After spending a decade in the military, I saw a consistent theme of underestimating opponents and making plans on how we want them to act. War isn’t rational and never plays out how you want it to. The people trying to make nuclear war seem like a reasonable outcome terrify me, especially when they make assumptions about how the opponent would act that best aligns with what they want to happen.
Except it would need to restart without all the easily accessible fossil fuels and lumber of that time…
Like what pop-sci article first misquoted a paper where someone stated that this was a possibility in a narrow set of circumstances?
I'm not saying it's wrong per se, It just seems like one of those factoids that sounds great, that fits in a nice little spot in our brains ready to be regurgitated when we hear something tangentially related. It's a little too convenient of an idea.
Basically, we consume the oil that is cheapest to get to. And right now some of the cheapest oil to get to is under kilometers of sea and seabed.
I'm a bit skeptical of this article, which seems excessively optimistic, since the estimation it does at the very beginning:
> Arms-control treaties limit both nations to 1,550 deployed warheads, although FAS estimates 1,588 for Russia and 1,644 for the US
seems to interpret numbers differently (deployed strategically/readily deployable).
Edit: the two articles complement each other in a very interesting way, for example: navalgazing.net assumes that nuclear weapons would target strategic targets, cornell.edu instead densely populated areas (I think reality would tend towards the first case).
The navalgazing.net article states that the soot research is from 80s/90s, while the reserch referenced by cornell.edu is from 2020 (I think in this specific case, the navalgazing.net is at fault).
When the US decommissions a warhead for treaty purposes, they remove the plutonium trigger and put it on a shelf somewhere. The trigger assembly doesn't count as a weapon, and therefore it can't be deployed. However, since the plutonium trigger is not actually destroyed, these could be rapidly assembled into a deployable weapon. You would not expect any of these to be participating in a nuclear exchange. The US has relative few operational warheads but it probably maintains an inventory of 10,000+ plutonium triggers.
For treaty purposes, they often count delivery platforms, like missiles and bombers. This makes sense when you consider that it is easy to re-hydrate a warhead on short notice if you have the necessary components in inventory but not so easy to produce an operational delivery system which may have a lead time of years.
The point of keeping inventory is that it is possible, if deemed necessary, to quietly scale up the number of warheads prior to any nuclear exchange, should the situation warrant it. Also, there is very limited capacity to produce new warhead assemblies, so keeping the old triggers around provides optionality for a relatively low cost while also creating a patina of uncertainty about capacity for adversaries.
It's also a little complex in terms of the count. Bombers count as one independent of how many warheads they carry (the US has non-trivial nuclear bomber forces)
So I think a significant amount of nukes will not be used at all.
There’s a rich and horrifying literature on nuclear bargaining that’s suddenly relevant again, right up to a bunch of people (particularly in Russia) rehashing old HAK theories about being about to control the nuclear escalatory ladder in the midst of combat. It’s not a comforting time right now.
I wish I could remember where I read it. It still isn't particularly comforting, but maybe better than the all-out-nuclear-war scenario.
Unnervingly, Russian (and Soviet) policy has always assumed a smooth ramp from conventional to nuclear war and back, while US policy since Kennedy has seen nuclear escalation as an irrevocable step change in warfare (more reassuringly, China is, like the US, also unlikely to add nukes into a conventional conflict).
Russian doctrine therefore encompasses using a limited demonstration strike to compel an end to conventional hostilities on Moscow’s terms. It’s hard to imagine NATO not responding, though, because the obvious effect of not responding is Europe living under Russian control enforced by the constant threat of nuclear destruction. What that response would look like is uncertain, though warplans certainly exist, but it would absolutely set us up on an escalatory spiral.
What Russian doctrine says this? This sentence is a complete fabrication.
Over the last decade, Russian leadership has repeatedly floated public hypotheticals (including the Zapad military field exercises) in which nuclear threats (or, in their war games, simulated nuclear strikes) are used to deter NATO from operations “beyond the edge of the Russian empire” (such as majority-Russophone regions in the Baltic states), which is in keeping with an evolving strategy generally termed “escalate to de-escalate” in the West. In fact, where Western game theorists developed an intricate theory of nuclear deterrence vs compellance, the Russian literature refers to both using сдерживания, seeing threats to compel and threats to deter as functionally identical, strategically speaking. (Compare with the PLA’s “Science of Military Strategy,” both editions of which discuss the PLA’s nuclear arsenal in deterrent terms in the event of a general war in East Asia against Western forces.)
