tracks when the drive's reserved-area file system was created during manufacturing, firmware will increment the Event Log pointer past the end of the event log data structure. This error is detected and results in an "Assert Failure", which causes the drive to hang as a failsafe measure. When the drive enters failsafe further update s to the counter become impossible and the condition will remain through subsequent power cycles. The problem only arises if a power cycle initialization occurs when the Event Log is at 320 or some multiple of 256 thereafter. Once a drive is in this state, there is no path to resolve/recover existing failed drives without Seagate technical intervention. For a drive to be susceptible to this issue, it must have both the firmware that contains the issue and have been tested through the specific manufacturing process.
Remind me of my laptop that I bought with 2 SSDs. Not from HP or Dell, but still, I now wonder if I should replace one of them with a more recent SSD and give the other to my son (he currently has an anemic SSD that's too small to install Genshin Impact on).
It's rare, but it's not _that_ rare. You have to make the effort to understand why it failed.
I had a situation where I deployed Toshiba SLC SSDs (that were purchased over the course of several months) and a piece of software that synchronized to disk frequently, resulting in about 1GB of writes per hour.
After ~11 months in service, most of the drives died in the same 4 week period. We were astounded that everything failed so close to each other, including instances where both drives in a RAID 1 set were toast.
We did extensive troubleshooting between the failed servers and the remaining servers and figured out that write volume (by proxy of in-service date) was the one predictor of failure. Shortly thereafter, wear leveling and TRIM became things we sought out mentions of when spec'ing out hardware.
Absolute best mechanical drives available until quite recently can be traced back to Deatstar. Deskstar 7K4000 were absolute best in class.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deskstar
Hitachi bought IBM hard drive business in 2003 for $2B. Sadly Its now owned by WD.
HGST SAS SSDs (the ones that pair Intel NAND and Hitachi SAS controllers) have also been reliable performers in my home office experience, even without (RAID controller support for) UNMAP (SCSI "TRIM"). Incidentally, these now appear to be selling on eBay for more than I paid for them "lightly used" several years ago.
IBM Deskstar: https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&que...
IBM Deathstar: https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&que...
Wondering if it's real... https://m.slashdot.org/story/20680
Years later, it's a widespread phenomenon: https://m.slashdot.org/story/43312
It was affectionately called the "click of death".
Ah, inventing an opinion to get angry about: some things never change.
May 26, 2006: https://www.pcworld.com/article/535838/worst_products_ever.h...
October 9, 2006: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1
Memory would still have been reasonably green.
So if you only formatted them (filesystem wise) out to capacity-2Gb they were a really cheap option at the time.
I would not have let a normal business user near one, but the developers I was supporting were most pleased about their larger than expected scratch disks for test databases and intermediate compilation artifacts.
Everything breaks. Things that at least break predictably make me happier than the alternative.