This is what unnerves game theorists about the Ukraine war and Russia’s poor performance there — if it weren’t for global public opinion (crucially China and India at this point), their doctrine certainly encompasses an escalatory demonstration strike (a tactical-yield weapon on a largely uninhabited area of farmland, for example) used to quickly “de-escalate” the war, freeze the lines at a position of relative Russian advantage, and force Ukraine into negotiations.
https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-military-doctrine-ca...
As made by some of the original nuclear winter paper authors.
Mostly going from memory there's a lot that's wrong, unsupported, questionable, or nor longer relevant about the TTAPS paper. The easily unbalanced one dimensional model of the atmosphere, where there are no winds or oceans, particles can just go up and down. No support for the size range of soot produced. Very few cities in the US or USSR with enough fuel to produced real firestorms like the Tokyo one in WWII. And now many many fewer nukes in both nation's inventories.
Also, I am a bit cautious about the line about densely populated areas. A city has the manpower to take control of its rural hinterland, provide workers for manual work, and outgun opposition. It may turn out to be more resilient in the long run. An isolated ranch seems secure right up until 100 guys from the local city show up.
If C&C is destroyed, Russia cannot do a coordinated launch of its full arsenal. If C&C in Moscow is taken out, it will be up to people in command bunkers in Russia to decide on taking own action, fully knowing that random fire at will launch is futile against a seriously NBC prepared adversary.
Only silo based ICBMs are kept in state of high readiness, and can be fired "with a press of a button." That limits targets by range, number of delivery vehicles, and whether the warheads have their own individual last stages. Russian has 3 major silo based ICBM field, each built with 1 major target in mind: 1 for Europe, 1 for the US, and 1 for China. We don't know how many of missiles will be retargeted, or how many can, but we are certain that a lot of ICBMs employed, say, in the Russian Far East, cannot reach most of the US even with a single warhead.
The highly improbable scenario of Russia being allowed to launch all of its ~1000 at short notice, and launch them only at densely populated cities is predicted to cause 50M deaths in USA without BMD, people taking to nuclear shelters, and no civil defence defence response.
In reality, it's practically impossible to successfully fire their whole arsenal without prior notice, and fire it on designated target only in Europe or North America.
The realistic estimate is that the US will face 300 to 500 warheads.
Does this include boomers?
I suspect that, given the a) greatly reduced number of Russian SSBNs at sea since the USSR's dissoluton,[1] and b) improvements in Western technology since that event, the US and allies a) have every Russian SSBN under 100% surveillance by a SSN, and b) can take every Russian SSBN out with a good approximation of success. Am I off base in my thinking?
[1] Yes, I know about the Russian ability to launch in port. Events of the past month have made me less confident about this ability's functionality.
No, only silo based. No submarines at sea, or any mobile land based ones, as they will delay the first strike, and out the preparations for it. Warheads on them are tiny as well.
One of the dumbest quotes by a famous smart person I've run across is the Einstein quote about WW4 (it would be fought with sticks and stones), which most people here are likely familiar with. For a scientist it was comically irrational, emotional and false; a scare statement, nothing more.
Obviously we don't want a nuclear war to ever happen. If it does, neither humanity nor civilization will end. Russia could aim all of their nukes at the US and would struggle to kill more than a third of the US population at worst, and that's if their weapons all work and are all accurate. Russia couldn't kill everyone in Texas with their nukes if they wanted to. The vast majority of the rest of the world and its civilizations would continue on just fine.
And in a wider sense, the planet would shrug off the nuclear event. Even if it caused an extra million cases per year of cancer (an extreme outcome), the human population would shrug that off too (80 million net population is being added still). When it comes to material thrown up, that would be trivial, as someone else noted about prior wars and how that came to not much consequence.
So is it rational to keep lying to the population about the end-of-the-world risk that nukes (don't) pose, in an effort to prevent their use? Maybe, probably? They certainly pose a risk in terms of vast destruction, vast death, and the end of cities that get targeted. You could kill 300 million in a mass nuclear attack and that population would be replaced numerically in four years (which isn't to ignore all the other obvious effects, including that the new population isn't an instant stand-in for the people now missing).
The linked article is definitely alarmist, but seems to be accurately reflecting the current beliefs of atmospheric scientists. The most recent paper they cite is this one: https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2019JD03...
I've only skimmed it, but it would seem to disagree with your position of no risk to civilization. They are predicting full on nuclear winter: "Despite this, the models agree that a nuclear winter would follow a large-scale nuclear war between the United States and Russia, a result previously found by a large number of diverse but much less sophisticated models in the 1980s."
Can you convince us that we should believe you rather than the atmospheric scientists? I actually do believe you might be right, but you are in the difficult position of having us discard what appears to be the current scientific consensus in favor of what appears to be amateur speculation.
There is no reason to escalate tensions in Ukraine to the point where this is an option, anyway. NATO should back off, call it Iraq 2.0 and agree that there are to be no NATO-supported military on Russia's doorstep. The current policies are recklessly provocative.
Regimes come and go but whataboutism lives forever.
Google Translate: "And you have blacks linch"
My assumption as to a more natural translation: "And you have Blacks lynched"
Context: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/And_you_are_lynching_Negroes
As does hypocrisy.
This is just apologism for Russian atrocities masquerading as pointing out a double standard. As we’ve seen in the West for more than one hundred years now.
> Two wrongs make a right?
No. But when the US normalizes a behaviour and other countries follow suit, why are those other countries criticized but the US is not?For what it's worth, I'm on neither side of the Ukraine-Russia debate. Both are horribly corrupt states, and NATO has been prodding Russia over the ex-Soviet states for a decade.
Stop with this double standard whataboutism, and maybe find some other circles to hang around in: you'll find the critique you wish for there.
So yeah, faulty premise, cherry picking, and circular logic, as well as putting words into someone else’s mouth. It is just sub-standard trolling.
Who is holding that stance? Must every conversation start with a comprehensive list of all unjust things currently occurring anywhere in the world?
Unjust things done by other countries can be discussed freely.
The one who was willing to risk nuclear war for Russian actions, it's above in this comment thread. I am making pretty reasonable guess that the same person was not wanting nuclear war over similar actions of US.
No agenda, right?
Which city did the US flatten since Dresden? How many hospitals did they voluntarily bomb? Hell, how many hospitals did the US bomb at all (and no, I don’t assume that number is zero)? Now, compare that to what happened in Karkhiv alone.
Playing chicken when Assad used chemical weapons on Syrian civilians and Putin razed Grozny were stupid mistakes. This is not a reason to let the same thing happen again in Ukraine.
The only long term stable geopolitical option for the region is the historic option: a powerful regional state and/or bloc that can simultaneously dampen Russian imperialism as well as "Western" ambition, like this one[0] which is a nascent project that I suspect can lead to a high degree of regional solidarity that will stabilize all of Europe and therefore contribute to the stability of the Eurasian landmass.
- Putin has been left in charge by the same people that now are surprised Putin is being Putin. also US were too busy in Afghanistan and trying to make China look like the biggest threat to international peace.
- NATO should never ever intervene in areas that do not belong to NATO. When it happened it didn't go well (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995, Kosovo 1999)
I don't think anybody in Russia is surprised by Putin. They are, far and away, primarily responsible for him being in power.
NATO stopped some pretty horrific atrocities from spiraling even further out of control during those interventions. The not going well part mainly happened before they intervened. And yes, nothing is ever perfect.
who ever said anything about Russians?
You should also aknowledge that Russians don't know as much as we do about what's really happening in Ukraine right now.
> They are, far and away, primarily responsible for him being in power.
ridiculous.
Now it's clear why things are unclear to you, you don't even know how Putin got in charge in the first place.
> NATO stopped some pretty horrific atrocities from spiraling even further out of control during those interventions
No, it didn't.
Nothing NATO did prevented any atrocity, the atrocities had already happened, they could be stopped in many other ways, NATO chose bombings because bombing was the easier option and the one that assured that as little men as possible would be killed on NATO side.
The fact that it (kinda) worked doesn't imply that it did go well, it went very bad indeed.
NATO bombings worked same way they worked in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lybia, middle east in general: they didn't.
They just killed a lot of people for no real gain, what actually stopped those wars was the capture of the dictator of the day, not the bombs.
Milošević survived all of that and was also running for presidency in 2000.
He was arrested on suspicion of corruption, abuse of power, and embezzlement. The international tribunal could not charge him with anything, he died of heart attack in his cell in 2006 without a verdict under very unclear circumstances.
Ask William Perry (former Secretary of defense) what he thinks of those actions in retrospect.
Also the legality of the operation is still unclear.
You knew if your country was 30kms of sea away from former Yugoslavia and you could see the sky turning bright and red at night or fishermen kept digging up unused bomb flushed into the Adriatic sea by NATO bombers, together with a lot of toxic and dangerous chemicals.
Just a few pointers to shed some light on the whole fiasco
- United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (bombed because allegation that proved to be false)
- Niš cluster bombing (cluster bombs were already illegal in 1999)
- A Perfect Failure: NATO's War against Yugoslavia - Michael Mandelbaum: Kosovo's consequences were just the opposite of what NATO intended: suffering Kosovar civilians, regional instability, and a fuming Russia and China.
But yeah, I guess American propaganda worked if there are people that still believe 23 years later that bombing the Balkans was "good". The Mandela effect is stronger than I thought.
I am intimately aware of the Kosovo situation, and not from US sources. I had to do a fair amount of reading to understand since I was constantly exposed to both Serbian and Albanian perspectives. This always turns into a flame war whenever it is mentioned online, but suffice to say there are many people who think they would not be alive today if it were not for NATO's actions. And that war was 23 years ago. The same thing could be more precisely done today of course. Again, I do not claim they were perfect at all. However, exponentially more innocent people were killed by the Serbs than those bombings ever killed. And civilian deaths were never the intention.
As for Milošević, let me pull out my tiney tiny violin. Whatever we might disagree on, I do think we can agree he was a war criminal, full stop. Whether he was convicted is irrelevant.
They are not.
> I was talking about the present, with 20 years of many/most Russians just basking in Putin's killer tough guy shtick while he had his soldiers massacre and rape people indiscriminately, and invade countries around the region
Not differently from what US has done in the past 20 years.
Russians are responsible for Putin's actions no more than Americans are for what their DOD does.
> but suffice to say there are many people who think they would not be alive today if it were not for NATO's actions.
That doesn't imply, __again__, that it wasn't bad.
Many people would not be alive if Stalin hadn't defeat Hitler, that doesn't mean it was good.
> However, exponentially more innocent people were killed by the Serbs than those bombings ever killed. And civilian deaths were never the intention.
Arithmetic is the weapon of dictators, not of democracies.
> Whatever we might disagree on, I do think we can agree he was a war criminal, full stop. Whether he was convicted is irrelevant.
Failure to bring criminals to justice is the reason why the death of civilians is unacceptable.
In our democracies nobody is a criminal, unless convicted.
Even war criminals such as Milošević.
It's not enough to know they are criminals to kill them in a prison's cell, that's what people like Putin do.
But most of all, democracies should __protect prisoners at all costs__, not kill them (if your country hasn't abolished death penalty, it's not a real modern democracy and can't be taken seriously when talking about "freedom rights") not let them die in prison and not discard their deaths because they were enemies.
I call myself a democrat because I would never do to them what they would probably do to me.
If we go around bombing civilians and keep doing things like this, covering up the atrocities[1] with lies and false myths[2], we are in no position to believe we are better.
That's why NATO should not intervene outside of NATO territories, because that's what NATO pact is about.
Protecting its members, not policing the World, especially those parts of the World that we kept unstable with our bombs.
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/13/us/us-airstrikes-civilian...
The basic conclusion of all of this is simple. Nuclear war is definitely not an existential threat to humanity, much less to all life on the planet. Most people even in major urban areas would survive the initial attack, along with a surprising amount of infrastructure. This isn’t to minimize the effects, as it would be a humanitarian catastrophe unprecedented in human history, as the global economy breaks down and regions are pushed back on their own resources. This could easily kill more people than the war itself, particularly in densely-populated areas, but I would expect things to stabilize at a technology level of maybe the late 19th/early 20th century and start back up.
https://www.navalgazing.net/Nuclear-Weapon-Destructiveness
The main difference is that he concludes that nuclear winter is mostly a myth. His main evidence is that the effect on weather of the soot produced by the oil wells burning in Kuwait in 1991 did not match the nuclear winter theory predictions. It would be interesting to reconcile these two disparate conclusions.